中國怎麼就威脅美國了？_風聞

美國《哈潑斯雜誌》2月號刊登復旦大學中國研究院春秋高級研究員馬凱碩文章《什麼中國威脅？》

文：Kishore Mahbubani

譯：周順子

用不了15年，中國就能超越美國成為世界上最大的經濟體。隨着超越時刻的臨近，**華盛頓政界早已達成一個共識：**中國必將成為美國人民利益和福祉的頭等威脅。約瑟夫·鄧福德（Joseph Dunford）上將，這位美國參謀長聯席會議主席曾表示：“差不多到2025年，中國將極有可能成為我國最大的威脅”。《2018年美國國防戰略報告》聲稱，中國和俄羅斯這兩個“修正主義”勢力正在致力於“塑造一個與其國內威權主義模式相一致的全球秩序，並將干涉、控制他國的經濟、外交和國土安全政策”。聯邦調查局局長克里斯托弗·雷（Christopher Wray）也曾説過，“中國威脅不單單是美國政府需要面對的問題，它還是整個美國社會需要面對的問題……我認為全社會都應該有所行動”。中國威脅論在美國甚囂塵上，以至於當特朗普在2018年1月發動對華貿易戰時，連許多素來以立場温和著稱的民主黨人都對他表達了支持，比如民主黨參議員查克·舒默（Chuck Schumer）。

  美國如此坐卧不安是出於兩方面的憂慮。首先是經濟層面：美方稱，中國通過不正當貿易行為損害了美國的經濟利益，比如要求美國企業轉讓技術、侵犯美國企業的知識版權、設置非關税貿易壁壘提高市場準入門檻等等。其次是政治層面：經濟的騰飛並沒有在中國催生出符合西方自由民主標準的改革，這出乎很多西方國家（尤其是美國）的意料。更有甚者，在和其他國家打交道的時候，中國正變得越來越堅定地以自己的意志行事。

縱觀此類言論，可見美國官員早已認定中國威脅迫在眉睫，自然也就難怪格雷厄姆·艾利森（Graham Allison）會提出“修昔底德陷阱”這一概念，認為美中一戰已無可避免。然而，中國並不具備能夠威脅或入侵美國的軍事力量，中國從沒有嘗試過去幹涉美國內政，中國更未作出過任何試圖摧毀美國經濟的行為。所以，請冷靜想想吧，儘管中國威脅論在美國甚囂塵上，美國仍有可能找到辦法與中國和平共處，即便中國在未來10年內成為世界第一大經濟體和地緣政治上舉足輕重的力量。一種相對平和的對華策略未必就不能做到利好美國的同時還能對中國起到抑制作用。

美國必須重新審視長期以來對中國政治制度的固執看法。自蘇聯解體以來，美國政客們始終堅信中國共產黨會像蘇聯共產黨一樣走向滅亡，他們認為這只是個時間問題。無論是左派還是右派，整個美國政界或多或少都相信福山在1992年提出的著名論斷：“歷史的發展只有一條道路。我們見證的不僅僅是冷戰的結束，我們還見證了歷史本身的終結：人類意識形態的發展已經走到了終點，西方自由民主作為社會治理的終極形式是放諸四海而皆準的”。

2000年3月，正因為相信經濟自由一定能夠催生政治自由，比爾·克林頓才選擇支持中國加入世界貿易組織，他認為這樣一定能夠給中國人民帶來更多的開放和自由。他的繼任者小布什也這樣認為，並在2002年的《國家安全戰略報告》中寫道：“隨着時間的推移，中國終將發現，社會自由和政治自由是振興國家的唯一途徑”。希拉里·克林頓則更加直接，她認為中國是在“逆勢而為，抗拒歷史潮流，螳臂當車，終將潰敗，中國人只不過是在儘可能地推遲最終結果的到來”。

是時候讓美國政客們反思一下他們的剛愎自用了，他們曾過於自信地給中國開出他們自己的“藥方”。就算沒有任何帝國像今天的美國一樣擁有強大如斯的經濟、政治和軍事實力，美國建國至今也不過250年。相比之下，中國歷史要久遠得多。過去的數千年曆史讓中國人民深諳一個道理，孱弱又分裂的政府會讓自己吃盡苦頭，正如1842年鴉片戰爭後的那近一個世紀，中國承受着外敵侵略、經年內戰、饑荒和諸多疾苦。然而，自1978年以來，中國已有8億人擺脱貧困，這個國家還形成了世界上規模最大的中產階級羣體。正如格雷厄姆·艾利森在《中國日報》上所寫的那樣，“毋庸置疑，近40年來中國奇蹟一般的飛速發展為其人民創造了過去4000年曆史都無法比擬的福祉”。而這一切都發生在中共執政之後。中國人不會沒有注意到，就在同一時期，俄羅斯人均預期壽命在前蘇聯解體後大幅縮短，嬰兒死亡率上升，居民收入一落千丈。

在很多美國人看來，美中之間的政治博弈是民主與專制之間的對抗，一方讓人民能夠自由選擇政府、享有言論自由和宗教信仰自由，而另一方則在剝奪這些自由。然而，對於立場中立的觀察人士來説，美中兩者之間僅僅存在財閥政治（plutocracy）與賢能政治（meritocracy）之間的差別：美國的重大公共政策最終多有利於富人，而中國的重大公共決策則由根據能力和政績選出的黨內精英制定，最終成功地減少了貧困現象。一個事實是不容否認的，在過去30年裏，美國勞動者們的收入中位數幾乎陷於停滯：在1979年到2013年之間，小時工資中位數僅上漲6%，平均到每年增幅連0.2%都不到。

我並非認為中國當今的政治體制已經完美到無需任何改變。即使是在中國國內，也有很多人在呼籲改革。中國的政治體制理應隨着社會和經濟狀況而發展進步。實際上，伴隨着改革開放，中國早已日新月異，日漸開放。1980年我第一次去中國的時候，任何中國的普通居民都不能以遊客身份出國旅行。而去年，中國出境遊人數為1.34億。同時，數百萬年輕的中國精英學子赴美留學，得以享受美國大學裏的學術自由，然而在2017年，有80%的中國留學生在美國大學畢業後仍舊選擇回國工作。

中國始終在避免無謂的戰爭和衝突。美國的地理環境得天獨厚，兩個鄰居加拿大和墨西哥都温和無害。而中國則不同，中國與周邊不少國家之間都存在着緊張關係，比如印度、日本、韓國和越南。自1988年中越兩國之間發生短暫的海上衝突之後，中國在五個聯合國安理會常任理事國中是唯一一個在過去30年裏從未對他國進行過軍事打擊的國家。反觀美國，即便是在以和平立場著稱的奧巴馬擔任總統時期，美國也曾在一年內對7個國家投下了26000枚炸彈。顯而易見，中國更懂得戰略剋制的藝術。

但是，仍然有很多人認為，中國已經徘徊在發動戰爭的邊緣了。理查德·麥克格雷（Richard McGregor）的著作《亞洲審判日》（Asia’s Reckoning）聚焦二戰後美中日三國的戰略外交關係，詳實地記錄了2012年以來中日之間的緊張時刻。2012年9月，日本首相野田佳彥聲稱將“釣魚島”國有化，此後中日兩國的軍艦一度在海上危險對峙。儘管很多經驗豐富的觀察家預測中日兩國可能將於2014年時發生軍事衝突，但實際上後來什麼也沒有發生。

還有不少人認為南中國海海域很有可能發生軍事衝突。全球每年五分之一的海運都要經過這一地區，在部分海域主權被質疑的情況下，中國人在部分島礁和淺灘上修建軍事設施。然而，同西方分析人士的結論相反，雖****然在政治方面中國對待南海地區的態度更加強硬，但軍事上並沒有變得更加激進。像馬來西亞、菲律賓和越南這些小國家已經在南中國海海域佔領了一些中國曾宣誓主權的島嶼，中國完全可以輕而易舉地將他們趕走，但中國並沒這樣做。

在看那些有關“中國侵略”的陳詞濫調時，不要忘了這一點，美國已經錯過很多可以緩和這一地區緊張局勢的好機會。前美國駐華大使芮效儉（J.Stapleton Roy）曾提到，在2015年9月25日舉行的美中峯會上，中國領導人曾就南中國海問題向美方提出了一些建議，包括認可東盟十國提出的一些聲明，不僅如此，他還表示儘管中國在南沙羣島的部分礁石和淺灘上進行了大規模填海作業，但中國無意在有爭議的南沙羣島“搞軍事化”。然而，奧巴馬政府對中國的合理建議無動於衷，甚至還加大了在南中國海的巡邏力度。作為回應，中國加快了在這些人造島礁上的防禦工事和基礎設施建設的步伐。

發動貿易戰和發動真正的戰爭一樣，需要在外交層面上慎之又慎，尤其當美中兩國之間存在着千絲萬縷經濟聯繫的時候。特朗普和他的首席貿易顧問彼得·納瓦羅（Peter Navarro）、貿易代表羅伯特·萊特希澤（Robert Lighthizer）堅持認為是其他國家不遵守貿易平等原則的惡劣行徑導致了美國的對外貿易逆差。事實上，沒有任何一位德高望重的主流經濟學家同意這種論調。著名經濟學家馬丁·費爾德斯坦（Martin Feldstein），這位美國前總統里根的經濟顧問委員會主席直言不諱：美國在全球的貿易逆差是由國內消費總量超出其國內生產而引起的，因此，對低廉的中國商品徵收關税並不能解決這個結構性問題，只會使美國普通百姓負擔不起許多生活必需品。

特朗普對中國的貿易戰為他贏得了民意，美國社會上的主流聲音均支持他的決定。事到如今，其實中國方面也難辭其咎。長期以來，中國一直對美方日益增長的抱怨視而不見，哪怕美國領導人擺出數據來證明中國的許多經濟政策不符合公平貿易原則。喬治·馬格努斯（George Magnus）在《紅旗》（Red Flags）一書中指出，美國曾強烈反對中國堅持的那些歧視性政策，它們藉故懲罰外國企業以利好本地公司。但是，他建議美國通過諸如美中全面經濟對話等方式，在非政治敏感的商業領域和服務生產領域開闢市場準入的途徑。

馬格努斯建議美中兩國通過現有的一些機構進行對話，這種選擇遠比特朗普式的貿易戰更加明智。如果特朗普只針對中國那些不符合貿易公平原則的經濟政策進行抨擊和譴責，他的行為將得到全世界的支持，而世界貿易組織也為此提供了許多途徑。甚至可以預見的是，中國極有可能在私下裏承認這些問題並做出讓步，修正不當的經濟政策。然而，特朗普如今的所作所為不禁讓中國和其它國家懷疑，其真正目的不是消滅不公平的貿易行為，而是另有所圖，他的目的是阻撓或破壞中國成為全球科技領軍者的雄心抱負。正如馬丁·費爾德斯坦（Martin Feldstein）所言，美國當然有權利維護自己的知識產權，防止他國盜竊美國的科技技術。但是，美國不應以此為藉口，試圖破壞中國的國家工業計劃——“中國製造2025”，阻撓中國發展自己的電動汽車、機器人和人工智能等技術，躋身世界製造強國之列。

費爾德斯坦和馬格努斯都認為，要維持美國自身在航空航天和機器人等高科技產業中的霸主地位，政府應選擇加大投資高等教育和科技研發，而不是追着其他國家大漲關税。簡而言之，美國同樣需要制定自己的長期經濟發展戰略來應對中國的長期經濟發展戰略。無論從政策層面還是從理論層面來看，中國領導人對於國家經濟和民生的未來發展均更有遠見。“中國製造2025”計劃以及“一帶一路”倡議中的基建項目，尤其是高鐵建設等，都展示了中國正在努力成為新興製造業一流大國的抱負。與此同時，中國領導人開始強調未來絕不能再以製造不平等和犧牲環境等社會問題為代價片面追求經濟增長。2017年，習近平宣佈，中國社會的主要矛盾已經轉化為“人民日益增長的美好生活需求與不平衡不充分發展之間的矛盾”。馬格努斯以此預測，中國政府未來的執政重點將轉移到“改善環境、遏制污染、縮小貧富差距和地區發展不平衡、加強社會安全網絡建設”等方面。儘管中國的經濟發展必將面臨一些嚴峻挑戰，但至少中國領導人已經開始想辦法解決這些問題，而美國是時候也這樣做了。

然而要制定長期戰略，美國首先需要想明白自身經濟發展理念中自相矛盾的地方。大多數紙上談兵的美國經濟學家認為政府引導產業發展的辦法根本行不通，他們支持自由市場主導的資本主義。但是，如果美國對這種推斷成竹在胸，特朗普的主要貿易談判代表萊特希澤何必對努力提高自身技術實力的北京喊打喊殺？他應該作壁上觀，反正北京的“中國製造2025”最終會像蘇聯的經濟計劃一樣失敗。但是，如果萊特希澤也認為“中國製造2025”計劃能夠成功，那麼他應該建議美國政府重塑其意識形態，向中國學習，制定一個長期的、綜合性的經濟發展戰略，以此來抗衡中國。就算像德國這樣領跑全球的傳統工業強國也已經制定了此類戰略——“工業4.0”。德國的計劃不像中國的計劃那樣力圖讓政府力量的觸角面面俱到，但仍然強調國家將扮演重要角色，正如戰略與國際研究中心的斯科特·肯尼迪（Scott Kennedy）所介紹的那樣，德國政府將制定整體發展框架，利用金融和財政工具，大力支持製造業創新中心的建設。為什麼美國就不能也這樣制定出自己的計劃呢？

具有諷刺意味的是，如果美國最終決定要制定一項長期經濟發展戰略，那麼其最好的合作伙伴大概就是中國了。手握3萬億美元的外匯儲備，中國會很樂意加大在美國的投資。亞當·博森（Adam Posen）是遐邇著聞的彼得森國際經濟研究所所長，他早就指出特朗普針對中國和世界其他國家的貿易戰爭已經導致美國2008年接受的外國投資接近於零。美國早就應該考慮響應中國提出的“一帶一路”倡議——這項由中國在2013年發起的計劃旨在通過大規模投資基礎設施建設來加強亞洲、歐洲和非洲三個大洲的區域經濟合作。“一帶一路”倡議的參與國們必然會非常歡迎美國的加入，以藉此來“平衡”中國的影響力。美國將有很多可以從中獲利的機會。波音和通用電氣這兩家美國巨頭企業都曾在中國掙得盆滿缽滿，中國航空市場的爆炸式增長給他們帶來了海量訂單。同樣的，卡特彼勒（Caterpillar）和貝克特爾(Bechtel)等公司也可以在“一帶一路”計劃裏的基礎設施建設項目中尋找商機。可惜，美國對國家資本主義意識形態的偏見不僅斷送了自己與中國長期合作共贏的機會，也葬送了美國亟需的工業發展長期戰略。

隨着中國的崛起，美國必須在兩個方面做出抉擇。第一，美國是否要維持如今的對華政策，即一方面加強兩國雙邊關係，同時又對中國行削弱之實？在經濟方面，除特朗普執意發動對華貿易戰外，美國長期以來的主流政策仍將中國視為合作伙伴；但在政治領域，尤其是軍事領域，美國始終將中國視為心腹大患。第二，美國能否像中國那樣，制定一個長期有效的對外戰略？這聽上去好像沒什麼難度。但是，美國能否像中國那樣做到嚴格遵守和貫徹自己的戰略計劃呢？如果決定將中國作為第一戰略目標，美國能否果斷地放棄針對伊斯蘭世界的徒勞戰爭和對俄羅斯毫無必要的抹黑中傷？

作為世界第一經濟強國，美國的國防預算全球第一是情有可原的。但如果它的經濟實力落到世界第二位呢？屆時美國是否還需要維持全球第一的國防預算？如果美國拒絕放棄軍事擴張，那才是正中中國下懷。蘇聯的解體給中國人上了一課，軍費開支不應高於經濟增長。如果美國繼續為了無謂的軍事擴張燒錢，那反而正符合中國的長遠利益。

如果美國最終願意改變對華態度，那它或許有可能發現一種既能夠遏制中國發展又能夠擴大自身利益的戰略。克林頓2003年在耶魯大學的演講中提出過一種思路：遏制下一個超級大國崛起的唯一方式就是制定限制其發展的多邊規則和多邊合作機制。比如，雖然中國宣稱擁有南中國海內眾多島礁的領土主權，但《聯合國海洋法公約》使中國不能將整個南中國海視為自己的內海。當世界貿易組織判定中國有違反條約的行為，中國也不得不遵從世界貿易組織的判決。國際上的諸多規則和機制已經對中國形成制約。更加幸運的是，中國始終支持以美國為核心建立起的全球多邊框架，無論是國際貨幣基金組織、世界銀行、聯合國還是世界貿易組織。在國際維和方面，中國派出的維和人員數量比另外四個常任理事國加起來還要多。實際上，基於諸多的多邊合作平台和框架，美中之間可以擁有很多合作空間和合作機會。

但是，要抓住這些機遇，**美國領導人必須接受一個無法否認的事實：**中國和印度迴歸國際舞台已經無可避免。這個事實有什麼不能接受的？從公元1世紀到1820年之間，中國和印度始終是世界上最大的兩個經濟體。從幾千年人類歷史的角度來看，近兩百年西方世界對全球商業活動的統治才是對常態的偏離。根據普華永道做出的預測，2050年或者更早，中國和印度就能拿回他們世界第一和第二的位置。

中國和印度的領導人們明白，我們生活的地球村並不大，國家之間只有彼此依存，才能共同面對全人類的威脅和挑戰，比如全球變暖。當特朗普執意退出“巴黎氣候協定”，中國和印度原本也可以跟着退出，但他們沒有。儘管中印兩國的政治體制有些差異，但他們都決定做有擔當、負責任的世界公民。觀察中國對待全球多邊規則的態度，足以幫助我們判斷中國是否會對美國、對世界構成威脅。如果中國願意被諸多的全球多邊規則和多邊夥伴關係所約束，那麼就算它不是一個符合西方民主自由標準的國家，也不會是一個對全球和平穩定的威脅。這或許是一個更好的可以替代“中國威脅論”的方案和思路，也是美國未來應該考慮和努力的方向。

What China Threat?

Within about fifteen years, China’s economy will surpass America’s and become the largest in the world. As this moment approaches, meanwhile, a consensus has formed in Washington that China poses a significant threat to American interests and well-­being. General Joseph Dunford, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), has said that “China probably poses the greatest threat to our nation by about 2025.” The summary of America’s 2018 National Defense Strategy claims that China and Russia are “revisionist powers” seeking to “shape a world consistent with their authoritarian model—gaining veto authority over other nations’ economic, diplomatic, and security decisions.” Christopher Wray, the FBI director, has said, “One of the things we’re trying to do is view the China threat as not just a whole-­of-­government threat, but a whole-­of-­society threat . . . and I think it’s going to take a whole-­of-­society response by us.” So widespread is this notion that when Donald Trump launched his trade war against China, in January 2018, he received support even from moderate figures such as Democratic senator Chuck Schumer.

Two main currents are driving these concerns. One is economic: that China has undermined the US economy by pursuing unfair trade practices, demanding technology transfers, stealing intellectual property, and imposing non-­tariff barriers that impede access to Chinese markets. The other current is political: that China’s successful economic development has not been accompanied by the liberal democratic reform Western governments, and particularly the United States, had expected; and that China has become too aggressive in its dealing with other nations.

Reading about the imminent threat American officials believe China poses, it is not hard to see why Graham Allison, in his book Destined for War, reaches the depressing conclusion that armed conflict between the two countries is more likely than not. Yet since China is not mounting a military force to threaten or invade the United States, not trying to intervene in America’s domestic politics, and not engaged in a deliberate campaign to destroy the American economy, we must consider that, in spite of the increasing clamor about the threat China poses to the United States, it is still possible for America to find a way to deal peaceably with a China that will become the number one economic, and possibly geopolitical, power within a decade—and to do so in a way that advances its own interests, even as it constrains China’s.

America must first reconsider a long-­held belief about China’s political system. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, American policymakers have been convinced that it would only be a matter of time before the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) followed the Soviet Communist Party into the political grave. Politicians and policymakers on both ends of the political spectrum accepted, implicitly or explicitly, the famous thesis of Francis Fukuyama that there was only one historical road to follow.

What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of postwar history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.

When Bill Clinton explained in March 2000 why he supported China’s admission to the World Trade Organization, he stressed that political liberation would inevitably flow from economic liberalization, concluding that “if you believe in a future of greater openness and freedom for the people of China, you ought to be for this agreement.” His successor, George W. Bush, shared the same conviction. In his 2002 National Security Strategy, he wrote, “In time, China will find that social and political freedom is the only source of that national greatness.” Hillary Clinton was more explicit. According to her, by persisting with Communist Party rule, the Chinese “are trying to stop history, which is a fool’s errand. They cannot do it. But they’re going to hold it off as long as possible.”

It is worth considering the conviction of American policymakers that they could so confidently dispense political prescriptions to China. No other empire, of course, has accumulated as much economic, political, and military power as the United States has. Yet, it has still been less than 250 years since the Declaration of Independence was signed, in 1776. China, by contrast, is considerably older, and the Chinese people have learned from several thousand years of history that they suffer most when the central government is weak and divided, as it was for almost a century after the Opium War of 1842, when the country was ravaged by foreign invasions, civil wars, famines, and much else besides. Since 1978, however, China has lifted 800 million people out of poverty and created the largest middle class in the world. As Graham Allison wrote in an op-­ed for China Daily, an En­glish-­language newspaper owned by the Chinese government, “it could be argued that 40 years of miracle growth have created a greater increase in human well-­being for more individuals than occurred in the previous more than 4,000 years of China’s history.” All this has happened while the CCP has been in power. And the Chinese did not fail to notice that the collapse of the Soviet Communist party led to a decline in Russian life expectancy, increase in infant mortality, and plummeting incomes.

In American eyes, the contest between America’s and China’s political systems is one between a democracy, where the people freely choose their government and enjoy freedom of speech and of religion, and an autocracy, where the people have no such freedoms. To neutral observers, however, it could just as easily be seen as a choice between a plutocracy in the United States, where major public policy decisions end up favoring the rich over the masses, and a meritocracy in China, where major public policy decisions made by officials chosen by Party elites on the basis of ability and performance have resulted in such a striking alleviation of poverty. One fact cannot be denied. In the past thirty years, the median income of the American worker has not improved: between 1979 and 2013, median hourly wages rose just 6 percent—less than 0.2 percent per year.

This doesn’t mean that the Chinese political system should remain in its current form forever. Human rights violations—such as the detention of hundreds of thousands of Uighurs—remain a major concern. Within China today, there are many voices calling for reforms. Among them is the prominent liberal scholar Xu Jilin. And in Rethinking China’s Rise: A Liberal Critique, David Ownby has produced an excellent En­glish translation of eight essays Xu has written over the past decade. Xu lodges his sharpest criticisms against his fellow Chinese scholars, and especially against what he sees as their excessive focus on the nation-­state and insistence on China’s essential cultural and historical difference from Western political models. He argues that this overemphasis on particularism in fact marks a departure from traditional Chinese culture, which, as exemplified by its historical tianxia model of foreign relations, was a universal and open system. Criticizing the blanket rejection by “extreme nationalists” among his Chinese academic peers of “anything created by Westerners,” Xu argues instead that China has historically succeeded because it was open. However, not even a liberal like Xu would call for China to replicate the American political system. Instead, he argues that China should “employ her own cultural traditions,” through promoting a “new tianxia”: on the domestic front, “Han people and the various national minorities will enjoy mutual equality in legal and status terms, and the cultural uniqueness and pluralism of the different nationalities will be respected and protected,” while its relations with other countries “will be defined by the principles of respect for each other’s sovereign independence, equality in their treatment of each other, and peaceful coexistence.”

China’s political system will have to evolve with its social and economic conditions. And, in many respects, it has evolved significantly, becoming much more open than it once was. When I first went to China, in 1980, for instance, no Chinese were allowed to travel overseas as private tourists. Last year, roughly 134 million traveled overseas. And roughly 134 million Chinese returned home freely. Similarly, millions of the best young Chinese minds have experienced the academic freedom of American universities. Yet, in 2017, eight in ten Chinese students chose to return home. Though the question remains: If things have been going well, why is Xi imposing tighter political discipline on Communist Party members and removing term limits? His predecessor, Hu Jintao, delivered spectacular economic growth. But this period was also marked by a spike in corruption and party factionalism led by Bo Xilai, the Chongqing party secretary who tried to challenge Xi’s rise to power, and Zhou Yongkang, the powerful domestic security chief under Xi’s predecessor. Xi believed these trends would delegitimize the CCP and end China’s successful rejuvenation. Against these dire challenges, he saw no realistic alternative to reimposing strong central leadership. Despite doing this (or, because he did this), Xi remains hugely popular.

Many in the West have been alarmed by the enormous power Xi has accumulated, taking it as a harbinger of armed conflict. Xi’s accumulation of power, however, has not fundamentally changed China’s long-­term geopolitical strategy. The Chinese have, for instance, avoided unnecessary wars. Unlike the United States, which is blessed with two nonthreatening neighbors in Canada and Mexico, China has difficult relations with a number of strong, nationalistic neighbors, including India, Japan, South Korea, and Vietnam. Quite remarkably, of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (China, France, Russia, the United States, and the United Kingdom), China is the only one among them that has not fired a single military shot across its border in thirty years, since a brief naval battle between China and Vietnam in 1988. By contrast, even during the relatively peaceful Obama Administration, the American military dropped twenty-six thousand bombs on seven countries in a single year. Evidently, the Chinese understand well the art of strategic restraint.

There have, of course, been moments when China seemed close to war. Richard McGregor’s book, Asia’s Reckoning, which focuses on the strategic relationship between the United States, China, and Japan since the postwar period, vividly documents the precarious moments between China and Japan since 2012. After Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda “nationalized” the disputed Senkaku Islands in September 2012, Chinese and Japanese naval vessels came perilously close to each other. Yet while many seasoned observers predicted a military clash between the two countries in 2014, none came to pass.

Much has been made of the possibility of conflict in the South China Sea, through which roughly one fifth of all global shipping passes each year, and where the Chinese have converted isolated reefs and shoals into military installations as part of larger, contested claims to sovereignty over portions of the waters. But contrary to Western analyses, China, while undeniably more politically assertive in the region, has not become more aggressive militarily. The smaller, rival claimants to sovereignty in the South China Sea, including Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam, control a number of islands in the waters. China could easily dislodge them. It has not done so.

When considering the familiar narrative of Chinese aggression in the South China Sea, it must be remembered that the United States itself has missed opportunities to defuse tensions there. A former US ambassador to China, J. Stapleton Roy, told me that in a joint press conference with President Obama on September 25, 2015, Xi Jinping not only proposed an approach to the South China Sea that included the endorsement of declarations supported by all ten members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, but, more significantly, added that China had no intention of militarizing the Spratly Islands, where it had engaged in massive reclamation work on the reefs and shoals it occupied. Yet the Obama Administration made no effort to pursue China’s reasonable proposal. Instead, the US Navy stepped up its patrols. In response, China increased the pace of its construction of defensive installations on the islands.

Just as careful diplomacy is required in military matters, it is also integral to America’s economic relations with China. Virtually no well-­known mainstream economist agrees with Trump, or his top trade adviser Peter Navarro and trade representative Robert Lighthizer, that America’s trade deficits are the result of unfair practices by other countries. Martin Feldstein, the former chairman of Ronald Reagan’s Council of Economic Advisers, has pointed out that America’s global trade deficit is due to the fact that its consumption outweighs its domestic production. Imposing tariffs on low-­cost Chinese goods will not rectify this structural feature, but will serve only to make many essential goods less affordable to ordinary Americans.

Trump’s trade war against China has nevertheless won him broad mainstream support. This is a result of a major mistake that China has made. It has ignored growing perceptions and complaints, including by leading American figures, that China has been fundamentally unfair in many of its economic policies. “The US has a strong case” against China in “alleg[ing] that China persists with discriminatory policies that favour local companies and penalise foreign firms,” as George Magnus notes in Red Flags, recommending that the United States engage China in a dialogue to encourage the latter to open up “market access in non-­politically sensitive commercial and service-­producing sectors” through avenues such as the US–China Comprehensive Economic Dialogue.

Magnus’s suggestion of dialogue through existing institutions is a far wiser route for America to take than Trump’s trade war. If the Trump Administration were to focus its economic campaign against China on the areas of these unfair practices, it would generate a great deal of global support for this campaign. Indeed, the WTO provides many avenues to do so. Conceivably, China may also privately acknowledge mistakes made in these areas and alter its policies. However, there is a growing perception in China and beyond that the real goal of the Trump Administration is not just to eliminate these unfair trade practices but to undermine or thwart China’s long-­term plan to become a technological leader in its own right. Although the United States has the right to implement policies to prevent the theft of its technology, as Martin Feldstein has indicated, this should not be conflated with its efforts to thwart China’s long-­term, state-­led industrial plan, Made in China 2025, designed to make China a global competitor in advanced manufacturing, focusing on industries like electric cars, advanced robotics, and artificial intelligence.

Both Feldstein and Magnus agree that in order to maintain supremacy in high-­tech industries like aerospace and robotics, the US government, rather than pursuing tariffs, should invest in areas such as higher education and research and development. In short, America needs to develop its own long-­term economic strategy to match that of China. In both policy and rhetoric, it is clear to see that China’s leadership has a vision for its economy and people. Plans like Made in China 2025 and the infrastructure projects undertaken in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), such as the construction of high-speed railways, demonstrate China’s efforts to become a global competitor in new, advanced industries. At the same time, China’s leaders have emphasized that the country can no longer pursue GDP growth at the expense of social costs such as inequality and environmental pollution. This Xi made clear when he declared in 2017 that the principal contradiction facing Chinese society is now “between unbalanced and inadequate development and the people’s ever-­growing needs for a better life.” As Magnus sums it up, this means a shift in focus to “improving the environment and pollution, lowering income and regional inequality, and strengthening the social safety net.” Although, as Magnus writes, China’s economy faces several important challenges, China’s leaders have, at the very least, taken steps to address them. It is time for the United States to do the same.

However, to work out a long-­term strategy, America needs to resolve a fundamental contradiction in its economic assumptions. Most sophisticated American economists believe that government-­led industrial policies do not work, arguing instead for free-market capitalism. If this American belief is correct, Trump’s main trade negotiator, Robert Lighthizer, should not oppose China’s 2025 government-­led plan to upgrade its technological capabilities. Lighthizer should sit back and allow this Chinese industrial initiative to fail, as the Soviet Union’s economic plans did.

However, if Lighthizer believes that the 2025 plan could succeed, he should consider the possibility that America should revisit its ideological assumptions and, like China, formulate a long-­term comprehensive economic strategy to match the Chinese plan. Even Germany, arguably the world’s leading industrial power, has such a strategy, called Industry 4.0. It’s obviously less intrusive than the Chinese version of industrial policy, which, as Scott Kennedy of the Center for Strategic and International Studies has described, involves the state playing “a significant role . . . in providing an overall framework, utilizing financial and fiscal tools, and supporting the creation of manufacturing innovation centers.” Why can’t the United States formulate a plan to match?

Ironically, the best country that the United States could work with in formulating such a long-­term economic strategy might well be China. China is keen to deploy its $3 trillion reserves to invest more in the United States. Adam Posen, the head of the influential Peterson Institute for International Economics, has already noted that Trump’s trade war with China and the rest of the world has led net foreign investment in the United States to fall to nearly zero in 2018. America should also consider participating in China’s Belt and Road Initiative, the Chinese governmental program launched in 2013 to strengthen regional economic cooperation in Asia, Europe, and Africa through massive investments in infrastructure. The countries currently participating in BRI would welcome US participation, as it would help balance China’s influence. In short, there are many economic opportunities America could take advantage of. Just as Boeing and GE, two major American corporations, have benefited from the explosion in the Chinese aviation market, firms like Caterpillar and Bechtel could benefit from the massive construction undertaken in the BRI region. Unfortunately, America’s ideological aversion to state-­led economic initiatives will prevent both mutually beneficial long-­term economic cooperation with China and needed industrial strategies in the United States.

As China rises, America faces two stark choices. First, should it continue with its current mixed bag of policies toward China, with some seeking to enhance bilateral relations and others effectively undermining them? On the economic front, with the exception of Trump’s latest trade war with China, American policies have consistently treated China as a partner, while America’s political and especially military policies have most often treated China as an adversary. Second, can the United States match China and develop an equally effective long-­term strategic plan to manage the latter’s rise? The simple answer is yes. However, if China is to be America’s number-one strategic priority, as it should be, the obvious question is whether America can be as strategically disciplined as China and give up its futile wars in the Islamic world and its unnecessary vilification of Russia.

It was rational for the United States to have the world’s largest defense budget when its economy dwarfed every other in the world. Would it be rational for the world’s number-­two economy to have the world’s largest defense budget? And if America refuses to give this up, isn’t it a strategic gift to China? China learned one major lesson from the collapse of the Soviet Union. Economic growth must come before military expenditure. Hence, it would actually serve China’s long-­term interests for the United States to burn money away on unnecessary military expenses.

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If America finally changes its strategic thinking about China, it will also discover that it is possible to develop a strategy that will both constrain China and advance US interests. Bill Clinton provided the wisdom for this strategy in a speech at Yale University in 2003, when he said, in short, that the only way to manage the next superpower is to create multilateral rules and partnerships that would tie it down. For example, though China lays claim to reefs and shoals in the South China Sea, the UN Law of the Sea Convention has prevented it from declaring the entire South China Sea an internal Chinese lake. China has also been obliged to implement WTO judgments that have gone against it. International rules do have bite. Fortunately, under Xi Jinping, China is still in favor of strengthening the global multilateral architecture the United States created, including the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the United Nations, and the WTO. China has contributed more UN peacekeepers than the four other Permanent Members of the UN Security Council combined. Hence, there is a window of opportunity for cooperation between America and China in multilateral forums.

To seize the opportunity, American policymakers have to accept the undeniable reality that the return of China (and India) is unstoppable. Why not? From the year 1 to 1820, China and India had the world’s two largest economies. The past two hundred years of Western domination of global commerce have been an aberration. As PricewaterhouseCoopers has predicted, China and India will resume their number one and two position by 2050 or earlier.

The leaders of both China and India understand that we now live in a small, interdependent global village, threatened by many new challenges, including global warming. Both China and India could have walked away from the Paris Agreement after Trump did so. Both chose not to. Despite their very different political systems, both have decided that they can be responsible global citizens. Perhaps this may be the best route to find out if China will emerge as a threat to the United States and the world. If it agrees to be constrained by multiple global rules and partnerships, China could very well remain a different polity—­that is, not a liberal democracy—­and still not be a threatening one. This is the alternative scenario that the “China threat” industry in the United States should consider and work toward.

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