逆轉!IMF論文稱新自由主義致不平等不穩定
三位IMF經濟學家週四發文呼籲,各國政府需要重新考慮財政緊縮和對外資開放的價值。文章一出,立即引發軒然大波。因為IMF正是當年力推這些政策的重要參與機構之一。

IMF總裁拉加德
在IMF最新一期刊物《FINANCE & DEVELOPMENT》上發表的題為《新自由主義:已超賣》(Neoliberalism: Oversold ?)的論文中,IMF研究部副主任Jonathan D. Ostry、宏觀經濟發展部主管Prakash Loungani等三位經濟學家對“新自由主義”提出了批評。
“新自由主義”的政策理念,其以1989年誕生的“華盛頓共識”為政策宣言。後者是一整套針對當時陷入危機的拉美國家和東歐轉軌國家的政治經濟理論,提出者是美國,參與者為IMF、世界銀行、美洲開發銀行和美國財政部的研究人員。
“華盛頓共識”主要包括壓縮財政赤字、重視基建、降低邊際税率、實施利率市場化、採用具有競爭力的匯率制度、實施貿易自由化、放鬆對外資的限制、實施國有企業私有化等十大方面。
這種政策在近幾年的希臘危機期間被IMF通過借錢而強加給希臘推行。如今,它是美國總統競選中的熱門話題之一。

新自由主義的精神領袖、著名經濟學家弗里德里希·哈耶克
上述三位IMF經濟學家對新自由主義理論的批評之處主要集中在兩點:一是財政緊縮政策,二是不同國家之間的資本自由流動。
他們援引全球數據稱,上述兩個關鍵政策不僅擴大了社會不平等,還危害了經濟的持續增長,也令資本市場不穩定。
具體細節方面,三位經濟學家稱,財政緊縮方面,他們認同部分歐洲國家由於無法不斷借貸度日,在別無選擇的情況下只能緊縮開支,但不應該要求所有國家都一刀切,統統採取財政緊縮措施。對於有良好記錄的國家來説,減少債務的好處其實很小,但是加税及削減開支的代價卻很大。
文章還稱,對於一個國家來説,債務負擔是已經發生且無法恢復的沉沒成本。有充足的財政空間的政府應當選擇保持一定的債務水平以推動經濟發展,而不是強行增加盈餘來減少債務。
他們還表示,新自由主義提倡的金融貿易自由化當中,資本流入的確有助於經濟發展,比如外商直接投資。但證券投資及債務類資金流入卻對一個國家的經濟發展沒有幫助。
同時,開放資本賬户等金融市場化手段則會導致經濟波動加劇,令金融危機更加頻繁。也有研究顯示這與社會不平等有關。有足夠證據顯示,開放資本流動需要付出龐大代價。
文章還強調,無論是開放資本流動或是推動緊縮政策,都會導致社會收入不均問題加劇,從而阻礙經濟發展。
事實上,新自由主義在過去多年一直引發學界和政界爭議,IMF也曾對此進行反思。比如,該機構前首席經濟學家Olivier Blanchard早在2010年已指出,很多發達經濟體都不應強推緊縮,而是要作中期的財政整頓。
附:IMF經濟學家原文《新自由主義已然江郎才盡?》(翻譯來自微信公眾號“女神讀書會”)
Neoliberalism: Oversold?
新自由主義已然江郎才盡?
Instead of delivering growth, some neoliberal policies have increasedinequality, in turn jeopardizing durable expansion
部分新自由主義的政策並沒有給經濟帶來增長,反而加劇了不公平,進而危及了經濟體量的持久擴大。
Milton Friedman in 1982 hailed Chile as an “economic miracle.” Nearly adecade earlier, Chile had turned to policies that have since been widelyemulated across the globe. The neoliberal agenda—a label used more by critics than by the architects of the policies—rests on two main planks. The first is increased competition—achieved through deregulation and the opening up of domesticmarkets, including financial markets, to foreign competition. The second is asmaller role for the state, achieved through privatization and limits on theability of governments to run fiscal deficits and accumulate debt.
1982年彌爾頓·弗裏德曼盛讚智利是一個“經濟奇蹟”。將近十年前,智利已轉向那些被世界各地廣泛效仿的政策。“新自由主義議程”這一標籤主要被批評者拿來使用,而非那些政策締造者們,它主要基於兩條總綱。第一點是加劇競爭,這可以通過放松管制和開放國內市場迎接外資競爭,包括開放金融市場來實現。第二點是弱化國家的作用,通過私有化和限制各國政府的運行財政赤字和債務積累的能力來實現。
There has beena strong and widespread global trend toward neoliberalism since the 1980s,according to a composite index that measures the extent to which countriesintroduced competition in various spheres of economic activity to fostereconomic growth. As shown in the left panel of Chart 1, Chile’s push started a decade or so earlier than 1982, with subsequent policy changes bringing it ever closer to theUnited States. Other countries have also steadily implemented neoliberalpolicies (see Chart 1, right panel
自20世紀80年代以來,全球範圍內出現了一個強大的新自由主義趨勢,這是一個綜合指數以後得出的結論,該指數用於測量各個國家為了促進經濟增長的在多個領域的經濟活動中的程度。如圖1的左圖中所示,早在1982年之前,智利推行新自由主義已有10年左右了。隨後的政策變化使其比以往任何時候都要接近於美國。其他國家也穩步實施新自由主義政策(見下圖)。

There is much to cheer in the neoliberal agenda. The expansion ofglobal trade has rescued millions from abject poverty. Foreign directinvestment has often been a way to transfer technology and know-how todeveloping economies. Privatization of state-owned enterprises has in manyinstances led to more efficient provision of services and lowered the fiscalburden on governments.
“新自由主義議程”得到了許多呼聲。全球貿易的擴張已經從赤貧中救出了數百萬人。外國直接投資也成了將科技和知識技能轉移到發展中國家經濟體的一種常見方式。許多時候,國有企業的私有化使得服務的供應更高效,並降低各國政府財政負擔。
However, there are aspects of the neoliberal agenda that have notdelivered as expected. Our assessment of the agenda is confined to the effectsof two policies: removing restrictions on the movement of capital across acountry’s borders (so-calledcapital account liberalization); and fiscal consolidation, sometimes called “austerity,” which isshorthand for policies to reduce fiscal deficits and debt levels. An assessmentof these specific policies (rather than the broad neoliberal agenda)reaches three disquieting conclusions:
•The benefits in terms of increased growth seemfairly difficult to establish when looking at a broad group of countries.
•The costs in terms of increased inequality areprominent. Such costs epitomize the trade-off between the growth and equityeffects of some aspects of the neoliberal agenda.
•Increased inequality in turn hurts the level and sustainability ofgrowth. Even if growth is the sole or main purpose of the neoliberal agenda,advocates of that agenda still need to pay attention to the distributionaleffects.
不過在一些方面,“新自由主義議程”並沒有如期實現。我們對此“議程”的評估僅限於兩項政策的效果:一、消除資本在國家間的流動限制(所謂的資本賬户自由化)。二、財政整合,有時也被稱為“緊縮”,這是減少財政赤字和債務水平的政策的簡稱。對於這些具體政策(而不是廣義的“新自由主義議程”)的評估有三點令人不安的結論:
•在一個更加廣泛的、多國團體的視域下來看(譯者按:如歐盟),利益增長似乎很難實現。
•不公平的加劇非常顯著。這樣的代價體現了新自由主義議程的某些方面對經濟增長和公平效益之間的權衡。
•不平等的加劇進而損害了經濟增長的水平和可持續性。即使增長是新自由主義議程的唯一或主要目的,該議程的倡導者還需要注意的分配的結果。
Open and shut?
As Maurice Obstfeld (1998) has noted, “economic theory leaves no doubt about the potential advantages” of capital account liberalization, which is also sometimes calledfinancial openness. It can allow the international capital market to channelworld savings to their most productive uses across the globe. Developingeconomies with little capital can borrow to finance investment, therebypromoting their economic growth without requiring sharp increases in their ownsaving. But Obstfeld also pointed to the “genuine hazards” of openness toforeign financial flows and concluded that “this duality of benefits and risks is inescapable in the real world.”
開放還是關閉?
正如莫里斯·奧布斯特菲爾德(1998年)所指出的,“經濟理論絕不懷疑潛在優勢”這是對資本賬户自由化來説的,它有時也被稱為金融開放。它可以讓國際資本市場打開渠道,從而使世界上的儲蓄最大程度上被利用。發展中國家資本有限,可以借貸進行經濟投資,促進其經濟增長,而不需要使自己的儲蓄急劇增加。但奧布斯特菲爾德還指出了開放外國資本流動的“真正風險”,並認為“這種收益和風險並存的二元性在現實世界中是無法避免的。”
This indeed turns out to be the case. The link between financialopenness and economic growth is complex. Some capital inflows, such as foreigndirect investment—which may include atransfer of technology or human capital—do seem to boost long-term growth. But the impact of other flows—such as portfolio investment and banking and especially hot, orspeculative, debt inflows—seem neither toboost growth nor allow the country to better share risks with its tradingpartners (Dell’Ariccia and others,2008; Ostry, Prati, and Spilimbergo, 2009). This suggests that the growth andrisk-sharing benefits of capital flows depend on which type of flow is beingconsidered; it may also depend on the nature of supporting institutions andpolicies.
情況也的確如此。資本開放與經濟增長之間的關係非常複雜。一些資本流入,如外商直接投資,其中可能包括科技或人力資本的轉移,似乎能刺激長期的經濟增長。但其他方面資本的流入,如尤為火爆的證券投資和銀行投資,或投機性的債務流入,似乎既不刺激經濟增長,也無法使該國與貿易伙伴更好地共擔風險(Dell’Ariccia等人,2008年;Ostry,Prati和的Spilimbergo,2009)。這表明,經濟增長和資本流動帶來的風險共擔型的利益取決於流動類型,也可能取決於配套制度和政策的性質。
Although growth benefits are uncertain, costs in terms of increasedeconomic volatility and crisis frequency seem more evident. Since 1980, therehave been about 150 episodes of surges in capital inflows in more than 50emerging market economies; as shown in the left panel of Chart 2, about 20percent of the time, these episodes end in a financial crisis, and many ofthese crises are associated with large output declines (Ghosh, Ostry, andQureshi, 2016).
儘管在獲益方面不是很確定,但經濟動盪和危機頻率加劇這兩個方面倒是變得更加明顯。自1980年以來,在50多個新興市場經濟體中。已經有大約150次危機事件由資本流入導致。如圖2的左圖中所示,這段時間大約有20%的事件以金融危機告終,許多這些危機都與產出大量下降有關(戈什,奧斯特里,和庫雷希,2016年)。
The pervasiveness of booms and busts gives credence to the claim byHarvard economist Dani Rodrik that these “are hardly a sideshow or a minor blemish in international capitalflows; they are the main story.” While thereare many drivers, increased capital account openness consistently figures as arisk factor in these cycles. In addition to raising the odds of a crash,financial openness has distributional effects, appreciably raising inequality(see Furceri and Loungani, 2015, for a discussion of the channels through whichthis operates). Moreover, the effects of openness on inequality are much higherwhen a crash ensues (Chart 2, right panel).
大面積的繁榮與大面積的蕭條(如此大起大落)讓哈佛大學經濟學家,丹尼·羅德里克得以斷言,這些事件“不是在國際資本流動中的一個插曲或是小瑕疵,它們正是主要情節。”有了如此多先例,堅持加大資本賬户開放被證明在這個循環中是一個風險因素。除了提高崩潰的幾率,資本開放還具有分配效應,即明顯加劇不公平(見Furceri和Loungani,2015年,對於此類運作渠道的討論)。此外,當經濟崩潰來臨,開放帶來的不公平效應將會更大。(見下圖)。

The mounting evidence on the high cost-to-benefitratio of capital account openness, particularly with respect toshort-term flows, led the IMF’s former FirstDeputy Managing Director, Stanley Fischer, now the vice chair of the U.S.Federal Reserve Board, to exclaim recently: “What useful purpose is served by short-term international capitalflows?” Among policymakerstoday, there is increased acceptance of controls to limit short-term debt flowsthat are viewed as likely to lead to—or compound—a financialcrisis. While not the only tool available—exchange rate and financial policies can also help—capital controls are a viable, and sometimes the only, option whenthe source of an unsustainable credit boom is direct borrowing from abroad(Ostry and others, 2012).
資本賬户開放,特別是對於短期流動來説,“成本-效益”的轉化率很高,越來越多的證據表明了這一點。這讓國際貨幣基金組織(IMF)的前第一副理事,現美聯儲委員會的副主席,斯坦利·費希爾,最近驚呼:“短期國際資本流動有何益處?”今天,政策制定者們,更加傾向控制政策,以限制短期債務流動,因為它往往直接導致或者催化經濟危機。雖然資本控制不是僅有的有效手段,匯率和財政政策也會起作用,但它是非常靠譜的,甚至當一股當不可持續的信貸繁榮的來源是直接借用海外資本時,它是唯一的手段。(奧斯特里等,2012)
Size of the state
Curbing the size of the state is another aspect of the neoliberalagenda. Privatization of some government functions is one way to achieve this.Another is to constrain government spending through limits on the size offiscal deficits and on the ability of governments to accumulate debt. Theeconomic history of recent decades offers many examples of such curbs, such asthe limit of 60 percent of GDP set for countries to join the euro area (one ofthe so-called Maastricht criteria).
政府的規模
遏制政府的大小是新自由主義議程的另一個方面。一些政府職能私有化是實現這一目標的途徑之一。另一種是通過限制財政赤字的規模和政府債務累積的能力來控制政府開支。近幾十年來的經濟發展史提供了很多此類限制的例子,比如加入歐元區國家的,赤字不得超過GDP的60%的限定(所謂的馬斯特裏赫特標準之一)。
經濟學理論很少提供對最佳公共債務目標的指導。一些理論表明需要更高的債務(因為税收具有扭曲性),而另一些則認為是更低的甚至是負的水平(因為應對不利衝擊需要預防性儲蓄)。在一些財政政策的建議中,IMF主要關注各國政府減少赤字和債務水平的步伐,這是全球金融危機背景下,由發達經濟體的債務積累所引起的:步伐太慢會使市場失去勇氣;太快則會破壞復甦。但IMF也同意,中期就償還部分債務,降低一些負債率,尤其是一些有廣泛的發達國家和新興國家參與債務裏,主要是作為對未來衝擊的保險。
But is there really a defensible case for countries like Germany,the United Kingdom, or the United States to pay down the public debt? Twoarguments are usually made in support of paying down the debt in countries withample fiscal space—that is, incountries where there is little real prospect of a fiscal crisis. The first isthat, although large adverse shocks such as the Great Depression of the 1930sor the global financial crisis of the past decade occur rarely, when they do,it is helpful to have used the quiet times to pay down the debt. The secondargument rests on the notion that high debt is bad for growth—and, therefore, to lay a firm foundation for growth, paying down thedebt is essential.
但其他國家真的能像德國,英國,或美國一樣能守住危機,來償還公共債務?通常有兩個理由來支持國家是否有擁有償還債務的充足財政空間,這意味着那些國家幾乎不會出現財政危機。第一點,雖然像20世紀30年代的大蕭條或過去十年的全球性金融危機那樣的巨大負面衝擊很少發生,但在平穩時期償還債務是有所助益的。第二個理由是建立在“高負債不利於經濟發展”這一概念之上的,因此,償還債務能為發展打下一個堅實的基礎。
It is surely the case that many countries (such as those in southernEurope) have little choice but to engage in fiscal consolidation, becausemarkets will not allow them to continue borrowing. But the need forconsolidation in some countries does not mean all countries—at least in this case, caution about “one size fits all” seemscompletely warranted. Markets generally attach very low probabilities of a debtcrisis to countries that have a strong record of being fiscally responsible(Mendoza and Ostry, 2007). Such a track record gives them latitude to decidenot to raise taxes or cut productive spending when the debt level is high(Ostry and others, 2010; Ghosh and others, 2013). And for countries with astrong track record, the benefit of debt reduction, in terms of insuranceagainst a future fiscal crisis, turns out to be remarkably small, even at veryhigh levels of debt to GDP. For example, moving from a debt ratio of 120percent of GDP to 100 percent of GDP over a few years buys the country verylittle in terms of reduced crisis risk (Baldacci and others, 2011).
無疑許多國家(如那些在歐洲南部的國家)別無他法,只能選擇財政整合。因為市場不會允許他們繼續借貸。但一些國家需要整合並不意味着所有國家需要——至少在這種情況下,關於“一刀切”警告似乎是必要的。市場通常認為那些有較好財政責任記錄的國家,債務危機的可能性會低一些(門多薩和奧斯特里,2007)。這樣的跟蹤紀錄給了他們一個標準,當這些國家債務水平較高時,決定不提高税收或削減生產開支。(奧斯特里等,2010; Ghosh等,2013年)。而對於具有較強的跟蹤記錄的國家,減債是應對未來財政危機的保險,其好處真可謂是非常小,即使債務佔GDP比重很高。例如,從債務比率佔GDP的120%從幾年內變到100%,這對國家降低危機風險並沒有多大作用。(巴達西等,2011年)
But even if the insurance benefit is small, it may still be worthincurring if the cost is sufficiently low. It turns out, however, that the costcould be large—much larger than thebenefit. The reason is that, to get to a lower debt level, taxes that distorteconomic behavior need to be raised temporarily or productive spending needs tobe cut—or both. The costs of the tax increases or expenditure cuts requiredto bring down the debt may be much larger than the reduced crisis riskengendered by the lower debt(Ostry,Ghosh, and Espinoza, 2015). This is not to deny that high debt is bad forgrowth and welfare. It is. But the key point is that the welfare cost from thehigher debt (the so-called burden of the debt) is one that has already beenincurred and cannot be recovered; it is a sunk cost. Faced with a choicebetween living with the higher debt—allowing the debt ratio to decline organically through growth—or deliberately running budgetary surpluses to reduce the debt,governments with ample fiscal space will do better by living with the debt.
但是,即使保險金很少,如果成本足夠低,它可能仍然是值得承擔。然而,事實證明,這種成本比獲益大得多。其原因在於,要獲得較低的債務水平,税(即扭曲經濟行為)需要暫時升高或生產性開支需要被削減,甚至兩者同時進行。而加税或削減開支來被用來降低債務,但其費用可能比用低債務降低的危機風險大得多(奧斯特里,戈什和埃斯皮諾薩,2015)。這並不是否認高負債不利於增長和福利。高負債確實不好。但關鍵是,高債務下的福利成本(所謂的債務負擔)是已經發生且無法收回的成本之一,它是一種沉沒成本。與高額債務共存,使債務比率在經濟增長中有機下降,或者刻意以預算盈餘來減少債務,面對這兩種選擇時,只有與債務共存,擁有充足的財政空間的政府才能有更好的表現。
Austerity policies not only generate substantial welfare costs dueto supply-side channels, they also hurt demand—and thus worsen employment and unemployment. The notion that fiscalconsolidations can be expansionary (that is, raise output and employment), inpart by raising private sector confidence and investment, has been championedby, among others, Harvard economist Alberto Alesina in the academic world andby former European Central Bank President Jean-Claude Trichet in the policyarena. However, in practice, episodesof fiscal consolidation have been followed, on average, by drops rather than byexpansions in output. On average, a consolidation of 1 percent of GDP increasesthe long-term unemployment rate by 0.6 percentage point and raises by 1.5percent within five years the Gini measure of income inequality (Ball andothers, 2013).
緊縮政策不僅因供應方的渠道而產生巨大的福利成本,同樣也傷害了需求,從而惡化就業。財政整合可以是擴張性(即提高產出和就業)的,某種程度上是通過提高私營部門的信心和投資來實現的。這一觀點在學術界被哈佛大學經濟學家阿爾貝託·阿萊西以及其他人所認同,在政策領域,則被前歐洲央行(ECB)主席Jean-Claude Trichet認同,然而,在實踐中,財政整合的意外也隨之而來,這通常是產量降低而非擴張。一般而言,1%GDP的合併增加了0.6個百分點的長期失業率,並且,用來檢測收入不平等的基尼係數在五年內提高了1.5%(鮑爾等人,2013年)。
總之,一些政策的好處似乎已經有所誇大,這些政策正是新自由主義議程的一個重要組成部分。在資本開放的情況下,部分資本流動,例如外國直接投資,似乎的確能帶來他們所聲稱的好處。但對於其他人,尤其是短期資本流動,對經濟增長沒什麼好處,而在出現較大動盪和增加危機風險方面,這些政策似乎使得情況迫在眉睫。
在財政整合時,較低的產能和福利以及高失業率方面的短期成本已經被淡化。而一個財政空間充足的國家,面對高負債時,對於允許通過經濟的發展從而有機地降低負債率的願望,總是不得實現。
An adverse loop
Moreover, since both openness and austerity are associated withincreasing income inequality, this distributional effect sets up an adversefeedback loop. The increase in inequality engendered by financial openness andausterity might itself undercut growth, the very thing that the neoliberalagenda is intent on boosting. There is now strong evidence that inequality cansignificantly lower both the level and the durability of growth (Ostry, Berg,and Tsangarides, 2014).
一個怪圈
此外,因為開放和緊縮政策都與收入增長的不平等有關,這種分配效應設置了一個不利的循環。資本開放造成不公平的加劇,資本緊縮本身又可能削弱經濟增長,恰好,新自由主義議程的意圖就是刺激增長。而有力的證據表明不公平會顯著降低經濟增長的水平和持續性(Ostry,Berg和Tsangarides,2014年)。
The evidence of the economic damage from inequality suggests thatpolicymakers should be more open to redistribution than they are. Of course,apart from redistribution, policies could be designed to mitigate some of theimpacts in advance—for instance,through increased spending on education and training, which expands equality ofopportunity (so-called predistribution policies). And fiscal consolidation strategies—when they are needed—could bedesigned to minimize the adverse impact on low-income groups. But in somecases, the untoward distributional consequences will have to be remedied after they occur by using taxes and governmentspending to redistribute income. Fortunately, the fear that such policies willthemselves necessarily hurt growth is unfounded (Ostry, 2014).
由不公平所造成的經濟損失的表明,政策制定者應該更加註重再分配。當然,除了再分配,可以預先制定一些旨在緩和衝擊的政策——例如,通過增加教育和培訓的支出,擴大機會的平等(所謂的預分配政策)。而必要時,財政整合策略可以被用來儘量減少對低收入羣體帶來的不利影響。但在某些情況下,利用税收和政府支出對收入進行再分配後,一些再分配的意外結果必須得到糾正。幸好,擔心這樣的政策將必然損害經濟增長是杞人憂天。(奧斯特里,2014年)。
Finding the balance
These findings suggest a need for a more nuanced view of what theneoliberal agenda is likely to be able to achieve. The IMF, which oversees theinternational monetary system, has been at the forefront of thisreconsideration.
尋找平衡
這些發現表明,對於新自由主義議程的更細緻觀點的呼喚應該能夠實現。負責監督國際貨幣體系的國際貨幣基金組織(IMF),早已對重新審議做出了行動。
例如,IMF的前首席經濟學家奧利維爾·布蘭查德在2010年説:“許多先進的經濟體需要一個可信的中期財政整合,而不是像今天一樣的財政束縛。”三年後,IMF理事克里斯蒂娜·拉加德説,説我們相信美國國會提出上升該國的債務上限是正確的,“因為目前的重點不是通過野蠻地大幅削減支出來約束經濟,因為目前的經濟開始復甦。”2015年,IMF建議在歐元區的各國“財政空間應該用來支持投資。”
On capital account liberalization, the IMF’s view has also changed—from one that considered capital controls as almost alwayscounterproductive to greater acceptance of controlstodeal with the volatility of capital flows. The IMF also recognizes that fullcapital flow liberalization is not always an appropriate end-goal, and thatfurther liberalization is more beneficial and less risky if countries havereached certain thresholds of financial and institutional development.
在資本賬户自由化方面,IMF的看法也發生了變化——他們原本認為資本管控幾乎總是適得其反,如今卻在更大程度上接受了它,以應對資本流動的動盪。 IMF還認識到,全面資本流動自由化並不總是一個合適的最終目標,如果國家已達到財政和機構發展的特定閾值,進一步自由化更為有利且風險更低。
智利的新自由主義的開拓經驗得到了諾貝爾經濟學獎得主弗裏德曼的高度讚揚,但現在很多經濟學家都向更為細緻的觀點轉變。這些觀點來自美國哥倫比亞大學教授約瑟夫·斯蒂格利茨(也是個諾貝爾經濟學獎得主)。智利“是市場結合適當監管的一個成功的例子“(2002年)。斯蒂格利茨指出,在早年轉向新自由主義期間,智利實行“控制資本的流入,這樣他們就不會被淹沒,”,例如,泰國,第一次亞洲金融危機爆發的國家,則是十年半以後才這麼幹的。智利(現在全國避開資本管制),以及其他國家的經驗,表明沒有固定的章程能夠為所有國家的任何時候給予好的結果。這提醒了政策制定者們和一些機構,如國際貨幣基金組織,制定政策要通過有效的事實證據,絕不是靠自信。