林毅夫：中國將保持多快增長？

**【**2015年，中國決策者將制定“十三五”規劃。他們面臨一個基本問題：增長目標定在多少？

有人拋出“十三五經濟增長6.5%即可”論，認為“‘十三五’期間只需保持6.5%的年均增長速度，即可實現黨的十八大報告提出的到2020年GDP比2010年翻一番的目標。但經濟學家林毅夫賜稿觀察者網，他在文中認為，在為下一個五年制定計劃時，決策者應該將增長目標定在7%~7.5%，這一增長目標，將有助於穩定就業、降低金融風險、實現2020年收入翻番的目標。 】

在市場經濟改革以來的35年中，中國的平均增長率高達9.8%——這是前所未有的爆炸式增長。但有跡象表明，中國奇蹟正在走向終點——或者至少經濟增長正在放緩。

自2010年第一季度以來，中國的增長率一直在下降。2014年第三季度，經濟增長率降到了相對較低的7.3%。

隨着2014年臨近尾聲，中國的經濟增長可能將繼續面臨強勁的逆風，至少與前幾十年相比是如此。2015年，決策者將制定中國的“十三五”規劃。他們將面臨一個基本問題：增長目標定在多少？

在制定一國GDP目標時，首先要明白經濟的潛在增長率，即假設內部和外部條件有利、未來增長穩定性與可持續性不會受到威脅的情況下的最快擴張速度。亞當·斯密在《國富論》中論證了經濟增長取決於勞動生產率的改善。而今天，勞動生產率的改善要麼來自技術創新，要麼來自產業升級（將產能重新配置給更高附加值的新部門）。

但位於創新前沿的發達國家處於劣勢。要想從新技術中獲益，它們就必須創造新技術。相反，發展中國家擁有“後發優勢”，因為它們可以通過模仿、進口、綜合和許可實現技術進步。結果，它們的成本和風險更低。過去150年中，發達經濟體平均每年增長3%，而一些發展中國家在20年甚至更長的時間裏保持着7%甚至更高的年增長率。

中國在經歷了35年前所未有的經濟增長之後，還剩下多少後發優勢？我們需要考察其技術和產業發展水平與高收入國家的差距。考察這一差距的最佳辦法是比較經購買力平價(PPP)調整的人均收入。人均收入差距越大，後發優勢和增長潛力也就越大。

2008年，中國人均收入只有美國的五分之一略多。這一差距大致相當於1951年美國和日本之間的差距，在此之後的20年裏，日本平均年增長率為9.2%；這一差距也大致等於1977年美國和韓國之間的差距，在此之後的20年裏，韓國年增長率為7.6%。1967年的新加坡和1975年的中國台灣地區也有類似差距——此後也出現了類似的增長率。由此類推，在2008年後的20年裏，中國的潛在增長率應在8%左右。 

但潛在增長率只是故事的一部分。它是否可以實現，取決於國內條件和國際環境。為了利用後發優勢，中國必須深化改革，消除經濟中殘留的扭曲因素。與此同時，政府應該更主動地克服市場失靈——如外部性和協調問題——這些失靈是伴隨技術創新和產業升級而來的不可避免的現象。

中國有潛力通過內需——不僅是家庭消費——保持“魯棒”(Robust，健壯和強壯)增長。中國不缺少投資機會，有充分的產業升級空間和足夠的潛力改善城市基礎設施、公共住房和環境管理。

此外，中國的投資資源十分豐富。中央和地方政府債務總和還不到GDP的50%——以國際標準衡量屬於低水平。與此同時，中國的私人儲蓄相當於GDP的近50%，外匯儲備高達4萬億美元。即使面臨相對不利的外部條件，中國也可以在短期內依靠投資創造就業；而隨着就業崗位數量的增加，消費也會水漲船高。

但是，外部環境會更加令人沮喪。儘管發達國家在2008年全球金融危機後進行了強力干預，啓動了大規模財政和貨幣刺激手段，但很多發達國家的結構缺陷仍沒有解決。日本的“安倍經濟學”收效甚微，歐洲央行正在步美國和日本的後塵，試圖用量化寬鬆提振需求。

美國的就業正在增加，但勞動力參與率仍然不高，經濟也沒有達到衰退後反彈通常可以達到的6%~7%。美國、歐洲和日本可能將經歷持續低迷，抑制中國的出口增長。

因此，中國的增長可能會低於每年8%的潛在增長率。在為下一個五年制定計劃時，決策者應該將增長目標定在7%~7.5%，並在此範圍內根據國際氣候變化調整。這一增長目標有助於穩定就業、降低金融風險、實現2020年收入翻番的目標。

（翻頁查看英文版，英文版首發於Project-Syndicate）

How fast will China grow over the next five years?

By Justin Yifu Lin

In the 35 years since China’s transition to a market economy began, the country has grown at an average rate of 9.8 percent - an explosive and unprecedented rise. But there are signs that the Chinese miracle is coming to an end - or at least that the country’s economic growth is slowing. China’s growth rate has been falling since the first quarter of 2010. In the third quarter of 2014, it was a relatively anemic 7.3 percent.

As 2014 winds down, China’s economic growth is likely to continue to face stiff headwinds, at least when compared to previous decades. As policymakers in 2015 draw up the country’s 13th Five-Year Plan (2016-20), they will grapple with a fundamental question: How fast can China expect to grow?

In setting a country’s GDP target, the first thing to understand is the economy’s potential growth rate: the maximum pace of expansion that can be attained, assuming favorable conditions, internally and externally, without endangering the stability and sustainability of future growth. As Adam Smith discussed in An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, economic growth depends on improvements in labor productivity, which today result from either technological innovation or industrial upgrading.

But developed countries at the innovation frontier are at a disadvantage. To benefit from new technology, they must create it. Developing countries, by contrast, possess a “latecomer advantage”, because they can achieve technological advances through imitation, importation, integration, and licensing. As a result, their costs and risks are lower. Over the last 150 years, developed economies have grown at an average rate of 3 percent per year, whereas some developing countries have achieved annual growth rates of 7 percent or higher for periods of 20 years or longer.

To calculate how much of a latecomer advantage China has after 35 years of unprecedented growth, one needs to look at the gap between its levels of technological and industrial development and those of high-income countries. The best way to see this is by comparing its per capita income, adjusted for purchasing power parity with those of developed countries: The larger the gap in per capita income the larger the latecomer advantage and the greater the potential for growth.

In 2008, China’s per capita income was just over one-fifth that of the United States. This gap is roughly equal to the gap between the US and Japan in 1951, after which Japan grew at an average annual rate of 9.2 percent for the next 20 years, or between the US and South Korea in 1977, after which South Korea grew at 7.6 percent per year for two decades. Singapore in 1967 had similar gaps - followed by similar growth rates. By extension, in the 20 years after 2008, China should have a potential growth rate of roughly 8 percent.

But potential growth is just one part of the story. Whether it can be achieved depends on domestic conditions and the international environment. In order to exploit its latecomer advantage, China must deepen its reforms and eliminate its economy’s residual distortions. Meanwhile, the government should play a proactive role in overcoming the market failures - such as externalities and coordination problems - that are certain to accompany technological innovation and industrial upgrading.

China has the potential to maintain robust growth by relying on domestic demand - and not only household consumption. The country suffers no lack of investment opportunities, with significant scope for industrial upgrading and plenty of potential for improvement in urban infrastructure, public housing and environmental management.

Moreover, China’s investment resources are abundant. Combined central and local government debt amounts to less than 50 percent of GDP - low by international standards. Meanwhile, private savings in China amount to nearly 50 percent of GDP, and the country’s foreign exchange reserves have reached $4 trillion. Even under comparatively unfavorable external conditions, China can rely on investment to create jobs in the short term; and as the number of jobs grows, so will consumption.

The external scenario, however, is gloomier. Though developed countries’ authorities intervened strongly in the aftermath of the global financial crisis in 2008, launching significant fiscal and monetary stimulus measures, many of their structural shortcomings remain unresolved. “Abenomics” in Japan has yet to yield results, and the European Central Bank is following in the footsteps of America and Japan, pursuing quantitative easing in an effort to shore up demand.

Employment in the US is growing, but the rate of workforce participation remains subdued and the economy has yet to attain the 6 to 7 percent growth rates usually recorded in a post-recession rebound. The US, Europe, and Japan are likely to experience continued sluggish performance, inhibiting China’s export growth.

As a result, Chinese growth is likely to fall below its potential of 8 percent a year. As policymakers plan for the next five years, they should set China’s growth targets at 7 to 7.5 percent, adjusting them within that range as changes in the international climate dictate. Such a growth target can help to stabilize employment, lower financial risks, and achieve the country’s goal of doubling incomes by 2020.