高大偉、普羅迪：信息時代中美逐鹿，老歐洲怎樣才能不被遺忘？-羅馬諾·普羅迪、高大偉

如何佔據陸地領土和海上航線，是傳統戰略家們思考的重心所在。近年來，對領空和太空的控制能力，對國家實力產生了重要影響。進入信息時代後，綜合國力完全離不開該國在網絡空間的存在。

中國的政策制定者們不但對地緣政治的各個維度進行綜合考慮，更對迅速發展的網絡政治領域給予了高度重視。

由於西方几乎把全部注意力都放在了中國互聯網的侷限性和不完善之處上面，因此並沒有完全領會中國數字轉型的重大意義。在當前這個時代，隨着中國開始在全球投射影響力並追求創新，數字中國是影響最深遠的事件之一。

18世紀的歐洲工業革命，翻開了人類歷史的新篇章。中國沒能迅速跟上機械時代的腳步，錯過了工業革命的班車，曾在長達150年的時間裏被邊緣化；然而今天的中國不僅對全球科學開拓持開放態度，更有志成為技術進步的急先鋒。

遭遇過內憂外患，經歷過痛苦的衰退，當今的中國再也不甘偏安一隅，無論是生物技術還是互聯網，納米科技還是航空航天領域，皆是如此。更寬泛地説，中國不願再當被動的旁觀者，任由西方掌握全球化的主導權，而要成為現代性的來源，這是中華民族走向復興的一大決定性要素。

雖然清朝既沒孕育出工業革命，也沒能迅速適應其帶來的變革，但當今的中國卻已成為數字化轉型的催化劑。中國錯過了工業革命，可她卻成為了信息時代的構建者之一。

與二戰後的國際關係體系相似，全球網絡空間也是兩極化的，網絡世界的架構不再由美蘇主導，而是由美國和中國決定。目前，數字世界的兩極化體現在中美互聯網公司之間的競爭上：谷歌、推特、YouTube、亞馬遜、eBay、優步、Expedia和蘋果支付，都是數字美國的標誌；而百度、騰訊、優酷、京東、阿里巴巴、滴滴快的、攜程以及支付寶，則是中國網絡空間的象徵。從某種意義上説，全球網絡空間裏有兩套互聯網的故事。

如今，互聯網上使用最多的兩大語言是英語（8.51億用户）和中文（7.04億用户），但隨着中國互聯網普及率進一步提高（中國互聯網普及率約為50%，而美國則為87%），中文可能很快將成為互聯網的第一語言。

韓國的數字經濟已佔國民生產總值的10%，在許多方面，它為信息時代提供了參考。然而，作為人口僅5000萬的國家，韓國的網絡影響力受到了根本性侷限，無法撼動全球網絡的兩極化格局。

也許有人會説，儘管中國互聯網的數量級十分龐大，但從性質上來看，中國不過是在步硅谷後塵。然而，通過保護本國互聯網巨頭的發展，中國不僅及時地縮小了與世界先進水平的差距，而且創造出一整套數字生態系統，這樣一來，中國得以在互聯網基礎設施領域進行實實在在的創新，並改變網絡空間的格局。

中國互聯網公司積累的數據給了它們絕對的優勢，因為中國很快將成為世界最大的經濟體。單在電子支付領域，就有超過200家互聯網公司服務於中國消費者，中國的互聯網倡議已經成為推動互聯網進步的驅動力。

只有拿中國同非洲、拉丁美洲、阿拉伯世界，甚至印度的互聯網現狀作比較，才能體會到數字中國的偉大意義，因為大多數發展中國家的工程師們都在為硅谷打工。很難想象，在美國互聯網公司面前，歐盟竟然甘於僅僅扮演用户的角色，因為無論從商業還是安全的角度來看，這樣的依賴性都將是歐盟的長期弱點。

誠然，“谷歌意大利”“谷歌法國”和“谷歌德國”豐富了歐洲人的生活，但它們都只是谷歌世界的邊緣，真正的中心在美國加州山景城的谷歌總部。

16年前，馬雲創立了阿里巴巴；2014年，這個電商巨頭在紐交所上市，首次公開募股250億美元，創下歷史融資紀錄；如今阿里正在歐盟拓展業務，這將直接有利於中歐經貿關係。然而，當歐洲公司通過阿里巴巴搭建的交易平台向中國出口商品時，它們便對這個無法直接掌控的介質產生了依賴性。

歐盟要以長遠眼光看待信息時代的歐洲利益，就必須把發展歐洲數字大戰略視為首要任務。在21世紀，任何大國都不可忽略網絡政治的核心地位，否則必將遭到邊緣化。

歐洲應該得到的，遠不止各種語言版本的谷歌，歐洲也應培養足以同亞馬遜和阿里巴巴競爭的電子商務平台。在此背景下，歐盟委員會負責數字議程的小組，自然要在監管層面努力朝數字化單一市場而努力，但它也應為歐洲數字商業在全球範圍的發展壯大創造條件。

歐洲的長期數字戰略必須考慮到硅谷的創造力，但另一方面，歐洲也須通過新的數字絲綢跟上中國互聯網不斷前進的步伐。在布魯塞爾和北京之間不存在網絡信任的問題，中歐互聯網朝同一個方向彙集，是對“一帶一路”互聯互通倡議的補充。

從發現美洲開始的地理大發現時代，標誌着“全球化1.0”的開始，歐洲掌握了工業革命帶來的技術手段，得以在世界事務中發揮卓越的作用。如今，世界正在迎來“全球化2.0”的黎明，人類正朝着無限的電子領域進軍，並將新的數字技術應用到生產過程中去。

作為“全球化1.0”的中心，難道歐洲要淪為“全球化2.0”的邊緣地帶？現在這樣説自然為時過早，但歐洲人應該好好從以下兩個歷史轉折點中汲取教訓。

在文藝復興時期，意大利城邦代表着歐洲貿易、金融、科學和藝術的最前沿。在發現新大陸以後，歐洲的中心逐漸從地中海轉移到了大西洋。意大利城邦之間無法相互協調，以維護它們在地緣政治新格局中的重要性，於是走上了衰落的道路。直到19世紀下半葉意大利統一，才重新回到世界政治的地圖上。

另一個例子是乾隆皇帝，他使中國無法同18世紀的歐洲正常來往。雖然當時大清國的經濟仍佔世界經濟總量兩成有餘，但天朝上國的思想使他無法料想機械時代將給世界權力版圖帶來改變。因為他的自大，中國走向了屈辱的衰落。

雖然歐洲曾是信息時代的共同締造者，但如果它拿不出政治智慧來促進一體化，不能集中力量全面進入信息時代，那麼它可能逐步被邊緣化，無法有效參與塑造新的全球秩序，最終淪為無關輕重的小角色。

（觀察者網楊晗軼譯，英文版以刊載於《赫芬頓郵報》，作者授權觀察者網獨家翻譯）

本文系觀察者網獨家稿件，文章內容純屬作者個人觀點，不代表平台觀點，未經授權，不得轉載，否則將追究法律責任。關注觀察者網微信guanchacn，每日閲讀趣味文章。

翻頁查看英文原文

The strategists were traditionally preoccupied by the possession of territories or the domination of sea routes. More recently, the capacity to control airspace and outer space modified the equation of national strength, in the Information Age, a country’s comprehensive power has become inseparable from her presence in the cyberspace.

Chinese policy makers have not only integrated the various dimensions of geopolitics but they have rightly paid great attention to the rapidly evolving domain of cyberpolitics.

By almost exclusively focusing on what it perceives as the limitations and the imperfections of the Chinese internet, the West has not yet fully realized the significance of the Chinese digital transformation. At the intersection of China’s global projection and of her quest for innovation, digital China is one of the most significant stories of our time.

Not a source of the 18th century Industrial Revolution which, after its birth in Europe, opened a new era in the history of mankind, marginalized for 150 years as a consequence of her incapacity to rapidly connect with the changes associated with the reign of the machines, China is now marked by her openness to the world’s scientific advancement but also by her ambition to be at the avantgarde of technological progress.

Following a painful decay whose causes were as much internal than external, China is currently, from biotech to the internet, from nano-tech to aeronautics or space exploration, in a quest for relevance. More generally, the ambition not to be a passive spectator in a western led globalization but to stand as a source of modernity is one of the defining elements of the Chinese renaissance.

If the Qing dynasty (1644-1912) was neither able to generate the Industrial Revolution nor to rapidly adjust to the changes it implied, the PRC is already a catalyst of the digital transformation. China missed the Industrial Revolution but it is a co-architect of the Information Age.

Global cyberspace, like the post WWII system of international relations, is bipolar, not structured around Washington D.C. and Moscow, but articulated around the U.S. and China. The current digital bipolarity is reflected in the competition between internet companies : Google, Twitter, YouTube, Amazon, eBay, Uber, Expedia and Apple Pay are the icons of digital America while Baidu, Tencent’s Wechat, Youku, JD.com, Alibaba, DidiKuaidi, Ctrip and Alipay symbolize China’s cyberspace. In a sense, global cyberspace is a tale of two internets.

Today, the two top languages of the World Wide Web are English (851 million users) and Chinese (704 million users) but with the rise of the internet penetration in the Middle Country (around 50% internet penetration in China against 87% for the U.S.), Mandarin might be soon the internet number one language.

South Korea whose digital economy represents 10% of her GDP is in many ways a reference in the Information Age but with 50 million inhabitants the country’s impact is intrinsically limited and it can not affect the dynamics of a bipolar cyberspace.

Some would argue that despite the quantitative dimension of the Chinese internet, China has been qualitatively a mere follower of the Silicon Valley. However, by choosing to protect the development of her own giants she has not only be able to narrow the gap very aptly, but the country’s existing digital ecosystem put her in a position to genuinely innovate in the infrastructure and the systems of the cyberspace.

The data that the Chinese internet companies have been accumulating give them an absolute advantage in what will be soon the world’s largest economy, and in the field of e-payment where more than 200 firms serve the Chinese consumers, the Middle Country’s initiatives have become driving forces.

The significance of digital China is even more striking when it is compared with the internet situation in Africa, Latin America, the Arab world or even India whose engineers continue to contribute to the success of the Silicon Valley. The European Union finds it satisfying to be the user of tools developed by American companies even if such a dependence is both from a commercial and a security perspective an incredible long term weakness.

“Google Italy”, “Google France” or “Google Germany” have certainly enriched the life of Europeans but they are variations in a universe centered around Googleplex in Mountain View, California.

Alibaba, the e-commerce giant created 16 years ago by Jack Ma and whose IPO raised a record $25 billion on the New York Stock Exchange, is increasing its presence in the European Union in a move which will immediately benefit the Sino-European trade relations. However, when European companies export to China through trading platforms conceived by Alibaba they become dependent on a new kind of vehicle upon which they have no direct control.

A long term view of the European interests in the Information Age commands to put the development of an ambitious European digital strategy at the top of Brussels’priorities. In the 21st century a power which ignores the centrality of cyberpolitics condemns itself to irrelevance.

Europe would deserve better than linguistic variations on the Google main theme and should be able also to grow e-commerce platforms capable to compete with Amazon or Alibaba. In that context, the European Commission’s team in charge of the Digital Agenda of the European Union should certainly work at the regulatory level for the Digital Single Market but it should help to shape the conditions for the emergence, beyond startup companies, of European digital global businesses.

Any long term European digital strategy has to take into account the creativity of the Silicon Valley but the vision of a New Digital Silk Road would allow Europe to keep pace with the evolving Chinese cyberspace. While cyber mistrust is not an issue in the relations between Brussels and Beijing, a converging Sino-European internet has to complement the “One Belt, one Road” connectivity.

The discoveries of new continents, starting from the discovery of America, marked the beginning of “Globalization 1.0” and, equipped with the instruments of the Industrial Revolution, Europe has been in a position to play a preeminent role in the world’s affairs. At the dawn of “Globalization 2.0”an expansion into unlimited e-territories is combined with the injection of new digital technology into the production processes.

Would it be possible that the civilization which was at the center of “Globalization 1.0” ends at the periphery of “Globalization 2.0” ? If it is certainly too early to tell, Europeans should nonetheless meditate upon two historical turning points.

During the Renaissance, Italian cities were leading in the fields of trade, banking, science and art. Following the discovery of the New World the European center of gravity gradually shifted from the Mediterranean Sea to the Atlantic Ocean. Incapable of coordinating their efforts to reach the necessary dimension to maintain their rank in a new geopolitical configuration, the Italian states declined and one had to wait the unification of Italy in the second half of the 19th century for the Italian peninsula to be back on the map of world politics.

When the Emperor Qianlong (1711-1799) made it impossible for his Empire to have normal interactions with the 18th century Europe, the economy of the Qing dynasty was still more than 20% of the world economy. But, convinced by the idea of the superiority of the Middle Country, the Son of Heaven was unable to anticipate that the age of the machines would change the distribution of power and his complacency caused a humiliating decline.

If Europe does not find the political wisdom to deepen her integration and the strength to fully enter the Information Age as one of its co-creators, it simply takes the risk, after a gradual marginalization, to end at the periphery of a new global order which would have been shaped without her effective participation.

本文系觀察者網獨家稿件，文章內容純屬作者個人觀點，不代表平台觀點，未經授權，不得轉載，否則將追究法律責任。關注觀察者網微信guanchacn，每日閲讀趣味文章。