中國和俄羅斯需要比民主嗎？-Ivan Krastev

俄羅斯和中國，哪個更民主？

拋出這個問題就好像問“史泰龍和施瓦辛格哪個更具女性魅力”一樣，我們可以比較兩人的二頭肌和個人魅力，但話説回來，俄羅斯和中國本質上都不是民主國家。中國人和俄羅斯人也許過上了前所未有的好日子，但這兩個國家都不符合民主的基本定義——開放性的選舉。

不過，兩國免不了要遭遇民主化、全球化的大潮。過去，非民主國家可以依靠君主威望或意識形態來支撐；如今，治理國家的權力唯一來源是人民主權。霸道不再是俄羅斯或中國的行事邏輯。民主化的必然結果人民賦權，尤其是在這全球化時代，技術和通訊進步助力頗多。非民主國家仍然阻止不了民眾使用互聯網與外界保持聯繫。

金融危機也是一個不容忽視的因素。危機爆發伊始，許多分析家認為這將破壞新興民主體的穩定局勢，還有人斷言，此次危機向威權主義政府宣判了死刑。但實際情況要複雜得多：民主主義與威權主義的界限變得模糊。俄羅斯與中國的體制雖然還不能説提供了一條替代性道路，但至少已經調整、適應了民主化大潮的挑戰。寬泛地説，俄羅斯人假裝民主，中國人假裝共產主義。

俄羅斯和中國，哪個更民主？（資料圖）

兩種詭辯

1989-1991年間，蘇聯和中國的共產主義領導層意識到，共產主義的體制已經無法有效運轉。但兩國對失靈的肇因有着不同理解。蘇聯的戈爾巴喬夫認為，社會主義理念有它的價值，壞的是共產黨，蘇共已經失去了社會動員的能力。戈爾巴喬夫的社會轉型理念是超越政黨統治，發展西方模式下的有競爭力的國家體制。中國共產黨的想法迥然不同。後者認為，共產主義、社會主義的理念（尤其在經濟學意義上）出了問題，值得保留的是共產黨本身，及其管理社會的能力。所以，中國共產黨人全力以赴，確保基本的權力機制不受破壞。

這兩個國家現在如何？俄羅斯政府乍看之下當然很像民主政體。俄羅斯有民主憲法、有選舉、有多黨制，還有一些自由媒體。**假如外星人突然降臨俄羅斯，他會覺得這個國家就是民主的。相反，中國看起來不民主，更像是一個典型的共產主義政權。**馬利德（Richard McGregor）在《中國共產黨不可説的秘密》（The Party）一書中寫道：“北京繼承了二十世紀共產政權的大量特質。中國共產黨消滅了政治敵人，解除了司法獨立和媒體獨立，限制了宗教和公民社會，建立了全面的公安網絡，還把異見者送入勞改營”。

自1989年以來，中國的體制設計沒什麼大變化，但俄羅斯卻天翻地覆。悖論卻是，俄羅斯試圖模仿西方民主體制，結果卻喪失了政治能動力，決策能力低下。人們普遍認為，中國政府在決策能力上比俄羅斯更為高效。中國大概比俄羅斯更民主。中國政府更善於自我糾正。中國人成功地吸納了民主制度的關鍵元素，同時，保留共產主義政權的基本權力制度。

五點理由：中國比俄羅斯更民主

權力更替

俄羅斯當然有選舉，但那不是權力更替。**蘇共垮台後的二十年間，現任總統從未在選舉中失手過。選舉不是為了更替權力，而是維持權力。**在中國，反對派也沒有勝選的機會。但另一方面，中國領導人掌握最高權力不會超過10年，黨的總書記和國家主席職位會自動進行新的選舉。換言之，俄羅斯的選舉是為了掩飾權力更替的缺失，而中國則是發展了具有權力更替特徵的體制。當然，我們還是在討論兩個非競爭性政權。但中國人知道，你必須更換領導層，否則就會出問題。中國體制基於集體領導原則，防止了個人化的威權主義，具有更強的分權制衡因素。中國不同於俄羅斯，沒有權力交接的困擾：中共具備明晰的權力交接程序。

傾聽民意

按照定義，非民主政權本質上無法順暢地響應民意。監聽和民意調查無法代替定期的、自由的、競爭性選舉所體現的民意。民主選舉不僅是選領導人，也是測量民眾立場的直接手段。

但在“傾聽民意”方面，中俄有着巨大差異。必須提到的一點是，中國政府沒有在法律上禁止工人抗議。勞資衝突通常都是指向地方領導或公司老闆，對於黨本身沒有危險。所以，每年都有數以萬計的罷工，並且這已成為可靠的信息來源。直接的抗議要比民意調查更有價值，更能考驗地方領導處理危機的能力。在俄羅斯，理論上體制更加民主，但你看不到罷工，因為罷工代價極為高昂。俄羅斯的賄選現象削弱了民意表達的有效性以及地方官員的領導力。

寬容異見

民主的決策過程需要多元的意見和寬容的心態。比較中俄兩國，俄羅斯對於反對派組織更為寬容。過程很糟糕，但你至少可以註冊一個政黨，甚至上街抗議要求普京下台。中國政府在這方面更為嚴厲。克里姆林宮對反對派持寬容態度，但對他們的意見充耳不聞。政府不允許異見者干預政策，官員也會小心翼翼地避免與反對派站在同一立場上。

中國的體制更加威權主義和共產主義，決策的質量更高、更具包容性。**在俄羅斯，就算你和精英們意見不同，大多數只會覺得這是“屁股決定腦袋”。而在中國的集體領導制度下，意見不同則是正常現象。只有到了真正的執行階段，黨才要求忠誠。**在俄羅斯，總統一提出想法，“忠誠測驗”就開始了。普遍的樂觀精神和國力上升，也使得中國人對於政策走向的異議持更加寬容的態度。

吸納精英

也許，中俄兩國政治制度最有趣的差異是吸納精英的方式。政府要職由哪些人來填補？新聞週刊《Russkiy Reporter》2011年末發現了一些有趣的事實。第一，絕大多數俄羅斯精英都來自兩所大學。第二，300個最高層的政府官員中，沒有一個來自遠東地區。第三，精英圈子在普京當上總統以前就對他十分熟悉。簡而言之，俄羅斯是由一小幫子人統治的。這和選賢任能毫無關係：其中大多人都沒有匹配的資歷，但最終總能佔據統治精英的一席之地。

這不是中國共產黨的運作方式。中共儘可能擴大社會精英的階層範圍，選拔最為優秀的人才。如果你足夠睿智、如果你想飛黃騰達，中共會張開雙臂歡迎你。中共成為吸納精英、讓精英服務社會的工具，中國領導層投入大量精力，努力保證精英的地區代表性，讓幹部在各個地方獲取經驗。

試驗精神

最後一點，中俄看待政治的試驗性方式完全不同。中國的政治改革和經濟改革圍繞着不同地區、不同模式的試驗，領導層從中考量何種模式更為有效。俄羅斯的情形完全不同，基本上，“試驗”在那兒是句髒話。他們築建國家的過程中從不試驗。

有何意義？

總之，**從前你可以通過制度衡量民主程度，現在你必須要問制度是如何運作的。在多大程度上像民主？可能是假民主嗎？**俄羅斯是一個極好的例子。俄羅斯搭建了民主的表面功夫，但表面之下，各種非民主因素暗潮洶湧。中國完全是另一個國家，威權主義、管制嚴厲。但由於體制壓力、轉型期各種思潮以及對外開放，中國的政治實踐比表面上要開放得多。

自我糾錯和問責制度是民主的根本優勢。克里姆林宮裏面有許多人以為，過度民主化是新興國家問題的根源。**許多人羨慕中國“貨真價實的”威權主義。但事實是，中國在許多方面比俄羅斯更加民主，決策機制更加優越。**過去二十年間，中國致力於提高國家能力，俄羅斯看起來則專注於掩蓋無能。西方評論家考量新興威權主義國家之間的差異時，思路應該超越形式上的制度設計。

（朱新偉 譯）

英文原文請見下一頁

 Is China more democratic than Russia?

Ivan Krastev

Asking the question, ‘who is more democratic, Russia or China’? is in some ways like asking the question ‘who is more feminine, Sylvester Stallone or Arnold Schwarzenegger’? We can spend some time comparing bicep sizes, and we can speculate about their gentle souls, but Russia and China are essentially two non-democracies. The average Chinese or Russian may today be wealthier and freer than any time before, but neither country can satisfy a minimalist definition of democracy, i.e. competitive elections with uncertain outcomes.

The broader trends of democratization and globalization have not, however, passed either by. If in the past, monarchical power or ideology gave strong foundations to non-democratic regimes, today the only way to claim the right to govern is to claim popular backing. Coercion is no longer the central survival logic of either the Russian and Chinese regimes. A corollary of democratization is the empowerment of people, and in particular the role of technology and communication within a globalizing society. However hard they may try, non-democratic countries are still unable to prevent people from using the Internet, keeping cross-border connections, travelling or obtaining information about the wider world.

Added to these trends is another factor: financial crisis. At the onset of the difficulties, many analysts assumed that the effects would destabilize emerging democracies; others saw the crisis as a death sentence for authoritarian regimes. What seems to have happened is instead something more complex: a blurring of the border between democracy and authoritarianism. Though not quite representing an alternative to the age of democratization, the Russian and Chinese systems have essentially become adjustments to it. Broadly speaking, the Russians are faking democracy while the Chinese are faking communism.

A tale of two sophistries

At the juncture 1989-1991, both communist leaderships – Soviet and Chinese – came to realize that Communism had become a dysfunctional type of system. But they had different understandings of what was wrong with it. In the Soviet Union, Gorbachev decided that what was worth preserving were the socialist ideas, and what was bad was the Communist Party and its inability to bring to mobilize the energy of the society. His idea of social transformation meant moving beyond Party rule, and developing a state which could be competitive in the Western paradigm. The Chinese Communist Party took a totally different view. They believed what was bad about communism were the communist, socialist ideas, especially in an economic sense, and what was good about socialism was the Communist Party itself and its capacity to keep control of society. So they did everything to keep the power infrastructure intact.

What do these regimes look like today? The Russian regime, observed from afar, certainly looks like a democracy. It enjoys a democratic constitution, runs elections, has a multiparty political system, has some free media and has not yet used tanks to crush massive public protests. If an alien with a degree in political science came from some other planet and landed in Russia, he would most probably think the country was a democracy. China, on the other hand, does not look like a democracy, not even to our alien friend. It is, instead, rather like a classic communist regime. As Richard McGregor observes in his book ‘The Party’: ‘Beijing retains a surprising number of qualities that characterized communist regimes of the twentieth century. The Party in China has eradicated and emasculated political rivals, eliminated the autonomy of courts and press, restricted religion and civil society, established extensive network of security police, and dispatched dissidents to labour camps’.

On the level of institutional design not so much has changed in China since 1989, but almost everything has changed in Russia. The paradox, though, is that Russia’s imitation of democratic institutions has led to the establishment of an ineffective political regime deprived of political dynamism and characterized by low quality decision-making. The Chinese regime is generally accepted to be much more effective than the Russian one, and the quality of its decision-making is certainly much better. Moreover, it is arguably more democratic than Russia. Chinese regimes are much more capable of self-correction. They have succeeded in integrating key democratic elements while preserving the communist infrastructure of power.

Five reasons why China is more democratic than Russia

Power Rotation

Russia clearly has elections, but no rotation of power. In the two post-communist decades, the president has not lost a single election: the role of the elections are not to secure the rotation of power, but to avoid it. In the case of China, clearly, the opposition doesn’t have a chance of winning either. Yet on the other hand, Chinese leaders do not stay in power for any more than ten years, after which a new party leader and president are automatically elected. In other words, in the Russian system elections are used as the way to legitimize the lack of rotation, while the Chinese Communist institutional structure has developed to allow an element of power rotation. Of course, we are still talking about two non-competitive regimes. But the Chinese understand that you need to change leadership, or you have a problem. The Chinese system, based on the principle of collective leadership, prevents the emergence of personalized authoritarianism and provides much more checks and balances. Unlike Russia, China is not haunted by the ghost of succession: the Party ensures a clear process of succession.

Listening to the people

By definition, non-democratic regimes have in-built hearing problems. Surveillance and polling can never replace the information that comes from people regularly taking place in free and competitive elections. Democratic elections are not only an option to elect leaders, but also a direct way to gauge where people stand.

When it comes to ‘hearing the people’, however, there is an important difference between China and Russia. This comes down to the fact that the Chinese government has not criminalized labour protest. Labour conflicts, ordinarily directed against regional leaders or company directors, are not considered dangerous for the Party. So every year there are hundreds of thousands of strikes, and these have become an important source of reliable information. When people participate in a direct protest, it is much better than pure polls – valuable not only because they are visible, but because they also offer an opportunity to contest the ability of the local leaders to settle conflicts. In Russia, the supposedly more democratic system, you don’t see strikes, because the price for protesting on labour issues is very high. Russia’s rigged elections are a much weaker test to judge the mood of the people and the ability of the regional leaders to deal with them.

Tolerance of opposition, tolerance of dissent

Democratic decision making depends upon both a diversity of views and the acceptability of disagreement, and here is where we uncover another point of divergence. If you compare Russia and China, you will see that in Russia there is certainly much more tolerance for organized opposition. The process is completely screwed up, but you can register a party, you can go on the street to protest, you can even ask Putin to resign. The Chinese regime is certainly much harsher and intolerant in this respect. But while the Kremlin broadly tolerates the opposition, it does not listen to it. It does not allow for dissent on policy matters and government officials are careful not to advocate policies favoured by the opposition.

Though the Chinese system is much more classically authoritarian and communist, its decision-making process is of a much better quality, more inclusive than the Russian one. In Russia, even when you have differences within the elite, most people explain them simply on the basis of economic differences. In the case of Chinese collective leadership, having different views is actually seen as legitimate. The loyalty test in China starts only once the Communist Party has taken a decision. The loyalty test in Russia starts as soon as the president makes a proposal. A sense of general optimism and rising power also seems to have made China more tolerable to dissent on policy positions.

Recruitment of elites

Perhaps the most interesting comparison you can make between the two political systems is the way each country goes about recruiting its elites. Where do people come from to occupy the most important positions in the state and leading industry? A study conducted by Russkiy Reporter in the end of 2011 revealed a number of interesting facts on this front. First, the great majority of the Russian elites went to one of just two universities. Second, none of those occupying the top 300 positions came from the Russian Far East. And, third, the most important factor influencing membership of this elite circle is to have known Mr Putin before he became president. In short, Russia is governed by a circle of friends. This is not a meritocratic system in any sense: most of these people have not had proper careers, but have simply ended in this ruling group.

This is not the way in which the Chinese Communist Party works. It is doing its best to create different layers of society, and does try to make the system reasonably meritocratic. If you are cynical enough, if you want to do well, if you want to make money, the Communist Party is open for you. The Communist Party serves as a vehicle to recruit and socialize elites, and the Chinese leadership invests a lot in ensuring regional representation and providing its cadres with opportunity to get diverse experience.

Experimentation

My last point comparing these two systems is to emphasize the way in which the Chinese and Russians totally differ in their view of the experimental nature of politics. Chinese political and economic reforms are organized around experimentation with different models in the different regions aimed at figuring out what works from the point of view of the leadership. This is emphatically not the case in Russia, where experiment is, basically, a dirty word. They are not experimenting in the process of trying to build a governable state.

What does it all mean?

In summary, while there was once a time that you measured democracy looking at institutions, now you need to also ask questions about how the institutions function. Do they look like democracies? Is it possible that the democracy is faked? Russia is a brilliant example that should force us to think. It has fashioned a democratic surface, but under this surface all types of non-democratic practices are flourishing. China is another country – authoritarian and severe undoubtedly. But because of the pressure of the system, the different ideas underlying its transformation, and the country’s involvement on the world stage, its political practices are much more open than its formal institutions may lead us to believe.

It is the capacity of a given political regime for self-correction and public accountability that it is at the heart of any democratic advantage. There are now many in the Kremlin who, on the contrary, think that excessive democratization has been responsible for many of the problems that the new country faces. Many envy ’true’ Chinese authoritarianism. But the truth is that in many of its practices China is more democratic than Russia, and its decision-making is undoubtedly superior. Over the last two decades, when China was busy with capacity building, Russia seems to have been preoccupied with incapacity hiding. When western commentators try to make sense of the different performance of the new authoritarians, they would be well advised to look beyond formal institutional design.

From：http://www.eurozine.com/authors/mullerson.html