閻學通：中美為戰略伙伴而競爭

【中國一貫奉行不結盟政策，贏得了世界各國的尊重，但隨着世界格局的改變，特別是中俄走近之後，在國際關係學界也出現了主張結盟的聲音。清華大學當代國際關係研究院閻學通院長近日在《中美聚焦網》上發表文章，認為中國需要新的聯盟戰略，而不僅僅滿足於所謂的“戰略合作伙伴關係”，尤其是與“與亞太地區的美國盟友結成新的聯盟，將能塑造一個有利於民族復興的環境”。觀察者網翻譯全文，以資讀者參考。】

2012年年底習近平的任期剛開始時，沒人能想到2015年9月，來自美國三大盟國的領導人會前往北京出席紀念抗戰勝利70週年的盛大閲兵式。但他們——韓國的朴槿惠總統、捷克總統米羅什·澤曼以及泰國副總理——的確來了。在那場展示中國軍事實力的盛會上，他們就站在習近平主席身旁。

美國雖然仍是世界上唯一的超級大國，但中國正在逐漸縮短距離。中國已是世界第二大經濟體，其領導人在國際場合發言時底氣越來越足。雖然中國歷史上一直避免與其他國家建立正式聯盟，但這個政策正在慢慢發生變化：北京方面正在接觸新的合作伙伴，其中包括了韓國等美國的盟友。

但中國若想成為像美國那樣的超級大國，北京方面需要新的聯盟戰略，而不僅僅滿足於所謂的“戰略合作伙伴關係”。真正的盟國關係往往由條約約束 ，當一國安全受到戰爭衝突威脅時，盟國將提供防衞支援；相反，“戰略伙伴關係”只是個漂亮的外交術語，兩國只要簽訂過經濟協議，基本上都能往裏面套，這種關係不如真正的聯盟那樣緊密。

北京方面一直很厭惡聯盟這個概念，因為中國自1982年以來，為避免被捲入冷戰，一直奉行不結盟政策。不結盟的立場降低了捲入其他國家尤其是美蘇之間衝突的風險，同時給予了中國政策制定者更多的獨立性。此後，中國得以在不承擔外交同盟義務的情況下，將精力集中到發展經濟上去。

就目前來看，中國的“朋友圈”在深度廣度上都遠遠不及美國。中國已經與大約70個國家建立了“戰略合作伙伴”或“合作伙伴關係”，其中包括英國、法國、德國和意大利等許多美國的盟國。中國與這些國家的夥伴關係大多屬於經濟性質，而非傳統的、全面的軍事聯盟。美國則與大約60個國家簽署了全面條約，其中規定了軍事合作。以這個標準來看，中國只有一個正式的盟友，那就是巴基斯坦。今年早些時候，中國與巴基斯坦簽署了聯合聲明，將中巴關係提升到“全天候戰略合作伙伴關係”。

在鞏固雙邊戰略合作方面，普通的戰略合作伙伴關係顯然不如軍事同盟可靠。國內社會與國際社會之間的根本區別在於，後者當中不存在壟斷軍事力量的中央政府。因此，所有不具備充分軍事能力的國家為求生存，必須藉助外國軍事力量或組織來保護本國的安全。對次要國家或小國來説，軍事保護比經濟援助更加重要。中國周邊的國家若能通過與中國結盟換來安全保障，它們將支持中國實現民族復興，但如果得不到這樣的安全承諾，它們將擔心中國可能對它們動武。

在與美國進行戰略競爭的方面，中國需要更多的軍事盟友，才能維持東亞的政治平衡。由於世界中心從跨大西洋轉向亞太地區，美國若想遏制中國的崛起，很可能將強化“亞太再平衡”戰略。中國若能恢復其1982年以前的結盟傳統，與亞太地區的美國盟友結成新的聯盟，將能塑造一個有利於民族復興的環境。在該地區內，越多美國盟友成為中國的盟友，華盛頓方面達成“再平衡戰略”目標的機會就越渺茫。

雖然許多國家的領導人出席中國9·3閲兵，説明了中國的對外戰略正在慢慢轉型，開始與更多國家進行更多軍事合作；但該戰略面臨另一重與不結盟原則相關的障礙，即經濟決定論。在過去三十年裏，中國人一心爭取經濟成就，因此“以經促政”——即用經濟手段改善政治關係——成為了中國外交的主要形式。建立經貿夥伴關係自然比完全沒有戰略合作更好，但它不如軍事同盟對雙邊戰略關係的影響大。

中國應該首先與地區鄰國結盟。從地緣政治上講，中國為了民族復興大計，必須獲取周邊國家的戰略支持。如果大多數鄰國不認同中國的地區領導者角色，很難想象中國能成為世界級大國。民族復興大計不僅比發展經濟困難得多，而且還需要另一套高度重視周邊軍事合作的對外戰略。一個國家的後院要是不安全，那麼它幾乎不可能在世界上發揮領導作用。

認為中國能在短期內與多數鄰國結成聯盟，是不現實的。然而，中國不是沒有可能把同柬埔寨、老撾以及上合組織六個成員國之間的關係提升為與巴基斯坦一樣的全面軍事同盟，名義上可以也叫做“全天候戰略合作伙伴”。美國是中國的主要戰略競爭對手，它與中國某些鄰國之間的衝突可能導致這些國家轉而尋求中國的保護。地區軍事霸權不掌握在中美任何一國手上，是某些國家——尤其是大多數東盟國家——更樂於見到的局面。與中美兩國結盟相當於不結盟策略，能幫助這些國家減少對中美的依賴性，降低來自任何一方的威脅。

事實上，中國擴大結盟範圍有助於抗衡美國的影響力，也有利於世界和平。大多數西方人可能更中意於一個以美國為首的單極世界，但並非所有國家都這樣看。如果全球大國平衡向某個國家傾斜，那麼該國製造的問題將比它解決的問題多。所有東盟國家都知道，要維護東盟在地區安全事務中的主導作用，唯一途徑是保持中美之間的平衡，並迫使它們爭取東盟的支持。

美國的歐洲盟友與中國之間不存在邊境爭議，也沒有安全衝突，雖然這些國家目前與中國建立軍事同盟還不現實，但建立經濟戰略合作伙伴關係是正確的一步。在中國所有鄰國裏，日本、菲律賓、越南和朝鮮與中國締結聯盟的可能性最低。雖然《中朝友好合作互助條約》尚未廢除，但已經有名無實。多年以來，中朝之間既未發展軍事關係，也沒有高層互訪。中國必須耐心等待這四個國家內部發生變化，改變對華政策。隨着現任總統阿基諾三世將於明年下台，菲律賓可能第一個轉變對中國的態度。

中國應該汲取冷戰時期美蘇爭霸的經驗教訓。蘇聯在其盟國面前缺乏戰略可信度，它們不相信蘇聯提供的安全保護，這在一定程度上導致了蘇聯的失敗。相反，大多數盟國對蘇聯的軍事勢力充滿戒心，害怕它做出1956年在匈牙利和1968年在捷克斯洛伐克那樣的軍事幹預行動。這就是為什麼1990年東德率先退出華約後，這個軍事組織比蘇聯更早瓦解。反觀美國，它對盟友的信譽為其最終贏得冷戰作出了巨大貢獻。正因為有這段歷史，奧巴馬的“再平衡戰略”才會對傳統盟友關係給予高度重視。

中美兩國有許多人認為，如果中國採取結盟戰略，世界將陷入新的冷戰。然而，聯盟網絡只是冷戰的必要條件，而不是充分條件。事實上，意識形態不是中美之間的核心衝突，所以兩國不大可能把世界再次拖入冷戰。每年往來於中美兩國之間的旅客數以百萬計，更何況雙方經濟聯繫廣泛而密切，這些因素都會減少可預見的未來再次爆發冷戰的可能性。

隨着中國在未來十年內全面成長為超級大國，中美之間防止爆發軍事衝突，維持和平競爭，對全世界都十分重要。由於兩大巨人的衝突與競爭正在增加，預防性安全合作的重要性大於經濟合作的重要性。建立網絡安全治理規範是一個典型的案例。如果中國與鄰國——尤其是美國的盟友——結盟，將對安全風險起到預防作用。它將從三個方面維護地區和平。首先，中國與鄰國既已結盟，它們之間的安全衝突將減少。其次，結盟將降低美國介入其盟友與中國間衝突的危險。第三，它將把亞太地區軍事平衡從不對稱狀態調整至相對平衡的狀態，使中美雙方在採取軍事行動時都更加謹慎。

（本文英文原文載於chinausfocus.com，觀察者網楊晗軼/譯。）

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No one would have imagined in late 2012, at the start of Xi Jinping’s tenure as president of China, that by September 2015 leaders from three U.S. allies would attend an extravagant military parade put on by Beijing to celebrate the end of the Sino-Japanese War 70 years ago. But there they were -- President Park Geun-hye of South Korea, President Miloš Zeman of the Czech Republic and Deputy Prime Minister Prawit Wongsuwan of Thailand -- standing near President Xi earlier this month surveying the impressive display of modern military might.

America is still the world’s only superpower, but China is gradually catching up. China’s economy has become the second largest in the world, and the leadership is speaking with a louder voice in international affairs. And while historically China has eschewed building formal alliances with other countries, even that policy is slowly shifting: Beijing is courting new partners, including allies of Washington like President Park and others.

But for China to become a superpower like the United States, Beijing needs a new strategy that fully embraces genuine alliances, and not just so-called “strategic partnerships.” True allies are most often bound by treaties that commit each country to defending the other in times of security, conflict or war, while “strategic partnership” is only a nice diplomatic jargon for a bilateral relationship involving any number of agreements -- often economic in nature -- that falls short of true alliances.

The concept of alliances has been anathema to Beijing since 1982, when China adopted a non-alignment policy to avoid getting entangled in the Cold War. This position reduced the risk of being dragged into conflicts among other states, especially between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, while allowing for more independence in policymaking. Later on, freedom from diplomatic obligations was a policy that allowed China to focus energies on building its economy.

China’s current list of friends is no match for America’s. At present China has established about 70 “strategy partnerships” or “cooperation partnerships,” including with many American allies, such as Britain, France, Germany and Italy. These friendships are mostly economic in nature, not traditional, full-fledged military alliances, whereas the U.S. has about 60 full-fledged treaty allies that involve military cooperation. By that standard, China has only one full-fledged ally, namely Pakistan, which signed a joint statement with China to upgrade their relationship to an “all-weather strategic partnership of cooperation” early this year.

The ordinary strategic partnership cannot consolidate the bilateral strategic cooperation as reliably as a military alliance. The fundamental difference between domestic society and international society is that there is no central government monopolizing military power in the latter. Thus all states without enough military capability to protect their own security have to rely on a foreign military power or organization for the sake of survival. In comparison with economic aid, military protection is more crucial for the secondary or small states. Surrounding countries will support China to achieve national rejuvenation if in return it provides security protection to those states by making alliances. In the absence of that kind of promise, these neighbors fear that China could use military might against them.

In terms of strategic competition with the U.S., China also needs more military allies in order to maintain a political balance in East Asia. Due to the world’s center shifting from cross-Atlantic to the Asia-Pacific, it is very possible for the U.S. to strengthen its Asia-Pacific rebalance strategy if it wishes to constrain China’s rise. China will be able to shape a favorable environment for its national rejuvenation if it resumes its alliance tradition from before 1982, especially making new alliances with American allies in Asia Pacific. The more U.S. allies in this region become China’s allies, the slighter chance for Washington’s rebalancing strategy to achieve its goal.

Although the presence of many foreign heads of state at the military parade shows China’s foreign strategy is slowly shifting towards developing more military cooperation with as many countries as possible, the strategy is also faced with another obstacle related to the non-alliance principle, namely economic determinism. In the last three decades, economic achievement has dominated the minds of Chinese people, and thus “improving political ties with economic approaches,” called yi-jing-cu-zheng, has become the dominant form of China’s diplomacy. Economic partnership is better than no strategic cooperation, but it does not have the same impact as military alliance on bilateral strategic relations.

China should start by forming alliances from its own neighborhood. Geopolitically speaking, China must attain the strategic support of surrounding countries in order to achieve the goal of “national rejuvenation.” It is hard to imagine that China can become a leading world power without a majority of its neighbors accepting its role as the regional leader. The task of national rejuvenation is not only much more difficult than economic development but also requires a different foreign strategy, which gives the top priority to military cooperation with surrounding countries. It is almost impossible for a power to play a leading role in the world when it does not have a safe neighborhood.

It is unrealistic to argue that China is able to make an alliance with most of its neighbors in the short term. Nevertheless, there is potential for Cambodia, Laos and the six members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization to upgrade their relations with China to full-fledged military allies, like Pakistan, with the title of all-weather strategic partnership of cooperation. The U.S. is certainly the major strategic competitor of China, but its conflict with some of China’s neighbors produces the possibility for those states to return to China for protection. Those states, particularly most of the ASEAN states, prefer no regional military dominance from either the U.S. or China. Making an alliance with both China and the U.S. is a strategic approach similar to non-alliance strategy helping them to reduce dependence on or threat from either China or America.

In fact, a deeper bench of allies for China would provide a counter-balance to America’s reach, and make the world a more peaceful place. Most people in the West may prefer a unipolar world led by the United States, but not all the world sees it that way. A global balance of power tipped in favor of any one country creates more problems than it solves. All ASEAN states know that the only way to maintain ASEAN’s leading role in regional security affairs is to maintain the balance between China and the U.S. and force them to compete for ASEAN’s support.

China made the right decision to establish an economic strategic partnership with those countries, including America’s European allies, who have neither border disputes nor security conflicts with it, while military alliance is not practical at present. Among all of its neighbors, Japan, the Philippines, Vietnam and North Korea have the least possibility of making an alliance with China. Although the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between China and North Korea has not been abrogated, it has become merely nominal. There have been neither military relations nor state summits between these two countries for years. China has to be patient to wait for the domestic change in these four countries, which will change their policy towards China. The Philippines could be the first one because its current president, Benigno Aquino III will step down next year in accordance with the Philippines constitution.

China should learn from the competition between the U.S. and the Soviet Union in the Cold War. The failure of the Soviet Union is partially due to its lack of strategic credibility to its allies, namely those who did not trust Soviet security protection. On the contrary, most of its allies were fearful of Soviet military might after its military interventions into Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. That is why the Warsaw Pact was ended before the collapse of the Soviet Union, after East Germany took the lead to sign out this military organization in 1990. In contrast, America’s alliance credibility made a great contribution to its winning of the Cold War. This history can explain why Obama’s rebalancing strategy gives the top priority to relations with traditional allies.

Many people both in China and America have argued that the world would fall into a new Cold War if China adopted an alliance strategy. But an alliance network is only one of the necessary conditions for a Cold War, rather than a sufficient one. In fact, there is little chance of a new Cold War given that ideology is not a core conflict between China and the United States. Millions of Chinese and Americans visit each other’s country annually, not to mention the extensive economic ties between these two countries, factors which also reduce the chance for a new Cold War in the visible future.

It will be crucial to the whole world to prevent military clashes between China and the U.S. and maintain their competition peacefully when China becomes a full-fledged superpower in the next decade. Because conflicts and competition between these two giants are increasing, preventative security cooperation becomes more important than economic cooperation. Establishing norms to govern cybersecurity is a typical case. If China makes alliance with neighbors, especially American allies, it has some function of preventative cooperation. It can help to maintain regional peace in three aspects. First, it will reduce the security conflicts between China and its neighbors after they become allies. Second, it will decrease the danger of American involvement into conflicts between its allies and China. Third, it will transfer the asymmetric military balance to relative symmetric balance in Asia Pacific, making both sides more cautious about any military action.