誰説中美必有一戰？_風聞

美國《國家利益》雜誌網站4月23日刊登聖母大學大三學生尼古拉斯·格蘭普瑞文章《中美衝突並非無可避免》，本文獲得該校“2019政策議論文大賽”優勝獎。

文：Nicholas Grandpre

譯：由冠羣

隨着中國的崛起和美國逐漸從中東事務中抽身退出，眾多外交政策評論家接二連三的預言世界將回到大國爭霸的格局上來。如果中美兩國都不會像蘇聯那樣轟然崩潰，那麼它們能否和平共處以及如何和平共處就成了21世紀最重大的國際安全問題。如果華盛頓方面能恪守國家安全利益，則中美兩國和平共處的可能性會很高。

國際政治領域不少極具智慧的學者已經開始探討這個問題，他們的觀點值得簡要回顧一下。約翰·伊肯伯裏（John Ikenberry）認為美國應努力“在地區秩序中給予中國一定的地位和空間，來容納崛起中的中國，以此換取北京方面接受並容納美國的核心戰略利益——其中包括繼續讓美國在東亞充當主導性的安全保障者。”

約翰·米爾斯海默（John Mearsheimer）一向對機構化解衝突的能力比較悲觀，他在《大國政治的悲劇》一書中總結到，如果中國經濟持續增長，“最終結局將是一場激烈的安全競賽，有相當大的可能會引發戰爭。簡而言之，中國的崛起不太可能是和平的。”格雷厄姆·艾利森（Graham Allison）也宣稱中美兩國“註定一戰”（這句話也是其著作的名稱），無法避開“修昔底德陷阱”的悲劇。

夾在伊肯伯裏“制度樂觀主義”和米爾斯海默“悲觀主義”兩種突出觀點之間，另外一些學者的觀點遭到了忽視——包括詹妮弗·林德（Jennifer Lind），查爾斯·格拉澤（Charles Glaser）和邁克爾·貝克利（Michael Beckley）——他們提出了一系列敏鋭的見解，綜合起來形成了一種21世紀東亞局勢理論框架，即便不能完全保障東亞地區平安無事，至少也可以將安全困境控制在和平的表象之下，防止其失控演變為毀滅性暴力衝突。

毫無疑問，中美關係接連出現了許多不祥徵兆，其中特別值得關注的包括反覆升級的貿易戰，特朗普政府在《2018美國國防戰略報告》中將中國定義為“戰略競爭對手”，以及中國在南海採取的軍事行動。但幸運的是，由於地理、技術以及美國政策選項的多樣性等若干因素的作用，中美兩國之間的衝突是完全可以避免的。中美兩國並非註定一戰。然而，要避免走上衝突之路，在很大程度上取決於美國外交建制派——鑑於他們近年來的種種失敗，未來能否成功避免戰爭十分堪憂。

兩國的地理位置決定了美國幾乎不可能入侵中國本土，同樣，中國也幾乎不可能入侵美國本土。與1914年或1939年的中歐地區相比，今天的太平洋要安全得多。當年有誰奪取並佔領了中歐地區的一片關鍵領土，的確會引發其他方面的合理恐懼。當然，現今悲觀論者擔心的的並不是美國或中國大舉入侵對方，而是擔心中美兩國會圍繞着三處最可能爆發衝突的領域展開爭奪，即南海、釣魚島和台灣地區。

中國當仁不讓地將自己看作東亞地區的頭等強國。加入中國的各方面能力持續增長，它有可能會動用實力來塑造東亞地區形勢使其朝着有利於自己的方向發展。廣為人知的是，中共一向高度重視領土主權問題。中國很可能在台灣問題上打出外交、經濟和政治的組合拳。

如果未來的美國領導人認為台灣問題屬於美國國家核心利益範疇，那麼中美衝突將很難避免。然而，如果美國能夠（冷峻地、）實事求是地看待將台灣——承認它不過是一個偏遠的小島，不會直接影響美國捍衞其國家安全的能力——那麼中美兩國至少可以避免在台灣問題上爆發衝突。而且即便兩岸統一之後，中國也不會成為地區霸主，也不會獲得向美洲投射硬實力的能力。統一的中國不會在短期內對夏威夷、墨西哥或秘魯動用武力。

在可預見的未來，中國的後院裏有太多事情需要解決。日本、韓國、印度、越南和澳大利亞等國的利益都決定了它們有意阻撓中國在亞洲佔據主導地位。這當然也符合美國的利益，但實現東亞均勢並不一定需要美國提供大規模安全保障、核保護傘，也不需要時時刻刻發表遏制中國的好戰言論。

或許與直覺相反，實現地區均勢的最佳途徑可能是美國撤軍。撤軍將鼓勵亞洲“中等強國”提高自身軍事實力（可能包括追求核能力）來制衡中國。收縮不是將地區霸權拱手讓給中國，而是要促成邁克爾·貝克利所説的那種已經初露端倪的地區新均勢。中國強勢的海洋主張以及“反介入/區域拒止（A2/AD）系統”範圍覆蓋到部分鄰國，都使人有理由懷疑中國能否完全控制南海或東海。周邊的中等強國可能阻撓中國建立控制權，而這又恰好是地區霸權的先決條件。

美國撤出東亞的另一個好處是它掐斷了最可能引發中美衝突的導火索。正如查爾斯·格拉澤所言，“保護亞洲的盟友可能需要美國從事小規模政治衝突和軍備競賽，這會惡化中美兩國的政治關係。”

在國際體系裏，最強大的行為體之間總會存在一定程度的不安全因素。所有國家必須時時對彼此保持戒懼，畢竟他人的意圖難以預料。然而，我們不可以將安全困境的必然性與激烈衝突甚至全面開戰的必然性混為一談。即使最冷酷的新現實主義者也承認，國家在考慮和確保安全的時候有做出不同選擇的餘地。國際政治不是機械僵化的。中美衝突的潛在導火索全部集中在東亞。這意味着美國在面對每一場潛在衝突時，可選擇讓步。中美關係會越來越充滿張力，但未來是否以負責任的態度管控張力，則是美國政府可以選擇的。

好消息是，美國是一個極其安全的國家，或許是世界歷史上最安全的國家。太平洋和大西洋像兩道巨大的護城河環繞着它，而周邊弱小的鄰居又幾乎不懷任何惡意。儘管中國崛起會對美國攬到自己頭上的價值觀構成威脅，甚至威脅到美國主導的自由主義國際秩序，但中國絕不會威脅到嚴格意義上的美國國家安全。

如果美國的決策者們能夠克服短視的毛病，不再執迷於以自己為模板重新塑造世界，就沒有理由認為中美兩國的緊張關係會步步惡化並最終造成全面武裝衝突。未來是戰爭還是和平，取決於美國外交決策者們能否審慎抉擇。不過，照美國政壇近期趨勢來看，恐怕難以樂觀。惟願下一代美國領導人能比前任們多一份剋制。

Conflict with China is Not Inevitable

As China rises and America’s interventions in the Middle East fade away, a stream of proclamations from the foreign policy commentariat has announced a return to great power competition. Short of a Soviet-like collapse, the most important international security question of the twenty-first century will be whether and how the United States and China might coexist in peace. The odds are good that they will if Washington stays focused on its strict national security interests.

Many of the brightest minds in international politics have already weighed in, and their conclusions are worth reviewing in brief. G. John Ikenberry has argued that the United States should work “to accommodate a rising China by offering it status and position within the regional order in return for Beijing accepting and accommodating Washington’s core strategic interests, which include remaining a dominant security provider within East Asia.”

Naturally less optimistic about institutions’ ability to mitigate conflict, John Mearsheimer argued in the conclusion to The Tragedy of Great Power Politics that if China’s economy continues to grow “the result will be an intense security competition with considerable potential for war. In short, China’s rise is unlikely to be peaceful.” Similarly, Graham Allison declared that the United States and China are Destined for War, tragically unable to avoid the “Thucydides Trap.”

Overlooked in the debate between Ikenberry’s institutional optimism and Mearsheimer’s pessimism are other scholars—including Jennifer Lind, Charles Glaser, and Michael Beckley—who have presented a series of incisive arguments which, in combination, outline the basis for, if not a fully tranquil twenty-first century East Asia, an East Asia where the security dilemma will exist below the surface rather than bubble over into destructive violence.

Undoubtedly, there has been a litany of disturbing signs regarding the future of Uncle Sam’s relationship with the Middle Kingdom, particularly the escalatory trade war, the Trump administration’s decision to brand China a “strategic competitor” in the 2018 National Defense Strategy, and China’s militaristic approach to the South China Sea. But luckily, several factors—geography, technology, and the sheer range of policy options available to the United States—point to the conclusion that conflict is fully avoidable. The United States and China are not destined for war. However, staying off the path to conflict will be largely up to the U.S. foreign policy establishment—a worrying admission given that establishment’s recent failures.

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Geography means that a U.S. invasion of mainland China is virtually unthinkable, as is a Chinese invasion of the United States. Today’s Pacific is far more security-rich than Central Europe in 1914 or 1939. There, an enemy taking and holding crucial territory was a legitimate fear. Of course, the roots of pessimists’ fears do not stem from a fear of large-scale invasion launched by the United States or China against the other great power. Rather, there are three arenas where conflict between the United States and China is most likely: the South China Sea, the Senkaku Islands, and Taiwan.

China views itself as the rightful first-order power in East Asia. Assuming China’s capabilities continue to grow, it will likely use its power to the shape the region towards its interests. It is no secret that the Republic of China’s sovereignty has long bothered the Communist Party of China. The People’s Republic of China will probably use some combination of diplomatic, economic, and political power to undermine Taiwan.

If future U.S. leaders decide that Taiwanese sovereignty is within the purview of America’s strict national interest, then conflict will be difficult to avoid. However, if (somewhat coldly) the United States recognizes Taiwan for what it is—a small, distant island with no direct impact on America’s ability to procure national security for itself—then conflict, at least over Taiwan, can be avoided. Even the conquest of Taiwan would not make China a regional hegemon, nor would it provide China with the ability to project significant power into the Americas. A reunified China is not going to exert military power in Hawaii, Mexico, or Peru anytime soon.

For the foreseeable future, China will have enough on its plate in its own backyard. Japan, South Korea, India, Vietnam, and Australia all have an interest in preventing Chinese dominance in Asia. America shares that interest, but reaching a balance of power in East Asia does not necessitate extensive security guarantees, nuclear umbrellas, and bellicose rhetoric focused on containing China at every point.

Perhaps counterintuitively, the best path to a regional balance of power is U.S. withdrawal. Withdrawal would provide Asia’s “middle powers” with an incentive to balance against China by increasing their military capabilities, which may include the pursuit of nuclear capabilities. Rather than ceding regional hegemony to China, retrenchment would facilitate what Michael Beckley argues is an already emergent balance of power in the region. China’s aggressive maritime claims and the proliferation of anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) systems to China’s neighbors give reason to doubt that China will be capable of establishing full control of either the South or East China Seas. The middle powers can stop China from seizing such prerequisites for regional hegemony.

Pulling back from East Asia will also eliminate potential flashpoints where conflict between the United States and China is most likely. As Charles Glaser has pointed out, “[p]rotecting U.S. allies in Asia might require the United States to engage in political skirmishes and military competition that will strain its political relations with China.”

Some amount of insecurity between the most powerful actors in the international system is inevitable. Intentions are inscrutable, and states must often fear the worst in one another. However, the inevitability of a security dilemma must not be conflated with the inevitability of intense conflict or outright war. Even the most hardened neorealists recognize that there is room for choice in how states think about and procure security. International politics is not mechanistic. Each potential flashpoint in the U.S.-Chinese relationship is in East Asia. This means that at each flashpoint, America will have the option of backing down. The United States and China are on a path to tension, but it is up to future U.S. administrations to responsibly manage those tensions.

The good news is that the United States is an incredibly secure country—perhaps the most secure country in the history of the world. We are surrounded by two enormous moats and weak neighbors who harbor negligible ill-will towards us. While China’s rise may threaten the values that the United States ascribes to itself and may even threaten the American-led liberal international order, it does not threaten the strict national security of the United States.

If policymakers overcome their myopic obsession with remaking the world in America’s image, there is no reason to assume tensions must escalate into full-blown military conflict. The choice between war and peace may depend upon the prudence of U.S. foreign policy decisionmakers. If recent history is any guide, this should provide little comfort. Here’s to hoping the next generation exercises more restraint than the last.

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