包道格：習馬會不僅是兩岸關係的一大步
**【2015年11月7日的習馬會是自1949年以來兩岸最高領導人第一次會面。此次會面將開啓兩岸領導人直接交流溝通的先河，有利於兩岸增進互信，鞏固共同的政治基礎，推進兩岸關係和平發展，維護台海和平穩定，其重要歷史意義不言而喻。就在習馬會前夕，觀察者網收到了卡內基國際和平基金會副會長包道格（Douglas Paal）的來稿。曾任****美國在台協會台北辦事處處長的包先生分別從大陸、台灣和美國三個角度分析了“習馬會”將產生的深遠政治影響。**觀察者網獨家翻譯，以饗讀者。】
本週六，也就是11月7日，台灣海峽兩岸領導人習近平、馬英九將在新加坡首次會面。自馬英九2008年擔任台灣“總統”以來，兩岸關係取得了改善，此次具有突破性意義的峯會顯然將進一步鞏固和平發展的趨勢。
即將離任的馬英九在任期內一改前任民進黨“總統”陳水扁的對抗性政策。如今距離台灣大選僅剩九個多星期，民進黨候選人在民意調查中遙遙領先，中國領導人習近平似乎是想通過“習馬會”提醒台灣選民，如果再次把民進黨選上位，馬英九任內取得的良好勢頭將有毀於一旦之虞。
長期以來，共產黨和國民黨一直是對頭，雙方都聲稱具備統治中國全境的合法性，所以安排這樣的會面將涉及各種各樣的敏感點。兩黨均未正式承認對方，兩岸領導人彼此之間如何稱呼是件令人頭疼的事。如今官方發佈消息稱，經雙方商定，此次在新加坡的會面將以兩岸領導人的身份和名義舉行，習近平與馬英九見面時將互稱“先生”。
習馬會將對整個東亞局勢產生深刻影響
此次“習馬會”的籌備工作高度保密，因此當消息公佈時許多反對派大受震驚，支持者們也表示出乎意料。且不論如果一開始籌劃便大張旗鼓，雙方還能否在敏感問題上協商一致；至少當該消息被泄露給反對黨報紙後，台灣當局便在相當大程度上失去了對官方口徑的掌控。（馬英九幕僚中某個受到足夠信任、能夠接觸機密信息的人向反對黨走漏了風聲，想必“總統府”上下為此大為懊惱。）
由於“習馬會”消息過於出人意料，台灣島內反對派們找到了充分理由指責馬英九未徵詢民意便倉促行事，以“突襲”方式告知民眾，是“出賣”台灣，是“黑箱作業”，是在為繼任者“下指導棋”。民進黨“總統”候選人蔡英文在發表的長文聲明中，首先強調了積極一面：
“我首先要強調，在符合‘對等尊嚴’、‘公開透明’、‘不涉政治前提’的原則下，我們樂見兩岸之間有正常的交流，只要是有助於台海和平、增進溝通對話、對雙方互惠互利的做法，我們一直都正面看待。換句話説，如果今天‘馬習會’的安排，能夠有一個透明的磋商過程，能夠把商談的議題、彼此承諾的條件，讓‘國人’瞭解，接受民意及‘國會’的監督，並且真正做到‘對等尊嚴’、‘公開透明’、‘不涉及政治前提’這三個原則，我相信，‘國人’的疑慮會降到最低。”
緊接着，蔡英文不忘嚴辭“敲打”馬英九：“在此，我要嚴肅地提醒馬‘總統’，兩岸關係應該要跳脱政黨政治利益的考量，台灣的未來不能拿來當作選舉一時的操作。我們和‘國人’一樣，都期待兩岸關係走向和平穩定發展的方向，也因此，‘對等尊嚴’、‘公開透明’、‘不涉及政治前提’，是必須被遵守的原則，也是不能被犧牲的底線。我們會跟人民站在一起。”
馬英九政府對此進行了回應，向民眾確保本次會面旨在針對鞏固兩岸和平，維持台海現狀交換意見，不會簽署任何協議，也不會發表聯合聲明。
在得知“習馬會”消息走漏後，台灣官方緊急通知了華盛頓方面。不搞突襲是令馬英九頗為自得的原則，但這個消息還是讓美國人始料不及。美國官方對此進行了積極回應，符合其長期所持的政治立場，即支持兩岸緩和緊張關係，促進商業和民間交流。美國官方至少沒有出格言論，官員也在私下明確表示，希望見到新加坡的“習馬會”對兩岸關係產生積極的影響。
不過，也有許多現任和前任官員在私下對此次“習馬會”表達擔憂，認為其結果將給兩岸帶來震盪，有損於台海穩定現狀。在街頭政治上，國民黨一向不是民進黨的對手，後者十分清楚如何利用一切機會詆譭國民黨領導層。
島內民意調查持續顯示，人們對中國大陸經濟越來越緊密地“擁抱”台灣持懷疑態度。近期以來，這種情緒還混雜着台灣方面對大陸增設新航線靠近“海峽中線”，以及換髮卡式台胞證的反感。此外，台灣在外交上孤立無援、經濟增速減緩，青年人口和勞動力市場存在錯位，使他們感到發展機會受限。
所有這一切都表明，兩岸領導人和各自團隊必須在新加坡集中力量，才能避免海峽關係走下坡路，若要試圖扭轉枱灣公眾對大陸的負面心態，則更加不易。據報道，兩岸領導人首先將開放媒體拍照，然後進行單獨會談，會後兩人將各自舉行記者會，並共進晚餐。
來自三個方面的觀眾將高度關注習近平主席會後的評論。內地觀眾希望看到他朝着兩岸統一的最終目標邁進。心存疑慮的台灣觀眾將尋找大陸對台增壓的跡象，以及關注大陸是否會對台灣做出讓步，譬如允許其拓展在國際機構中的角色等，從而削弱民進黨在明年大選中的優勢。然而，具有諷刺意味的是，台北很可能將北京慷慨的提議視為隱蔽的陷阱。
第三個方面的觀眾則是美國。美國或許已經覺察到，習近平實際上已經把眼光投向馬英九卸任以後，他最終需要與蔡英文打交道。如果蔡英文在2016年大選中勝出，考慮到中共十九大將於2017年召開，習近平將希望在台灣問題上得分，那麼台海關係將成為中國大陸政治議程的重要部分。
既然蔡英文承諾維持海峽兩岸現狀，那麼此次兩岸領導人的會面等於給“現狀”設置了非常高的標準。如果蔡英文當選且不再像馬英九那樣堅持“九二共識”，未來台海關係將迎來新基礎，屆時主動權將更多掌握在北京手裏。通過此次與馬英九會面，習近平展現出友善的一面，未來如果蔡英文沒能妥善處理兩岸關係，大陸方面將在與美國的交涉中佔據有利地位。
儘管華盛頓和北京方面將密切關注馬英九的表態，但他的觀眾主要還是集中在台灣島內。諷刺的是，馬英九的表態越不像是幫國民黨在大選中得分，越符合和平穩定發展的戰略原則，反而越有可能消減島內的批評聲，幫助國民黨候選人贏得選民支持。他應該明白這一點，很可能將作出建設性的表態。
當然，除兩岸領導人的評價以外，潛意識溝通也將發揮作用。大陸和台灣心照不宣，兩岸領導人都不會在鏡頭前冒犯對方的尊嚴。但是任何人都不應低估台灣媒體混淆視聽的能力，它們尤其擅長把一個人的威嚴舉止曲解成對另一個人的貶低侮辱。任何政治行家都知道，習馬會傳遞出的視覺信息，對外界如何解讀政治訊號至關重要。
放眼更寬泛的背景：美國利用中國鄰國對中國強硬舉動的不適，通過“再平衡”戰略侵入亞洲；作為回應，中國在過去兩年中開始在亞太地區推行新政策，基本可以稱之為對美國“再平衡戰略”的“抗衡”。
近兩年來，習近平提出了“一帶一路”倡議，增進中國與東南亞和中亞鄰國的商業與基礎設施聯繫。中國創立了亞洲基礎設施投資銀行，為這些建設項目提供資金支持。隨着美國拉攏緬甸政府，導致中緬關係明顯疏遠，中國開始主動走近昂山素季——雖然此前曾多年支持她所反對的軍政府。
中日韓三國首腦峯會上週末在首爾舉行，可以看出中日緊張關係得到了緩解。中俄關系也處於過去五十年最好的水平。習近平對地區安全架構提出了若干建議，並試圖將中美緊張關係保持在可控的範圍內。由於民族主義者對國家主權高度敏感，南海問題可能是一個特例。在這個問題上，時間會證明一切。
由此不難想象，如果主權問題能得到妥善處理，習近平希望穩定兩岸關係，維持周邊地區和諧。習近平把強勢領導與外交成果相結合，如果台海局勢朝積極方向發展，將成為他的重大得分點。這樣一來，中國周邊那些長期心存疑慮的鄰國將吃下定心丸，不會一直抗拒中國而順從美國。考慮到未來兩年美國將投入大量精力到“總統選舉”和組建下屆政府當中去，中國外交可能會在此取得重大成就。
（觀察者網楊晗軼譯）
翻頁可見英文原文
Taiwan and Mainland Leader Meet for the First Time
On Saturday, November 7, Singapore will host the first ever meeting between the leaders of Taiwan and mainland China. This breakthrough summit is evidently intended to reinforce the trends toward peace and development across the Taiwan Strait that prevailed under Taiwan’s President Ma Ying-jeou since 2008.
Ma’s tenure, and now his legacy, marked a sharp departure from the confrontational policies of his predecessor, the Taiwan Democratic Progressive Party’s (DPP) Chen Shui-bian. With an election in Taiwan just over nine weeks away, and the opposition DPP candidate well ahead in the polls, Chinese leader Xi Jinping appears to want to remind Taiwan’s voters that the positive trends under President Ma could be at risk if they choose the DPP again.
Arrangements for a meeting of this sort involve every kind of sensitivity, since the leaders of the Nationalist and Communist parties have long been rival claimants for the mantle of governing all of China. They do not recognize each other formally, so terminology is tricky. Officials have revealed that they will refer to each other in the Singapore meeting as the “leader” of Taiwan and the mainland, rather than use the formal title of president. They will call each other as “Mr. Ma” and “Mr. Xi.”
The secrecy surrounding the preparations for the meeting contributed to the sense of shock and anger expressed by many opponents and of surprise by many supporters on Taiwan. Whether satisfactory terms for such a sensitive meeting could have been achieved without the cloak of secrecy is something for historians to wrestle with, but in any event Taiwan officials lost considerable control of their messages when the story was leaked to an opposition newspaper. (It must be a source of angst in the Presidential Office that someone trusted enough to be given access to the information was nonetheless motivated to hand it over to the opposition.)
The surprising nature of the news gave opponents of the ruling party on Taiwan ample opportunity to allege last minute efforts by Ma to “sell out” Taiwan, engage in “black box” decision making with insufficient public consultation, and to tie the hands of his successor with more extensive engagement with the mainland. Tsai Ing-wen, the DPP presidential frontrunner, issued a multi-part statement, first emphasizing the positive:
“I want to emphasize that we are happy to see communications between both sides of the Strait, in accordance with the principles of “equal respect”, “transparency” and “without political preconditions.” We would view these endeavors in a positive light if such communication is helpful to facilitate cross-strait peace, to improve communication and dialogue and is beneficial to mutual interests. In other words, if the arrangements between President Ma and President Xi were transparent--that is, allowing our citizens to understand what will be discussed; what will be promised, if anything; to have legislative and public opinion oversight, and genuinely implement these three principles of “equal respect”, “transparency” and “without political precondition.” I believe this will greatly reduce public anxieties.”
Then she delivered her warning punch: “I would like to issue a solemn reminder to President Ma that cross-strait relations should not be handled based on political parties’ self-interest. Taiwan’s future should not be traded away for short-term electoral success. We all wish for a stable, peaceful cross-strait relationship; therefore, the principles of “equal respect”, “transparency” and “without political precondition” should not be sacrificed in anyway. We will stand with the people
Ma’s officials responded by assuring the public that there will be no agreements reached at the summit. Nor will there be a joint statement. They emphasized the meeting is to reinforce cross-strait peace and prosperity and to nurture the status quo, not make new initiatives.
Once Taiwan officials knew the leak was out, they hastily notified relevant officials in Washington, on a principle that Ma Ying-jeou has frequently made a point of pride: no surprises. Still, it was pretty surprising to the Americans. The official U.S. response was positive, in line with long standing policy support for easing cross-strait tensions and developing commercial and popular exchanges. At least this should not have been a surprise. U.S. officials privately are equally clear that they hope the meeting in Singapore will bring a positive influence to Taiwan-mainland relations.
But many current and former officials also privately convey fears that the meeting and its results will reverberate on Taiwan and the mainland in ways that may in fact not contribute to stability and maintenance of the status quo. The DPP has long had better political street-fighting skills than the KMT, and it knows how to exploit opportunities to denigrate the KMT leadership.
Public opinion polls have continuously shown growing suspicion of China’s ever closer economic embrace of Taiwan. This combines in a volatile cocktail with resentment of recent unilateral Chinese actions regarding flight routes over the Taiwan Strait and travel documents to the mainland. And there is malaise about Taiwan’s diplomatic isolation, slower economic growth than in previous eras, and the mismatch between Taiwan’s youth and labor markets that has limited their perceived opportunities.
All this suggests that avoiding a setback in cross-strait relations will take the concentrated efforts of both leaders and their teams in Singapore, let alone trying to turn around the current negative drift in public attitudes toward the mainland. Both leaders are reported to have a public meeting, then a private session, then dinner together. Each will have his own news conference to discuss their meetings.
What President Xi says will have at least three audiences. The mainland audience will expect him at least to show he is working toward eventual reunification of Taiwan with China. The skeptical (David facing Goliath) Taiwan audience will look for signs of increased pressure on the island, for efforts to undermine the DPP in the coming election, perhaps with last minute concessions to Taiwan, such as permitting an increased presence in international functional organizations. Here among the several ironies is that what Beijing might consider a generous offer could be seen in Taipei as a devious trap.
The third audience is the United States, which may sense Xi is in fact already looking past Ma to his need eventually to deal with Tsai. If Tsai wins, relations with Taiwan will be part of the background for Xi’s own political agenda at home, with an imminent 19th Party Congress in 2017 and all the changes attendant on that. Xi should want to position himself as securely as possible regarding Taiwan before then.
A “two leaders” meeting will be a very high bar for Tsai to jump to maintain the status quo, as she has pledged to do. This could give Beijing greater leverage to decide what basis for the relationship is good enough, if it is not to be based on the “1992 consensus” that prevails under Ma, as Tsai in the past has insisted it will not be. And by meeting with Ma, offering sweetness and light, Xi gains a talking point to use with the U.S. if ultimately she fails to compete in appearing reasonable about cross-strait relations.
President Ma’s audience will primarily be in Taiwan, though Washington and Beijing will watch him closely. Ironically, again, the less that Ma’s remarks appear to be aimed at tactically helping the KMT in the upcoming election and the more they address strategic principles of peace and prosperity, the more they are likely to defuse criticism at home and bolster support for KMT candidates. He is very likely to understand that and stick to a constructive script.
Of course, subliminal communications will also play a role in addition to the words of the leaders. Both the mainland and Taiwan share a culture of sophisticated protocol, and one should expect the leaders to treat each other before the cameras with appropriate dignity. But the capacity of Taiwan’s media to construe one man’s dignified behavior as a demeaning insult should not be underestimated. As any political pro would say, the optics of the visit could prove very important to the message that emerges.
Finally, a word about the broader context: In reaction to inroads made by the United States with its “rebalance” to Asia -- facilitated by China’s neighbors and their discomfort with Chinese assertive behavior -- China has for the past two years or so embarked on a policy one can term “counterbalance” in the Asia Pacific region to the American “rebalance.”
Xi Jinping has since announced the “one belt and one road” initiatives to strengthen commercial and infrastructure ties with Southeast and Central Asian neighbors. His government has produced the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank to finance those connections. Xi has courted Aung San Suu Kyi after years of support for her Myanmar opponents in the military, after the Myanmar authorities visibly pulled away from China and toward the U.S.
Tensions have been lowered with Japan, as exemplified in last weekend’s trilateral summit in Seoul. Russia and China are getting along better than in the last fifty years. Xi has made several proposals for regional security architecture and has tried to keep tensions with the United States manageable. The South China Sea may be an outlier due to the nationalist sensitivity about sovereignty. Here only time will tell.
So it seems natural that Xi might want to add Taiwan to the picture of a calmer diplomacy on China’s periphery, if sovereignty issues can be managed adequately. This would be a major political point for Xi in selling his combination of strong leadership and mostly positive results for Chinese diplomacy. By the same token, he will have given China’s always skeptical neighbors material reasons not always to resist Chinese preferences in deference to American interests. This could become a quite substantial achievement over the next two years as the U.S. obsesses about elections and the next administration.
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