妖魔化中國，美國玩不起（附英文原文）_風聞

本文轉自微信公眾號學術plus（caeit-e）

編者按

近年來，美國媒體和戰略界瀰漫着一股妖魔化中國之風。2018年6月29日，“外交政策”網站發表文章《美國無法承受妖魔化中國的後果》，對美國妖魔化中國的原因、危害和後果進行了分析，併為雙方停止爭吵、對話合作提出了建議。現全文中英對照僅供參考**。**

文章版權歸原作者所有

觀點不代表本機構立場

美國無法承受

妖魔化中國的後果

原載：《外交事務》網站

編譯：學術plus

網址：https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/06/29/the-u-s-cant-afford-to-demonize-china/

美國和中國延續已久的建設性接觸正在以驚人的速度瓦解，雙方需要進行重大修正。儘管特朗普説和中國領導人建立了“偉大”關係，中國領導人也強調“雙贏”，但最近的政策和行動（尤其是美國方面）已經對雙方關係造成極大的破壞。

在美國，這種動向最明顯的驅動因素是充滿敵意的過度批評，包括權威的美國戰略文件（如最近發佈的國家安全和國防戰略），美國高級官員的類似聲明，以及美國的經濟政策轉變（包括嚴重不良的關税），所有人都認為北京是威脅到所有美國人的“修正主義者”大國。

美國的專家和記者強化了美中關係的這種朦朧觀點。幾乎每天，專家們都會揭示中國背信棄義的新案例，從中國企圖破壞美國大學的知識分子自由，到中國旨在煽動和控制發展中國家的邪惡債務陷阱。

這種批評態度能夠蠱惑人心的基本假設是：**每一箇中國人的收益都是以美國為代價的，過去的美國政策制定者和專家長期以來一直忽略了中國政權的敵意。**而這些批評的結論則是，**要通過一切可能的手段來抵禦日益嚴重的威脅，任何與中國的合作都必須服從於此。**正如“華盛頓郵報”專欄作家約什·羅金去年12月所寫的那樣，這種表達的誇張程度簡直突破雲霄：

華盛頓正在意識到中國共產黨在美國境內影響行動的巨大範圍和規模，這些行動滲透到美國各種機構中。中國的最低目標是捍衞其體制免遭襲擊，最高目標則是要踩着美國走向世界。

如果北京不在火上澆油，這種語言也不會那麼受歡迎。儘管北京不斷聲稱中國不會對任何人構成威脅，但它採取的行動有時暗示着相反的情況。中國對在華經營的外國公司施加了不公正的限制，繼續對西方國家實施商業盜竊，加強了國內的政治和意識形態控制，加大了反外國人的宣傳力度，並在對待其海上鄰國時更加自信。

這些行動當然令人不安，在許多情況下需要更有效的對策。但其程度還不至於為此重新評估美中政策，發表激烈的言辭，以及我們現在看到的“大棒式”、“零和式”的美國政策。

在很多情況下，事實並不支持這樣的絕對和片面的結論。例如接觸政策從不是現在許多人説的那樣，要把中國變成西方民主國家。它起源於一種戰略上的需要，即與中國一起制衡前蘇聯，讓中國社會更開放地接受外界的影響，當然也為西方的商業利益服務。我們都忘記了中國以前是什麼樣子：直到20世紀70年代和80年代初，基本上是一個封閉的、敵對的大國，渴望將毛澤東主義推廣到其他國家。而中美合作在所有這些領域都取得了很大的成功，儘管最近遇到了一些挫折，但毫無疑問，今天的中國與接觸之前相比更加開放、全球化和包容。

**另一個非常普遍的嚴重扭曲的概念是，中國試圖將美國逐出亞洲，並征服該地區。**事實上，沒有確鑿的證據表明中國有這樣的目標。那些堅持自己觀點的人，要麼是基於特例(比如中國在南中國海影響力的擴大)的胡亂推斷，要麼是由不具任何權威的所謂中國觀察人士發表的聲明，要麼是基於現實主義的假設，即大國所謂的無限制權力最大化。如果中美兩國關係惡化到一定程度，北京最終可能會選取這種災難性的目標，但據此認為兩國關係已經惡化至此，則是魯莽和不負責任的。

**認為中國決心顛覆全球秩序的觀點，同樣引發了一種以民主為中心的、極為狹隘且值得懷疑的秩序認定，從而嚴重扭曲了對中國批評。**實際上，北京方面支持現有秩序的許多要素，包括當前美國政府拒絕或破壞的一些要素，如對抗氣候變化的鬥爭和多邊經濟協定的價值。儘管中國存在一些保護主義措施(例如，在電信和金融服務方面)，政策要求加強對經濟部門的控制，以及對國有企業的壓力，但中國的經濟增長仍然主要由私營企業和一個基本開放的貿易體系驅動。當然世界貿易組織(World Trade Organization)的體系需要改革，而北京方面基本上一直是在遵守該體系的宗旨和精神。

這些極端的記者和官員提供一種引人注意的故事,無疑會增加國防支出,增加報紙銷量，把美國人的注意力從他們所面臨的許多國內問題，如鉅額預算赤字、收入不平等、的基礎設施崩潰等等問題上吸引開來。

這種對中國的過度敵視的觀點與20世紀70年代開始的美中關係“改革開放”時代的實用主義大不相同。那是立足於現實而不是現在的一維方式，重視在與北京解決問題合作的必要努力之間取得平衡，以謹慎對沖和有限競爭來處理共同關切。這種雙管齊下的方式現在已經被遺棄（至少在亞洲），**取而代之的是零和式的”印度太平洋戰略”，**這個戰略迄今為止主要是一個空洞的口號，呼籲亞洲民主國家聯合起來對付中國。

是什麼原因導致美國出現了中國妖魔化的新常態呢?除了上述狹隘的官僚和政治利益之外，**最重要的因素是源自美國政治心態中根深蒂固的“偏執風格”，借用歷史學家理查德•霍夫施塔特(Richard Hofstadter) 1964年發表的一篇開創性文章中的一句話，這種帶有“強烈誇張、懷疑和陰謀幻想感”的性格，**被特朗普煽動起來，他把美國幾乎所有的弊病都歸咎於外人。儘管特朗普聲稱自己與中國領導人有着良好的關係，並預言未來會有一段“偉大”的雙邊關係，但事實上，他對美國不安全感的玩世不恭的操縱，為他的下屬找到了一個合乎邏輯的目標。

更重要的是，在特朗普定義的政治背景下，**這些敵對言論和行動完全掩蓋了華盛頓和北京之間繼續合作解決共同問題和關切，**包括氣候變化，大規模毀滅性武器擴散，流行病，全球經濟體系的狀況以及亞洲的穩定。華盛頓現在甚少提到這種必要性。

中國人的自信，與美國對中國的不安全感正在創造一個前所未有的挑戰，而這種挑戰無法通過否認和妖魔化來實現。**如果華盛頓繼續集中精力在幾乎所有方面遏制和削弱北京，它將進一步孤立自己（就像它與盟友在貿易問題上所做的那樣），並將注意力和資源從處理其他許多問題上轉移開。**而如果北京採取針對美國在該地區及其他地區的利益的行動，只會進一步加劇華盛頓的不安全感和偏執，可能引發與美國的衝突，同時疏遠外交和貿易伙伴。

當此關鍵時期，兩國需要通過實質性(而不僅僅是口頭上的)保證和在關鍵問題上的妥協，創造積極的勢頭，從而扭轉兩國關係的螺旋式下降趨勢，而不損害至關重要的國家利益。就當前的美國和中國政府而言，短期內這一艱鉅的任務幾乎是不可能完成的，但如果我們要避免未來發生嚴重危機甚至衝突，那麼這一任務仍將是當務之急。**首先它需要基於事實的目標與資源的長期匹配，關鍵利益與次要利益的區分，以及明確認識到，任何一個國家都不會主宰亞洲或整個世界。**隨着相互依存的加深和資源的緊張，全球權力正在擴散。這需要努力平衡和合作，而不是排斥和削弱。

**其次華盛頓必須認識到，儘管中國領導人現在佔據了主導地位，但中國政府並不是鐵板一塊。**需要為體制內更大改革、開放和和解的支持者創造積極的激勵。這些人存在於許多部門，如果政策造成嚴重的社會和經濟動盪，他們的影響力可能會增加。但目前對中國政府動機和行為的妖魔化，只會削弱他們的地位，幫助那些在中國扮演“外國威脅”幽靈的人，為自己的敵意政策辯護。

**同樣，如果北京只是繼續強調“雙贏”的説辭，不斷擔憂外國滲透，而不認識到中國日益增長的實力造成的不安全感，那麼將在對美交往時一無所獲。**只有中國通過向外國(尤其是亞洲國家)提供實質性的政治、經濟和安全保障，並以有意義的行動為後盾，才能解決這種不安全感。

這種改變並非不可能，但雙方都需要停止裝腔作勢，着手建立一種穩定的關係，使雙方都從中受益。

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The United States and China’s lengthy track record of constructive engagement is disintegrating at an alarming rate, requiring a major correction by both sides. Despite U.S. President Donald Trump’s occasional talk of his “truly great” connection with Chinese President Xi Jinping, and Xi’s constant references to “win-win” outcomes all round, recent policies and actions — especially on the U.S. side — have created an enormously destructive dynamic in the relationship.

In the case of the United States, this dynamic is most clearly driven by excessively critical, often hostile, authoritative U.S. strategy documents such as the recently issued National Security and National Defense Strategies, similar statements by senior U.S. officials, and U.S. economic policy shifts — including grossly ill-conceived tariffs — that all envision Beijing as a “revisionist” power that threatens all Americans hold dear.

American journalists reinforce this dim view of U.S.-Chinese relations. Almost daily, pundits unveil new aspects of China’s perfidy, ranging from Chinese attempts to undermine intellectual freedom at U.S. universities to China’s sinister debt traps designed to ensnare and control developing countries.

This steady drumbeat of criticism assumes that every Chinese gain comes at American expense, and that past U.S. policymakers and experts have long overlooked the hostility of the Chinese regime. These critics conclude that any cooperation with China must take a back seat to the imperative of pushing back against the growing threat through all means possible. This hyperbole often reaches stratospheric heights, as Washington Post columnist Josh Rogin wrote last December:

Washington is waking up to the huge scope and scale of Chinese Communist Party influence operations inside the United States, which permeate American institutions of all kinds. China’s overriding goal is, at the least, to defend its authoritarian system from attack and at most to export it to the world at America’s expense.

Such language would be less popular if Beijing did not also add fuel to the fire. While endlessly asserting that China poses no threat to anyone, Beijing takes actions that sometimes suggest otherwise. China is unjustly increasing constraints on foreign corporations operating there, continuing commercial theft directed against Western countries, growing its domestic political and ideological controls while increasing anti-foreigner propaganda, and becoming more assertive in its maritime neighborhood.

These actions are certainly troubling and in many cases require more effective counter-policies. However they do not come close to justifying the calls for a fundamental reassessment of U.S.-China policy, the heated rhetoric, and the sledgehammer-like, zero-sum U.S. policies we now see.

Never mind that in many cases the facts don’t support such categorical and one-sided conclusions. For example, engagement was never intended to turn China into a democracy, as many now assert. It originated from a strategic imperative to join with Beijing to balance against the former Soviet Union, to end China’s revolutionary impulses, to make its society more open to outside influence, and, of course, to serve Western business interests. We forget what China was until the 1970s and early 1980s: a largely closed, hostile power with a desire to spread its Maoist, Stalinist model to others. Engagement has largely succeeded in all of these areas. Despite recent setbacks, China remains vastly more open, globalized, and tolerant today than it was prior to engagement, no question.

Another hugely distorted notion is the now all-too-common assumption that China seeks to eject the United States from Asia and subjugate the region. In fact, no conclusive evidence exists of such Chinese goals. Those who assert it base their arguments either on wild extrapolations from individual actions (such as the extension of Chinese influence in the South China Sea), statements by decidedly not authoritative Chinese observers, or problematic realist-based assumptions about the supposedly open-ended power maximization behavior of large nations. Beijing might eventually adopt such disastrous goals if the Sino-U.S. relationship deteriorates sufficiently, but to assume they already exist is reckless and irresponsible.

Similarly, the notion that Beijing is committed to overturning the global order invokes an exceedingly narrow and questionable democracy-centered definition of that order and thus grossly distorts the scope of the Chinese criticisms. Actually, Beijing supports many elements of the existing order, including some that the current U.S. administration rejects or undermines, such as the fight against climate change and the value of multilateral economic agreements. On the latter point, despite some significant protectionist measures (e.g., in telecommunications and financial services), policies calling for increased party controls in economic sectors, and a resurgent stress on state-owned enterprises, China’s economic growth remains driven primarily by private companies and a largely open trading system. Although the World Trade Organization system certainly needs reforming, Beijing has largely complied with the letter, if not always the spirit, of that regime.

What the most extreme among these journalists and officials are providing is an arresting narrative that will no doubt increase defense outlays, sell papers, strike a contrast with the allegedly “failed” China policies of previous administrations, and distract Americans from the many domestic problems they face, such as huge budget deficits, income inequality, and collapsing infrastructure.

This excessively belligerent perspective on China departs greatly from the pragmatism of the “reform and opening” era of U.S.-China relations that began in the 1970s. Based far more in reality, both then and now, than the current one-dimensional stance, this view recognized the need to balance necessary efforts at problem-solving cooperation with Beijing in handling common concerns with prudent hedging and bounded competition. Such a two-pronged approach has now been rejected — at least for Asia — in favor of a zero-sum Indo-Pacific strategy that is thus far mostly an empty slogan calling for a supposed alliance of democratic Asian nations against China.

So what accounts for the emergence in the United States of the new normal of China demonization? Aside from the narrow bureaucratic and political interests noted above, the most significant factor derives from a deep-rooted “paranoid style” evident within the U.S. political mindset, to borrow a phrase from a seminal 1964 article by historian Richard Hofstadter. This disposition, characterized by a “sense of heated exaggeration, suspiciousness, and conspiratorial fantasy,” to quote Hofstadter, is stoked by Trump, who blames outsiders for almost all of America’s ills. Although Trump claims to have a wonderful relationship with Xi and predicts a “great” bilateral relationship in the future, in fact, his cynical manipulation of America’s insecurities finds a logical target for his subordinates, if not always for himself, in Xi’s China.

More importantly, within the Trump-defined political context, these hostile words and actions completely overshadow the obvious and pressing need for continued cooperation between Washington and Beijing in addressing common problems and concerns, including climate change, weapon of mass destruction proliferation, pandemics, the state of the global economic system, and stability in Asia. These imperatives are rarely if ever even mentioned by Washington now.

The intersection of Chinese assertiveness and both U.S. and Chinese insecurity is creating an unprecedented challenge that cannot be met by denial and demonization. If Washington continues to focus on containing and undermining Beijing on virtually all fronts, it will simply further isolate itself — as it is doing with its allies on trade issues — and divert attention and resources away from handing its many other problems. On the other hand, if Beijing pursues actions that target U.S. interests in the region and beyond, it will simply further fuel Washington’s insecurity and paranoia, possibly courting conflict with the United States while alienating both diplomatic and trading partners.

At this critical moment, both nations need to reverse the downward spiral in relations by creating positive momentum through substantive (and not merely rhetorical) assurances and compromises on key issues, without, however, undermining vital national interests. This difficult task is virtually impossible over the near to medium term under the current U.S. and Chinese governments, but it will nevertheless remain an imperative if we are to avoid serious crises or even clashes in the future. It requires, first, a fact-based matching of goals with resources over time, a differentiation between vital and secondary interests, and a clear-eyed recognition that neither country will dominate either Asia or the world at large. Power is now diffusing across the globe as interdependence deepens and resources are strained. This demands efforts to balance and cooperate rather than exclude and weaken.

Second, Washington must recognize that despite Xi’s now-dominant position, the Chinese government is not a monolithic entity and motivating it requires creating positive incentives for supporters of greater reform, openness, and accommodation within the system. Such individuals exist in many sectors, and their influence could grow if the Xi regime’s more repressive policies create serious social and economic unrest. But the current demonization of Beijing’s motives and behavior will simply weaken their position by helping those in China who play to the specter of the “foreign threat” to justify their own hostile policies.

Similarly, Beijing will get nowhere with U.S. officials if it continues to mouth platitudes about win-win outcomes and stoke domestic fears of foreign infiltration instead of recognizing that its growing strengths create insecurities that can only be addressed through the offering of substantive political, economic, and security assurances — backed by meaningful actions — to outsiders, especially in Asia. Such changes are not impossible, but both sides need to stop the posturing and get down to the business of creating a stable relationship from which both can benefit.