斯蒂芬·里克特：美國人準備何時鬧革命？

大多數美國人心中珍藏着一種信念，即他們的國家降生於革命風暴當中。儘管這則建國神話對大眾充滿吸引力，但其實世界至今還在等待美國革命的到來。

我無意在此貶低美國國父們的成就。他們的集體行動確實使美國衝破了外國國王——英王喬治三世——的桎梏，讓美國人掌握了自己的命運。

然而，且不論英國統治者究竟是座壓在美國人民身上的大山，抑或僅是隻遠隔重洋的蠅虻，推翻他的統治都談不上是一場革命，只能算作民族解放運動。美利堅合眾國是民族解放運動的先行者。其他深受外國殖民統治之苦的國家——特別是數十個亞非拉國家——直到大約兩百年後才完成了民族解放。

革命與民族解放最大的不同之處在於，革命的本質永遠是社會性的。要判斷一場運動是否是真正的革命，最根本的標準在於它有沒有迎來命運攸關的時刻，即革命者有沒有用刀尖抵着統治者的咽喉，並威脅道“不讓權就掉腦袋”。

無可否認，1773年的確發生了波士頓傾茶事件。該事件反映出，當時美國人認為英王分走了自己的收入，是無理的剝奪。然而，傾茶事件針對的是外國國王，而不是美國自身經濟社會的權力結構。

波士頓傾茶事件以及由此發端的茶黨被許多人視作美國革命的象徵

還有些人提出，當親英派“保王黨”離開美國，回到英格蘭或出走加拿大時（加拿大本來是作為保王黨大本營而存在的），美國曾經歷了一場革命。這些保王黨多數曾是新殖民地經濟大權的掌控者。

親英派的出走確實是重大歷史事件，但它不是革命，其本質是經濟精英階層之間的更迭換代，親英派“保王黨”被獨立派“愛國者”取而代之。勝利者公開宣稱放棄英國利益，忠於美國事業。“愛國者”們改變效忠對象，並非出於對英國文化習慣或社會信念的否定，而是他們要在經濟上接過親英派的衣缽，就必須在政治上做出符合利益的選擇。

另外有人認為，美國從誕生之日起便是民主國家，這一事實使美國革命——包括革命中不可或缺的社會動盪——都變得不再必需。在他們眼中，有了民主，革命便失去了必要性。

鑑於當時的歐洲國家大多還實行着封建制度，這種説法的確有可取之處。在歐洲，從封建走向民主的確是個長期艱苦鬥爭的過程，民主政權往往經過了一輪又一輪的血腥革命，才擺脱王室，最終建立起來。如此看來，美國是幸運的。它從未有過封建制度，所以未經血腥的革命便實現了民主；而歐洲人為了打破根深蒂固的社會層級，不知流了多少鮮血。

從這種角度審視美國的權力結構相當有説服力，美國革命建國神話也由此被編織成一套核心信念。

其中一個重要的例子，是關於“美國為什麼沒有社會主義”的著名辯論。其隱含的假設是，如果公民們一開始就掌握了自己命運，那麼由他們組成的國家根本不會存在政治壓迫和經濟剝削。歐洲工人階級多數曾是封建社會政治程序的客體，而美國工人則被認為是政治程序的主體。簡而言之，美國沒有國王，沒有親王，沒有伯爵——所以你看，社會很容易取得平衡。

這種説法究竟對不對暫且不提。重要的是我們應當銘記，1776年後發生的一系列事件，最終成功給美國大地帶來了解放，一個民主國家由此成功誕生。

然而，雖然殖民地的解放和美國的誕生都是令人印象深刻的開創性事件；雖然它們在其後兩百年內對世界其他地區產生了輻射效果，但它們不代表美國經歷了革命。人們頂多可以説，基於美國特殊的情況和發展道路，從未需要過一場革命。

從1776年到1783年，獨立戰爭期間正是美國應當經歷革命的時候，而這場革命沒有發生。同樣，《美國憲法》的通過以及1789年的首次全國選舉，雖然把美國引上了通往成功的道路，都算不上是革命。

制憲和選舉雖然給美國帶來了一套穩定的政治制度，但事實證明這種體制在結構上相當保守。在一個經濟與社會都充滿活力的國家，這是個相當令人意外的結果。

1860年，南方各州紛紛宣告獨立，並於次年組建邦聯政府，引發了美國內戰。蓄奴的支持者們將這場重大暴力衝突稱作“第二次美國革命”。他們公開宣稱要維護奴隸制這種“特別的制度”——顯然，南方蓄奴州的目標在本質上是反動的，而不是革命的。

這對我們意味着什麼？美利堅合眾國從來沒有經歷過真正國內革命的考驗和洗禮。因此，雖然美國的政治結構在本質上真正符合民主精神，但與大部分工業化民主大國相比，它在許多方面顯得更加笨拙而沉悶。美國的政治活力遠不及其經濟活力。不管其他民主國家有這樣那樣的問題，它們的優勢在於民主政治結構能夠與時俱進。

雖然美國人以傳統為傲，但必須承認，時至今日，美國的政治結構已經非常過時，甚至稱得上畸形。在劃分選區時，政黨為了爭奪票源最大化而不公正地擅改選區，美國政治結構的嚴重扭曲可見一斑。“傑利蠑螈”（觀察者網注：即gerrymandering，最初是由馬薩諸塞州州長Elbridge Gerry的名字，及當時劃分後的選區形狀貌似蠑螈（salamander）兩者結合而來）旨在精準地獲取政治回報，往往導致行政區劃面目全非，仿似癌變的腫瘤。另外，金錢也是一大毒瘤，對美國政治產生了扭曲作用。

原載於《波士頓公報》上關於“傑利蠑螈”的諷刺漫畫

實事求是地説，美利堅合眾國成立之初確實曾經是民主國家，但現在它越來越多地展現出封建政權的特點。時至今日，共和黨和最高法院還在頌揚和維護國父們建立的政治結構，這是美國結構性落後的明顯標誌。

所有這些跡象表明，美國發生重大政治變革的時機可能已經成熟，在權力穩固的階層看來，這場變革無異於革命。然而，無論你多麼頑固地捍衞現狀，有一點必須承認：在嚴峻的挑戰面前，美國當前的政治體制無法做出回應，也無法達到人民對其成功的期許。

（作者獨家供稿，觀察者網楊晗軼譯，翻頁可閲讀英文原文）

Still Waiting for An American Revolution

According to a widely held belief that is cherished by most Americans, their country was born in a revolution. For all the popular appeal of that founding myth, the world is still waiting for an American revolution.

This is not to belittle the achievement of the country’s Founding Fathers. Their collective action certainly shook off the yokes of a foreign king — King George III of Great Britain — and put Americans in charge of their own destiny.

But getting rid of a foreign ruler, whether one that is truly oppressive or more of an irritant, does not a revolution make. It merely constitutes an act of national liberation. In that regard, the United States of America was the early bird. Other victims of foreign colonization — in particular, dozens of countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America — only accomplished that act roughly two centuries later.

In sharp contrast, revolutions are always social in nature. The essential measure of a true revolution is whether or not the cardinal moment — call it “your throat or my share,” often spoken at knife point — ever occurred.

Now, it is true, there was a Boston Tea Party in 1773. That event reflected true concerns about what early Americans considered inappropriate, or even expropriatory, revenue-sharing by the British crown. However, that action was directed at a foreign king, not America’s own socio-economic power structure.

There are those who argue that the revolution occurred when “all the king’s men,” departed. This term refers to the colonial loyalists to the British crown who either returned to England or moved north, to Canada (whose founding motif was that of a royalist holdout). These loyalists had generally been the ones to hold the economic power in the new colonies.

That was a significant event, but no revolution. All that essentially occurred was the replacement of one set of economic elites — call them the British loyalists — with another, the American Patriots. The victors did profess loyalty to the American venture and an abandonment of British causes.

Their change of heart came about not so much because of any rejection of British cultural habits or social beliefs. Rather, it was the requirement — and benefit — of their stepping into the powerful economic role of the departing pro-British loyalists.

Other observers argue that the American Revolution — including the critical component of social upheaval — was essentially fulfilled by virtue of the fact that the United States was a democracy from its inception. In their eyes, this obviated the need for any revolution.

That is certainly a compelling argument, especially considering that at the time feudalism prevailed in many European nations. There, the establishment of a democracy was indeed the end result of a usually prolonged and painstaking process of shaking off the royals, often involving bloody bouts of revolution.

Viewed from this perspective, America was lucky. It did not need a bloody revolution to achieve the same end result as the Europeans, with their far more entrenched forms of social stratification. As a consequence, the United States — never having had feudalist structures to begin with — did not need to shake them loose in any bloody manner.

This way of looking at the power structure of the United States is certainly very compelling — and its founding myth of having been born in a “revolution” has been spun into other enticing core beliefs.

One important example is the famous debate on “why there is no socialism in America”? The underlying assumption is that a nation that was formed by citizens who are in charge of their own destiny from the get-go essentially does not undergo political oppression and economic exploitation.

Unlike Europe’s working classes who often were the objects of the political process in feudalist societies, American workers were said to be its subjects. In short, no kings, no princes and no counts — et voilà, social balance is put into place.

Whether or not that is actually true is another matter. For now, it is important to remember that the events of 1776 culminated in the successful liberation of a territory — which, in turn, gave birth to the successful rise of a democratic nation.

And yet, as impressive and path breaking as both of those events were, and as much as they had a radiating effect on the rest of the world for centuries to come, they did not represent a revolution. At most, some arguments can be made with good reason that America, because of its special circumstances and path of development, never needed a revolution.

It certainly did not have one back in the time when it is supposed to have happened, during its War of Independence from 1776 to 1783. The ratification of the U.S. Constitution, followed by the first national elections in 1789, while putting the United States onto a successful path, was not a revolution either.

What that event achieved was the launch of a political system that, while stable, also proved to be structurally rather conservative. That came about as quite a surprise, given the country’s dynamic economic and social systems.

It fits into this pattern that the one great violent conflict in U.S. history, the secession of the Southern states that led to the Civil War, was proclaimed by its proponents as a “Second American Revolution.” Tellingly, they openly acknowledged that their purpose was reactionary rather than revolutionary in nature, as it was carried out to preserve the “Peculiar Institution” of slavery.

Where does that leave us? The United States is a nation that has never been tested or transformed by any kind of true domestic revolution. Consequently, its political structure, while genuinely democratic in nature, by now is in many respects more ponderous and leaden than the political structures of most other major industrialized democracies. It certainly is nowhere nearly as dynamic as its economy. Whatever these other countries problems, they did have the advantage of evolving their democratic political structures quite a bit later.

For all the pride taken in American traditions, the country’s political structures are at this stage quite outdated, if not deformed. The latter becomes readily apparent when one looks at such grave distortions as the so-called gerrymandering of electoral districts. The latter, aimed at engineering preferred political outcomes, often look more like cancerous outgrowths rather than recognizable administrative districts. The cancerous role of money in American politics is another such distortion.

It would not be an exaggeration to say that the United States of America certainly started out as a democracy, but now exhibits ever more features of a feudalistic regime. The way in which the Republican Party and the Supreme Court celebrate, and fight for upholding, the political structures set up by the founders is a clear indication of that structural backwardness.

All of this suggests that the United States might be ripe for dramatic political change that some of the established powers in the country would consider revolutionary. However, even diehard defenders of the status quo in America cannot claim with any degree of seriousness that the current political structures are responsive to the serious challenges and expectations the country must meet to succeed in the future.

(Ends)

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