李世默：全球主義的終結與世界新秩序的誕生

俗話説，屋漏偏逢連夜雨。自從2008年金融海嘯以來，經濟大衰退、歐元區危機、貿易協定停滯，俄羅斯和西方衝突加劇，歐洲選民反叛政治精英等事接踵而至，再加上不久前的英國退歐公投，全球化已呈強弩之末，勢衰力乏有目共睹。然而，全球化的信徒們卻大都選擇視而不見，而最激烈的反全球化者們也沒料到，他們能這麼快攻佔最高的堡壘——白宮。

特朗普當選美國總統，揭開新時代序幕

頭戴顛覆者光環的特朗普入主白宮，讓世界各大國領導內心或抓狂或竊喜，反應奇特。早在美國大選塵埃落定之前，日本首相安倍晉三不但多次對特朗普競選總統表示憂心，而且特地在大選前僅與希拉里·克林頓會面；但在選舉結果揭曉後，安倍又搖身一變，連忙趕往紐約特朗普大廈，面見準總統。歐洲各國首腦對特朗普當選的態度也是逡巡不定，德國總理默克爾竟然給未來德美合作提出了先決條件。俄國上下則是一片欣喜，俄羅斯總統普京在賀信中寫道，特朗普的勝利可以為莫斯科和華盛頓帶來“基於平等、相互尊重和實事求是的建設性對話”。

然而，中國作為最重要的大國之一，仍未明確表露態度。在美國大選期間，中國是特朗普抨擊美國貿易現狀最主要的靶子。然而，特朗普如其所言大概會退出“跨太平洋夥伴關係協定”（TPP），這樣中國將成為獲益者。在對外政策方面，特朗普持反干涉主義觀點，這顯然符合中國人的世界觀。目前的跡象表明，中國政府尚未完全消化特朗普當選美國總統這一重磅事件，仍在精確調校其對策。

北京得抓緊時間了。在特朗普的勝利一頭撞開的新時代，中國潛在的得與失都有可能是最大的。作為世界第二大經濟體以及最大貿易國，中國對特朗普政府的應對，或許決定着這個世界將通往繁榮還是停滯，甚至影響着世界走向戰爭還是和平。

全球主義的死亡

全球化誕生於20世紀70年代，它最初只是個單純的概念：在貿易、投資、旅遊和信息互通的作用下，世界各地聯繫越來越緊密。但冷戰後，它被注入了一種意識形態：全球主義。如今，人們幾乎已難以分辨全球化和全球主義。

全球主義植根於被新自由主義者奉為圭臬的華盛頓共識。華盛頓共識是由冷戰後首任美國總統比爾·克林頓政府發起，並由小布什和奧巴馬持續貫徹執行的。在其構想中，全世界經濟、政治和國際關係等領域的規則與標準，都將必然地邁向一體化。國家邊界將逐漸失去意義，甚至消失。文化差異將讓位於普世價值。選舉民主和市場資本主義將主導整個世界。最終，所有國家都將以幾乎相同的模式治理。

政黨輪替並沒有阻礙美國推動全球主義

美國依仗它巨大的硬實力和軟實力推動了這一進程。在相當程度上，也正是基於這種邏輯，脱胎於新自由主義的新保守主義者和自由干涉主義者，把美國拖入了阿富汗戰爭和伊拉克戰爭。這就是問題所在：全球主義是現代版的特洛伊木馬，它吞噬了全球化，成為脱繮的野馬一往無前，直到如今被自己的狂妄自大所壓垮。

在西方，鼓吹全球主義最賣力的信徒成了全球化最大的受益者。財富和權力集中於社會頂層，掌握在高高在上的資本所有者和調度者手中；貿易自由、多元文化主義、多邊機構，乃至在他國策劃政權更迭和國家創建等等，都得到這羣人的青睞與樂些不疲的支持。但他們的願景傷害了包括中產階級在內的絕大多數人。距離贏得冷戰僅過了一代人的時間，美國的工業基礎便已被掏空，基礎設施年久失修，教育系統江河日下，社會契約分崩離析。

除了造成經濟衰敗，全球主義還傳播了一套新的社會價值觀，威脅到社會團結。政治學者羅伯特·普特南（Robert Putnam）在其重要書作《獨自玩保齡》（Bowling Alone）中，通過描寫美國基層社區走向崩潰的種種細節，精確地捕捉到全球主義對美國社會的衝擊。換句話説，美國精英打着全球化的旗號，在以他們的國家為代價構建他們的帝國。

歐洲也發生着同樣的事情。歐盟總部的技術官員以及他們在各成員國中的盟友們，致力於不斷擴張歐盟，並推行一套不斷擴充的統一準則，而將各成員國人民的根本利益置之腦後。在部分歐洲國家，青年失業率竟持續處於50%高位。

如果全球主義精英們當初沒有那麼好高騖遠，他們有可能走得更遠。但現在補救似乎為時已晚，精英們賴以維持統治的投票箱背叛了他們，他們正在被推翻。

中國與全球化

中國從全球化中獲利超過其他任何發展中國家。它從一個貧窮的農業經濟體，轉變為全球工業強國，同時還實現了六億多人的脱貧。然而，中國堅持以自己的方式基於本國的國情參與全球化，在擁抱互聯互通的同時，斷然拒絕了全球主義。相反，中國不但鞏固了其一黨執政的政治制度，還能夠審時度勢，根據本國發展的優先順序決定市場開放的速度和程度。

或許是因為察覺到這一點，特朗普把美國的許多病灶都怪罪到中國頭上。讓中國背這黑鍋是不公平的。中國領導人所推行的當然是以中國國家利益為最終考量的政策，這是他們的責任；如果不這樣做，才是他們的過失。話説回來，如果特朗普上台後專為美國人民的利益着想——用他的競選口號來説，就是“美國優先”——那麼其正當性也應該是不言而喻的。

中國應從特朗普的勝利中有所啓示。中國不應把眾多——甚至可能是大多數——美國人的覺醒視為對中國崛起的全面對抗，或認為兩國將不可避免地由此走向勢不兩立的衝突。相反，中國應該以此為契機，來研究如何在新時代與美國打交道。

特朗普的崛起來得正是時候。中國的意見領袖一直以來只從美國精英那裏獲取關於美國的信息，所以他們跟那些美國媒體和智庫的專家們一樣，與美國城鄉的中產階級嚴重脱節。因此，他們很容易也和希拉里一樣，把特朗普的支持者看作一羣“卑鄙之徒”，認為他們只是一羣教育程度低下的種族主義者和性別歧視者。這將是非常嚴重的誤判。

中國只需看看鏡子，就會更好地理解歐美的改變。中國人一向批評全球主義者唯我獨尊的“一刀切”的價值、治理模式，呼籲世界各國尋求適合自身的發展道路。中國國家主席習近平曾説：“鞋子合不合腳，自已穿了才知道。”而今特朗普似乎準備讓美國試穿幾雙新鞋子。另外，特朗普持對外不干涉主義態度，他曾強調“要使既無民主經驗、又對民主化缺乏興趣的國家成為西方民主國家，是種危險的想法。”這種説法在中國無疑會產生共鳴。

毫無疑問，特朗普專注於追求美國國家利益必將給中美兩國之間造成衝突。但中國應當重視和尊重美國社會支撐特朗普崛起的民怨與訴求。如果特朗普正如預期的那樣，在貿易上為難中國，中國最好保持一定程度的剋制。針鋒相對的貿易報復行動，可能引發地緣政治衝突，而在這種情況下，中美兩國都會是輸家。

從零和博弈到正和博弈

多年執政表現證明，中國領導人是睿智的，他們應已意識到，與特朗普治下的美國謀求共同利益，意味着前所未有的機會。

在根本上，中國人的理念與特朗普的願景是兼容的。強大的主權國家對於當今國際體系的有效治理至關重要。文化的首要地位必須得到承認，國際統一規則的執行不應凌駕於國家主權與國情差異之上。此外，當雙邊外交更有效時，多邊機構不應被用來壓制雙邊接觸。以上這些話，不論從特朗普或習近平口中説出來，都毫不令人意外。

在現實層面上，有許多政策可以使中美兩國共贏。特朗普最重要的倡議之一，是重建美國破舊的基礎設施。他承諾在該領域將投入一萬億美元，也許還不夠。這個目標是明智的，將會通過創造就業，新建和升級道路、機場、水壩等基礎設施，為美國經濟注入急需的活力，但執行時必將遭遇財政限制和工業產能不足等諸多挑戰。

中國在基礎設施建設方面，是有兩把刷子的。對此特朗普十分清楚，他在競選演説中曾多次提到中國的基建能力。在競選過程中，特朗普還高聲抱怨，美國的基礎設施與中國相比，屬於“第三世界”水平。中國完全可以去美國發揮自己的長項。一方面，中國可以邀請美國加入亞洲基礎設施投資銀行（亞投行），並且優惠而迅速地為美國基建提供工業產能支持。這將大大有利於中國，因為中國的過剩資本與產能需要消化，而美國作為中國最大的貿易伙伴，提供了絕佳而互利的用武之地。

2013年，美國土木工程協會曾給美國基礎設施評出D+的低分

在地緣政治領域，中美也不乏重大共同利益。特朗普和中國似乎都認識到，非國家行為體對世界和平構成了最嚴重的威脅。全球主義給世界帶來的最嚴重創傷之一，是削弱了國家主權。在跨國恐怖主義威脅提升的今天尤其如此，全球主義架空了國家邊界，壓縮了政府權力，卻沒有提供有效的替代品，造就了一個更危險的世界。多年來，全球主義者一直變着法子譴責中國不識時務地固守國家主權，但在維護人民安全和利益方面中國似乎做得更好。在這方面，中國和特朗普治下的美國可以找到許多全新的交集。

即使在貿易領域，中美之間也並非完全得失對立。掛在全球主義精英嘴邊的教條，將貿易自由與保護主義説成是國際貿易非此即彼的二元對立關係。任何迴避全球標準化的人，都可能被扣上貿易保護主義者的帽子。（基於這種敍事，中國常常被批評奉行保護主義。）然而，全球主義者的二元對立敍事其實根本站不住腳。促進國際貿易與保護各國合法利益完全可以並行不悖。例如，中國關於亞太地區貿易擴張的提議，即區域全面經濟夥伴關係（RCEP），考慮到參與國經濟和政治條件各異，特別對各國關税和行業標準進行區分對待。

與此相反，奧巴馬的跨太平洋夥伴關係協定（TPP）奉行一套單一化的規則，不顧各國不同發展階段相應地在貿易領域的特殊要求。具有諷刺意義的是，許多美國人現在到頭來認為該協定不適應本國的國情。隨着中國經濟結構的調整，對出口的依賴減少，內需旺盛、高附加值服務業展露頭角；與此同時，美國開始尋求重建生產能力，中美完全可以探索擴大貿易的新途徑。

最後，特朗普似乎憑直覺認識到了歷史學家保羅·肯尼迪所説的“帝國過度擴張”現象對美國造成的損害。美國精英有種強烈的願望，要按照美國形象去塑造全世界，這使美國乃至世界付出了巨大代價。美國人口在全世界佔比不足5%，GDP總量佔比約為20%，但其軍費開支佔全球總額的40%（在某些年份，這個數字甚至達到了50%）。特朗普表示希望減少這種干涉主義，全球主義精英們因此給他戴上孤立主義者的帽子。但事實上，這是他們在全球主義話語中設立的兩個極端：一個是堅持對其他國家的治理指手畫腳，另一個是徹底脱離國際事務，但在現實中，兩者之間美國明明有很大舞台發揮重大作用。例如，美國應繼續關注和影響中東事務，但終結其對當地的政權更迭或國家創建的干涉。

促使特朗普跳出意識形態桎梏，非常符合中國的利益。作為世界第二大經濟體，中國有責任協助維持全球穩定。要實現這一點，中國可以像對菲律賓所做的那樣緩和緊張的雙邊關係，通過在亞太地區調整地緣政治姿態來促進地區和平。另外，中國正迅速成為中東地區最大的石油進口國，該地區的穩定符合中國長遠利益，中國可以考慮幫助美國分擔處理中東事務的負擔。

營造世界新秩序

特朗普的勝利並非意外，而是美國精英長期忽視自己眼皮底下社會結構發生劇變的結果。在這些力量的推動下，美國和世界將脱離此前延續25年的慣性軌道，沿着新的路徑前進。中國領導人認清這一現實，並做出相應的反應，將至關重要。如果中國踏錯一步，貿易戰爭、地緣政治對抗甚至軍事衝突都可能接踵而至。不幸如此，則一個經典的修昔底德陷阱重現：崛起大國刺激守成大國產生恐懼心理，緊張局勢升級為戰爭。美國開始在世界事務中將自己的國家利益置於首位，有其正當的理由，對此，中國比其他任何國家都更應心知肚明。同時中國也比其他任何國家更有能耐助美國一臂之力，讓特朗普成功調整國策，應對當務之急。

全球主義的死亡並不意味全球化的終結

全球主義的死亡並不意味着最初意義上的全球化走向終結。相反，由於科技和經濟領域的長期趨勢，國家之間的互聯互通程度可能繼續增加。也就是説，世界比以往任何時候都更需要有效的全球治理。但新時期的全球治理必將脱離全球主義敍事。

世界需要新的秩序，這套新秩序絕非是建立在二十世紀意識形態斷層線上的，也必需拋棄自負的“歷史終結論”。它將尊重國與國之間的多樣性，尊重國家主權和文化主體性。各國可以按照適合本國國情的方式自由合作，而不是根據某種單一的全球標準來治理世界。只有強大的主權國家才能有效地相互合作，並在適當時，為維護世界秩序，自願調整主權範圍。

如果我們希望二十一世紀是個和平繁榮的世紀，那麼中國應該與特朗普治下的美國共同開拓新的未來。雖然中美兩個大國之間競爭不可避免，但今天，中美的世界觀出現了幾乎前所未有的重疊，兩國之間求大同存小異越來越可能。中國領導人應該留意特朗普今年四月發表的重要外交政策講話：“我們渴望與俄羅斯及中國和平共處。我們與這兩個國家有嚴重分歧，必須保持警惕，但它們並不一定要成為美國的敵人。我們應該在共同利益的基礎上尋求共同點。”

目前，太多人極度悲觀，美國和世界的未來在他們眼裏晦暗無光，前景無比險惡，因此保持樂觀尤為可貴。中國無意取代美國的世界主導地位，只尋求在周邊地區重新確立應有的領導地位；美國則需關注自我重建。如果雙方擁有足夠智慧和務實精神，互相寬容，共同實現這些目標，或許能夠制定出全球治理的新共識，藉以通向更加穩定的新世界。

全球主義自殺了，又一個世界秩序誕生了。讓我們邁向新的時代吧。

（觀察者網楊晗軼譯自《外交事務》，翻頁閲讀英文原文）

The End of Globalism: Where China and the United States Go From Here

By Eric X. Li

When it rains, it pours. As the Great Recession, eurozone crisis, stalled trade deals, increased conflict between Russia and the West, electoral revolts against European political elites, and finally Brexit followed the 2008 financial meltdown, the fact that globalization was running out of steam should have been obvious to all. Yet most of its converts were blind, and even the fiercest rebels against globalization never expected to claim the top prize—the White House—and so soon.

World powers are now scrambling to react to Donald Trump’s paradigm-shifting election as president of the United States. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, after repeatedly expressing concern about a potential Trump presidency and pointedly meeting with only Hillary Clinton before the election, rushed to New York for face time with the president-elect. European leaders have been more ambivalent, with German Chancellor Angela Merkel even putting conditions on working with Trump. And the Russians have seemed downright gleeful; in a congratulatory note, Russian President Vladimir Putin wrote that Trump’s victory could bring “a constructive dialogue between Moscow and Washington on the principles of equality, mutual respect and real consideration.”

Yet the feelings of perhaps the most consequential power—China—remain somewhat unclear. During the campaign, China was a primary target of Trump’s dissatisfaction with trade. Yet Trump’s likely jettisoning of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade agreement would immediately benefit China. And for obvious reasons, his anti-interventionist foreign policy outlook suits the Chinese. For now, there are signs that Beijing is still processing the enormous development and is calibrating its response.

It better hurry. In the new era ushered in by Trump’s victory, the Chinese have the most to gain—or to lose. And as the world’s second-largest economy and its largest trading nation, China’s response could mean the difference between prosperity and stagnation, and even war and peace, around the world.

THE RISE AND FALL OF GLOBALISM

Globalization started as an innocent enough concept in the 1970s: the world was becoming increasingly connected through trade, investment, travel, and information. But after the Cold War, it was injected with an ideological component: globalism. And now one can hardly distinguish between the two.

Globalism is rooted in the neo-liberal doctrine of the Washington Consensus, which was initiated by the first post–Cold War U.S. president, Bill Clinton, and carried out by the successive administrations of George W. Bush and Barack Obama. It envisioned a world moving inextricably toward the adoption of a unified set of rules and standards in economics, politics, and international relations. National borders would gradually lose relevance and even disappear. Cultural distinctions would give way to universal values. Electoral democracy and market capitalism would spread the world over. Eventually, all countries would be governed in more or less the same way.

The process would be backed by the United States’ hard and soft power. Indeed, it was partially according to this logic that neo-liberalism’s offspring, the neo-conservatives and liberal interventionists, took America to war in Afghanistan and Iraq. And therein lies the problem; globalism was a Trojan Horse. It devoured globalization, turning it into a force that seemed unstoppable until it collapsed under the weight of its own hubris.

In the West, the leading disciples of globalism became its greatest beneficiaries. Wealth and power concentrated at the top, among the owners and deployers of capital, who favored free trade, multiculturalism, multilateral institutions, and even regime change and nation building in foreign lands. But their vision harmed the vast majority that constituted the middle class. Just one generation after winning the Cold War, the United States saw its industrial base hollow out, its infrastructure fall into disrepair, its education system deteriorate, and its social contract rip apart.

Beyond the economic damage, changes in social values propagated by globalism threatened social cohesion. The political scientist Robert Putnam captured the process best in his important book, Bowling Alone, in which he described in painful detail the collapse of American communities. In the name of globalization, in other words, American elites had been building an empire at the expense of a nation.

THE VIEW FROM BEIJING

China, more than any other developing country, has benefited from globalization. It saw itself transform from a poor agrarian economy into a global industrial powerhouse, all while lifting more than 600 million people out of poverty. Yet China chose to engage globalization on its own terms, embracing connectivity while decisively rejecting globalism. In turn, China was able to strengthen its one-party political system and open its market according to its own national development priorities.

Perhaps sensing as much, Trump has taken to blaming China for many of the United States’ ills. This seems wholly unfair. Chinese leaders simply exercised their responsibility to do what was best for their people. They would have been in the wrong if they hadn’t. But it is also wholly understandable and justified for Trump to want to do what is best for the American people—to put, as his slogan goes, “America First.”

Rather than balking, China should see this as a teachable moment. The awakening of a large portion of the American people should not be viewed as a wholesale rejection of China or as a precursor to unavoidable and fundamental conflicts. Rather, it should be seen as a study in how to engage the United States in a new era.

The lesson comes at an important moment. China’s opinion leaders tend to get their information about the United States from American elites. So they are just as disconnected from Middle America as those in the country’s own newsrooms and think tanks. As such, they are susceptible to seeing Trump’s supporters as “deplorables,” as Trump’s rival, Hillary Clinton, put it, who are racist, uneducated, and misogynistic. And that would be a grave misjudgment.

China would do better to look in the mirror to understand the ways in which the United States and Europe are changing for good. The Chinese have been among the loudest voices criticizing the one-size-fits-all model of globalism and calling for the world’s nations to be allowed to pursue their own development paths. As Chinese President Xi Jinping famously said, “One could only know if a pair of shoes are good by wearing them.” Trump, it seems, is ready to try on some new ones for America. Meanwhile, Trump’s non-interventionist approach to the world—he has emphasized that it was “a dangerous idea that we could make Western democracies out of countries that had no experience or interest in becoming a Western democracy,”—must hearten the Chinese.

No doubt, there will be conflicts as Trump pursues American national interests. But the grievances behind his rise deserve China’s attention and due respect. If, for example, Trump were to be less friendly to China on trade, as is expected, China would do well to exercise a degree of restraint. If it responds with tit-for-tat escalation, the risk of a geopolitical conflict is real. In such a scenario, both China and the United States would lose.

ROOM TO MANEUVER

Chinese leaders, having proved wise over so many years, should see unprecedented opportunities to pursue common interests with Trump’s America.

China’s ideas are fundamentally compatible with Trump’s vision. Strong sovereign nations are paramount to a functioning international system. The primacy of culture must be recognized, and enforcing uniform rules should never take precedence over national considerations. Multilateral institutions, moreover, should not be used to suppress bilateral engagements when bilateral arrangements are more effective. All these statements could have been uttered by Trump or by Xi.

On a practical level, there is a wide range of policies that could benefit both the United States and China. One of Trump’s most important initiatives is to rebuild America’s decrepit infrastructure. He has promised one trillion dollars in spending, which might not even be enough. His is a laudable goal that would infuse the U.S. economy with much-needed vitality by creating jobs and by building new roads, airports, and dams and upgrading existing ones. But challenges, namely financial constraints and industrial capacity, abound.

China understands a thing or two about building infrastructure. And as his many campaign speeches indicated, Trump knows it. On the campaign trail, Trump complained loudly that, compared with China, America’s infrastructure was “third world.” China could bring its considerable capacities to bear in the United States. For one, it could bring the United States into the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and supply industrial capacity on favorable terms and relatively quickly. This would significantly benefit China, which needs to deploy its excess capital and capacity. And there is no better place to do so than in its largest trading partner.

In the area of geopolitics, there are likewise significant common interests. Both Trump and China seem to recognize that the gravest threat to world peace comes from nonstate actors. One of the worst injuries globalism has inflicted on the world has been to weaken the state just as the threat of transnational terrorism has grown. By erasing national borders and diminishing the powers of national governments without providing a good replacement, globalism has created a more dangerous world. Over the years, of course, globalists have condemned China for a supposedly regressive insistence on protecting its national sovereignty. But China certainly seems to have fared better in protecting its people’s safety and interests. China and Trump’s America can find much common ground in that.

Even on trade, there is potential for convergence. The globalist elite narrative presents a dichotomy between free trade and protectionism. Anyone who eschews global standardization risks being labeled a protectionist. (In fact, China has frequently been accused of protectionism on those grounds.) But the globalists’ dichotomy is false. It is possible to promote trade and to protect legitimate national interests at the same time. For example, China’s proposal for trade expansion in Asia Pacific, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), specifically allows for many differentiations on tariffs and industry standards based on participating countries’ varied economic and political conditions.

By contrast, Obama’s TPP was solely designed to enforce a set of uniform rules regardless of the particular requirements of nations at very different stages of development. Ironically, many Americans now see the agreement as unsuitable to their country’s own needs. As China restructures its economy to rely less on exports and more on domestic demand and service industries, which are higher value-add, and as the United States seeks to rebuild productive capacity, the two countries are in a good position to explore new approaches to expanding their trade.

Last but not least, Trump seems to intuitively grasp the damage done to the United States by what the historian Paul Kennedy called imperial overreach. The desire by American elites to remake the world in their country’s own image has cost them—and the world—dearly. The United States has less than five percent of the world’s population and about 20 percent of its total GDP, but it accounts for 40 percent of its total military expenditures (that figure reaches half in some years). Trump has said that he would like to curtail such interventionism, and global elites have derided him as isolationist. But there is plenty of room between a United States that insists on telling other countries how to govern themselves and total disengagement. For example, the United States should remain engaged on Middle East issues, but end efforts at regime change or nation building there.

It is very much in China’s interest to encourage Trump’s shift away from an ideologically driven worldview. And, as the second largest economy in the world, China has a responsibility to help maintain global stability. It could do so by moderating its own geopolitical postures in the Asia Pacific so as to foster a more peaceful region, as it has already done with the Philippines. China could also share the burden in the Middle East, where it is fast becoming the region’s largest oil importer and has a long-term interest in stability.

A NEW WORLD ORDER?

Trump’s victory was not an accident. It was the culmination of structural changes within American society that elites had ignored for too long. These forces will continue to push the United States and the world down a different path than the one they’ve been on for 25 years now. It is critical that Chinese leaders see this reality and respond accordingly. If China gets it wrong, trade wars, geopolitical confrontations, and even military conflicts could follow. It would be a classic case of the Thucydides Trap, in which a rising power strikes fear in an established power and tensions escalate into war. The United States has legitimate reasons to place itself first in its dealings with the world. China, more than any other nation, should be capable of understanding that. And China, also more than any other nation, could offer Trump’s America room to successfully adjust its national priorities.

The death of globalism does not mean the end of globalization as the idea was originally understood. On the contrary, interconnectedness will probably continue to increase, driven by secular trends in technology and economics. Effective global governance, in other words, is needed more than ever. But it can no longer be based on the narrative of globalism.

The world needs a new order grounded not in twentieth-century ideological fault lines and the idea that history would soon reach its end, but in respect for diversity among nations, state sovereignty, and cultural integrity. Instead of trying to run the world according to a singular set of global standards, nations can cooperate freely in ways that are suited to their particular circumstances. Only strong sovereign states can effectively cooperate with each other and, when appropriate, willingly moderate their sovereignties for the benefit of world order.

If we want a peaceful and prosperous twenty-first century, China should work with Trump’s America to develop that new future. Although competition between the two powers will be unavoidable, their now-shared outlooks on the world and common interests far outweigh their differences. Indeed, China’s leaders would be well advised to hear what Trump had to say in a major foreign policy speech last April: “We desire to live peacefully and in friendship with Russia and China. We have serious differences with these two nations, and must regard them with open eyes, but we are not bound to be adversaries. We should seek common ground based on shared interests.”

With so much doomsday thinking—so many dire predictions about what’s going to happen to America and the world—a dose of optimism is needed. China harbors no designs to somehow replace the United States as the dominant world power. It naturally seeks to reclaim a leadership position in its neighborhood. And America needs to focus on rebuilding itself. If the two nations have the wisdom and pragmatism to work together on those goals, to live and let live, they can perhaps formulate a new consensus on global governance that will lead to a more stable world.

Globalism has committed suicide. A new world order has been born. Let’s engage it now.

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