民主不是答案-李世默

編者按：春秋研究院研究員李世默先生接受以色列日報Calcalist的訪問，就中國模式，中國的政治目標以及普世價值、言論自由等諸多問題展開討論。作者授權觀察者網獨家發佈。小標題為編者所加。

中國的政治目標與中國政治文化傳統緊密關聯

Beitarie：我且不拿中國的政治體系與其他國家去對比，我只是想了解中國模式本身。你與阿斯彭研究所（Aspen Institute）的阿南德·格里德哈拉達斯（Anand Giridharadas）曾有一次談話，我記得你當時對中國模式有一些排除性描述。你説中國模式不是西方式的自由民主制，也不是資本主義。但除此之外，對中國模式至今還缺乏清晰的定義。你可否試着下一定義？比如闡釋一下中國模式的目標指向，以及如何才能實現？

李：談到政治的“目標”，在現代西方世界，要數托馬斯·傑斐遜的表述最為精闢。他在《獨立宣言》中指出：人的生命、自由及追求幸福的權利不可剝奪；如果遇有任何形式的政府有礙於此，人民就有權利改變或推翻它。不過，傑斐遜的政治思想有其哲學背景，即認為個人是宇宙的中心，是人類社會的主宰和基石。這種信念其實是西方世界文化傳承、宗教發展的結果，而這一過程在全人類歷史上是獨一無二的。這一過程並不見於非西方社會，也無從產生相應的政治理念。所以，西方的政治理念並不是普世的。

在中國的歷史上，早在2500多年前，孔子就闡述了政治的目標。孔子認為，相較於過於美好而只能訴諸理想的“大同”社會，政府在現實中應致力於促成“小康”。千百年來，孔子的政治思想歷久彌新。在當下的語境中，孔子主張的“小康”，就是國家和平、和諧、繁榮，法制公正，社會道德向上。十分有趣的是，鄧小平在1979年啓動改革時，就把中國下一階段的目標稱為建設，或者更準確地説是重建“小康”社會。

鄧小平的用語也許並非巧合。眾所周知，在創建新中國的革命過程中，共產主義思想的影響不可磨滅。但隨着形勢的發展，這一思想在理論上逐漸僵化。因此在擬定中國發展目標時，鄧小平擺脱了理論教條的桎梏，重新回到中國傳統的深處，進而參詳孔子的思想。現在看來，在政治目標上，孔子和鄧小平的某些思想可以相互輝映。以此為標準來衡量，在共產黨一黨領導下，中國迄今為止的發展成就可圈可點，儘管並非十全十美。

在當下，中國模式具體而言，包括以下幾點：

首先，中國共產黨作為全體中國人民的代表，同時掌握政治權威與道德權威。而在西方政治體系中，即使在一國之內，不同羣體的利益也是由不同的政黨分別代表。

其次，選賢任能的規則保證了執政黨的地位和效率。在官員的選拔、晉升問題上，中共建立了一套十分複雜、精緻、有活力的制度，以便在有志進入政府的人中錄用、提升德才兼備者，並做到人盡其才。

再次，高度的政治權威是中國模式的核心。這樣就避免了特定的利益集團（比如資本集團或是專業技能羣體）將一己之利凌駕於國家利益之上。市場，或所謂的公民社會，都要受政治權威約束。

最後，主張實事求是，拒絕意識形態化。在現階段，中國最重要的任務是發展經濟。在政治制度上，相關設計和調整必須有利於加快經濟發展速度，並符合國家需要和國情變化。

就上述幾方面而言，現實情況還遠遠達不到中國模式的理想狀態。腐敗氾濫和貧富分化，就是明證。

共產黨的糾錯能力更勝於一般選舉

Beitarie：你最近在《紐約時報》評論中寫道：當代西方把民主和人權作為人類發展的頂峯，而這是基於絕對信仰的信念。但是，中國的道路與此不同，如果有利於經濟發展和國家利益，中國的領導人會提高政治決策的開放程度，過去10年以來就是如此。你認為民主制度陷入困境的觀點，得到了很多人的認同，甚至在西方國家也是如此。但回到中國製度上來，如果開放政治決策的前提是對國家利益有利，那麼中國領導人為何有權決定國家利益是什麼？在沒有司法監督、全民選舉和新聞自由的情況下，中國的領導人是否會做出錯誤的決策？

李：弗朗西斯·福山曾指出，中國模式具有“響應性威權”（responsive authoritarianism）的特點。很多人都不會否認，中國政府似乎有一種能力，可以感受到“時代脈搏”，並相應地做出政治調整，同時又保證在大方向上與國家的長遠目標契合。

很多人一直認為，自我糾錯能力是民主制度的專利。但事實上歷史已經證明，中國共產黨具備了強大的自我糾錯能力，這已經成為其最引人注目的特徵。自從1949年建國以來，在中國共產黨一黨領導下，中國在政府政策和政治環境方面的變化，跨越了幾乎不可能跨越的政治鴻溝。從最初的“新民主主義”聯盟，到50年代初的激進土改；從“大躍進”，到60年代初的耕地準私有化；從“文化大革命”，到鄧小平的市場經濟改革，以及江澤民“三個代表”理論對共產黨理念的創新。在國內政治上，中國從一個階段到下一個階段的變化令人震驚。

在外交政策上，中國同樣在不斷調整。在50年代，中國向蘇聯“一邊倒”；70年代到80年代，中國事實上與美國結盟遏制蘇聯。今天，在越來越多極化的世界中，中國堅持獨立而有特色的外交方針。沒有人會否認，從毛澤東到鄧小平，從江澤民到胡錦濤，以及今年將接班的習近平，幾代中國的領導人在政治觀念、政策路線存在巨大差異，甚至遠遠大於在西方政治制度中輪流執政的不同政黨領導人。在過去60多年裏，中國出現了很多錯誤，但也做出了相應的糾正。“文化大革命”被定性為一場浩劫，遭到徹底否定；中國從四分五裂的局面，發展到今天的成就，等等。這些事實足以證明中國的一黨制，在自我調整和糾錯方面具有卓越能力。

相對而言，很多建立了代議制政府的國家，卻紛紛陷入困境。多黨競選、輪流執政，並不能保證必要的靈活性和自我糾錯能力。在美國，選舉可以產生新的總統和新的國會多數黨，但是並不能解決當下美國面臨的長遠危機。歐洲各國通過選舉定期更換政府，但是沒有一場選舉能稍稍緩解歐洲的巨大困境。在日本，首相幾乎每年一換，但選舉和政黨輪換絲毫無助於擺脱20多年的滯脹。或許這能解釋，為何在許多國家有定期選舉，但政府的支持率長期不足50%；而中國一黨領導的政府，幾十年來支持率一直超過80%。

一個似乎壟斷了權力的政黨，怎麼能保持如此強的靈活性和生命力？答案之一，是中國共產黨在基因裏保持了向上流動的活力。比如中共和中國的最高決策機構中央政治局有25位成員，其中只有5位成員在出身上有優越背景，也就是所謂的“太子黨”。其餘20位成員，包括國家主席和政府總理在內，他們的出身背景都十分普通，並沒有特殊的政治或經濟依靠，完全憑努力和競爭走到今天的地位。中央委員會包括的成員更多，出身優越者比例更小。相比於美國聯邦參議院，一目瞭然，情況相反。任何人只要走進中國的名牌高校，都能看到中國共產黨不斷吸引着最優秀的年輕人加入。中國共產黨也許是當今世界上最能選賢任能的主流政治組織之一，勝於多數西方國家和大多數發展中國家的執政集團。在中國，政治制度中向上流動的活力可以確保領導人不脱離社會，事實上他們和普通民眾是同一代人。

選舉“認同”徒具法律上的瞬間形式，而缺乏道德上的權威

Beitarie：你在阿斯彭研究所（Aspen Institute）的討論中談到民眾的認同，你指出中國政府在國內有很高的支持率。當然，對此還有不同的數據，比如農村地區羣體性事件不斷增長，並且近來在城市中也發生了類似事件，執政黨也對此表示擔憂。我想問一個更基本的問題，你在那次討論中説：“如果政府失去民眾的認同，就會出問題。”歷史告訴我們，任何統治者最後都毫無意外地失去了民眾的認同。既然如此，中國模式就有一個缺陷，就是隻有通過暴力才能實現政權更迭。即使民主本身不是目標，難道定期普選不是一種確保民眾認同政府的合理機制嗎？或者，中國能否發展出一種不同的機制，讓中國民眾來決定誰來領導？

李：這個問題是在比較蘋果和橘子。這也就是弗朗西斯·福山説的“壞皇帝”的問題，當一個君主變壞時怎樣使他下台？

這是一個錯誤的假設。中國古語説“水能載舟，亦能覆舟”。今天民族國家已經取代了帝國和王國，在這個比喻裏，水還代表民眾，但是舟已不再意味着皇帝和他的王朝，而是指構成當代民族國家的更為龐大、複雜的政治體系。一黨制已經寫入中國憲法，正如代議制民主寫在美國憲法中一樣。長期以來，獨立的輿論調查顯示，共產黨領導的政府受到中國民眾的持續支持。這一事實的背景是一黨制的政治架構，所以足以説明民眾對政府基本制度的支持。美國人在支持共和黨還是民主黨時，可能變化不定，但絕大多贊同代議制民主的基本制度。可以説，當前中美兩國的民眾各自都支持本國的政治制度。

一些人認為，除非中國共產黨能做到，假如失去支持後就交權下台，才能證明這個黨目前受到的支持具有合法性。按照這個邏輯推演，不難得出這樣的結論，即如果美國當前的民主制度失去了民眾的支持，美國就必須取消選舉，廢除權利法案，並建立獨裁或者其他形式的政權。這顯然荒謬無比。政治權力要實現和平交接和輪換，其前提是承認既定的政治制度，而後者恰恰是很難改動一分一毫的。除了極少數的例外情況，只有革命才能撼動政治制度。在美國短短兩百多年的歷史上，圍繞政治制度的建立和鞏固，已經發生過兩次慘烈的戰爭。即使是在民主代議制下，要實現從總統制到議會制的變更，也幾乎毫無可能，反之亦然。

在毛澤東、鄧小平、江澤民、胡錦濤、習近平之間，一代又一代中國領導人在政治上促成了巨大變化。就變化的深度和廣度而言，中國的領導人的作為要遠遠超過代議制民主產生的領導人。藉此，中國共產黨獲得並維繫了民眾的普遍支持。至於中國共產黨的政治制度下，未來能否繼續推出呼應民眾要求並受到民眾支持的領導集體？這有待歷史去驗證。

至於“認同”的概念，其實不過是政治炒作。在當代西方的政治意識形態中，所謂被統治者的“認同”被等同於政府的合法性，其實是形式蓋過了內容，程序超越了本質。況且，這種簡單的劃等號有些不着邊際。大量民意調查顯示，世界上大多數經選舉上台的政府，其支持率都低於50%。，包括美國近來的歷任政府和歐洲的大多數政府，政府執政後支持率都迅速跌落，大幅低於50%，並在政府任期內一撅不振。難道這就是民主制度創造的“認同”？若如此，這種“認同”似乎只是流於瞬間程序，太虛了，一點也不真實。事實上，美國和歐洲的社會運動，表明這些國家的政府正決定性地在民眾中失去合法性。即使是在誕生現代民主制的西方，由選舉產生的所謂“認同”也不過徒具法律上的瞬間形式，而缺乏道德上的權威。法律程序上空虛的“認同”，配合道德上的破產，結果是合法性的崩潰。

中國模式並不排斥公民社會

Beitarie：從2002年起我就待在中國。在這些年裏，我注意到公民社會（civil society）的逐漸發展。我説的公民社會，並不僅僅指政治異見人士，還包括動物權益保護者、環保人士、慈善人士等等。許多小型組織在相關層面上就自己關心的問題提出議題。然而在你的表述中，中國模式並不承認在政府之外存在公民社會。你能否具體闡述一下這一點？在你看來，這些發展趨勢是消極的嗎？為什麼？

李：這個問題涉及到中國模式中的政府治理方式。中國公民社會的發展的確是有益的。事實上，公民社會為政府架起了感受“時代脈搏”的橋樑，政府以此接觸民情、體察民意。公民社會當然可以在政府之外存在，但在中國模式中，公民社會不會也不能凌駕於國家的最高政治權威之上。

Beitarie：緊接着上一個問題。你曾經指出，中國模式有一個特點，就是能保障十分廣泛的個人自由，但不允許干預政府行為。這兩者之間，在何種程度上可以區別開來呢？比如説，就像北京等城市發生過的，當民眾呼籲政府關注基本生存條件，如空氣和飲用水質量時，這屬於保障個人自由還是干預政府行為呢？在中國的許多案例中，包括最近發生且備受關注的烏坎事件，民眾發現團結在一起，集體表達訴求，就往往能達到目的。在你看來，中國模式能包涵這些內容嗎？若不能，中國模式如何保證其開放性？

李：中國政府並不壓制民眾對生存條件的訴求。恰恰相反，中國社會正經歷巨大變遷，各方面的挑戰尤其艱鉅，但政府在回應公民訴求時表現極其敏鋭，進而更加鞏固了中央政府的道德權威。在烏坎事件中，最有趣的是抗議者高舉的標語，其中最顯眼的一條標語寫着“中國共產黨萬歲！”。事件平息後，抗議活動的領導者被選為村長，而他恰恰是一名老黨員。

普世的東西只能是最低標準的

Beitarie：你一針見血地指出，自由民主制度深深根植於猶太教-基督教宗教思想，這個事實無人能否認。然而，我對以下兩個問題感到困惑。首先，根據我的理解，你認為中國模式是基於中國的歷史傳統尤其是儒家思想，然而當前中國的政治制度是從蘇聯輸入的，而且憲法規定的國家意識形態是馬克思列寧主義和毛澤東思想。這些因素為何能並行不悖？

我的第二個困惑是：雖然各種不同的文化都應該受到尊重，而不同的文化會塑造出不同形式的政府。但對照各種文化的文本典籍，就會發現其中很多觀點總是極其相似的。孔子在其著作中堅持反對政府腐敗，反對統治者濫用權力，這些觀點也同樣見於新約和舊約，其他文化中的先賢規訓也近乎於此。在不同文化中，是非判斷的基本價值觀非常相似。巧合的是，權力無度、權力濫用、政府腐敗總是最受關注的問題，這也是普通中國民眾的切膚之痛。這是否意味着即使在不同的文化中，也有很多問題是相通的，意味着有很多價值觀是普世的？進而意味着，不僅文化可以互相學習，甚至制度也可以移植？

李：所謂的普世價值，只是一個謬誤。每次提到普世價值，它只能囊括最低端、最抽象的因素。飢餓時我們都想吃東西，我們都想找到異性來繁衍後代——好像很普世，但幾乎所有動物也如此。人類區別於動物，是因為人類有文化，而文化塑造價值觀。從根本上説，不同文化之間是不能簡單比附的，因為它們成長於不同的環境，其中也包括地理、氣候這樣的客觀條件。抽象地説，一個人可以宣稱所有人都需要如尊嚴之類。誰能反駁呢？這聽起來的確非常普世。但是在不同文化中，尊嚴的含義不僅會有不同，甚至還會是完全相反的。任何來自中東的人士都無需提醒，猶太人和穆斯林所理解的尊嚴是有差異的，許多人甚至不惜犧牲生命去維護這種差異。在儒家思想中，人的尊嚴來自於人際關係結構中其所處的位置，這當然和現代西方社會對尊嚴的理解完全相反。誠然，“權力無度”在儒家思想和其他文化中都是錯誤的。但是對“權力無度”如何定義，以及權力如何受“制約”，不同文化的看法就完全不同了。在儒家價值觀中，對權力的制約來自社會內在的道德準則，而在西方傳統觀念中，則必須訴諸於法律措施。

但這並不是説不能引進、吸收外來文化。佛教本來也是外來文化，但它融入了中國文明，形成了非常重要的傳統。外來文化是以原生態，還是以本土化的形式存在，以及輸入的成功與否，在於它與當地文化土壤的契合程度。馬克思主義傳入中國後，引起儒家平等精神的共鳴，同時其現代因素呼應了中國全社會對現代化的迫切需求。最後，本土化的馬克思主義在現代中國生根發芽。

張口就説的自由，有責任的人應該先想想其後果

Beitarie：在阿斯彭研究所（Aspen Institute），你曾經説過，如果觸犯了中國刑法，艾未未就應被關進監獄。幾個星期前我採訪了艾未未先生。在準備採訪時我很驚訝，因為他和你的生平有不少相似之處。你們出生的家庭，在革命年代都遭到過迫害；到你們年輕時，走出國門求學；儘管有其他選擇，你們最後還是回到中國，並在各自的領域成為有影響力的成功人士。事實上，艾未未的訴求和你的主張很相似。他在接受採訪時表示：“我不要求很多。我只要創作的自由，以及每個人想要什麼張口就能説出來的自由。” 這有什麼不對嗎？如果中國模式是有效、成功和正確的，那為何要把批評人士關進監獄？而不是與他們辯論，就像你我之間這樣探討？你曾表示，在美國的經歷讓你學會了多元主義和公開辯論，但在現在的中國社會，多元化的辯論似乎越來越受到限制。你認為決策者這樣做明智嗎？

李：任何社會對多元主義和公開辯論的開放程度，都取決於當時的社會條件。只有歷史才能堅定當今中國的開放程度是否有利於中國的長期發展。

“我不要求很多。我只要創作的自由，以及每個人想要什麼張口能説出來的自由。”作為一項聲明，這可真是夠簡單的。然而它要求的其實很多，而且是太多了。在西方政治意識形態中，有所謂的“言論自由”概念，但這是錯誤的。這一概念假設言論和行為不同，純粹的言論是無害的，因此可以被授予絕對的自由，比如“每個人説出其需求的自由”。但是人類幾千年的歷史經驗證明，言論即行動，而從史前時期開始，言論就足以危害到社會，中國古代先賢告誡説：贈人以言如沫春風，傷人以言勝過劍戟。在西方，無需追溯到近代以前，就可以輕易找到相關的事實。1933年，在特定的歷史和社會條件下，一個政客的言論煽動導致了千百萬人的死亡和毀滅。每個社會在不同的歷史階段都有其獨一無二的文化環境，只有社會自身才能根據當時的條件決定言論（行動）的界限。比如鑑於德國的特殊歷史，《我的奮鬥》至今被禁止出版。

當代中國正在經歷社會轉型，其速度和規模是人類社會有史以來前所未有的。在轉型過程中，社會穩定是非常脆弱的。某些言論被放大後，會衝擊社會的穩定。有責任感的人士應該考慮到，支持“每個人想要什麼張口就能説出來的自由”，可能會帶來的後果。社會分析人士和歷史研究者，應該更深思熟慮一些，而不是簡單地問“這有什麼不對嗎？”

民主人士要避免狂熱病

Beitarie：你也許已經瞭解，關於民主的界限，以色列也有一場生動的辯論。有些團體主張，以色列不應該成為民主國家，而應該找到某種基於猶太教傳統的政治模式。在一些穆斯林國家，也有相同的思潮，希望能找到符合伊斯蘭教法的現代模式。你認為不同的文化要找到各自的發展模式，這是不是符合你的觀點？你認為其他國家無法照搬中國模式，原因是什麼？

李：從根本上説，不同文化難以簡單類比，中國模式和西方模式都是不可照搬的。在猶太教-基督教文化的西方世界之外，除了少數幾個特例，大多數建立代議制民主的國家，都沒有享受到繁榮與和平，這並不是偶然的。許多非洲和亞洲國家被西方殖民者和本國精英強加了代議制民主，至今依然在貧困和內亂的泥沼中掙扎，數億人因此遭受無盡的苦難。中國模式唯一可以借鑑的一點，也許就是每一種文化都能夠找到屬於自己的發展道路。

Beitarie：對於1989年春天發生在北京的事件，可以説説你的看法嗎？在《紐約時報》的評論中，你形容這是一次“大規模的動亂”。這真的是動亂，而不是公民的抗議嗎？要是當時政府換一種方式來應對，結果是否會更好呢？

李：如果當時政府沒有果斷平息動亂，中國社會將會蒙受巨大暴力的破壞。任何導致無辜者，甚至本意善良的人傷亡的事件都是悲劇，這一事件也不例外。但除此之外的其他選擇只會更糟糕，甚至引發一場曠日持久血流成河的內戰。於是只能兩害相權取其輕，而1989年以後的政治穩定，也使無數中國民眾過上了比以往任何時候更富足、自由的生活。

Beitarie: 你強調中國模式的優勢在於自我調整和糾錯，很多評論家認為這在鄧小平時代表現可謂出色，的確真正地為中國開闢了一條新路，但在此之後這些能力嚴重退化。比如，貧富分化是導致社會不滿、不和諧的重要原因，然而分化依然在擴大。另外，過去幾年中羣體性事件的數量迅速增加，中國的領導人已經認識到其嚴重性。不過，政府在壓制抗議方面展現的能力和投入，要比在治理官員腐敗和濫用權力時更多。你對此怎麼看？

李：沒有人，包括共產黨在內，會否認政府腐敗和貧富分化的嚴重性，但是我們應該思考分析產生這些問題的原因。這是中國政治制度自身固有的問題，還是國家快速發展的副作用？一個多世紀前，當美國經歷快速發展和工業擴張時，暴力犯罪、貧富分化和政府腐敗比今天中國嚴重得多。相關的歷史記錄不勝枚舉，如果要聽故事，只要去看看好萊塢的電影，比如《紐約黑幫》 (Gangs of New York)和《血腥風暴》（Let There Be Blood）就夠了。當時加利福尼亞州的整個經濟，完全被幾個家族所控制。

回到先前討論的腐敗問題上，據透明國際組織的報告，在全世界最透明，最少腐敗的20個國家和地區中，僅有新加坡、香港、卡塔爾和日本不屬於西方世界。而在這其中威權政府就有三個，且恰恰是上述國家、地區中僅有的廉政案例。據透明國際統計的透明指數，中國排名第75位，高於無數代議制民主國家，譬如印度的第95位、菲律賓的第129位、印度尼西亞的第100位、阿根廷的第100位，與希臘的第80位差相彷彿，稍稍低於意大利的第69位。可見，中國的一黨執政，要比許多代議制民主國家更廉潔。

如果拋棄意識形態的偏見，僅看事實數據，不管縱向還是橫向，或許我們可以看到，在有效解決快速發展的副作用時，中國在既有政治制度下勝出的機會，至少不會低於條件近似而制度不同的其他國家。

Beitarie：你曾經指出，在西方世界以外，民主制的實驗大多以失敗告終。但是在中國周邊，卻有一些最成功的例子，尤其是那些同樣具有儒家精神的社會，比如日本、韓國和台灣。你認為這些國家的政治制度比較成功嗎？如果是，原因是什麼？

李：在過去半個世紀，有一些非西方國家逐漸發展到發達國家水平。其中，新加坡、台灣、韓國的發展是在威權政府的領導下實現的，而日本是一黨執政下完成的。事實上，當時這些國家和地區的威權政府，要比當今中國的政府嚴厲很多。其中一些國家在富裕以後確實建立了代議制民主，但迄今為止還不到一代人的時間。對於嚴肅研究歷史和政治的學者來説，現在就下最後定論是不是有點過早？

最後值得一提的是，當今世界上有許多人還在自由民主制度意識形態的優越感中沉迷不醒，相信其放之四海而皆準。從20世紀一開始，人類遭受苦難的禍根，莫過於歷史決定論。卡爾·馬克思擬定了人類社會向共產主義進軍的必然道路，充滿意識形態熱情的領導人將其奉若圭臬，結果將人民引入深淵。中國的民眾也品嚐了這段苦果，但是歷史的反諷最終在蘇聯實現，這個紅色帝國土崩瓦解。中國早已在實踐中摒棄了宏大敍事的歷史目的論。相反，現在全世界的民主人士似乎繼承了類似的衣缽，他們宣稱自由民主制的勝利不可避免，民主的天國將降臨人間。他們的道德狂熱，完全可以和蘇聯的先驅們媲美。這一切，彷彿歷史在重演。（完）

原文請見下頁

 

   

This is a written Q&A with Rachel Beitarie of the Israeli daily newspaper the Calcalist, published on May 3, 2012.

Beitarie: I would like to start not with a comparison of the Chinese and other systems of government, but by a look at the Chinese model itself. You said at the talk with Anand Giridharadas at the Aspen Institute (I’m rephrasing a bit) that we know what the Chinese model isn’t -- it isn’t liberal democracy, and it isn’t capitalism, but that what it is was not yet well defined. Could you try and define it anyway? What is the end of the Chinese model and what are the means to get there?

Li: What is the “end” of political governance? Thomas Jefferson probably defined it best for the modern West: life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; and governments that prove to be destructive to such ends must be overthrown. This Jeffersonian articulation of the end of governance was the culmination of cultural and religious developments unique to the West. Such developments placed the individual at the center of the universe as the basic and sovereign unit of human society. However, they did not occur in non-Western societies and their resulting political philosophy is, therefore, not universal.

In the Chinese tradition, an enduring definition of the end of political governance was articulated by Confucius two and a half millenniums ago. He called it Xiao Kang (as differentiated from Da Tong -- an unattainable ideal). In contemporary terms it can be described as a society of general peace and prosperity with a just legal order and built upon a righteous moral foundation. Interestingly enough, when Deng Xiaoping launched his reforms in 1979 he declared that the goal of the Chinese nation in the next phase of its development was to build or, perhaps more accurately, rebuild a Xiao Kang society.

It was probably no accident that Mr. Deng, in declaring China’s national goal, did not rely on the modern Communist ideologies that were instrumental in the revolution that established the People’s Republic, but rather reached deep into China’s ancient tradition, to Confucius. Measured by the “end” as articulated by Confucius and by Deng, the current one-party state model has so far served China well, albeit with real shortcomings.

The current China model has the following components:

1. Political authority, combined with moral authority, is vested in a single political organization, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which represents the entirety of the Chinese nation. This is in contrast to systems under which multiple parties represent different sectors of a nation state.

2. Meritocracy underlies the effectiveness and survival of the ruling organization. A highly sophisticated, elaborate, and rigorous system of selection and promotion within the CCP is designed to recruit those with capabilities and integrity into the Party and move them up the ranks if they choose government service as their careers.

3. The preeminence of political authority is central to the China model. This ensures no special groups, be it capital or talents, can develop capabilities that enable them to place their interests above the national interests. The market and the so-called civil society are both subservient to political authority.

4. Pragmatism is central and ideologies are peripheral. As economic development is seen as of paramount importance to China at the current stage, the political system is designed and adjusted to maximize its success. As the nation’s needs and conditions change, political adjustments can follow.

The current practice of the Chinese model is far from obtaining the ideal state in each of these components. Widespread corruption and the wealth gap are but two examples.

Beitarie: In your recent New York Times op-ed you write: The modern West sees democracy and human rights as the pinnacle of human development. It is a belief premised on an absolute faith. China is on a different path. Its leaders are prepared to allow greater popular participation in political decisions if and when it is conducive to economic development and favorable to the country’s national interests, as they have done in the past 10 years. I think many, even in western countries, would agree with your view of the democratic system being dysfunctional in many ways. However, going back to the Chinese system, I’d say leaders definitely allow participation only if it serves what they see as the country’s national interests. But where do the rulers draw their authority from to decide what those national interests are? And in the absence of judicial oversight, popular vote or free press, what is the mechanism the Chinese model suggests to alert the rulers of being wrong about what they regard as national interests?

Li: One characteristic of the China model is what Francis Fukuyama once called “responsive authoritarianism”. Many would agree that the Chinese government seems to have developed the ability to “feel the pulse” of the nation and adjust its politics in response to it while keeping it largely in alignment with the country’s long-term interests.

Indeed, historical facts demonstrate that self-correction, a capability many ascribe to democratic systems, has been the most notable characteristic of the CCP. Since the Party established the People’s Republic in 1949, under the leadership of a single political party, changes in China’s government policies and political environment have covered the widest possible spectrum. From the so-called “New Democratic” coalition at the beginning to the dramatic land reforms of the early 1950’s, from the Great Leap Forward to the quasi privatization of farm land in the early 1960’s, from the Cultural Revolution to Deng Xiaoping’s market reform and Jiang Zemin’s re-definition of the Party through his “Theory of Three Represents”, China’s domestic politics is almost unrecognizable from one period to another.

In foreign policy, China moved from a close alliance with the Soviet Union in the 1950’s to a virtual alliance with the United States in the 1970’s and 80’s to contain the former. Today, its pursuit of an independent course in an increasingly multi-polar world is distinctive among the nations of the world. No one could deny that its leaders, from Mao to Deng, from Jiang to Hu and to Xi later this year, differ as widely in political outlooks and policy priorities as those that move in and out of power under any other political systems. Through the six decades, there have been many blunders and corresponding course corrections. The Cultural Revolution - a disaster - was outright condemned. And the country went from its shattered state to the China we know today. The facts demonstrate this extraordinary capability of a one-party system for change and self-correction.

On the other hand, the records of electoral regimes around the world indicate that party rotation through elections may not provide the needed flexibility or self-correction. In the United States, elections may have produced new presidents and Congressional majorities, but do not seem to have done much to tackle America’s long-term challenges. In Europe, governments regularly get voted in and out, but no elections have produced even the minimal corrections required to address their monumental distress. In the one-prime-minster-per-year Japan, elections and party rotations have failed to lift the country out of its 20-year stagnation. Perhaps this could explain why governments produced by elections routinely fall substantially below 50% approval rating in their countries and China’s one-party government retains above 80% approval for decades.

The question is how could a political organization that seems to have a monopoly on power be so agile and flexible? One answer is the upward mobility that seems to have been successfully engineered into the CCP’s DNA. The CCP’s Politburo, the highest ruling body of the Party and the state, consists of 25 members. At the current count, only five of them come from any background of wealth or power, the so-called princelings. The other twenty, including the President and the Prime Minister, come from totally ordinary backgrounds with no special political or economic advantages. They worked and competed their way to the top. In the larger Central Committee, those with privileged backgrounds are even scarcer. Compare that to the U.S. Senate? A visit to any top university campus in China would make it obvious to anyone that the CCP continues to attract the best and the brightest of the country’s youth into its ranks. In fact, one can suggest without much risk that the CCP may be one of the most meritocratic and upwardly mobile major political organizations in the world today - far more meritocratic than the ruling elites of most Western countries and the vast majority of developing countries. This upward mobility in its political system helps ensure the rulers are not disconnected from society; in fact, they are of the same generation as the ordinary populace.

Beitarie: At the Aspen Institute discussion you talked a bit about the consent of the ruled, and you rightly pointed out very high rates of support to the government in China. Of course, there is data of a different kind as well, like the growing number of mass incidents in rural areas, and lately also in urban ones, that the ruling party itself cites as a cause for worry. I would like to ask a more basic question though: in that talk you said: “If they lose the consent of the ruled, they are in trouble.” I think history shows us that every ruler without exception eventually loses the consent of the ruled. If so, I see a flaw in the Chinese model in that it won’t allow for a regime change in any other means but violent ones. Even if we don’t see democracy as an end to itself, wouldn’t periodical popular vote be a sensible mechanism for making sure the ruled are indeed consenting? Or can China develop a different mechanism that will allow the Chinese people a say in who would rule them?

Li: This question compares an apple to an orange. It is what Francis Fukuyam calls the “bad emperor” problem. How do you get rid of an emperor if and when he turns bad?

But this is a faux proposition. There is an old Chinese saying, “the people are like water; the ruler is a ship on that water. Water can carry the ship; water can overturn the ship.” Today, nation-states have replaced empires and kingdoms. In this analogy, water is still the people. The ship, however, is no longer just an emperor and his dynasty but the larger and far more sophisticated political system that constitutes the modern nation-state. China’s one-party rule is enshrined in its constitution, just as America’s electoral democracy is in its. The Chinese people’s overwhelming and sustained support for the Party’s leadership, as consistently reflected in independent public opinion surveys, is within the context of the nation’s one-party political constitution, and therefore can only be interpreted as support for this fundamental system of government. Americans’ support for either the Republican Party or the Democratic Party ebbs and flows but it is not necessarily linked to popular support for its fundamental system of electoral democracy. At the moment, both nations’ peoples support their respective political constitutions.

Some say that in the hypothetical situation in which the Party lost popular support it should step down from power, and only when this is ensured the support of the people the Party currently carries could be rendered legitimate. Such argument, if pushed to its logical conclusion, would mean that if, in a hypothetical situation, the current electoral regime in America lost the people’s support the U.S. must do away with elections, cancel the Bill of Rights, and install an authoritarian or some other system of governance. This, of course, is absurd. Rulers may be succeeded or rotated peacefully within established systems of governance. Political systems themselves cannot be changed on a dime. With few exceptions, political systems change quickly only through revolutions. In America’s short history, it took two violent wars on its soil to establish and consolidate its current governing system. Even within an electoral democracy, it is nearly impossible to change from a presidential system to a parliamentary one or vice versa.

The fact is China’s rulers have changed, from Mao to Deng to Jiang to Hu to Xi. The breath and depth of change in their politics have proven greater than those of most rulers produced by democratic elections, and the Party’s continued survival and success indicate the general support it enjoys. The question is can the CCP’s power mechanism continue to produce rulers that are responsive and accepted by the populace? It’s a big “if.”

The idea of consent is hyped. The political ideology of the modern West equates the so-called consent of the governed to legitimacy. This is form over substance and procedure over essence. And such equation is in need of some verification. Most public opinion polls indicate that a large majority of governments in the world that came to power through elections carry substantially lower than 50% approval rating. Most of them, including the recent governments of the United States and much of Europe, consistently fall below that mark soon after their elections and stay there throughout their terms. Is this the “consent” democracies produce? If so, such “consent” seems to be all procedure with little substance. In fact, social movements in America and Europe point to a decisive loss of legitimacy of their governments among their populations. It seems that even in the West, the birthplace of modern democracy, the so-called consent produced by elections is a legal form devoid of moral authority. Legally consensual but morally bankrupt do not legitimacy make.

Beitarie: I have been in China since 2002, and one development I’ve noticed over the years might be described as the gradual building up of a civil society. I don’t necessarily mean to include political dissidents in this phenomenon but rather groups like animal rights activists, environmentalists, charities, etc. Many small organizations, acting sometimes at a very local level to address issues they care about. You stated, however, that the Chinese model as you view it does not recognize a civil society that exists outside of the government, would you care to elaborate on that point? Are those developments in China negative in your view? Why?

Li: Refer to answer one regarding China’s model of governance. The development of civil society is indeed healthy. In fact it is one avenue through which the government has been able to “feel the pulse” of the nation and be more responsive. A civil society of course exists outside the government, but in the Chinese model, it is not, and cannot be, above the nation’s overall political authority.

Beitarie: Following my previous question, one feature you have described of the Chinese model was that of allowing fairly wide personal freedoms, but not participation in governing. To what extent can the two really be distinguished? When people have demands from their government regarding their basic living conditions, like the quality of the air they breathe or the water they drink (as happened lately in Beijing and elsewhere), does this fall under personal freedoms or political organization? In many cases in China (events in Wukan village of Guangdong being a recent and much cited example) people find that coming together and making their demands heard as a group is an effective way to get what they want. Does the Chinese model as you see it object to that? If it does, what is this model’s alternative to public participation?

Li: Far from objecting to people’s demands related to their living conditions the Chinese government has proved deftly competent in responding to and co-opting such demands, considering the scale of the challenge brought about by Chinese society’s rapid change. This actually further enhances the moral authority of the central government. One interesting thing to observe was the highest banner held by the Wukan protestors read: Long Live the Chinese Communist Party. Indeed the leader of the protest movement whom later was elected village chief is a long serving member of the Party.

Beitarie: You rightly point out that liberal democracies have deep roots in Judeo-Christian thinking, a fact probably no one can deny. However, there are two points that bother me here: if I understand you correctly, you suggest China bases its model on its own ancient traditions, specifically Confucianism, yet the organization of the current Chinese regime is borrowed from the soviet union, and its stated ideology (in the Chinese constitution) is Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong’s thought. How does that add up?

A second point that you might help me understand is this: Though of course we should respect different cultures and they may influence different forms of governments, if you look into the forming texts of different cultures, you can find that many of the issues are, and always have been, quite similar. Confucius wrote against corruption and abuse of power by the rulers, issues that are evident in both the old testaments and the new one, as well as in the words of thinkers from other cultures. Many of the basic evaluations of what’s right or wrong are also remarkably similar in different cultures. Coincidentally, the issue of unchecked power, abuse of power, and official corruption is repeatedly being mentioned as an issue most ordinary Chinese are extremely bothered by. Could it be that some issues are universal and that there are some universal values, and that therefore different cultures can learn from each other or adopt systems that have been working elsewhere?

Li: The fallacy of the so-called universal values is that whenever they are pronounced they cover only the most base or the most abstract. We all want to eat when we are hungry and we want to mate to produce offspring -- very universal. But all animals are like that. What makes man different from animals is the former has culture, which is the foundation of values. And cultures are fundamentally incommensurate to each other, as they have been developed under vastly different conditions, including hard conditions such as geography and climate. On the abstract end, one can claim we all want certain things, such as dignity - who can argue against that? Sounds universal? Yes. But what dignity means not only can be different but also totally opposite among cultures. Someone from the Middle East does not need to be educated on the difference between the meaning of dignity between Jews and Muslims - many are willing to die to defend that difference. For Confucius, dignity of man is derived from the respect he accords to his position in a hierarchy of human relations. This, of course, is fundamentally opposite to what dignity means in the modern West. And yes, unchecked power is indeed wrong in Confucian values as it is in most other cultures. But the very definition of “unchecked power” and how to “check” it are so abstract that the similarity ends there. For example, in Confucian values, power is checked by the inherent moral order of society not by legal means relied upon by the Western tradition.

This is not to say that aspects of alien cultures cannot be imported and absorbed. Buddhism came into China from the outside and became a major feature of the Chinese civilization. The success or failure of such importation depends on how consistent it is with the fundamentals of the host cultures, whether in its original or adapted forms. Marxism found deep resonance in China’s Confucian egalitarianism and its modern features were much needed in China’s desperate attempt to modernize. As such, Marxism’s adapted forms have taken roots in modern China.

Beitarie: At the Aspen Institute you’ve mentioned Ai Weiwei and said he should have been imprisoned. I’ve interviewed Mr. Ai a couple of weeks ago. And when I was preparing these questions it struck me that you and he have quite a few shared biographical details: both from families who were persecuted in the revolutionary era, both were given the opportunity to go abroad at a young age, and you both chose to come back to China despite no doubt having other options. You have both also became successful and influential in your respective fields. What Ai told me he aims for, is actually not very different from what you advocate yourself. I quote from my interview with him: “I don’t ask for much. Just the freedom to create, and the freedom for everyone to say what they want”. Why is that a problem? If the Chinese model is valid and successful and right for China, why is it necessary to imprison its critics rather than debate with them in the same way you are debating ideas? You asserted that what you’ve learned from your time in the U.S. was pluralism and the space for debate, yet China seems to be limiting more and more the space for pluralistic debate within its own society. Do you think that’s wise by the rulers?

Li: The degree of pluralism and the space for debate should be calibrated by the conditions of a society at particular times. History will tell if China’s current degree and space are conducive to its long-term success.

“I don’t ask for much. Just the freedom to create, and the freedom for everyone to say what they want”. That, indeed, is simple enough of a statement. However, it is asking for much - too much. One fallacy in the modern Western political ideology is the so-called freedom of speech. It makes a presumption that speech, unlike acts, is harmless and therefore can and must be allowed absolute freedom - “the freedom for everyone to say what they want.” But of course nothing can be further from the truth grounded in thousands of years of human experience. Speech is act; and speech has been harmful to human society since time immemorial. In the West, one does not need to go further than 1933 to find an example of the power of speech by just one man, due to the unique circumstances of that particular time and place, causing death and destruction to millions. The prevailing cultural conditions are unique to different societies at different times. It is up to that society to determine the boundaries of speech and alter them as conditions change. Germany, for instance, due to its unique recent history, seems to believe the publication of Mein Kampf must not be allowed.

Contemporary China is experiencing social transformations of which the speed and scale are unprecedented in human history. Under such conditions the fragility of social stability can be easily disrupted by amplified speech. A responsible person, one would think, would consider the consequences of advocating everyone being free to say whatever he wants. An intelligent observer of human society and student of history ought to be more thoughtful than simply asking, “why is that a problem?”

Beitarie: As you might know, in my country, Israel, there is also a lively debate regarding the limits of democracy, with some groups saying the country shouldn’t be a democracy at all but should find its own model based on Jewish tradition. You can find the same line of thought in some Muslim countries that try to adopt modern version of Sharia law. Is this what you have in mind when you advocate for different cultures to find their own models? You said the Chinese model was un-exportable. Why?

Li: Cultures are fundamentally incommensurate to each other and that is why the Chinese model is not exportable, neither is the modern Western model. It is no accident that, with a few exceptions due to notably unique circumstances, electoral democracies have not been successful in bringing peace and prosperity to countries outside of the Judeo-Christian West. With all the elections that have been imposed on them by Western conquerors or their own elites, the vast number of countries in Africa and Asia are still mired in poverty and civil strife, causing untold sufferings to hundreds of millions. Perhaps the only thing that is exportable from the Chinese experience is that each culture must find its own path.

Beitarie: Can you elaborate a bit regarding your views on the events of spring 1989 in Beijing. In your New York Times op-ed you described that event as a “vast rebellion”. Was it really a rebellion rather than a civil protest? What would have been the consequences had the government acted differently at the time?

Li: Chinese society at that time could not have sustained the enormous and violent disruptions that would have come about if the disturbances were not ended decisively. It was a tragic event, as any that causes death of innocent and even well intentioned people. However, the alternatives would have been far worse - the possibility of a civil war comes to mind. On the contrary, the stability post 1989 has led to hundreds of millions people living better and freer lives than ever.

Follow-ons:

Beitarie: You stress the ability of the system to adapt and self-correct as an advantage of the Chinese model. However, many commentators claim that this ability has been seriously reduced since the days of Deng Xiaoping, who really put the country on a new course. For example, we see that the wealth gap is a serious cause of discontent and disharmony; yet this gap continues to widen. What more, if you look at mass incidents; their number has grown significantly in recent years, a problem recognized by China’s top leaders. Wouldn’t you agree that the Party has shown itself to be much more competent and zealous in cracking down on protests than on official corruption and abuse of power?

Li: No one, not least the CCP itself, disputes that corruption and the wealth gap are significant problems in China. But one needs to be thoughtful in analyzing the cause of such problems. Are they inherent to China’s political system or by products of the rapid change the country is going through? When America was going through its rapid and expansive industrialization a century and a half ago, the violence, wealth gap and corruption were worse than China today. Historical data is abundant. For anecdotal evidence one needs to go no further than Hollywood movies such as Gangs of New York and Let There Be Blood. A few families once controlled the lion’s share of the economy of the entire state of California.

Fast forward to the present, according to Transparency International (TI), the top 20 cleanest (least corrupt) places worldwide include only four non-Western polities: Singapore, Hong Kong, Japan, and Qatar -- three of the four are authoritarian regimes; the same three are the only ones that belong to the developing world. By TI’s account, China (75) ranks higher than Greece (80), India (95), Philippines (129), Indonesia (100), Argentina (100) and many more, and barely below Italy (69) -- all electoral democracies. Apparently, China’s one-party system is less corrupt than electoral democracy in many countries.

If one steps back from ideological bias and examines actual data, both vertically and horizontally, perhaps one can see that the probability for China’s political system to over time resolve these by products of its rapid development is at least as good as any other country, regardless of political system, that is undergoing similar change.

Beitarie: You wrote that experiments in democracy outside of Western countries have mostly failed. Some of the most successful examples, though, can be found in China’s proximity, and in societies that also carry the Confucian ethos: Japan, South Korea and of course Taiwan, whose population is Chinese. Do you agree that those countries have relatively successful governance systems, and if so, what do you make of that?

Li: Most of the non-Western polities that achieved first-world status in the last half century did so under authoritarian regimes (Singapore, Taiwan, South Korea) or some form of one-party rule (Japan). In fact, the authoritarian regimes of these places were much more severe than that of today’s China. True, some of them have implemented electoral democracies after they became wealthy. But barely a generation has passed since they did so - is it not much too soon for any serious student of history and politics to render judgment on their outcomes?

One more thing needs to be said about those who seem so confident in their political ideology of liberal democracy. Ever since the onset of the 20th century, few things have caused more human suffering than historic determinism. Karl Marx mapped out what he claimed to be an inevitable path for human society ending at Communism. Those who implemented it with ideological fervor brought catastrophe to their peoples, the Chinese being among them. But history had its revenge and the Soviet empire went up in flames. China had, in practice, long since abandoned such grand end-of-history schemes. Now the world’s democrats seem to have taken on that same mantle, claiming the inevitability of liberal democracy as man’s paradise on earth. Their moral certitude rivals that of their Soviet predecessors. History may be repeating itself.

【原文鏈接】

以色列最大的日報頭版發表的希伯來文版

http://www.calcalist.co.il/local/articles/0,7340,L-3569820,00.html

赫芬頓郵報的原文鏈接

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/eric-x-li/democracy-is-not-the-answ_b_1520172.html