歐洲考慮怎麼對待中國，美國想着怎麼對付中國_風聞

《南華早報》4月1日刊登新加坡國立大學李光耀公共政策學院前院長馬凱碩和亞洲與全球化研究中心高級研究員帕拉格·康納文章《意大利加入“一帶一路”反映美歐的亞洲政策存在差異》

文：Parag Khanna & Kishore Mahbubani

譯：Kris

北京大學每年夏天都會迎來大約50名都靈大學的商科學生，他們利用這個暑期學術項目的機會到中國來學習中文、宏觀經濟學，並在中國企業裏實習。

這些年輕人自稱為“21世紀的馬可·波羅”，算是以一種幽默的方式致敬這位13世紀著名的威尼斯探險家。當被問及未來的職業目標時，不少人都表示希望成為中國工商銀行意大利分行的經理。

我們不妨以此作為背景，來分析不久前習近平主席對歐洲三國的國事訪問。在習主席訪問意大利期間，意大利正式成為七國集團裏第一個加入中國“一帶一路”倡議的國家。具有歷史性意義的“一帶一路”旨在為古絲綢之路沿線的亞洲、歐洲和非洲地區協調基礎設施投資，總規模超過萬億美元。

意大利將自己視作中國向歐洲出口之路上的天然門户。三年前，希臘比雷埃夫斯港在中遠海運集團的投資下獲救，併成為了歐洲增長最快的港口之一。據德國《時代週報》報道，今年比雷埃夫斯將取代漢堡成為歐洲第三大港。

意大利計劃從亞洲基礎設施投資銀行貸款開發的裏雅斯特港，該港位於亞德里亞海戰略要地，比漢堡與慕尼黑的距離還近300公里。難怪德國會對意大利誹謗中傷。

中國在塞爾維亞等巴爾幹國家的某些基建項目受到非議，被認為性價比不高。儘管歐洲人的批評不無道理，但他們只能怪自己沒有就中國投資形成統一意見。

南歐的希臘、葡萄牙等國和巴爾幹國家一樣，都受到2008年金融危機以及隨後歐洲銀行間拆借大幅萎縮的嚴重連鎖影響。

後冷戰時期，歐盟和西方國家分配給地中海國家的結構調整資金和私募資本越來越少，於是金融和物流的大門開始向中國敞開。

意大利是第14個與中國簽署“一帶一路”合作備忘錄的歐盟成員國。與其責怪中國利用機會，歐盟不如反省一下自身對成員國的忽視。

歐洲經常讓試圖分裂歐洲的外部勢力有機可乘，卻從不自我檢討。本世紀初，美國為了爭取外界支持其發動伊拉克戰爭，成功地將歐洲分化為“舊歐洲”和“新歐洲”。而如今，俄羅斯的北溪-2天然氣項目又引起了極大爭議。

該項目得到了德國的支持，但遭到美國反對，因為後者試圖限制俄羅斯的天然氣出口以便為本國天然氣擴大市場。

中國的出現使歐洲局面更加混亂。德國和法國支持歐盟委員會的聲明，將中國稱作“系統性競爭對手”。但這兩個國家的對華貿易反而最為平衡。

英國為了促進本國企業在“一帶一路”沿線國家的業務，已經聯手中國成立了“中英基礎設施聯盟”。意大利若再不推出類似的舉措，便是不明智的。

老撾和斯里蘭卡等小國償還中國的普通貸款可能比較吃力，但意大利能以更優惠的條件獲得亞投行貸款。與希臘的情況類似，意大利可以通過加入“一帶一路”倡議創造更多就業機會，升級基礎設施並促進與亞洲的貿易。

儘管歐洲內部積怨不淺，但中歐關係毫無疑問比中美關係更穩定、更富有成效。中歐貿易總量超過了中美貿易額，而中美貿易衝突只會進一步鞏固歐洲相對於美國的領先優勢。

中國已給予瑞銀集團等歐洲銀行在中國金融公司持有多數股份的特權；習主席訪問法國期間，空客公司與中國各大航空公司簽下出售300架客機的大單，大大改變美國波音公司面臨的全球競爭環境。

值得注意的是，就在習主席出訪歐洲的同時，中國發展高層論壇在北京召開。戴姆勒、寶馬、西門子、博世、殼牌、安盛、聯合利華等眾多歐洲企業集團紛紛出席。

在西方提出市場準入對等性之後，中國逐漸開放市場。隨着這一進程逐漸深化，最有可能獲益的便是歐洲企業。

因此，雖然美歐對中國的戰略雄心一致表示懷疑，但這只是表面現象，習主席出訪歐洲讓世人看清大西洋兩岸在對待亞洲新興大國的問題上存在根本性分歧。

一方面是美國不斷加劇與中國的貿易衝突，並用各種關税逼得日本、韓國和印度等盟友與自己漸行漸遠；另一方面歐盟與日本的自貿協定已經生效，與印度和東盟的貿易談判也在進行當中。

另外，即便歐洲的某些表態有批評中國的意思，但這並不影響歐盟去年9月頒佈的“歐亞連通戰略”——它是對“一帶一路”的回應。

不難看出，歐洲和美國對華政策的重大差異還不止於此。儘管歐洲也有保護主義傾向，但並沒有下禁令驅逐華為，而是對其進行檢視。比如德國要求華為與該國境內的信息安全實驗室共享源代碼。

美國拒絕了中國對其能源、技術等領域進行大規模投資，導致2018年期間中國對美直接投資下降了84％。而歐洲則忙着建立規章制度，對機器人等敏感領域投資進行審查。

與此同時，在歐洲許多中型企業和家族企業中，隨着老一代領導者退休，新的管理層希望擴大亞洲業務，因此它們仍在大量吸收中國投資。中國對歐洲國家的直接投資總額已超過600億美元。

同樣重要的是，長期來看，中國在非洲投資飛速增長符合歐洲的根本利益。只有非洲取得經濟發展，才能阻止更多的移民湧向歐洲。

歐盟與亞洲的貨物貿易總額達到了1.6萬億美元，這個數字還在迅速攀升（而歐盟與美國的貿易額僅為7090億美元）。未來，隨着美國繼續將中國、俄羅斯和伊朗視作安全威脅，歐亞之間的長期利益會越來越一致。

正如王毅外長不久前在布魯塞爾的講話中所提到的那樣，“中歐關係當前總體向好，雙方之間的共識遠遠多於分歧。”

如果下個月在華盛頓舉辦的北約成立70週年峯會變成美歐之間的口角之爭，人們大概也會感到習以為常。特朗普政府企圖將北約改造成一個反華聯盟，而歐洲人則會繼續提反對意見，並逃避承擔更多的軍費開支。

第二屆“一帶一路”國際合作高峯論壇也將於本月在北京召開。儘管美國試圖將“一帶一路”倡議歸作“面子工程”，但隨着後者越來越大地衝擊美歐關係，事實證明美國只是嘴硬罷了。

Italy joining China’s Belt and Road Initiative highlights different approaches of Europe and the US on Asia policy

At the annual summer academy for University of Turin students held on the campus of Peking University, about 50 Italian business students spend their days learning Mandarin, studying macroeconomics and interning with Chinese companies.

They call themselves the “Marco Polos of the 21st century”, a giggling nod to the famed 13th-century Venetian explorer. When asked what their career ambitions are, more than a few share the same goal: to be a country manager for China’s ICBC Bank back home in Italy.

This is worth remembering when analysing Chinese President Xi Jinping’s recent state visits in Europe, during which Italy formally became the first G7 country to join China’s monumental Belt and Road Initiative, an ambitious effort to coordinate trillions of dollars of infrastructure investment across the regions of Africa, Europe and Asia historically bound by the Silk Road.

Italy sees itself as a natural gateway for Chinese export ambitions into Europe. Investment from China’s Cosco Shipping rescued Greece’s Piraeus port three years ago, turning it into one of Europe’s fastest growing. According to Germany newspaper Die Zeit, Piraeus will displace Hamburg as Europe’s third-busiest port this year.

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No wonder Germany has cast aspersions on Italy’s plans to take loans from the mostly China-funded Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) to develop strategically located Adriatic Sea ports such as Trieste, which is over 300km closer to Munich than Hamburg.

While Europeans have valid concerns about the cost and utility of certain Chinese-backed infrastructure projects in Balkan countries such as Serbia, they have only themselves to blame for these internal divisions over investment from China.

Southern European countries such as Greece and Portugal, as well as those in the Balkans, were hit hard by the knock-on effects of the 2008 financial crisis and the significant contraction of European intra-bank lending that followed.

With diminished structural adjustment funds and private capital coming from their post-cold war patrons in Brussels and other Western capitals, the door was left open for China to make financial and logistical inroads into the Mediterranean.

In the past three years, Italy has become the 14th European Union member to sign a memorandum with China’s Belt and Road Initiative. European neglect is to blame for Chinese opportunism.

Far too often, Europe allows itself to be divided by outside powers, blaming them rather than itself. The US managed to split “old Europe” and “new Europe” to garner support for its 2003 Iraq war. Currently, Russia’s Nord Stream 2 pipeline has caused much controversy.

It is supported by Germany but opposed by the US, which seeks to curtail Russian gas exports while promoting its own liquefied natural gas.

China’s presence now compounds the disarray. Germany and France have backed a European Commission statement calling China a “systemic rival”. Yet, they enjoy the most balanced trade with it.

For its part, Britain has forged a “UK-China infrastructure alliance” aimed at boosting British business in countries where belt and road capital is flowing. Italy would be foolish not to pursue a similar path. Smaller countries like Laos and Sri Lanka may be struggling to pay off non-concessionary loans from Chinese bilateral agencies.

Italy will get loans at more favourable rates from the AIIB. As with Greece, Italy’s participation in the Belt and Road Initiative is likely to create jobs, upgrade infrastructure and boost trade with Asia.

Despite the internal rancour, there is no question that Europe has a more stable and productive relationship with China than the US does. European trade with China exceeds China’s trade with the US, and the US-China trade war will only enhance Europe’s lead.

China has given European banks, such as UBS, privileged rights to own majority stakes in Chinese financial firms, and during Xi’s visit to France, Airbus signed a massive deal for 300 new aircraft to be sold to multiple Chinese airlines, significantly tilting the global aviation rivalry against Boeing.

Indeed, it is worth noting that, at the same time as Xi’s Europe tour, the China Development Forum was under way in Beijing, with major corporate participation and patronage from Daimler, BMW, Siemens, Bosch, Shell, AXA, Unilever, and many other European conglomerates.

As China slowly opens up its markets, in the name of the reciprocity the West demands, corporate Europe appears most likely to reap the benefits.

Thus, despite the new superficial alignment between the US and Europe in expressing suspicion over China’s strategic ambitions, Xi’s visit to Europe more fundamentally underscores the transatlantic divide over how to deal with rising Asian powers.

While the US has escalated its trade war with China and alienated allies Japan, South Korea and India with various tariffs, the EU’s free trade agreement with Japan has just gone into effect, with similar agreements under negotiation with India and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.

Furthermore, Europe’s critical statements about China don’t nullify the “Asia connectivity strategy”, the EU’s answer to the Belt and Road Initiative, announced in Brussels last September.

It is not difficult to spot other major differences in China policy. While Europe has protectionist tendencies, it is not blocking Huawei but screening it, with Germany requiring the firm to share source codes in onshore information security labs.

While the US has rejected significant Chinese investment in energy, technology and other sectors – Chinese foreign direct investment into the US fell 84 per cent over the course of 2018 – Europe is instituting investment screening into sensitive areas such as robotics.

At the same time, European mid-size companies and family businesses are still drawing in large amounts of Chinese investment as an older generation retires and management committees seek greater Asian exposure. Total Chinese foreign direct investment into Europe has crossed US$60 billion.

Equally importantly, the surge in Chinese investment in Africa serves Europe’s fundamental long-term interests. Only the economic development of Africa will prevent more migrants going into Europe.

With annual EU-Asian trade totalling US$1.6 trillion in goods, and climbing rapidly (versus only US$709 billion in US-EU trade), Europe’s convergence of long-term interests with Asia is likely to advance while the US continues to view China, Russia and Iran through the prism of security alone.

As Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi himself put it during a speech in Brussels recently, “Between China and Europe, sometimes we have differences, but we have far more common ground.”

It should not come as a surprise, then, if next month’s 70th anniversary Nato summit in Washington devolves into the transatlantic bickering we have become accustomed to, with the Trump administration seeking to steer Nato into an anti-China compact with Europeans as usual demurring and continuing to shirk promises of greater military spending.

April will also witness the second belt and road summit in Beijing. While Washington officials have dismissed the Belt and Road Initiative as “vanity project”, the growing impact it is having on transatlantic relations shows that it is anything but.

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