並非最後一戰:中美貿易戰的前途和世界經濟體系的命運_風聞

據陳平老師在美國的一線觀察，美國正在進行以中國為戰略敵手的全國動員，開始對全美人民統一思想，灌輸信念。於此，我們對5月29日白宮突然宣佈的仍然要與中國打貿易戰的消息可能要料敵從寬，看看這場貿易戰真打成戰略決戰會是什麼樣的。

雖然特朗普今天就可能把繼續打貿易戰的話收回去，這一波貿易摩擦美國也必然不能取勝。但應該説美國此役過後不會善罷甘休。這次美國不能取勝，是因為它的規模比美國想要達到的目的小的太多了。如果要戰略進攻它可能會願意付更大代價，打一場更大規模的貿易——金融戰。

這次貿易摩擦，美方到北京提出的條件於它來説是合理的願望，但不是合理的目標。它要將中國在全球勞動分工中的地位鎖定在目前的位置上，不能再向高科技樹攀爬。這麼嚴肅的戰略目標作為美國的願望很合理，但小摩擦拋出大目標，這未免太兒戲了，結果小摩擦還沒解決，這邊廂習大大已經説“關鍵核心技術是要不來、買不來、討不來的”，一下子幫中國做了一個長遠決策。

“百里而趣利者蹶上將軍”，特朗普口中説的是針對貿易逆差，卻突然沒有任何準備的提出大要價，如同大軍未出卻要滅人之國，美國根本沒有把它的願望設立為可執行的目標，被完全拒絕實屬正常。

但萬一它真的操作一場全面的戰略進攻呢？

我們知道二戰之後的全球化2.0版本和二戰前列強爭霸掠奪殖民地的全球化1.0不同，特徵之一就是霸權決定全球勞動分工，而一國在全球勞動分工的地位決定了國窮國富。無論是蘇東集團的經互會，還是美國帶領的西方集團，其成員在全球勞動分工中的地位是老大決定的。舉例來説，都説1980年代的美日貿易爭端是貿易戰，但細究的話，日本能做什麼產業，本就是美國決定的，嚴格來講那是老師給學生布置作業而不是貿易戰。比如二戰後美國一度基本將日本重工業一鍋端掉了，現在它的很多產業，比如飛機產業，嚴格被壓。至今，為了保護飛機產業那點餘脈，自衞隊不管日本貨如何價格奇高，也要捏着鼻子買美國戰鬥機的日本組裝版；大家也別忘了“廣場協議”根本就是美日你情我願的事。

但中國不同，中國自主決定產業結構的能力和美蘇決定它國產業結構的權力一樣，是在血與火的戰場上打出來的。鴉片戰爭到建國前，中國基本已經被鎖定為半殖民地的農業、原材料供應國。共產黨帶領全國人民打贏了解放戰爭和朝鮮戰爭，不但收回了美國資本借抗戰獲得的中國自然資源股權，還拒絕了蘇聯要求中國再次成為農業國的分工安排。亞當·斯密在《國富論》裏頭定義什麼是“財富wealth”，用的是政治經濟學的解釋：財富即權力（power）。一國在全球勞動分工中的地位，首先是政治問題，其次才是經濟和科技問題。

美國由蘇聯解體和中國改革開放後的經驗，覺得它決定中國勞動分工的位置再正常不過了，而要防止衰落，必須處理中國這個對手，所以它提的條件是很合理的願望。但中美建交以來，中國接受美日的資本和產業轉移，為美國提供消費品生產，並非始自美國安排勞動分工的權力，而是中國和美國雙方自主決定的戰略耦合，這在史正富的著作《超常增長》一書中有詳盡的分析。這就不是美國幾千億美元規模的貿易戰可以左右的了。這次貿易爭端如何解決不改變本質，最直接的影響是提醒了中國攀爬勞動分工的產業制高點不是單純的商業行為，習近平的講話和近期坊間對聯想的非議，已經説明大家認識到看待高科技產業的視角根本上講並不是“進口芯片每年要花幾千億美元”這種單純商業上的考慮。

所以陳平老師提到前日，美國台高調紀念“被遺忘的”朝鮮戰爭，突顯中國是美國的主要戰爭對手，公開篡改歷史把發動朝鮮戰爭的責任説成是中國、進行戰爭動員。美國意識到它要想決定中國的位置，就需要舉國之力認認真真打一戰。

我們當然不希望和它打，因為沒道理當年打贏了現在卻打不贏，所以想想雙方要付出的巨大代價，肯定認為這是沒有必要的“瞎折騰”。但是現實已經説明，這次貿易摩擦可能不是最後一戰，我們反覆説金融是美國對中國有絕對優勢的領域，一旦在此發動戰爭我們就很難受，代價會很大。

中美貿易戰的前途如何，很重要的一點是防止它演變為貿易——金融戰。但金融是美國的國本，在此開戰需要全國共識，這美國已經開始凝聚。我們必須爭取真正關心美國前途的美國人，防止這種對雙方百害而無一利的共識形成，避免戰火升級。美國就算衰落，那也不是中國的原因，美國對此須有正確認識。

未來幾十年世界經濟體系的命運也繫於此。且不説城門失火殃及池魚，美國在全球分工體系中的衰落和被趕超幾乎難以阻止，引起的普遍焦慮促使特朗普一直在砍全球化的大旗。中國能自主決定自己的產業，但是沒有也不會追求安排它國產業的權力，“人類命運共同體”是不是能帶來全球化的3.0版本？那應該是一個所有國家都能自主選擇前進方向，自主在適合自己的產業位置充分發展，在此基礎上充分合作的全球化。希望美國不要破壞這個全球經濟體系的美好願景，中國有很多國際朋友可以爭取。

*作者唐毅南系復旦大學中國研究院研究員

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China-US Trade War And The War that Really Matters

A specter is haunting the world, the specter of US trade hawks. On May 29, by scrapping earlier trade truce and renewing tariff threats, the Trump Administration is not only moving against what it perceives to be one of its greatest strategic rivals but also mobilizing the masses and aligning their thinking with misplaced trade protectionism, which could spell disruption for the global economy. It is prudent for China to consider the worst-case scenario in which the bilateral trade war eventually evolves into a strategic showdown.

It is important to note that the United States will make relentless efforts to suppress China from challenging its global supremacy, even though there’s a chance that Trump may take back his bellicose rhetoric on trade any minute, and the odds of the US winning the ongoing trade skirmishes hands down are slim to none. The key factor limiting America’s success is the scale of conflict. Had the current tussle between Beijing and Washington been much grander in scale, a more strong-willed United States would not hesitate to drop financial weapons on trade battleground and make greater sacrifice in pursuit of ultimate strategic victory.

The terms brought up by American trade delegates in their negotiation with China reflect the US’s desire to confine China to its current role in the global division of labor and prevent the manufacturing giant from upgrading its technology. However, a reasoned desire for a strategic outcome may not prove to be tactically reasonable. When the US flaunted its strategic goal in a lesser affray, it helped China make a long-term decision to go all in on scientific and technological self-reliance. In a recent meeting with China’s top science and engineering academicians, President Xi Jinping stressed the importance for key and core technologies to be “self-developed and controllable”.

The current situation was created by the US when the Trump Administration touted deficit reduction as a simple- though incorrect- way to restore trade balance, before it quickly stepped up demands for China to destroy its own technological future. If The Art of the Deal author had known The Art of War better, he would probably heed Sun Tzu’s words of wisdom, “covering an unusual distance at a stretch, the leader of your army division will fall into the hands of the enemy.” Having failed to set executable goals for its long-term vision, the US revealed its strategic intention to China and was therefore flatly rejected.

But what if the US was well-prepared to wage an all-front war against China?

A key feature distinguishing post-WWII globalization from that of the previous era in which colonial powers fought against each other to carve up the world is that the new model centers around a hegemon who arbitrates global division of labor, which in turn determines the wealth of nations. In both the former Eastern Bloc and the Western world, a member state’s role in the international division of labor had always been assigned by the pack’s alpha. For example, when Japan and the US were embroiled in trade disputes in the 1980s, the US was in a position to discipline Japan: which sectors it could continue to develop and from which it must withdraw. That never was a trade war. After WWII, there was a time when Japan’s heavy industry base was largely obliterated by the US, and even now the Asian economic powerhouse still faces tremendous pressure from its ally in many high-end sectors such as aircraft manufacturing. Until very recently, Japan had insisted on assembling military aircrafts procured from the US despite staggering cost of doing so domestically, so as to keep the industry alive.

China is not Japan. Forged by fire, risen from blood, China’s autonomy in shaping its own industrial structure is the result of a series of hard-won victories, similar to those that empowered the US and the USSR to shape other countries’ industrial structures. From the Opium War to 1949, the semi-colonial China had been assigned the roles of an agricultural producer and a raw material provider. China was only able to defy such hegemonic arrangement after the Communist Party led the country to victory in both the Civil War and the Korean War. In The Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith gives a political economic definition of wealth, “wealth… is power.” Therefore, a nation’s position in the international division of labor is primarily a political issue, and only secondarily an economic and technological issue.

Based on its hegemonic experience, the US naturally feels it is in the right position to determine China’s place in the global division of labor. Besides, the US sees clearly the necessity of taking China down if it wants to prevent its own decline. However, the transfer of capital and industries from the US to China, and of consumer products from China to the US, is not the result of an America-dictated division of labor, but a coincidental outcome shaped by independent decisions from both sides.

Therefore, the political economic setup between China and the US is heftier than what a hundred-billion-dollar trade war could shake up. No matter how the current trade dispute may end, the fundamentals will not change, but China has come to the realization that the quest to “reach commanding heights in scientific and technological competition” requires much more than just commercial activities.

During the past National Memorial Day weekend, America has put up a pageantry to commemorate the “forgotten” Korean War, underscoring its historical enmity towards China and openly fabricating allegations that China was responsible for waging the war. It is an indication that America has come to the realization that winning an all-out war against China is the only way for it to lay down the law.

China has no intention to play America’s game, though it stands a good chance of winning it, because the cost will be immeasurable. However, facts on the ground suggest that the final showdown between China and the US may come one day even if the bilateral relation successfully endures the current trade conflict.

China has every interest in avoiding escalating a trade war into a financial war, because the US superpower lies its foundation on finance, thus America’s financial sector enjoys absolute advantage over the Chinese. As anti-China national consensus is beginning to take shape in the US, it is vitally important for those who are concerned with America’s future to understand the country’s resentful blame on China for its own decline is misplaced.

The fate of global economic system in the coming decades hinges upon America’s attitude towards China. While Americans are understandably anxious about losing their preeminence in the global division of labor, Trump is barking up the wrong tree by trying to reverse course on globalization- a hardly reversible process. As for China, it is determined to uphold its industrial autonomy, but it will never seek the power to dictate how other countries operate. Will China’s vision of “a community of shared future for mankind” represent the next stage of globalization? It may well be. Such globalization should give every nation full autonomy in deciding its own future as basis for international cooperation. China’s best hope for the enticing future is the US will not sabotage it.