遊凱嵐：為什麼亞洲應該對安倍呼籲的國際法治下的亞洲説不

【被稱為“香格里拉峯會”的亞洲安全會議5月30日正式召開。在當天的開幕會上，日本首相安倍晉三高調地發表主題演講，以“法制”為名不點名地指責中國，並對日本自我表揚，向亞洲推銷日本新型主導權，此舉引發全球熱議。本文由觀察者網供稿，刊載於6月24日美國《赫芬頓郵報》旗下的《世界郵報》（World Post）。以下為中文譯文。】

數週前，在新加坡香格里拉對話會上，安倍晉三大膽地向亞洲推銷日本新型主導權。在安倍先生看來，奠定亞太地區高速增長的和平基礎受到了威脅。雖未點名批評中國，但他卻有的放矢地警告亞洲正面臨新的危險。安倍提出，亞太地區需要日本的領導，需要對“國際法”在地區中的地位重新加以肯定。

在當前充滿變數的形勢下，安倍的言辭可謂非常猛烈。亞洲應該接受他的提議嗎？在講話中，安倍反覆提及《聯合國海洋法公約》與南中國海的航行自由，並代表日本政府表態，大力支持菲律賓與越南在南中國海的主權主張。

本文英文發表於《赫芬頓郵報》旗下的《世界郵報》

站在中國的角度，安倍對國際法的解讀和表述是充滿挑釁和非常危險的。中國從未採取任何行動或提出任何主張去限制南中國海的航行自由。早在1982年，中國便批准了《聯合國海洋法公約》；2002年，中國又簽署了《南中國海各方行為宣言》，再次肯定中國將“尊重並保證在南中國海及其上空的通航自由和飛行自由”。按照《聯合國海洋法公約》規定的最後期限，中國於2009年5月7日向聯合國提交了劃定“九段線”的地圖與公函。當菲律賓就南中國海的航行自由公開表達關切時，中國政府及時地做出了回應：“南中國海的航行自由與安全是有保障的”。

如果中國在南中國海的主權主張是一種威脅的話，為什麼其他聲索國的主張不是？同理，就外國軍事監視而言，如果中國的立場存在問題，為什麼菲律賓和馬來西亞不持同樣的立場？菲律賓提出可疑的“鏡框”主張，不但將大片矩形海域作為“羣島海域”劃歸己有，還極具爭議地提出該海域為其“內海”——即明確拒絕承認航行自由，甚至剝奪所有外國船舶的“無害通過權”，又該當何論？即使中國完全退出對該海域的主權聲索，南中國海的大片海域仍將被諸國瓜分。

數週前，在新加坡香格里拉對話會上，安倍晉三大膽地向亞洲推銷日本新型主導權

或許安倍先生認為，任何一個國家在單一毗連區內大片劃定專屬經濟區，或專屬經濟區範圍遠超該國主要海岸線均屬非法。但如果他真想發明一條這樣的法律，是否會將其應用於範圍遠超日本主要島嶼的海上專屬經濟區呢？要知道，日本專屬經濟區的面積比南中國海存在爭議的海域面積還要大，其邊界超出日本主要島嶼海岸線一千多海里——其法理依據不過是日本對西太平洋上稀疏分佈的諸小島（證據不充分）的領土主張而已。

南中國海的海事糾紛從來都與航行自由無關，而是各聲索國都在鑽聯合國海洋法公約的空子。從各個聲索國對該公約的正式批准聲明中能看出，他們對公約精神理解各不相同。菲律賓在批准聲明中宣稱聯合國海洋法公約“沒有損害如‘卡拉延羣島’（我南沙羣島）及附屬海域等菲律賓共和國行使主權之領土。”同樣，越南“重申越南對‘黃沙羣島’（我西沙羣島）及‘長沙羣島’（我南沙羣島）的主權。”中國也重新確認了對其“所有羣島和各島嶼擁有主權。”安倍先生在新加坡將中國拒與菲律賓接受國際仲裁的立場描黑為對地區和平的威脅。這又是對國際法錯誤的引述。在糾紛雙方均同意的前提下，仲裁是解決糾紛的一種選項；聯合國海洋法公約規定，在當事雙方未就接受仲裁取得統一意見時，解決糾紛的主要途徑是談判（第279條），交換意見（第283條），以及調解程序（第284條）（另見聯合國憲章第1條、第33條）。

聯合國海洋法公約第298條保證了締約國在任何時候退出由公約提供的海洋疆界仲裁的權利。包括澳大利亞、加拿大、智利、丹麥、法國、葡萄牙、意大利、西班牙、韓國和俄羅斯在內的許多國家已經行使了這一權利。在政治協議沒有做出明文規定的情況下，極少數個人罔顧億萬人口利益（例如中國的14億人口）提出的糾紛解決方案都是嚴重非法的。

安倍先生煽動南中國海的糾紛升級，其無益的野心與日本政府一貫拒不承認東中國海存在爭議的做法形成了極大的反差。過去幾年中，世界見證了中日兩國在釣魚島（日稱尖閣諸島）問題上高度緊張甚至時有危險的對抗。中日間爭議的來源在於1972年美國將釣魚島的“行政管轄權”交予日本，引起來自大陸與台灣的雙重抗議。同年晚些時候，在中日兩國決定實現邦交正常化時，兩國領導人同意擱置爭議，為未來最終解決領土問題創造條件。

縱觀歷史，日本與中國的罅隙雖由來已久，但任何人都想不到居然到了2014年安倍先生還不肯最起碼的承認爭議！安倍政府對國際法非同尋常的解讀和鼓吹，與去年日本對中國宣佈在東海設置防空識別區的回應一樣，都非常危險，可能動搖地區安全與和平。

去年，在中國宣佈防空識別區之後，安倍政府立刻宣稱其“無效”。日本官員指責中國侵犯了日本的防空識別區，單方面改變了東海現狀。安倍先生禁止所有日本飛機進入中國防空識別區後通報中方，並試圖説服其他國家也照做，最後不了了之。

日本最不願面對的事實是，日本有着全亞洲最大的防空識別區。歷年來，日本防空識別區的面積曾多次擴大，且每次都是單方面行動，從不與鄰國協商。如果日本的防空識別區是“合法的”，為什麼中國的防空識別區是“非法的“？

全世界首個防空識別區是美國於1950年單方面劃定的產物。其合法性闡釋簡單而直接：既然所有國家享有在美國領空通航的自由，那麼美國不得不派遣飛機在近海上空攔截、干預、跟蹤不明航班時，就存在潛在危險。為了降低產生嚴重誤會和發生事故的風險，美國設立了一種可供飛機通報身份的新機制。本着合作原則，美國雖希望航班在國際空域中通報身份，但並未對此做硬性法律要求。

中國的做法與美國很像——援引了與美國相似的理論，在與領空毗鄰的國際空域設置防空識別區。中日兩國防空識別區存在重疊並非史無前例。共享國際空域的鄰國，自然會根據自身的國防需要去設置重疊的防空識別區。中方的防空識別區覆蓋釣魚島則更沒什麼特別的，畢竟日方的防空識別區也同樣覆蓋了這片存在爭議的島嶼。中國對防空識別區的劃定其實非常有節制，僅覆蓋中國工業心腹重地（長江三角洲）和政治中心（北京）以外幾百英里空域，這在國際上倒是非常少見。美國和日本的防空識別區一直延伸到離經濟政治中心上千英里遠的遠洋公海上空，與中國形成了鮮明的對比。

在香格里拉對話會上，安倍先生大膽地提出了一套由日本主導和以“國際法”為基礎的亞洲秩序。然而安倍政府一而再、再而三地顯示出，日本構想中在“國際法”治下的亞洲，實際就是置於日本委任管理之下的亞洲。所有亞洲國家——包括那些日本正在拉攏討好的國家——都應該反對這個“日本的亞洲”。

（觀察者網楊晗軼 / 譯  請翻頁查看英文原文）

  Why Asia Should Say No to Mr. Abe’s Vision of International Law for Asia

By: Allen K. Yu

A few weeks ago at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, Shinzo Abe made a bold pitch to Asia to buy in on a new type of Japanese leadership. According to Mr. Abe, the peace that is at the foundation of the Asia Pacific’s unprecedented growth can no longer be guaranteed. Without naming China by name, Mr. Abe warns of a new danger that looms on the horizon. The Asia Pacific needs Japanese leadership and a new affirmation of “international law.”

These are heavy words for uncertain times. But should Asia buy in? In his speech, Mr. Abe talked extensively about The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, declaring his government’s strong support of the Philippines and Vietnam in their claims against China.

From China’s view, this was a provocative and dangerous articulation of law. China has never taken any actions or made any claims in the South China Sea that limits the freedom of passage. That is made abundantly clear with China’s ratification of the UNCLOS in 1982 and its signing of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea in 2002 reaffirming its “respect for and commitment to the freedom of navigation in and overflight above the South China Sea.” Pursuant to a deadline set by the UNCLOS, on May 7, 2009, China submitted a map and a letter to the U.N. detailing the extent and bases of its “nine-dashed” claim. When Philippines officials publicly expressed concerns about freedom of passage in the South China Sea, the Chinese government promptly reaffirmed saying, “the freedom and safety of navigation in the South China Sea is assured.”

If China’s claims are a threat, one might ask, why are those of the other claimants not? For example, if China’s stance on foreign military surveillance is a problem, why is the the same stance not taken by the Philippines and Malaysia? What about the Philippines’ dubious “picture frame” claims over a vast rectangular swath in the South China Sea as its “archipelago waters” and its controversial insistence of treating this swath as its “internal waters” -- thus explicitly repudiating any freedom of passage, including freedom of “innocent passage, through this vast area? Even if all of China’s claims were removed, most of the South China Sea would still be claimed by one or more of the such other competing claimants.

Perhaps Mr. Abe believes that it is illegal for one nation to claim too much exclusive economic zone in a single contiguous zone -- or to claim an EEZ that extends too far out from a nation’s main coastlines. But if he is serious about conjuring up such a law, would he also apply the same law to Japan’s EEZ lying beyond its main islands -- covering an area larger than the disputed areas of the South China Sea, stretching at points over a thousand miles from Japan’s main islands --based on (tenuous) claims to minor islands spread thinly across the Western Pacific?

The current maritime disputes in the South China Sea have never been about the freedom to navigate the seas, but about various nations’ competing claims on which the UNCLOS says nothing about. All the claimants understand as much, as can be assessed from their ratification statements. Thus the Philippines pronounced in its ratification statement that UNCLOS did “not in any manner impair or prejudice the sovereignty of the Republic of the Philippines over any territory over which it exercises sovereign authority, such as the Kalayaan Islands, and the waters appurtenant thereto.” Similarly, Vietnam “reiterate[d] Viet Nam’s sovereignty over the Hoang Sa and Truong Sa archipelagoes.” China, too, “reaffirm[ed] its sovereignty over all its archipelagos and islands.”

In Singapore, Mr. Abe also intoned China to be a threat to regional peace in refusing to participate in Philippine’s arbitration case. That is another dangerous mischaracterization of law. Arbitration is an option when mutually agreed to. Absent mutual agreement, the primary means for resolving disputes under UNCLOS is through negotiations (Article 279), exchange of views (Article 283), and conciliation procedures (Article 284) (See also, Articles 1 and 33 of U.N. charter).

The right to opt out of UNCLOS-provided maritime boundary arbitration at any time is guaranteed by Article 298. Many nations that have explicitly exercised the right include Australia, Canada, Chile, Denmark, France, Portugal, Italy, Spain, South Korea and Russia. The truth is, absent explicit political agreement, there is something very illegitimate about having a few individuals impose solutions on disputes that affect the interests of millions of people (or 1.4 plus billion as the case may be with China).

Mr. Abe’s unhelpful desire to declare and foment disputes in the South China Sea marks a great contrast to his government’s steadfast refusal to acknowledge any dispute in the East China Sea. Over the last few years, the world has come to witness the tense and sometimes dangerous confrontations between Japan and China over the Diaoyutai/ Senkaku Islands. The source of these disputes can be traced back to 1972 when the U.S. handed “administrative control” to Japan and both R.O.C. on Taiwan and P.R.C. on Mainland protested. When Japan and the P.R.C. decided to normalize their relations later that year, however, leaders from both nations agreed to shelve the disputes for the future.

Japan and China obviously hold wide and deeply-rooted differences over history, but one would think Mr. Abe would in 2014 at least acknowledge a dispute! The exceptional means by which Mr. Abe’s government approaches international law is dangerous and destabilizing, as was in full display last year with Japan’s response to China’s announcement of an Air Defense Identification Zone in the East China Sea.

Immediately, Mr. Abe’s government declared China’s ADIZ to be “invalid.” Japanese officials accused China of violating Japan’s ADIZ and of unilaterally changing the status quo in the East China Sea. Mr. Abe forbid all Japanese aircrafts from identifying themselves in China’s ADIZ and tried unsuccessfully to lobby other nations to do the same.

The inconvenient fact for Japan is that Japan claims the largest ADIZ in Asia, one that it has expanded multiple times throughout the years, each time unilaterally without ever consulting its neighbors. If Japan’s ADIZ “legal,” why is China’s “illegal”?

The first ADIZ in the world was created by the U.S., unilaterally, in 1950. The legal justification was straight forward. Since all nations enjoyed the freedom of navigation right up to the U.S.’s territorial airspace, a potentially dangerous situation above the near seas could arise when the U.S had to scramble aircrafts to intercept, meet and track unidentified aircrafts. To reduce the risk of serious incidents of misunderstanding and accidents, the U.S. provided a mechanism by which these aircrafts could identify themselves. The U.S. did not proclaim that aircrafts are legally required to identify themselves in these international airspaces, although it did generally expect them to do so since cooperation made sense.

China -- like the U.S. -- invoked a similar rationale to declare an ADIZ in its adjoining international airspace. The fact that China’s ADIZ overlap that of Japan was nothing exceptional. Nations sharing adjoining international airspaces would naturally look to the same airspaces to address their defense concerns. The fact that China’s ADIZ covers the disputed Diaoyutai / Senkaku is also unexceptional given that Japan’s ADIZ also covers the same disputed islands. China’s ADIZ is actually quite unexceptional in defining a modest area that is entirely within a few hundred miles from China’s industrial heartland (Shanghai delta area) and political center (Beijing area). By contrast, both the U.S. and Japan claim huge ADIZs that stretch deep into the open seas, at times over a thousand miles from any industrial or political center.

In the Shangri-La Dialogue, Mr. Abe boldly offers Asia an order based on Japanese leadership and “international law.” Yet in case after case, Mr. Abe’s government has shown that Japan’s conception of an Asia ruled by “international law” is really just an Asia ruled under Japanese mandate. All Asian nations -- including those currently being befriended by Japan -- should reject it.