葉劉淑儀：香港人，到底在憤怒什麼？

如果你跟外國派駐香港的外交官員打過交道，就會發現越是來自動盪地區的官員，就越羨慕香港社會的安全。以熱愛自由聞名於世香港人，就連遊行示威也一向以和平著稱。與暴行肆虐的地區相比，香港是一片和平的綠洲。但悲哀的是，如今這片綠洲隨時可能消失。

雖然現階段香港的實體安全尚未遭到威脅，但在暴力陰霾的籠罩下，整個城市的文明禮儀與社會穩定都岌岌可危。各種形式的暴力大行其道：自封“民主衞士”的反對派冀望通過“佔領中環”向中央施壓，讓北京屈從於他們的要求；學生團體在特首選舉上所持的極端立場不容妥協；民主派置香港未來於不顧，對立法會議事進行魯莽地阻撓；年輕的激進分子攜帶危險武器，以前所未見的暴力方式衝擊立法會大樓；大陸訪港遊客怎麼也想不到，經歷過大世面的香港竟會以如此充滿仇恨的語言暴力來迎接自己。不久前，署理行政長官林鄭月娥主禮香港演藝學院畢業典禮，卻遭學生侮辱。其實，辱人者敗壞禮儀，不過自取其辱罷了。

許多老一輩香港人都在問：我們的城市到底出了什麼問題？

反對派不明白，一旦缺少中央支持，獅子山下的香港夢真可能碎成滿地渣

香港確實出了很多問題。第一，雖然香港的總體財富增長了，但貧富差距卻變大了。基尼係數是一項衡量發達經濟體收入不平等程度的統計標準，而香港則是全球基尼係數最高的社會之一。新加坡和美國等其他自由市場經濟體也存在同樣的問題，或許自由、開放的市場本身就是一片弱肉強食的叢林。

官方統計數據顯示，香港的基尼係數不但處於高位，且有逐年上升趨勢——從1971年的0.43到1996年的0.518，到2011年的0.537。基尼係數的上升一方面緣於全球化，一方面與香港製造業向大陸轉移、經濟覆蓋面收縮有關。今天，服務業在香港經濟中佔93%。香港製造業提供的多種就業機會和業務技能都在這場產業轉移中消失了。

香港不再生產任何產品，除了作為金融中心提供金融和專業服務外，香港基本依賴向大陸客户提供貿易、物流、旅遊服務來維持生計。在金融和專業服務之外，香港的服務業多分佈於低端領域，並有江河日下趨勢。

過去的十年是財富向房地產業高度集中的十年。由於大量財富從大陸流向香港，導致香港地價飆升，到了特區政府不得不進行干預的地步。年輕一代靠買房致富的希望越來越渺茫。高昂的房價擠走了其他更具風險與創新的經濟活動，激化了無房產者與有房產者之間的矛盾。

在教育和技術培訓方面，過去幾十年中，香港的教育部門成功地普及了大眾教育，卻讓精英學校付出了較大的代價，造成許多傳統名校轉型成為“直資學校”（接受政府直接資助），以在開課、募資上獲取更大的自由。

一方面，家長們希望子女能具有全球競爭力，擠破頭也要讓孩子進直資學校、國際學校、獨立學校；另一方面，越來越多的學校開設旅遊、服務接待等“實用型”課程，培養學生滿足低端服務業就業需求。知識技能的兩極分化導致了就業機會的兩極分化，社會流動性和上行空間有限，也是今天香港年輕人不滿的緣由之一。

當下關於2017年特首普選的激烈爭論，無異於給處於困境中香港社會火上澆油。許多香港人反對北京以任何形式將候選人範圍控制在愛國愛港人士以內。表面來看，這是香港從北京爭取“真正選擇權”的對抗，但實際上，它是香港民意的試金石，香港人是願意捍衞主權、安全和發展利益等國家目標，還是要與大陸背道而馳？

宗派和族羣的分歧，從不曾深植於香港，在香港社會上造成隔閡的政治話題只有一個：中國。在反對派最狂妄的時候，他們鼓吹要徹底擺脱來自中央的約束，他們不明白，一旦缺少中央的支持，獅子山下的香港夢真可能碎成滿地渣。

（英文原載香港《南華早報》2014年7月6日，原標題：The roots of Hong Kong’s rage；觀察者網楊晗軼/譯。翻頁查看英文原文）

  The roots of Hong Kong’s rage

Regina Ip Lau Suk-yee

Anyone who has met diplomats posted to Hong Kong from much more turbulent parts of the world will have noticed how appreciative they are of the safety and security of our city. Famed for their love of freedom, Hong Kong people have established a reputation for staging peaceful public demonstrations. Compared to the mayhem that has torn some parts of the world, Hong Kong has stood out as an oasis of peace. Sadly, that seems poised to change.

Although the threats to Hong Kong’s physical security seem insignificant at this stage, an atmosphere of violence has set in and is poisoning the civility and stability of our city. Violence in the form of calls to “occupy Central” from self-proclaimed democracy advocates who want to pressurise Beijing into yielding to their demands. Violence in the form of extremist positions on arrangements for electing the chief executive, taken by student groups who will brook no compromise. Violence in the form of reckless filibustering in the Legislative Council, whatever the cost to Hong Kong’s future. Violence in the form of unprecedented attempts by young radicals, some armed with offensive weapons, to storm the Legco building. Violence in the form of hate-filled verbal abuse hurled at mainland visitors unaccustomed to the ways of our sophisticated city.

Also, violence in the form of insults hurled at the chief secretary by graduates of the Academy for Performing Arts at a recent graduation ceremony. By insulting the guest of honour, they debased the ceremony and disgraced themselves.

Many older Hongkongers are asking: what has become of our city and what went wrong?

Many things have indeed gone wrong. First, despite the increase in overall wealth, our wealth gap has widened. Hong Kong has one of the highest Gini coefficients, a statistical measure of income inequality, among developed economies. And so, too, do other free-market economies such as Singapore and the US. This may be due to the fact that when you have free, open markets, the strong get stronger while the weak get weaker.

According to government statistics, Hong Kong’s Gini coefficient is not only high but has also been rising over the years - from 0.43 in 1971 to 0.518 in 1996 and 0.537 in 2011. The steady increase is partly the effect of globalisation and partly the progressive narrowing of our economy with the migration of our manufacturing activities across the border. Hong Kong’s economy is now 93 per cent service-oriented. This relocation has meant the loss of a wide range of jobs in the manufacturing sector and the skills that go with it.

Hong Kong no longer makes anything, but makes its living largely by providing trading, logistics and tourism services mainly for mainland Chinese clients, and financial and professional services in connection with the city’s financial hub. Other than the financial and professional services, many of the services provided by the city are low-end, and by some accounts trending down.

The past decade has also seen a staggering concentration of wealth in the property sector. The overspill of wealth from the mainland caused prices to go through the roof until they were artificially suppressed by the various stamp duties slapped on by the administration. Young people have become increasingly disillusioned as their hopes for acquiring wealth through owning a home diminish. High property prices have crowded out other riskier, more innovative economic activities and turned those without homes against the landed class.

Where education and skills are concerned, in the past few decades, our education authorities have largely succeeded in expanding mass education but at considerable cost to the standards of elite schools, so much so that many have converted themselves into “direct subsidy schools” to acquire greater freedom in setting their curriculum and raising resources.

Parents who want their children to be globally competitive scramble to put them in direct subsidy, international or independent schools, while more and more “practical” subjects, like tourism and hospitality studies, are introduced to cater for students at the low end. The polarisation of knowledge and skills translates into the polarisation of opportunity, another source of discontent to young people with limited scope for upward social mobility.

Adding to all these woes we now have the heated constitutional debate on how to elect the chief executive in 2017. Many Hongkongers oppose any attempt by Beijing to limit the field of candidates to trustworthy patriots. On the face of it, it is a matter of Beijing versus Hong Kong people in allowing the people a “real choice”. But, essentially, it is about whether Hong Kong people are willing to support the national goal of safeguarding sovereignty, security and developmental interest, or insist on going the other way.

Void of deep-rooted sectarian or ethnic divides, the political cleavage in Hong Kong has always been about China. In their rebellious moment, some demonstrators might wish to be rid of constraints imposed by the centre. But Hong Kong might well fall to pieces if the centre cannot hold.

（原文鏈接：http://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/1546647/roots-hong-kongs-rage）