張維為：中國的底線必須得到尊重
近日，復旦大學特聘教授、上海社科院中國學研究所所長、春秋研究院研究員張維為教授，在《Security Times》（德國《Atlantic Times》第50屆慕尼黑安全會議特刊）上發表文章，闡述釣魚島問題及中美日三國關係，與新加坡國立大學李光耀公共政策學院院長馬凱碩（Kishore Mahbubani）針鋒相對。觀察者網楊晗軼翻譯全文如下：
自1972年中日邦交正常化以來，兩國關係從未像今天這般險惡。許多觀察家們甚至將中日間的緊張局勢與百年前第一次世界大戰爆發前夕的歐洲相提並論。雖然這樣的類比過於危言聳聽——畢竟北京、東京與華盛頓三方出於對共同經濟利益以及對世界繁榮的考慮，都不希望本地區爆發戰事，但毋庸置疑，中日關係確實正在滑向危險的邊緣。
儘管西方媒體紛紛對“強硬的中國”大加渲染，多數中國人卻認為日本應為弄僵中日關係負責，中方的觀點值得國際社會的重視。從中國的角度觀察，日本國內政治的“向右轉”是造成當前中日失和的主要原因；而這場“向右轉”又是日本社會中內部的三重因素造成的：首先，“失落的二十年”終結了日本人引以為傲的經濟奇蹟；其次，日本近十來年走馬燈似的換了十來個首相，幾乎都是弱勢領導人；第三，2011年的福島核電站事故和日本社會的一些危機使日本民眾深受其害。在這些經濟、政治和社會問題的綜合影響下，日本社會充滿了一種不安全感，日本對中國的崛起也愈發感到寢食難安，特別是考慮到中日兩國間歷史遺留下來的種種宿怨。安倍晉三等日本政客為了獲取國內選民的支持，如今似乎已將寶押在了日本的民族主義上。
1972年後，雖然中日兩國政府恢復了正常的外交關係，但多數中國人對日本在侵華戰爭中犯下的罪行記憶猶新，兩國民間從未像法國和德國那樣，達成真正的和解——畢竟，日本發動的侵華戰爭奪去了2000多萬中國人的性命，幾乎完全摧毀了中國的經濟。而今，以日本首相為代表的日本右翼勢力不但毫無悔罪之意，甚至否認對華戰爭是侵略行為，我們不妨假設一下，如果德國今日仍然沿用納粹旗號、納粹黨歌，德國總理和內閣成員仍向供奉着希特勒的神龕致敬，英法民眾該作何感想？
在這樣的背景下，東京方面單方面做出“國有化”釣魚島（日本稱“尖閣諸島”）的決定，當然會在中國掀起軒然大波。回顧歷史，釣魚島及其附屬島嶼一直是台灣的一部分。清王朝在甲午戰爭中敗給日本後，於1895年簽訂《馬關條約》，將台灣全島及附屬島嶼割讓給了日本。當第二次世界大戰接近尾聲時，中美英三國於1943年聯合發佈《開羅宣言》，規定日本將“自中國人處得到的所有領土，比如滿洲、台灣及澎湖羣島”歸還給中國。二戰結束後不久，中國解放戰爭爆發，中華人民共和國於1949年成立。此後又相繼發生了朝鮮戰爭和冷戰。日本在美國製定的和平憲法的約束下，成為了美國的盟友，美日間的盟友關係一直維持至今。1972年，美國決定把釣魚島的管理權交給日本，此舉引來了北京、台北與世界各地華人華僑的強烈抗議。
根據中方的記錄，1972年中日建交時，雙方同意擱置領土爭議。1978年，在東京出席《中日和平友好條約》批准書互換儀式的鄧小平面對新聞記者説過一段著名的話：“實現中日邦交正常化的時候，我們雙方約定不涉及這一問題。這次談中日和平友好條約的時候，雙方也約定不涉及這一問題。……這樣的問題放一下不要緊，等十年也沒有關係。我們這一代缺少智慧，談這個問題達不成一致意見。下一代總比我們聰明，定會找到彼此都能接受的方法。”他還提出了一項合理的建議，暨“擱置爭議、共同開發（區域內資源）”。時至今日，我認為鄧小平的主張仍是最為可行的建議。2012年，日本悍然做出“國有化”釣魚島的決定，根本不承認島嶼主權存在爭議這一事實，這使大多數中國人倍感羞辱與憤怒。
習近平主席是一位更加自信、對國家也更有信心的領導人，中國的立場也從過去的“戰略模糊”轉變為“戰略清晰”，部分作為對美國“重返亞洲”戰略及日本右翼軍國主義勢力挑釁的回應。習近平主席如是説：中國走和平發展道路，其他國家也都要走和平發展道路。實際上，中日之間已簽有四個文件，規定兩國必須以和平談判的方式解決彼此爭端。在北京方面看來，日本單方面“國有化”釣魚島的行動，違背了這一原則。
海監船在釣魚島近海巡航，中國的立場從過去的“戰略模糊”轉變為“戰略清晰”
在某些人眼中，中國的“戰略清晰”含有挑釁的色彩，但其實中國僅僅是更清楚表述了自己長期堅持的立場，北京方面明示底線，也許能夠避免有關各方誤判戰略形勢，這或許更加符合各方的利益。從某種意義上説，北京可能從自己與台北打交道的過程中獲得了一些有益的經驗：2003年，中國正式提出了“和平崛起”（“和平發展”），之後的2005年，又通過了《反分裂國家法》，這意味着一旦台灣宣佈獨立，北京將不得不使用“非和平手段”。這實際上也是北京自1949年以來一直堅持上述立場，然而《反分裂國家法》出台後還是引發了台北方面和西方媒體的強烈不安。但當我們今天回望過去，《反分裂國家法》其實為兩岸關係的巨大改善打下了堅實的基礎。
中國已經將長期堅持的立場清晰地表達了出來，現在到了日本和有關各方看清並尊重中國底線的時候了。北京、東京和華盛頓應當共同致力於緩和中日之間的緊張局勢，美國實際上可以為推動中日和解發揮有益的作用，畢竟在對待二戰歷史上，美國與安倍首相立場殊異，而對美國在日本的軍事存在，中國也不公開反對，中國不少人認為美在日本的軍事存在是一種“必要的惡”，一定程度上有助於約束日本軍國主義復活、特別是有助於防止日本走核武之路。
在未來十年中，中國很可能取代美國成為世界最大的經濟體。在西方的歷史上，守成大國與新興大國之間的關係通常是一場零和博弈，歐洲近現代史中此類先例比比皆是。作為一個文化傳統殊異於西方的大國，中國的崛起是西方前所未見的：中國傳統裏沒有西方基督教傳統的彌賽亞傳教士情結；中國的古老文化是一種“修築長城”的防禦性文化，迥異於西方的殖民文化；中國也是世界上唯一公開承諾不首先使用核武器的核大國。中國確實希望與美國在互相尊重主權、維護共同利益、保持人民友誼的基礎上，共同建設“新型大國關係”；但是如果美國處處敵視中國，中國則有可能真的成為其敵人。擺在中美兩國面前的，是一次歷史性的機遇——作為這個時代的新興大國與守成大國，中美完全可以跳出固有的歷史邏輯，超越對抗與衝突，成為朋友而非敵人。雙方應該抓住這次機遇，朝着這個方向努力，而緩和中日間緊張對峙的局面正是中美兩國可以首先做的事情。
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Time to respect China’s red lines
Beijing, Tokyo and Washington should work together to defuse the tension between China and Japan | By Zhang Weiwei
Sino-Japanese relations have never been so precarious since the two sides established diplomatic ties in 1972. Many observers now even compare the situation to that in Europe a century ago when the First World War was about to rage across the continent. This scenario may be exaggerated, as neither Beijing, nor Tokyo, nor Washington wants a war in the region – that would be disastrous for their shared economic interests and global prosperity– but Beijing-Tokyo relations are indeed experiencing a dangerous drift.
While the Western media seem to focus on what they perceive as a more assertive China, most Chinese blame Japan for the Sino-Japanese predicament, and the Chinese view deserves some attention. From a Chinese perspective, the right turn in Japan’s domestic politics is the major cause for the current status of Sino-Japanese relations, and this right turn is a product of three domestic developments in Japan: the country has experienced “two lost decades” which ended the proud Japanese economic miracle; the country has witnessed a string of weak leaders, literally 10 or so prime ministers replacing each other within ten years; and the 2011 Fukushima nuclear disaster and other social woes have gripped much of the Japanese society. The combined economic, political and social malaises have shaped among the Japanese a strong sense of insecurity and their perception of China’s rise as Japan’s possible nightmare, given the historical grievances between the two countries. Japanese politicians like Prime Minister Abe seem now to count on Japan’s nationalism for more domestic support.
Despite the normalization of the diplomatic ties between Beijing and Tokyo, regrettably there has never been real reconciliation between the two peoples, as there has, for instance, between France and Germany, and the memory of Japan’s war atrocities remain fresh and sharp in the minds of most Chinese. After all, it’s a war that caused the deaths of some 20 million Chinese and destroyed the Chinese economy. Yet China is still faced with an unrepentant Japan and a Prime Minister who even refuses to call the war an act of aggression. Just imagine how the French or the British public would react to a Germany that still used the Nazi flag and national anthem and whose chancellor and cabinet ministers still paid homage to Hitler’s shrine?
Against this background, it took only a single event like Tokyo’s decision to “nationalize” the Diaoyu (Senkaku) islands to spark a chain of strong reactions from China. Historically the Diaoyu islands, as part of Taiwan, were ceded to Japan after the Chinese empire was defeated in the first Sino-Japanese war in the 1890s. Towards the end of the Second World War, the Cairo Declaration of December 1943 issued by China, the US and Britain demanded that Japan return Taiwan and all other territories it had grabbed, to China. However, China’s civil war broke out soon after, followed by the founding of the People’s Republic in 1949, the Korean War of the early 1950s and the Cold War. Japan, under a peace constitution imposed by the US, became a US ally and has remained so up to now. In 1972, the US decided to return the “administrative rights” over the Diaoyu islands to Japan, which triggered sweeping protests from Beijing to Taipei to overseas Chinese communities across the world.
Beijing’s record shows that the two sides agreed to set aside the dispute when they established diplomatic ties in 1972. Deng Xiaoping famously said at a press conference held in Tokyo in 1978 when the two sides signed the Peace and Friendship Treaty: “we have agreed to shelve the dispute for the future, and we believe our future generations will be more intelligent than us today in finding a mutually acceptable solution to the dispute.” He also advocated a sensible approach to the dispute: that the two countries should defer the issue and start joint exploration (of resources in the area), which to this author, remains the most feasible option for both sides. Obviously Japan’s decision in 2012 to “nationalize” the disputed islands, as if China’s claim over the islands never existed, humiliated and angered most Chinese.
With the coming to power of President Xi Jinping, a leader more confident of himself and his country, China has shifted its overall stance from what can be called “strategic ambiguity” to “strategic clarity.” Partly in reaction to the US “pivot to Asia” and to Japan’s rising right-wing militarism, President Xi said that China will pursue peaceful development but others should do the same. Actually, between China and Japan, there are already four legal and political documents committing both sides to solve their disputes peacefully and through negotiations. Japan’s unilateral action to “nationalize” the Diaoyu Islands was viewed by Beijing as violating this principle.
Beijing’s “strategic clarity” may be provocative to some, yet it may serve the interests of all the actors concerned to avoid strategic miscalculations, as Beijing has only stated its long-held positions in much clearer terms. In this regard, Beijing may have drawn something useful from its dealings with Taipei. Beijing officially advanced the theme of China’s “peaceful rise” (later “peaceful development”) in 2003, but it adopted an Anti-Secession Law in 2005, which binds Beijing to adopt what’s called “non-peaceful means” if Taiwan declares independence, a position that Beijing has held since 1949. And the law caused uproar from Taipei and the Western media at that time. But in retrospect, the law has paved the way for the dramatic improvements in Beijing-Taipei relations we witness now.
It’s time for Japan, and the other parties concerned to know Beijing’s red line, which is only a clearer expression of Beijing’s long-held position, and Beijing, Tokyo and Washington should work together to defuse the tension between China and Japan, and the US could play a meaningful role as a facilitator in this regard, and after all, Washington does not share Prime Minister Abe’s position on the Second World War, and China does not openly object to the US military presence in Japan, as it is viewed by many in Beijing as a “necessary evil” to check Japan’s rising militarism, especially Japan’s possible nuclearization.
China may overtake the US as the world’s largest economy in less than a decade. In the history of the West, relations between an established power and rising power are often a zero-sum game, and the European history is full of examples of such conflicts. But for the first time, it’s the rise of a non-Western power, with a totally different cultural tradition: China does not have a messianic culture of converting others; it has a long culture of building the Great Wall to defend itself from others rather than colonizing others; China is the only nuclear power to openly state that it will not be the first to use nuclear weapons against other countries. China indeed hopes to establish “a new type of major power relationship” with the US, based on mutual respect for sovereignty, common interests and people-to-people friendship. But if the US treats China as an enemy, China may indeed become its enemy. History presents an opportunity to the two countries to become friends, rather than enemies, moving beyond the old logic of confrontation between established and rising powers. The two sides should grasp it and start in this direction perhaps with some meaningful initiatives to defuse Sino-Japanese tensions.