美國在等待它的李鴻章嗎?_風聞
观方翻译-观方翻译官方账号-2019-04-04 19:45
《外交政策》4月2日刊登美國作家大衞·克里昂文章《美利堅帝國是21世紀病夫》
文:David Klion
譯:由冠羣
在艾薩克.阿西莫夫的經典名作《基地》系列中,作者虛構了一個以“川陀”星球為首都的“銀河帝國”,在維繫了幾千年繁榮與和平之後,帝國頻臨衰落的邊緣。唯一看清這種趨勢的是心理史學家哈里.謝頓,他用數學方法推算出帝國存續的關鍵條件難以維持,帝國將在幾個世紀內崩潰。
在消化理解老師的演算過程後,謝頓的一名弟子推測道:“隨着川陀星球作為銀河帝國行政中心的地位日益突出,它也逐漸成為一個更令人垂涎的獵物。皇位繼承的不確定性越來越大,各大家族的爭權奪利愈演愈烈,已經無人來承擔社會責任。”
當阿西莫夫於1951年寫下這段話時,論實力美國在世界上可謂無出其右。這段話倒更像是在形容2019年的華盛頓特區,這個帝國首都已淪為精英們角逐的獵物,為此他們不惜相互傾軋。美國的狀況和阿西莫夫筆下的銀河帝國以及歷史上的各大帝國一模一樣。
腐朽的統治階級是如何成為國家安全風險的,又是如何對美利堅帝國的存續構成威脅的?尋找答案就要追溯到1970年代,經濟滯脹、能源危機和災難性的越南戰爭充分暴露了美國上世紀中期社會契約的脆弱性。
為了應對危機,美國政治精英們採取了私有化、去監管化、減免富人税收、工業崗位外包以及經濟金融化等措施。從那以後,不平等現象急劇惡化,美國大部分地區陷入持續凋敝,華盛頓等少數大城市卻聚集了金融、技術、媒體等行業的壟斷巨頭以及相應的遊説團體,使財富高度集中,普通人難以生存。事到如今,許多美國人已經看到了這種現象,但很少有人去思考這將如何影響他們在這個世界的位置。
對於美國在世界上扮演的角色,一般而言有兩種解讀。一種理論認為,冷戰時期的兩極世界已經讓位給單極世界,而美國則是單極世界中無可爭議的霸主。部分觀察人士認為這是件好事,因此擁護美利堅帝國,而另一些人則認為這是件壞事,所以要反抗美利堅帝國,但雙方都認為,美利堅帝國是當前時代的典型特徵。
第二種理論與第一種沒有本質上的不同,它認為冷戰後的世界是多極的,美國在眾多大國中佔有主導地位,但潛在對手——譬如中國——是有可能超越美國的。
有沒有可能這兩種理論都是錯的呢?幾乎所有人都把美國看作一個強大的、統一的全球行為體,但這種觀點是經不起推敲、需要修正的。與其説美國是個能夠推行自身意志的強國,不如説它是個對外來賄賂完全開放的露天市場,在這裏,各種相互競爭的外部勢力可以為了達到目的而購買影響力,塑造政治結果,挑動美國黨派鬥爭。
類似這樣的故事在歷史上有很多。儘管阿西莫夫寫《基地》的靈感來自愛德華.吉本的《羅馬帝國衰亡史》,但在歷史上軟弱的統治精英們相互內鬥,最後外強中乾的帝國被強敵趁虛而入的例子比比皆是。
比如,曾經的波蘭立陶宛聯邦是個幅員遼闊的貴族共和國,它從14世紀到18世紀以不同形式控制着東歐地區。後來這個聯邦從地圖上消失了,因為它的鄰國發現這裏的一切政治決策都可以通過收買議員來阻撓破壞。19世紀中葉,奧斯曼土耳其帝國被戲稱為“歐洲病夫”,只能眼瞅着西歐列強蠶食其國土,煽動其境內獨立運動卻束手無策。同一時期,清王朝統治下的中國被迫向歐洲殖民者割地求和。所有這些帝國都在不到一百年的時間裏就分崩離析。
將2019年的美國與歷史上搖搖欲墜的腐朽帝國相提並論,聽起來似乎有些荒謬。但看看今天的華盛頓吧。幾乎所有人都認為——至少私下承認——唐納德·特朗普根本不具備履行總統基本職責的能力,他本人則是全世界的笑柄。
通過向特朗普的跨國酒店與度假場所輸送利益,外國政府得以公然收買特朗普當局。在2016年大選結果出爐後的頭一個月,一名受沙特資助的政治説客在位於白宮和美國國會大廈之間的特朗普酒店一次性租用了500間客房。特朗普所屬的共和黨目前控制着參議院,對司法系統的影響力也越來越大,但他們無意在類似問題上追究下去。當然還有“通俄門”這件小事。截至目前“穆勒報告”中的有限信息顯示,特朗普和共和黨至少是被動、自願地成為了某外國勢力干預選舉結果的獲益人。
美國病了,但特朗普只是一個症狀,一個最明目張膽、最具諷刺意味的實例,他反映出在過去一代人的時間裏,外國資金影響美國政治已經是件司空見慣的事。阿聯酋等海灣國家全面影響着美國智庫和媒體機構;權勢熏天的美國以色列公共事務委員會能讓整個美國政府為之卑躬屈膝;中國與美國商會以及某些美國大企業的高層保持着熱絡關係;海外資金可以通過美國一線城市房地產業流入美國——美國政府已經處於待價而沽的狀態。
來自外國的金元不是華盛頓唯一的,甚至不是首要的主宰。總體上,強大的企業利益主導着首都,使民主責任制幾乎徹底喪失生存空間。這些利益集團來自美國本土的重要產業,比如金融、保險、能源和科技。但問題在於,現在還有什麼產業是美國本土產業嗎?最大的企業多數是跨國企業,公司總部遍佈世界各大主要城市,公司高管坐擁令人咋舌的財富,與普通美國人相比他們反而跟社會地位相近的外國高管更有共同之處。
美國徹底對競選獻金放鬆監管並將腐敗合法化,其規模之大是別的發達國家聞所未聞的,這導致外國和本國金元政治利益越來越難以甄別。換句話説,美國政府的存在不是為了通過內政外交政策服務美國人民,而是為了讓全球寡頭的利益固化永存。
説美國外強中乾,肯定有人會舉出明顯的反例,比如美國的國防支出超過緊隨其後的七國國防預算之和,美國也在世界上幾乎一半的國家裏運營着數百個軍事基地。美國投射軍力的能力遙遙領先於所有其他國家。沒有哪個國家像美國這樣富有,像美國這樣可以自行鑄造全球儲備貨幣,或像美國這樣擁有強大的軟實力。
同時,完全以從上至下的視角看待美利堅帝國會混淆因果關係。比如在2013年的埃及軍事政變中,阿拉伯之春後首位民選總統穆爾西被推翻。前白宮顧問本·羅德斯在回憶錄中寫道,奧巴馬政府不是那場政變的主導者,反而被動承受了來自盟國沙特和阿聯酋無窮無盡的壓力,沙特和阿聯酋在與埃及軍方策劃政變時對當時的美國大使採取了信息戰。
羅德斯寫道,他收到過一封郵件,裏面一張照片顯示當時的美國大使與穆斯林兄弟會關係密切。這封信來自阿聯酋駐美國大使尤瑟夫·阿爾奧泰巴,此人無處不在,熱衷社交,在華盛頓人脈極廣。奧巴馬和羅德斯不但受到國內建制派的壓力,還發現既定的中東政策反覆遭盟國綁架——後來也正是這些國家的政府成功遊説了美國在敍利亞和也門等地採取軍事行動。美國實力哪怕再強大,如果它只是拍賣出去供他人實現目的,對美國仍然毫無意義。
如果美利堅帝國真的在沿着裂痕悄然崩壞,很多人可能會拍手稱快。美國霸權是一大災難,它在全球散播戰爭和剝削,將生態環境破壞到無法修復的地步。阿西莫夫的觀察十分準確,帝國覆滅的原因往往是其過度擴張,縱容精英腐化墮落,所謂自作孽不可活。我們現在所看到的情況,既不是美國在深思熟慮後放棄帝國,集中精力解決內部問題;也不是世界各地飽受壓迫的人們造反推翻美帝。實際上這是一個長期衰朽的過程,任何略通羅馬或拜占庭歷史的人對此都十分熟悉。當你看到世界各國領導人對語無倫次的美國總統投以困惑而憐憫的目光時,就會知道美國是21世紀病夫。
The American Empire Is the Sick Man of the 21st Century
In his classic Foundation series, Isaac Asimov imagines a Galactic Empire, governed from the city-world of Trantor, that has maintained peace and prosperity for thousands of years but that is teetering on the brink of decline. The only person who sees this clearly is the psychohistorian Hari Seldon, who has mathematically determined that the core conditions for the Empire are unsustainable and will crumble over the course of centuries.
As Trantor “becomes more and more the administrative center of Empire, it becomes a greater prize,” a disciple says as he absorbs Seldon’s calculations. “As the Imperial succession becomes more and more uncertain, and the feuds among the great families more rampant, social responsibility disappears.”
Asimov published these words in 1951, at the peak of U.S. global power. But they might as well be describing Washington in 2019, an imperial capital whose elite have transformed it into a great prize to be feuded over as surely as Asimov’s future empire did—and as other empires have done in the past.
How did a decadent ruling class become a national security risk, an existential threat to the American empire? The answer lies in the 1970s, when the weaknesses of the midcentury American social contract were exposed through stagflation, the energy crisis, and the disastrous Vietnam War.
In response, America’s political elites embraced privatization, deregulation, massive tax cuts for the wealthy, the outsourcing of industrial jobs, and the financialization of the economy. Inequality has skyrocketed ever since, and much of the United States has experienced a steady decline while a handful of major cities, including Washington, have become hyperwealthy and almost unaffordable through the concentration of financial, tech, and media monopolies and their affiliated lobbyists. By now, many Americans know this story—but few think about what it means for their place in the world.
There are two conventional ways of understanding America’s global role. According to one theory, the bipolar world of the Cold War has given way to a unipolar world in which the United States is the undisputed hegemon. Some observers see this as a good thing and champion American empire, while others see it as a bad thing and seek to resist American empire, but both sides agree that American empire is the defining feature of our era.
A second theory, only different from the first by degrees, asserts that the post-Cold War world is multipolar, with the United States as the clear dominant power among many potential rivals, including countries such as China that might conceivably surpass the United States down the line.
But what if neither theory is correct? The near-universal understanding of the United States as a powerful, unified global actor is flawed and in need of revision. The United States is less a great power exerting its will and more an open-air market for global corruption, in which outside powers can purchase influence, shape political outcomes, and play factions against each other in the service of their own competing agendas.
That’s a familiar historical story. Although Foundation drew its direct inspiration from Edward Gibbon’s The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, history is replete with examples of seemingly powerful empires run by weak, divided elites and picked apart by outside powers.
The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, a vast aristocratic republic that dominated Eastern Europe in one form or another from the 14th to the 18th century, was wiped off the map by its neighbors, who found they could bribe its senators into paralyzing all political decisions. The Ottoman Empire of the mid-19th century was infamously dubbed “the sick man of Europe” as Western European powers chipped away at its territories and encouraged independence movements against it. During the same period, China under the Qing Dynasty was forced to give up numerous territorial concessions to European colonial empires—all of which, in turn, would themselves disintegrate within a century.
It may seem absurd to compare the United States in 2019 to the decadent and crumbling imperial powers of the past. But consider the state of the capital right now. President Donald Trump, as almost everyone at least privately concedes, is incompetent at fulfilling his most basic responsibilities and a global laughingstock.
Trump’s administration is openly bought by foreign governments via his international network of hotels and resorts, including the one located directly between the White House and the U.S. Capitol, where a Saudi-funded lobbyist rented 500 rooms in the month after the 2016 election. His political party, which still controls the Senate and increasingly dominates the judiciary, has no interest in holding him accountable for any of this. And of course there’s the small matter of Russian interference in the 2016 election; as the limited information known so far from special counsel Robert Mueller’s report confirms, Trump and the Republicans were at the very least the passive and willing beneficiaries of efforts by a foreign power to influence the election outcome.
But Trump is only a symptom, the most blatant and cartoonish example of how the influence of outside money in Washington has become routine over the past generation. From the pervasive influence of the United Arab Emirates and other Gulf monarchies over think tanks and media organizations to virtually the entire U.S. government kowtowing before the American Israel Public Affairs Committee to China’s warm relationship with the Chamber of Commerce and with the heads of some of the most powerful U.S. companies to the funneling of foreign money through the real estate industries of the country’s largest and wealthiest cities—the U.S. government is for sale.
To be sure, it isn’t only, or even primarily, foreign money that rules Washington. Powerful corporate interests in general have almost completely crowded out democratic accountability in the capital, including major U.S.-based industries such as finance, insurance, energy, and tech. Then again, is there any such thing as a U.S.-based industry anymore? Most of the biggest companies are multinational, with headquarters in major cities around the world and executives whose staggering wealth means they have more in common socially with their international counterparts than with most Americans.
The complete deregulation of campaign finance and the subsequent legalization of corruption in Washington, on a scale unheard of in other developed countries, have resulted in a capital where the distinction between foreign and domestic monied interests is harder and harder to parse. The U.S. government, in other words, does not exist to serve the interests of Americans through either its foreign or its domestic policies; rather, it exists to perpetuate the interests of the globalized oligarchy.
There’s an obvious counterargument to all of this: The United States still spends more on defense than the next seven countries combined, and it still operates a network of hundreds of military bases spread across nearly half the countries on Earth. No other country remotely rivals the United States in its ability to project military power. And no other country is as wealthy or mints the global reserve currency or wields as much soft power.
At the same time, focusing entirely on the American empire from the top down can confuse causality. Consider, for instance, the overthrow of Egypt’s post-Arab Spring elected leader Mohamed Morsi in a 2013 coup. In former White House advisor Ben Rhodes’s memoir, he describes President Barack Obama’s administration not as the driving force behind this coup but as the passive recipient of relentless pressure from its Saudi and Emirati allies, who waged an information campaign against the U.S. ambassador while plotting with the Egyptian military.
Rhodes writes that he personally received a photo in the mail portraying the U.S. ambassador as an accomplice of the Muslim Brotherhood from Yousef al-Otaiba, the ubiquitous, hard-partying, extremely well-connected Emirati ambassador in Washington. While Rhodes and Obama also faced pressure from within the Washington establishment, they found their agenda for the Middle East repeatedly hijacked by foreign allies—the same governments that also lobbied, with varying success, for U.S. military operations from Syria to Yemen. American power, however mighty, means nothing if it’s being used for the ends of the highest bidders.
So what if the American empire is coming apart at the seams? Good riddance, many would say. U.S. hegemony has been a disaster, spreading war and exploitation around the globe and poisoning the climate beyond repair. And that’s true: As Asimov observed, empires tend to fall because they overextend themselves, spoil their elites, and produce the preconditions for their own demise. But what we’re seeing is neither a considered, responsible withdrawal from empire in order to invest in urgent needs at home nor a revolt against empire by the world’s wretched. Rather, it’s a drawn-out, decadent collapse recognizable to any student of Rome or Constantinople. America is the sick man of the 21st century, and anyone who has watched its president bumble through a gathering of bemused, pitying world leaders knows it.
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