高大偉：遠見與文明——紀念中法建交五十週年（1964-2014）
【1964年1月27日，中、法兩國政府發表聯合公報決定建立外交關係。在中法建交50週年紀念日來臨之際，中歐國際商學院法籍教授、中歐論壇創始人高大偉先生賜稿觀察者網，從文明與歷史的高度論述中法關係。文章由南開大學張寧翻譯，觀察者網楊晗軼校對。】
48年前，時任法國總統的戴高樂（1890-1970）在柬埔寨首都金邊發表演説。如果説那是一曲戴高樂主義的史詩，那麼中國導演王家衞在電影《花樣年華》插入戴高樂金邊之行的新聞片段則完全是出人意料的手筆。這個真實的歷史片段，通過詩化的鏡頭語言娓娓道來，不同的人有不同的解讀，但它的確反映出中國人的精神中有着戴高樂的影子。
“中國這頭睡獅一旦醒來，世界將為之顫抖。”這句拿破崙•波拿巴（1769-1821）恐怕從未説過的話，雖已成為老生常談的名言，但戴高樂倒確實曾於1965年9月9日的一場新聞記者會上作出以下精闢的表述：“中國深刻的變革，使中國處於領導世界的位置，這件具有重大影響力的事實正在重塑着世界的面貌。”
時間證明了戴高樂的預言，中國的復興沒有以暴力破壞全球體系，而是以和平的方式，在循序漸進的過程中改變了世界權力分佈。
範曾作品：《戴高樂像》（高大偉先生供圖）
戴高樂的遠見
在馬年即將來臨之際，中法兩國於1月27日共同慶祝建交50週年。站在法國人的角度看中法建交，夏爾•戴高樂，這名20世紀世界政壇巨人、法國最偉大的政治家之一，當年可謂以一己之力做出了正式承認北京政府的決定。
就在中法聯合公報發表後數日內，《時代》雜誌針對黎塞留至戴高樂時代的法國外交評論道：“作為一個國家，法國在20世紀一直走在凋敝的路上……但就在上週，法國再一次撼動世界事務，將不可能變為了可能……為使法國真正重歸世界強國之列，戴高樂不顧華盛頓方面的抗議，承認北京的共產黨政權為中國唯一合法政府，對美國的亞洲政策造成了嚴重傷害。”
在上世紀六十年代的地緣政治背景下，戴高樂對中國的判斷可謂高瞻遠矚，透過紛紜的現象把握住了本質性的歷史趨勢。
戴高樂不但靠敏鋭政治頭腦和戰略思維開啓了巴黎與北京之間的特殊關係，而且以開拓精神為未來的中法合作打下了基準點。
在新中國成立初期，只有蘇聯集團成員國立刻承認了中國政府的合法性。雖然瑞典、丹麥、瑞士、列支敦士登和英國陸續與中國建立了關係，但法國才是率先與北京政府建立大使級外交關係的西方大國。
法國前教育部長呂西安•貝耶（1907-1972）於1964年5月27日抵達北京，出任首任法國駐華大使。當時，年輕的中華人民共和國不僅在意識形態領域與美國統領的西方陣營交鋒，而且與印度和蘇聯這兩大鄰國交惡。
1964年，呂西安·貝耶訪華。圖為當年5月31日，呂西安向時任國家主席劉少奇遞交國書
時任美國總統的民主黨人林登•約翰遜（1908-1973）遵照系統遏制政策，積極支持美國對越南進行大規模武裝干涉，以阻止共產主義在越南擴張。此外，1962年，印度軍隊與中國人民解放軍在中印邊境山區爆發衝突。尼基塔•赫魯曉夫（1894-1971）傾向於支持印度總理尼赫魯（1889-1964），再次暴露出中蘇關係的裂痕。
由於美國在二戰後全球秩序中的首要地位，七十年代尼克松對北京方面拋出的橄欖枝成為了地緣政治中最重要的分水嶺。中蘇關係的破裂，給美國帶來了大三角外交的契機，也成為政治評論家們大做文章的題材。具有諷刺意味的是，美國運用的正是中國古代“以夷制夷”外交戰略的現代版本。
美國前國務卿亨利•基辛格出色地構想並導演了這出外交政策的大轉移，曾任尼克松總統國家安全顧問的基辛格在1994年出版的《大外交》一書中提及了戴高樂將軍的遠見：“中蘇關係的破裂帶來了內在的機遇，有意思的是，最初看到這一點的領袖，是歐洲的外交老人戴高樂。”遺憾的是，基辛格在其2011年新作《論中國》中，對戴高樂主義的法國扮演的先鋒角色避而不談，似乎有意讓歲月沖淡記憶，在世人前樹立自己對華外交開路者的形象。
60年代時，本已孤立於國際舞台的中國又遭遇了相當嚴重的內部危機。1958年，中央政府欲加速全國工業化腳步，提出了“大躍進”。欲速則不達，一場巨大的經濟災難最終演變成了全國性災難。從廬山會議可以看出，中共領導層出現了分歧。
在這樣的背景之下，1962年年末，毛澤東創作了《七律•冬雲》，將中國上空雲譎波詭的危險化作筆下的詩句：“獨有英雄驅虎豹，更無豪傑怕熊羆。”這名指揮長征的老軍事家用生動的比喻，將筆鋒直接對準了國外的敵對勢力。
這樣的環境嚇得住懦夫，卻阻止不了滿懷決心的戴高樂。1964年1月31日，他在愛麗捨宮向數百名記者解釋了法國做出承認北京政府的決定。
身高1米96的戴高樂被法國人民親切地稱為“大個子夏爾”，他是個超乎常人的演説家，在動筆寫《回憶錄》之前就已寫過六本書。和丘吉爾一樣，戴高樂繼承了古希臘的雄辯傳統，能夠將統治權威昇華為領袖魅力。
新聞記者會上，戴高樂表述了他對中國的看法。那也是他戲劇般的演説最令人記憶深刻的一幕。《時代》雜誌記錄道：“一片由細長的金椅子組成的海洋上，正襟危坐着一千餘名新聞記者、外交官和政府官員，當下午三點的鐘聲敲響時，紫紅色的大幕徐徐拉開，戴高樂沉重遲緩地走向演講台。”
戲劇般的出場並沒有分散聽眾的注意力，演講的豐富內容依然是關注的焦點。戴高樂的推論有兩大支柱，一是長遠眼光；二是透過暫時的、紛紜的現象把握永恆的實質，這也是戴高樂主義的兩大鮮明特徵。
這位法國政治家以中國的人口與地理事實為切入點開始了新聞發佈會的演講。在廣袤的國土上，居住着“偉大的中國人民”。中華民族是地球上人數最多的民族，他們“聚羣而居，廣泛分佈”於“西起小亞細亞與歐洲邊疆，東至無邊無際的太平洋海岸，北起天寒地凍的西伯利亞，南至印度、越南等熱帶國家”的歐亞大陸。戴高樂對中國龐大的人口和國土有着深刻的理解，認為“人們必須理性地認識這一客觀現實”，必須與中國領導層進行合作。因為只有中國積極地、建設性地參與到國際事務中來，才能真正解決亞洲乃至世界長期存在的嚴重問題。
然後，戴高樂引出了自己對“中國之世界”的重要思考：中國不是一個民族或一個民族國家，中國從根本而言是一個文明，一個“非常獨特而深厚的文明”。
很明顯，作為一個西方大國，法國率先承認中華人民共和國，體現出一種政治姿態，帶有地緣政治上的動機，通過承認共產黨政權，巴黎向華盛頓和莫斯科發出了自主外交的信號。戴高樂也非常清楚，中國的戰略目標是鞏固國家主權與強化政治獨立。
1964年10月16日，中國第一個原子彈在羅布泊實驗基地爆炸成功。前一年，法國和中國都沒有簽署為了限制軍備競賽的“部分禁止核試驗條約”。戴高樂相信多極秩序比單極或危險的兩極結構更有利於世界持久的平衡。在一些圈子裏，戴高樂的“偉大政治”引起了不安與騷動。
1964年2月7日，戴高樂的外交部長顧夫•德姆維爾（1907-1999）成為《時代》雜誌的封面人物，背景是18世紀具有中國藝術風格特徵的法國畫家讓•安東尼•華多的作品“凝視者”，這個恰當的背景巧妙地暗示了戴高樂對中國的立場與政策。
《時代》雜誌緊接着發表了一位讀者的來信，這位讀者表達了自己被法國新立場激起的強烈情感，信中説：“謝謝你們把德姆維爾的照片放在了上週《時代》的封面，這將會使成千上萬像我這樣的讀者把它撕毀、燒掉甚至是把它踩在腳下。法國怎敢把台北稱為福摩薩政府，怎敢承認毛澤東的北京是中國的政府？”
就在有人對法國政府表達強烈抗議的同時，周恩來總理（1898-1976）正在非洲訪問。當他聽到法國承認中國政府的消息時，以法語向法國駐蘇丹大使致以問候“Bonjour，bonjour，comment allez-vous?”（你好，你好，過得好嗎？），並回顧了他20年代在法國留學的歲月。
然而，如果我們把戴高樂的決定完全看作一種政治手段的話，便忽略了戴高樂主義的一個基本要素。戴高樂把中國視為一種文明，他考慮到了一個更為本質的現實，超越了人們習以為常的地緣政治上的算計。對他而言，法國政府不僅必須與另一個外國政府共事協作，更重要的是，他想讓古老的法蘭西民族與歷史更加悠久的中國文明聯繫起來。
“永恆中國”理念
戴高樂非常重視長久性，他喚起了一個“永恆中國”，一個“意識到這種不變的持久性，併為之自豪”的中國。在戴高樂背後，有一位鮮為人知的人物，他是連接戴高樂與亞洲最重要的紐帶，也是戴高樂獲取有關中國的關鍵信息的來源之一。這個人不是外交官，也不是商人，而是一名影響力巨大的作家，也是法國首任文化事務部長（1959-1969）。
安德烈•馬爾羅（1901-1976）是一個書生報國的典型；是20世紀重大危機的親歷者和評論者；一身兼具百科全書式的淵博學識和遊歷各國的實地經驗。在22歲時探尋了高棉文化之後，他終身都密切關注亞洲的轉型和中國的蜕變。馬爾羅以1927年的上海為背景，創作了小説《人類的命運》，書中一名人物刺殺國民黨領袖蔣介石（1887-1975）失敗，慘遭殺害。
在戴高樂眼中，馬爾羅不只是法國政府的一位成員，正如他在自己的《回憶錄》中寫道，馬爾羅也是自己“出色的朋友，熱切關注着不同尋常的命運”。馬爾羅與中華文明元素的智慧對話和戴高樂對文明永恆的傾向性一拍即合，相得益彰。
1965年，戴高樂派馬爾羅作為自己的私人使節訪問中國。這是馬爾羅闊別神州40年後再次踏上中國的土地。在北京，他與時任外交部長的陳毅（1901-1972），以及周恩來、毛澤東等黨和國家領導人進行了會談。陳毅與周恩來、鄧小平（1904-1997）有着類似的經歷，曾於第一次世界大戰之後在法國度過了一段時間，對留法歲月的記憶拉近了部分中國領導人們與法國精英間的距離。
馬爾羅在自己的《反回憶錄》（1967）中記錄了那些談話的內容。從這部史詩般的敍述作品可以看出，在歷史潮流塑造傑出人物的同時，偉人的意志也創造了歷史。
馬爾羅把毛澤東想象為“青銅皇帝”，以神諭般的筆調宣稱，“歐洲持續300年的活力正在枯涸，而中國時代已經開始”。馬爾羅還借“青銅皇帝”的嘴説出了下面這句耐人尋味的話：“我很孤單……只有一些遙遠的朋友，請代我向戴高樂將軍問好。”
戴高樂與毛澤東從未謀面，但馬爾羅注意到兩人都有一種特別的“內在疏離感”。基辛格在《白宮歲月》中，也將戴高樂和毛澤東二人相提並論。在談及毛澤東時，他寫道，“除了戴高樂以外，我從來沒有見過任何像他（毛澤東）那樣意志堅強純粹的人。”
馬爾羅不但影響了戴高樂對中國的看法，而且對美國總統尼克松接近北京的方式也產生了一定的影響。在1972年2月訪華前夕，尼克松將這位時年71歲的法國作家邀請到白宮做客。在回憶錄中，尼克松寫道，“我又問馬爾羅，毛澤東百年之後將會是何等情形。他答道，‘正如毛澤東所言，他後繼無人’。他這是什麼意思呢？他的意思是丘吉爾、甘地、戴高樂等偉大的領袖，是由具有創傷性的天下大勢造就的，但這類歷史事件不會在世界上重演了。”
在戴高樂與媒體頗有戲劇性的對話中，他不斷提及自己從歷史根源中汲取自省的養分。談到中國時，他不無誇張地宣稱中國“比歷史還要古老”，通過挑戰人類歷史記載的極限，戴高樂出奇地培養了一種洞察現在的能力。他通過真誠的感召，使聽眾設身處地感受到中國在適應現代性過程中所經歷的百年磨難，以及中國人民遭受西方帝國主義壓迫的屈辱。
作為反對納粹主義的英雄，戴高樂為自己國家的獨立而奮戰；作為非殖民地化的主要倡行者之一，戴高樂捍衞了其它國家的尊嚴。
戴高樂在新聞發言結尾處提出了中法之間的“親近性”。中法兩個大國處於歐亞大陸的兩端，有些人選擇強調兩國間的區別，戴高樂卻堅持兩國的共同點與相互吸引之處，這無疑是正確的選擇。
從康熙皇帝（1654-1722）與路易十四國王（1638-1715）久遠而莊嚴關係開始，到左宗棠（1812-1885）與日意格（Prosper Giquel，1835-1886）之間的合作，或者李石曾（1881-1973）與他的支持者赫里歐（Édouart Herriot，1872-1957）或奧拉爾（Alphonse Aulard，1849-1928）之間在教育領域的活動，親法的中國人一直與親中的法國人彼此呼應。
“偉大”與“中心性” “中國夢”與“法國影響力”
在過去五十年中，世界格局雖然發生了巨大的變化，但戴高樂主義卻並未因此失去時代意義。將戴高樂主義高度提煉成一句話，那便是：把永久的現實作為行動的方針。
偉大（la grandeur）是法國民族品格中的核心概念。戴高樂正是在這種民族品格的照耀下思考和行動的。在世界舞台上，法國的相對國力時有變化，相對復興中的中國而言，法國的影響力必然在減小，但法國堅持扮演獨特角色的信念卻始終不渝。
作為法國的國家格言，自由、平等、博愛的提出是法國對世界的貢獻，它既是法蘭西民族追求“偉大”的結果，又是開創“偉大”的來源，只有全民都滿懷壯志並付諸行動的國家，才提得出這樣具有革命意義的原則，這些原則同時也是偉大的集體力量的源泉。
在中國的語境裏，“中”或“中心性”正好對應着法國式的“偉大”。如果説對“偉大”的追求激勵了法國曆代君王、皇帝與總統，那麼“中國”本身就代表了中央之國處於天下的中心地位。凡爾賽宮與紫禁城、協和廣場（Place of La Concorde）與天安門廣場，這些宏偉的建築羣，顯然都在以沉默的建築語言講述着“偉大民族”與“中心國家”的故事。
在過去數千年中，中國在巨大的歷史整合中將地球上五分之一的人口團結在一起。展望未來，中國將繼續在全球層面運用這種協調力量。
法國的生命力來自一種自覺向外輻射的努力，法國構想並闡述了一個具有啓迪意義宏大事業，並意欲影響、聯合外部世界；中國則與此不同，“中央之國”凝聚着廣大的人口，並以從未中斷的文明融合外部世界，其影響力來自一種向內的引力。
中國與法國都有極高的自我形象，總體而言，兩國人民對各自國運的盛衰變遷非常敏感，當“偉大”或“中心性”在歷史的沉浮中退化為追憶昔日輝煌的一道符號時，中法兩國的失落感相比其它政治體來得更加強烈。
除卻一些中法關係的偶然因素、臨時政權、暫時性政經狀況之外，巴黎和北京一直高度關注着全人類的命運，中法兩國未來也必將明確地表達出“偉大”，含蓄地體現出“中心性”。
在21世紀，中法兩國必須通力合作，以期實現中華民族偉大復興的“中國夢”，以及法國外交部長洛朗•法比尤斯針對法國所提出的“影響力”。
不無諷刺意味的是，法國的自我定位與法國國家實力之間的差距正在加大；與之形成鮮明對比的是，中國的中心地位正在逐步加強。然而，世界各國實力的演變不會抹殺法國豐富的遺產，也不會遺忘在歐洲形成過程中法國所做出的貢獻。更加寬泛而言，正是在最具挑戰的形勢下，“偉大”這個理念才能重振法國的活力。
“中心性”與“偉大”之間的協合效應，遠遠超過中法對各自政治身份的簡單肯定，這種協同效應更是新人文主義在全球復興的原動力；是促進東西溝通、南北對話的推動力；也是一種實實在在的普世主義。
2000多年前，儒家的人文主義將整個華夏文明提升到新高度；18世紀，《百科全書》（《百科全書，或科學、藝術和工藝詳解詞典》）的編撰者狄德羅（1713-1784）、達朗貝爾（1717-1783），以及寫下《人類精神進步史表綱要》的孔多賽（1743-1794）啓迪了整個歐洲。在當今世界，各國前所未有地呈現出相互依賴的態勢，中法知識界的交流互動已經對全球文明的形成做出了貢獻。
中國傳統書畫巨匠範曾先生運用丹青妙筆，在紙上賦予了戴高樂不朽的生命。這時，“偉大”與“中心性”已是水乳交融，人類對團結與進步的探求已不僅是法國人或中國人的追求，而是一種不分你我的普世理想。
範曾先生在戴高樂將軍書房
（翻頁請看英文原文）
Grandeur And Centrality
Commemorating the 50th Anniversary of the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between France and China.
By David Gosset
If the speech pronounced 48 years ago in Phnom Penh by the French President Charles de Gaulle (1890-1970) belongs to the Gaullist epic, the use by the Chinese director Wong Kar-wai of the statesman’s arrival in the Khmer capital as a newsreel sequence of “In the Mood for Love” was certainly unexpected. Open to various interpretations, this realistic moment in a highly poetic creation signals the subtle presence of De Gaulle in the Chinese psyche.
One repeatedly attributes to Napoleon Bonaparte (1769-1821) a statement he probably never uttered and which has become an inept cliché: “When China awakes, the world will shake.” In a press conference on September 9, 1965, Charles de Gaulle did present a more nuanced view: “A fact of considerable significance is at work and is reshaping the world: China’s very deep transformation puts her in a position to have a global leading role.”
Time has confirmed De Gaulle’s prediction, the Chinese renaissance has modified the world’s distribution of power in a gradual and peaceful process without any abrupt discontinuity nor violent disruption.
On January 27, three days before the beginning of the Year of the Horse, one will celebrate the 50th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between France and the People’s Republic of China. From a French perspective, the full recognition of the Beijing’s government was, above all, the decision of one man, Charles de Gaulle, one of France’s greatest statesmen and a colossus of the 20th century world politics.
Days after the 1964 announcement, the Time magazine commented the new state of affairs in a report on French diplomacy from Richelieu to De Gaulle which gave a sense of the global echo and significance of the Gaullist breakthrough: “As a nation, France has seemed to be dying all through the 20th century … Yet last week the impossible had apparently come true, and France was once more a mover and shaker in world affairs … To cap his nation’s re-emergence as a world power, De Gaulle recognized the communist regime in Beijing as the government of China, brushing aside protests from Washington that the move would seriously damage U.S. policy in Asia.”
In the geopolitical context of the 1960s, De Gaulle’s judgment upon China was visionary and an illustration of his ability to discern the fundamental historical trends from perhaps more spectacular but less consequential phenomena.
His acumen and strategic thinking were not only at the origin of a special relationship between Paris and Beijing, but the spirit of his groundbreaking decision remains a point of reference for the future of the Sino-French cooperation.
Only members of the Soviet bloc immediately recognized the new Chinese regime in 1949. Although Sweden, Denmark, Switzerland, Liechtenstein and the UK established relations with China one year after Mao Zedong (1893-1976) had proclaimed the birth of the People’s Republic on Tiananmen Square, France was the first among the major Western countries to opt for diplomatic relations with Beijing at the ambassadorial level.
When Lucien Paye (1907-1972), who had been minister of education, arrived in Beijing on May 27, 1964 as De Gaulle’s first ambassador in China, the 15-year-old People’s Republic was not only in an ideological battle against the American-led Western world, but it was also at odds with its two gigantic neighbors, India and the USSR.
The American President, Lyndon Johnson (1908-1973), a Democrat, adhered to a policy of systematic containment and actively supported the massive American military intervention in Vietnam in order to stop what he feared to be the expansion of communism. Furthermore, in 1962, India clashed with the People’s Liberation Army over border disputes in the Himalayas, and in another sign of a Sino-Soviet split, Nikita Khrushchev (1894-1971) tended to back the Pandit Nehru (1889-1964) in its complex relations with China.
Due to the preeminent American position in the post-Second World War global order, Nixon’s opening to Beijing in the 70s was a geopolitical watershed of the highest importance. Commentators often expand on the American triangular diplomacy which used the options offered by the rivalries between Beijing and Moscow, an ironic American application of the Chinese strategy of “using the foreigners to subdue the foreigners” – yi yi zhi yi.
The former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger conceived and masterfully orchestrated this foreign policy shift, but Nixon’s national security advisor has acknowledged in Diplomacy (1994) the French General’s foresight: “Interestingly enough, the leader who had first perceived the opportunities inherent in a Sino-Soviet split was the old man of European diplomacy, De Gaulle”. But, regrettably, Kissinger chose to ignore in his more recent On China (2011) the pioneering role played by Gaullian France as if he wishes to be remembered with the passage of time as the original trailblazer.
In the 1960s, isolated on the international stage, China was also facing an internal crisis of considerable magnitude. In 1958 the central government wanted to accelerate the country’s industrialization in a “Great Leap Forward”. It was an enormous economic failure, a move backward which generated a tragic collective disaster. With Peng Dehuai’s courageous disapproval of the movement at the Lushan conference, but also Deng Xiaoping and Liu Shaoqi’s legitimate criticisms of Mao’s radical economic policies, the ruling communist party was seriously divided.
It is in this context that at the end of 1962, Mao Zedong composed the poem Winter Clouds which encapsulated his perception of the imminent dangers looming over China. In it, the Long March’s old commander boldly pointed at hostile foreign forces with vivid metaphors: “Only heroes can quell tigers and leopards and wild bears never daunt the brave”.
In circumstances which would have deterred less confident characters, De Gaulle demonstrated his sound resolution, on January 31, 1964, in the Élysée Palace, he explained his decision to recognize Beijing in a press conference attended by hundreds of journalists.
1.96 m tall, affectionately called by the French people “le Grand Charles”, he was a prodigious orator who had written six books before he embarked on his famous Memoirs. In the Gaullian orations like in the Churchillian addresses the echo of the greatest Hellenic voices metamorphosed authority into charisma.
The press conference contained his thoughts on China, but is also a memorable moment of Gaullian dramaturgy which is described in these terms by the Time writer: “More than 1,000 newsmen, diplomats and officials were perched anxiously on a sea of spindly gold chairs when at the stroke of 3:00 pm the raspberry-red curtains parted and De Gaulle lumbered to the podium”.
The theatrical appearance should not distract from the rich content of De Gaulle’s presentation. His reasoning was solidly based upon two pillars which are also two distinctive features of Gaullism: a long-term view and the effort to take into consideration, beyond transitory events or relatively short-lived phenomena, more permanent realities.
The French statesman began his conference with demographic and geographic facts. “The great Chinese people”, the largest on earth, inhabit a very vast country, “compact but without unity”, which, “spans from Asia Minor and Europe’s marchlands to the immense Pacific coast and from the freezing Siberia to the tropical regions of India and Tonkin”. De Gaulle comprehended the implications of China’s size and considering “the weight of evidence and reason” decided that one had to work with the Chinese leadership. Long-lasting solutions to any serious problem in Asia or even in the world depends on the active and constructive participation of China.
Then, De Gaulle introduced the keystone of his thinking on the Chinese world: China is not a nation or a nation-state, but fundamentally is a civilization, a “very unique and very deep civilization”.
Obviously, France’s early recognition of the People’s Republic of China was a political gesture with geopolitical motives, by recognizing Mao’s government Paris signaled to both Washington and Moscow that France was an autonomous diplomatic force. De Gaulle was also well aware that China’s strategic objective was to consolidate her sovereignty and to strengthen her independence.
It was on October 16, 1964 that Beijing detonated its first nuclear weapon at the Lop Nur test site. One year earlier, neither France nor China had signed the Partial Test Ban Treaty, which aimed to limit the arms race. De Gaulle believed that a multipolar order would be more conducive to sustainable equilibrium than either unipolarity or the dangerous bipolar structure. In some circles, De Gaulle’s politics of grandeur caused uneasiness and uproar.
On February 7, 1964, Maurice Couve de Murville (1907-1999), De Gaulle’s Foreign Minister, was on Time magazine’s cover with a felicitous backdrop, the “Gazer” by Jean-Antoine Watteau, a 18th century French painter known for his chinoiserie, an arty allusion to De Gaulle’s China policy.
In the following issue, the magazine published a letter from one of its readers which gives an idea of the strong emotion triggered by France’s new stand: “Thank you for putting Couve de Murville’s picture on the cover of last week’s Time magazine. This will enable thousands of people like me to tear it up, burn it, or even step on it. How dare France call Taipei the government of Formosa and recognize Mao’s Beijing as the government of China?”
At the opposite of such violent opposition, when Prime Minister Zhou Enlai (1898-1976) heard the news of the recognition while on a visit in Africa, he addressed the French Ambassador in Sudan: “Bonjour, bonjour, comment allez-vous?”, and recalled that he had been a student in France in the 1920s.
However, by entirely reducing De Gaulle’s decision to politics one is missing a fundamental component of Gaullism. When he apprehended China as a civilization, De Gaulle transcended the usual geopolitical calculations and took into account a more essential reality. For him the French administration had to work with another foreign government but, more fundamentally, he wanted the old French nation to connect with the immemorial Chinese civilization.
De Gaulle was so focused on the idea of permanence that he evoked an “eternal China” which is “conscious and proud of an immutable perennity”. Revealingly, De Gaulle’s most important link with Asia and arguably one of his most influential sources of information on China, was not a diplomat or a businessman, but a powerful writer, who served the French President during a decade as the country’s first Minister for Cultural Affairs (1959-1969).
André Malraux (1901-1976), an incarnation of the engaged intellectual, commentator and actor of the 20th century major crises, combined an encyclopedic erudition with the traveler’s experience of the world’s diversity. At the age of 22 he explored the Khmer culture, and through his life he remained curious about the Asian continent’s transformation and followed China’s metamorphosis. In Man’s Fate, a novel which takes place in Shanghai in 1927, one of his characters is killed in a failed attack against Chiang Kai-shek (1887-1975), the leader of the Kuomintang.
In De Gaulle’s eyes, Malraux was not only another member of the French government but, as he wrote in his Memoirs, “this brilliant friend, fervent about exceptional destinies”. Malraux’s intellectual dialogue with the elements of the Chinese civilization and De Gaulle’s inclination toward the permanence of culture reinforced each other.
In 1965, De Gaulle asked Malraux to visit China as his personal envoy. In Beijing, 40 years after his first trip to China, Malraux had conversations with Chen Yi (1901-1972), the Chinese Foreign Minister who had been commander of the New Fourth Army and the first mayor of Shanghai after 1949, but also with Zhou Enlai and Mao Zedong. Like Zhou Enlai, but also Deng Xiaoping (1904-1997), Chen Yi had spent some time in France after the First World War, an episode conducive to a sentiment of relative proximity between some of the Chinese leaders and the French elite.
Malraux published the content of his conversations in his Anti-memoirs (1967), an epic narrative where historical forces forge extraordinary lives as much as powerful human wills make history.
Malraux visualizes Mao as the “Emperor of bronze” and he announces in a Delphic manner that “300 hundred years of European energy are fading while the Chinese-era begins”. He also attributes to the “Emperor of bronze” these intriguing words: “I am alone … or just with few faraway friends: please convey my regards to the General de Gaulle”.
De Gaulle and Mao never met but Malraux noticed that they had in common the same extraordinary “inner aloofness”. In the “White House Years”, Kissinger drew also a parallel between the two figures. Talking about Mao he wrote: “I have met no one, with the possible exception of Charles de Gaulle, who so distilled raw, concentrated willpower.”
Malraux did not only influence De Gaulle’s perception on China but he had also an impact on the way Nixon approached his journey to Beijing. Before his trip to China in February 1972, the American President invited the 71-year-old French author to the White House. In his memoirs, Nixon remembers: “I asked Malraux again what came after Mao. Malraux replied: ‘It is exactly as Mao said, he has no successor.’ What did he mean by it? He meant that in his view the great leaders - Churchill, Gandhi, De Gaulle - were created by the kind of traumatic historical events that will not occur in the world anymore”.
In his dramatic conversation with the media, De Gaulle consistently mentioned the roots of the past as a nourishment of his reflection. On the Chinese state, he hyperbolically declared that it is “more ancient than History”, by going at the limit of the recorded memory he paradoxically developed a perceptive understanding of the present. It is with a sincere empathy that De Gaulle reminded his audience of China’s painful adjustment to modernity over the past one hundred years, and the Chinese people’s sentiment of humiliation when they had to suffer Western imperialism.
As the hero of the resistance against Nazism, De Gaulle fought for the independence of his country, as one of the main architects of decolonization he defended the dignity of other nations.
De Gaulle concluded his presentation with a remark on what he called the “affinities” between France and China, while some chose to emphasize what separates the two edges of Eurasia, he rightly insisted on the mutual attraction and the commonalities between the two powers.
From the majestic but distant relations between the Emperor Kangxi (1654-1722) and the King Louis XIV (1638-1715), to the collaboration between Zuo Zongtang (1812-1885) and Prosper Giquel (1835-1886), or the action in the field of education by Li Shizeng (1881-1973) and his support Édouart Herriot (1872-1957) or Alphonse Aulard (1849-1928), Chinese Francophiles always responded to the call of French Sinophiles.
The world has changed significantly in the past five decades but the mutations did not affect radically the relevance of Gaullism which is, in its highest expression, the effort to act according to permanent realities.
De Gaulle thought and acted under the light of la grandeur, a notion which is at the heart of France’s national character. The relative weight of the French power varies, and it has certainly been diminishing by comparison with the Chinese reemergence, but the self-perception of the singular role it has to play is constant.
The imperatives of Liberté, Égalité and Fraternité, French propositions to the world, have been both a product and a generator of this passion for grandeur, only the exalted aspiration of a nation in movement could proclaim such revolutionary principles but they were at the same time the source of a powerful collective energy.
In the Chinese context, centrality – zhong, 中 – mirrors the French grandeur. If a sense of grandeur inspired the French monarchs, emperors and presidents, the “Middle Country” envisioned for itself centrality under Heaven. Versailles and the Forbidden City, the Place of La Concorde and Tiananmen Square are obvious architectural illustrations of the correspondence between the “Grande Nation” and the “Middle Country”.
China which has been through the millenia a prodigious process of synthesis unifying one fifth of mankind will go on to apply her harmonizing force at a global level.
Animated by a conscious effort of radiation or rayonnement, France aims to federate around what she conceives and enunciates as an enlightening project, by contrast, China’s impact is by gravitation, the “Middle Country” coheres around its demographic mass and the continuity of its civilization.
Having the highest self-image, the Chinese and the French are, taken collectively, especially sensitive to the variations of fortune and, when the inevitable vicissitudes of history reduce the grandeur or the centrality to a mere nostalgic representation, the sentiment of loss can be for them more acute than for other political bodies.
Beyond the contingent parameters of the Sino-French relations, transient administrations or politico-economic conditions, Paris and Beijing, concerned by the destiny of mankind, will always find it necessary to articulate an explicit grandeur and an implicit centrality.
In the 21st century they have to coordinate the “China Dream” of renaissance and what the French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius names in reference to his country “puissance d’influence”, “influential power”.
Ironically, the gap between France’s representation of herself and the weight of her relative power is widening and, therefore, contrasts with the Chinese centrality which is increasingly effective, but the global evolution won’t erase the rich French heritage nor the French contribution to the making of Europe, and, more generally, it is precisely in the middle of the most challenging circumstances that the idea of grandeur itself can re-energize the country.
The synergies between centrality and grandeur are more than the affirmation of two separate political identities, they are impulsions for the new humanism of a global renaissance, connections between East and West as much as North and South, they are concrete universalism.
More than two millennia ago Confucian humanism elevated the Chinese world, in the 18th century the “Encyclopedists”, Diderot (1713-1784), D’Alembert (1717-1783) or Condorcet (1743-1794), enlightened an entire continent, in a world of unprecedented interdependence the Sino-French intellectual interactions have already contributed to the making of a global civilization.
When the last grand master of the Chinese traditional painting, Fan Zeng, resurrects Charles De Gaulle in an ink portrait, grandeur and centrality have already cross-fertilized, the human quest for solidarity and progress has ceased to be French or Chinese, it has simply become universal.
David Gosset is director of the Academia Sinica Europaea at China Europe International Business School (CEIBS), Shanghai, Beijing & Accra, and founder of the Euro-China Forum.