李世默：中國為何能贏在下一個三十年

2013年TED大會上，李世默發表了頗受矚目的演講，其中重複了他在此前多篇文章中論述的觀點。李世默認為中國的經濟和國力將持續增長，一黨執政的中國模式將趨於完善，但中國絕不會嘗試向外輸出自己的價值觀和政治模式。4月26日，美國百人會第23屆年會在舊金山召開，今年的主題是“求同存異”。會上，李世默與《赫芬頓郵報》旗下的《世界郵報》（The World Post）專欄作家馬特•希恩（Matt Sheehan）對話，以《中國為何能贏在太平洋》為題，刊發於今日的《世界郵報》上，主題包括中國在領土問題上的立場，國際秩序的演變，以及中國政治制度的前景。以下為馬特·希恩與李世默對話。

馬特·希恩對話李世默

馬特•希恩：從奧巴馬總統的日本之行，和他就烏克蘭危機等的表態看，有跡象表明美國正試圖對盟友表示更大的支持，在各種衝突中為他們助威。而美國在敍利亞和克里米亞危機中的表現眾所周知, 您認為當下美國做的這些新的表態還有作用嗎？

李世默：對您的問題，我沒有直接的答案。不過在美國，口惠而實不至是政客的天性，他們總是輕易許諾，但很少兑現。在美國的選舉中，人們對此已司空見慣，但這一現象正擴散到國際政治中。喬治•凱南是一位偉大的戰略家，冷戰初期，他為美國一手打造了遏制戰略。冷戰結束後，北約和歐盟不斷東擴，也正是凱南警告這將鑄成大錯，他説美國儘管志得意滿地到處派發安全保證，但事實上它既無力也無心真正兑現。今天的局勢，證明凱南不幸言中。凱南已去，美國恐怕再沒有這樣清醒的戰略家了。

喬治•凱南是一位偉大的戰略家，冷戰初期，他為美國一手打造了遏制戰略。

馬特•希恩：克里米亞危機是否會影響中國領導人對亞太問題的估計？比如，是否會鼓勵他們採取更堅決的姿態？

李世默：我想影響是有限的。克里米亞危機只是次要的, 決定性的因素在美國自身。美國人口佔世界的4.5%，經濟產值不到20%，但軍費開支高達全球一半，在世界各地頻頻征戰。冷戰結束後僅僅一代人多一點的時間，美國就債台高築，產業空心化，中產階級萎縮，基礎設施失修，教育資金匱乏，社會契約失去合法性。顯而易見，這種局面是難以為繼的。美國的戰略重心搖擺不定，先是亞洲，接着是中東，然後是烏克蘭，最後又一無所獲地回到起點。與此同時, 美國民眾對重建本國社會基礎的訴求與日俱增。這才是影響中國長遠戰略思考的重要趨勢。

馬特•希恩：關於中美關係的進一步發展，您強調有序競爭、戰略合作和相互尊重各自的影響區域。就此，您如何看美國在亞太的角色？

李世默：在亞太地區，有些國家是美國的“保護國”，其中最大的是日本，菲律賓也名列其中。美國為這些“保護國”提供軍事保障，而有些美國”保護國”和中國有各種利益, 文化和戰略上的衝突。問題在於，中國作為一個崛起中的大國, 能否在其周邊地區有序地建立合理的影響區域？這個歷史悠久的大國，未來能否和平地重返其在亞太的領導地位？在這個過程中，美國又會扮演什麼樣的角色？

馬特•希恩：您曾強調中共的合法性既來源於它帶領中國實現的經濟成就，也建立在中共領導的民族解放運動，最終結束了列強侵略的“百年國恥”的歷史地位上。在與日本的領土爭端上，中國領導人將遭遇兩難挑戰，要麼不惜經濟滑坡的風險動武開戰，要麼放棄民族核心利益並妥協讓步。就您來看，中共的決策層會作何決斷呢？

李世默：的確，中共的合法性有賴於保持經濟增長與保衞民族利益。在您假設的挑戰中，這兩大目標很難兼顧，這將考驗中共決策層的政治決斷。要兼顧兩者而不偏廢，確實要求相當高的政治智慧，而迄今為止中共決策層的表現十分出色。如果一如既往，未來兩者還會相得益彰。

中國最近在南海和東海問題上更趨堅決，很多分析家認為其結果對中國是負面的，我認為那是誤判。事實很明顯，中國的戰略是積極改變對其不利的現有格局，同時避免軍事衝突。 在與日本、菲律賓的領土爭端上，中國的表現是出色的。在黃巖島問題上，中國實現了對那個區域的實際控制權， 但避免了戰爭。在釣魚島爭端上，中國改變了既往局勢，日本否認領土爭端的存在，但中國的策略已將爭端成為現實， 中國的船隻在釣魚島海域行駛， 挑戰了日本的實際控制權，這些戰略成果都是在一槍未發的條件下獲取的。

  馬特•希恩：在您看來，美國開創了戰後國際體系，但要繼續擔當世界警察，維持利維坦的門面已力不從心。而中國儘管正在崛起，卻絕不會試圖取代美國的角色。既然中國與非洲、南美乃至全世界的經濟聯繫日漸密切，中國還能堅持孤立主義的外交政策嗎？

李世默：毋庸置疑，中國與全球經濟的聯繫越來越密切。從非洲、東南亞到世界各地，中國的政治、經濟政策正不斷向外拓展。但中國的觀念與美國截然不同。中國從未企圖建立一個普世體系並執其牛耳。中國的政策目標是與各國平等互惠地發展經貿關係，增進中國民眾的福利。中國從未將自己的觀念強加於人，或對其他國家的內政指手劃腳，或兜售某種宏大敍事。中國一直致力於改善經貿關係，增進本國民眾的福利。當然，隨着其國力的上升, 中國的政策將趨於強勢，但必須看到這與美國的世界觀有本質區別。

馬特•希恩：您深信中國政府有能力解決中國當下面臨的諸多挑戰。眾所周知，這些挑戰包括環境惡化、腐敗引發的金融和經濟問題，在您看來，哪些挑戰是最嚴峻的？哪些是中共難以應對的？

李世默：經濟和腐敗問題是兩大最緊迫的挑戰。中國經濟持續高增長，但既有的經濟模式已走到盡頭。中國經濟亟需結構性改革，這意味着增速適當放緩，期間將出現一些新問題。兼顧結構調整與增長無疑是一大挑戰，但我相信在這方面中國的領導人能力出眾，足以應對。

第二大挑戰是腐敗問題。幾千年來，腐敗一直是中國政治中的頑症，歷代王朝都深陷其中。因此，腐敗的根源非常複雜、頑固，很難找到永久根治的靈丹妙藥。當前，中共正發動一次運動式的反腐風暴：猛藥去痾、重典治亂，在一定時期內足以遏制腐敗；當然時過境遷，腐敗還會死灰復燃，到時又必須啓動另一次反腐風暴。目前，這次堪稱建國以來最嚴厲的反腐風暴，正漸入高潮。我相信這足以在短期內遏制腐敗，但肯定無法根治。遠期來看，政府內部的制度化監督機制將逐漸強化，當然這是一個漸進的過程。

馬特•希恩：習近平主席主政已有一年半的時間。對習近平主席的施政理念和舉措，您有何感想？最大的看點是什麼？

李世默：我認為習近平主席正在開創中華人民共和國的第三個三十年。毋庸置疑，我認為這具有劃時代的意義。第一個三十年是毛澤東時代；第二個三十年是鄧小平時代，在某種意義上江澤民和胡錦濤兩位領導人繼承發揚了鄧小平的事業。我的理解是，習近平主席開創的新三十年，將是對前兩個三十年的辯證綜合。在剛過去的十八個月中，習近平主席讓全國民眾領會了他的施政理念和舉措，在經濟改革、反腐、政治改革等各方面，其大刀闊斧的決心和舉措超越了所有人的預期。

馬特•希恩：迄今為止，習近平主席的政績相當完美，但接下來改革的主要挑戰在哪裏？

李世默：在我看來，最大的風險是難以預測的國際衝突。我相信中國政府能有效地調整和發展經濟，許多人強調中國的經濟風險，我承認許多問題確實存在，但相信政府能處理好。中國經濟正踏上一個新台階，有充分的創新能力。

許多人聲稱中國的一大困境是創新乏力，這簡直是天方夜譚。今天的中國處於幾百年來最具有創新活力的時代。大約十八或十九年前，我開始從事風險投資時，主流觀點是中國永遠產生不了市值十億美元的高科技公司。今天，阿里巴巴和騰訊的市值都已超過千億美元。至於十億美元市值的公司，走進中關村的某家飯店，就隨處可見。

馬特•希恩：中國最大的高科技公司，都是在市場保護的環境中發展起來的。如果中國要培養更多有國際競爭力的公司，比如堪與WhatsApp競爭的微信，中共是否會助其一臂之力？

李世默：在我看來，中共不是直接幫助高科技公司，而是提供更基礎性的支持，改善吸引人才和投資的環境。只要看看中國的大學，就會發現其科研設施和人才與十年前相比，早已不可同日而語。在這樣的舞台上，年輕的創新人才將不斷開發出新技術和方案。對此我相當樂觀。

馬特•希恩：您指出難以預料的國際衝突是對中國崛起的最大威脅，然而當前的國際環境因為中國的崛起而充滿衝突, 就算中國成功地打破了對其不利的現有格局, 但是在大方向上中國的策略是否是失敗的？

李世默：任何長遠戰略都有其短期目標之間的矛盾,受制於這種矛盾才會失敗。利用和平的外部環境發展經濟，是中國關鍵的戰略目標。但是，中國的復興有其多重使命，其中就包括恢復在亞太的領導地位，以保衞中國的核心利益。中國要實現復興不可能不承擔風險，我想中國的戰略不是無謂的避免風險, 而是積極承擔風險, 穩妥控制風險, 以實現利益最大化。

馬特•希恩：您反駁了民眾收入增加會刺激政治權利、言論自由之類訴求的觀點。且不論政治表達的問題，您如何看如民族主義等中國民間政治意識覺醒的現象？

李世默：只要瀏覽一下中國的網絡平台，比如微博、YY語音或微信，就會發現無數民眾每天都在放開地表達自己。然而，認為中國民眾正期待政治權利，這是自欺欺人的偽命題。

在描述中國民眾時，我會避免用中產階級這個詞，因為這一概念的傾向十分明顯。中產階級的原義是資產階級，這是歐洲歷史特有的產物。資產階級的核心特徵不只是經濟因素，而是基因中的政治宗教理念。資產階級的政治宗教基因，可以追溯到歐洲歷史上的新教改革和啓蒙運動。新教改革和啓蒙運動對資產階級的誕生有決定性影響，而經濟因素的影響相對次要。晚至工業革命後，資產階級所取得的經濟實力推動了他們奪取政權,從而實現原有的政治宗教訴求。中國沒有什麼真正意義上的資產階級，卻有一個不斷擴大的中等收入羣體。相形之下，歐洲的資產階級天然就有政治、宗教的訴求，這在實質上並不取決於經濟狀況。

認為民眾一旦獲得冰箱、汽車，接着就自然會要求選票，這種想法十分荒唐，在歷史和政治學中毫無根據。

（翻頁請看英文原文）

  Eric X. Li On Why China Is Winning In The Pacific

Matt Sheehan

（Eric X. Li is a venture capitalist, political scientist and frequent commentator on China’s growing economic and military influence. In a provocative TED Talk and several articles he has predicted that while China will continue to grow its wealth and power, it’s unlikely to depart from one-party governance or take an evangelical approach to extending its values beyond Chinese borders. While in San Francisco for a conference, Li sat down with The WorldPost’s Matt Sheehan for a conversation about China’s growing territorial assertiveness, the transforming international order, and the future of China’s political system.）

With Obama’s recent trip to Japan and the rhetoric on conflicts in places like Ukraine, it seems that the U.S. is attempting to reassure allies that it will be there for them in case of conflict. Do you think these assurances carry much weight after what’s happened in Syria and Crimea?

I really don’t know. I think that American politicians have a tendency to make promises for the sake of expediency that they can’t possibly keep. It’s the norm for domestic politics during elections, but it’s also increasingly the case in international relations. This reminds me of George Kennan, the great architect of America’s containment policy during the Cold War. When NATO was expanding eastward along with the EU after the end of the Cold War, he said it was a grave mistake. The U.S. was just lightheartedly issuing security guarantees to protect many nations that it had no real desire or intent or ability to truly meaningfully fulfill. I think his prediction is becoming reality. Where is George Kennan when you need him?

Has what’s happened in places like Crimea changed the calculus of what Chinese leaders think is possible in the Asia Pacific? Has it changed how far they think they can push these conflicts?

I think only on the margin. It’s a secondary trend, whether Crimea happens or not. The more decisive trend is occurring in America. I mean, the United States has 4.5 percent of the world’s population, less than 20 percent of its production, but accounts for half of the whole world’s defense spending. It is constantly at war in distant lands. In a little more than a generation’s time after winning the Cold War, it has become deeply in debt, its industry is hollowed out, its middle class is collapsing, its infrastructure is badly in disrepair, its education is under-funded, and its social contract is in shambles. It is not sustainable; it simply can’t go on forever. American foreign policy is “pivoting” to Asia, then to the Middle East, then to Ukraine, while the American people badly need a pivot to Ohio. And that is the context within which China seems to be considering its strategic options in the very long term.

When discussing the emerging relationship between the U.S. and China, you’ve talked about managed competition, strategic cooperation and respect for spheres of influence. In that context, what role does the U.S. have to play in the Asia Pacific?

The United States has protectorates in the Asia Pacific region that are in conflict with China, Japan being the biggest and the Philippines as well. The question is whether we’re going toward a future in which China will justifiably be able to establish a legitimate sphere of influence in this neighborhood in an orderly fashion. It’s a large country with a long history, and we’ll see if it can fulfill its destiny as a pre-eminent power in the Asia Pacific in a peaceful manner and what will the United States’ role be in this process. That is the question.

You’ve argued that the Chinese Communist Party derives its legitimacy from economic progress and the nationalist legitimacy of liberating China after the ‘century of humiliation’ at the hands of foreign powers. In a potential territorial showdown with Japan, Chinese leaders may have to choose between a military clash that is highly disruptive to the economy, or appearing to give ground on core nationalist interests. If so, how do you see the party choosing to move forward?

In that case, the two sources of legitimacy are in conflict and the Chinese leadership has just got to manage this. This is a delicate balance that they have to get, and I think they’ve done reasonably well so far. If managed well, in the long term, the two goals are mutually supportive of each other.

I don’t buy the argument that China has hurt itself in its more assertive policies in the South and East China Sea. I think they’ve performed brilliantly. The strategy was to change the status quo in China’s favor without leading to actual military conflict, and in territorial disputes with the Philippines and Japan they’ve done that. For the islands disputed with the Philippines, China now effectively controls the space and there has been no war. In the Diaoyu Islands, China has been able to create new realities on the ground. Japan’s long held position has been the denial of dispute. They continue to deny there is a dispute, but dispute is now a fact. China’s patrol boats are there frequently. China has changed the status quo qualitatively, and there’s been no war.

At the same time, you’ve described unanticipated military conflict as the greatest threat to China’s development. If that’s the case, can recent moves that have changed the status quo but also ratcheted up tensions and the likelihood of conflict really be called a success for China?

Success does not come out of being paralyzed by seemingly conflicting objectives. Economic development helped by a peaceful external environment is a critical strategic objective for China, but so is a multifaceted renaissance of the Chinese nation that includes reclaiming a leadership position in the Asia Pacific that would enable China to protect its core interests. These goals cannot be achieved without taking risks. I think the Chinese strategy is to take calculated risks but control risks in order to obtain optimal outcomes.

You argue that the U.S. is no longer able to fill the Leviathan role of policing an international order that it has created. You also say that despite China’s ascendancy, it will not try to fill this role of regulating an international architecture. Given China’s increasing economic entanglement everywhere from Africa to South America, can China maintain its aloofness on foreign policy issues?

I think certainly China is going to be more internationally involved. It has more outward-looking political and economic policies everywhere from Africa to Southeast Asia. But the fundamental outlook is different. They’re not trying to build an overarching system where they’re the hegemon. They’re trying to do what’s best for the Chinese people, and they treat the other participants as independent players. They’re not going to try to force their ideas on others or tell others how to run their countries or sign them up to some kind of grand scheme. The Chinese are there to trade and cut the best deals for their own people. Of course they will be more assertive but it’s fundamentally different from the American worldview.

You’ve expressed high confidence in the ability of China’s bureaucracy to deal with the many issues that China faces today. Looking at the vast array of challenges, from environmental degradation to corruption to financial and economic hurdles, which issues worry you the most? Are there problems that you think the Chinese Communist Party is not ready or able to handle?

The two front-burner items are economics and corruption. The current economic structure has served China well in the past but will no longer be sustainable in the future, so they’re going to need to make structural changes to the economy. But in order to make those structural changes they’re going to need to slow down the growth rate, which could cause other problems. So getting that balance right is really hard, I think. But they have a very, very competent team and I think they’ll be able to lick it.

The second problem is corruption … Corruption has been a problem for China for thousands of years; every dynasty has had enormous corruption problems. So the root causes are complex and deep, and it’s very difficult to address permanently. Right now the policy is a campaign-style anti-corruption drive: you hit ’em hard and it’ll get better for some time and then eventually it will come back and another hit will be required. Right now we’re in the early stages of a tough anti-corruption drive, probably the toughest in the history of the People’s Republic. I think it’ll succeed for some time and it’ll contain corruption but won’t eliminate it. Other longer-term reforms are also taking place that will see an increasing role of a rule-based institutional system in China’s governance, but that is a gradual process.

We’re now a year and a half into Xi Jinping’s leadership. How do you rate Xi on vision and execution, and what are the real sticking points and toughest nuts to crack?

I characterize the Xi leadership as the beginning of the third 30-year period for the People’s Republic, so needless to say I think it’s really important. The first 30 years were the Mao era, the second 30 years were the Deng era. In many respects both Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao were extensions of the Deng era. I think Xi opens a new era that dialectically synthesizes the previous two. In terms of the vision that he has articulated to the Chinese people, where he wants to take the country, and what he’s been able to execute in the last 18 months, it has been beyond anyone’s imagination or expectations. Economic reforms, anti-corruption, political reforms, everything.

Things have mostly gone well for the Xi leadership so far, but where do the toughest aspects of reform lie?

In my view the biggest risk is an unanticipated international conflict. I think they’re going to lick the economics. I know a lot of people are emphasizing the risks, and I agree there are risks but I think they’re going to get it right. The economy is moving toward a new phase and it’s highly innovative.

I don’t know what people are talking about when they say innovation is China’s problem. I think China is going through the most innovative period in hundreds of years. When I started as a venture capitalist 18 or 19 years ago, I was told that China could never produce a tech company with a $1 billion market cap. Today Ali Baba and Tencent each are over $100 billion. A $1 billion company? You go into a restaurant in Beijing’s university district and there are ten of them.

Many of China’s biggest international tech companies are essentially shielded from competition at home. If China wants to produce more companies that compete internationally, say WeChat with WhatsApp, what role (if any) will the Chinese Communist Party play in that?

I think the party’s role is not in directly helping these companies. The party’s role is more fundamental: attracting people, attracting investment. If you look at universities in China, they are unrecognizable from 10 years ago in terms of the laboratories they’ve built and the people they’ve been able to attract. I think they’re setting the stage for a sustained period of young talent coming up and being able to create new technologies, new ways of doing things. I’m optimistic on that front.

You’ve argued against the assumption that with rising incomes will come rising demand for political rights and freedom of expression in China. If this kind of political expression doesn’t occur, do you see another kind of political consciousness filling the void, increased nationalism for example?

Just go on any Chinese Internet portal, Weibo, YY, WeChat, for example, and the Chinese people are expressing themselves all day long. I think that this presumption in the West that they’ll seek political rights is a pre-supposed problem that didn’t exist.

In describing Chinese people, I hesitate to use the term middle class because it’s a loaded term. Middle class means bourgeoisie. The bourgeoisie was a unique European phenomenon. The bourgeoisie was more than money, the bourgeoisie already had politics and religion in its DNA before their economic success. Money enabled them to act on those aspirations. It goes back to the Protestant Reformation and the Enlightenment. The bourgeoisie emerged with political and religious elements in its DNA and economics was part of it. China does not have a bourgeois class, it has a middle-income group that is rapidly expanding. In contrast, the European bourgeois class wanted political and religious rights to begin with, with or without money.

The idea that people start buying refrigerators and cars, and then the next thing is they want elections, that’s crazy. It has no basis in history or political science; it’s made up.

（This interview has been edited for length and clarity.）