美國以為自己很牛，其實連弱國都搞不定_風聞

美國《外交政策》網站4月26日刊登哈佛大學國際關係教授斯蒂芬·沃爾特文章《美國沒有自己想象的那麼強大》。

文：Stephen M. Walt

譯：李翠萍

美國現在到底有多強大？

它還是當年那個單極強國嗎？還能把自身意志強加於對手、盟友和中立國嗎？還是那個哪怕政策再愚蠢、再危險、再有悖於別國利益，都可以強迫它們忍氣吞聲嗎？還是説，美國實力其實存在明確而顯著的侷限，以至於它在設定和追求目標的時候必須更具選擇性和戰略性呢？

特朗普政府——尤其是在博爾頓成為白宮國家安全事務助理以及蓬佩奧接任國務卿之後——愈發傾向於前一種觀念。不管特朗普最初的直覺是什麼，博爾頓和蓬佩奧的上位都標誌着美國開始迴歸小布什首屆任期（副總統切尼和新保守派當道）時那種單邊主義、斬盡殺絕式的對外政策。

那個時期的一個關鍵特徵是，人們紛紛認為美國已經強大到了一種地步，可以單槍匹馬解決許多問題，只需展示實力和決心就能恫嚇其他國家，讓它們屈服。

據説小布什的高級顧問卡爾·羅夫曾對一位名叫羅恩·蘇斯金德的記者説：“今天的我們是一個帝國，我們採取行動的時候，就在創造新的現實。”對那時的美國來説，妥協和建設聯盟是懦夫和綏靖者才幹的事，正如切尼在2003年所説：“跟邪惡沒什麼好談的，打就是了”。

儘管小布什和切尼的做法導致美國遭遇了一系列失敗，但這種單邊主義傲慢心態仍然延續到了特朗普政府。從特朗普對中國等許多經貿夥伴威脅甚至真的發動貿易戰的決策來看，這種傲慢心態顯而易見。同樣，這正是這種心態導致美國衝動地放棄了跨太平洋夥伴關係協定，並退出了巴黎氣候協定。

正是在這種心態的作用下，美國政府對朝鮮和伊朗擺出了“要麼接受要麼捱揍”的外交態度，提出不切實際的要求，然後加大制裁力度，指望這兩個國家繳械投降，對美國唯命是從。但實際上這種對朝和對伊政策已屢屢被證明行不通。

這種單邊主義傲慢心態在美國最近實施二級制裁的決定中體現得更加明顯，美國將懲罰那些還在購買伊朗石油的國家，這可能導致油價上漲，並損害美國與中國、印度、土耳其、日本和韓國等國家之間的關係。

美國“首席裙帶官”、特朗普女婿兼高級顧問庫什納一直承諾要披露新的所謂中東和平計劃，也許它會讓以色列總理內塔尼亞胡、共和黨金主謝爾頓·阿德爾森和其他“大以色列”概念的支持者們感到高興，但幾乎可以肯定的是，它不會對地區和平事業有絲毫推動作用。

美國政府過早地承認胡安·瓜伊多作為委內瑞拉臨時總統，並提出“馬杜羅必須下台”的強硬要求。從中可以看出美國對自己具備控制結果的強大能力充滿信心，但不管結果多麼有利，美國都應該事先好好考慮到底如何着手行動。

所有這些政策背後的基本假設都是：對手必然在美國的壓力下被迫服從美國的要求，而且其他國家也無法找到任何辦法逃避、阻撓、轉移、稀釋、對沖、妨礙甚至抵消華盛頓方面採取的行動。它假定我們仍然生活在冷戰後的單極時刻，只要美國有意願動用實力就無往不利。

也許最重要的一點在於，這種對外政策道路不承認美國有必要在各種目的之間進行權衡。如果美國果真是全能的，那麼在採購伊朗石油問題上制裁中國將不會影響中美貿易談判，土耳其也不會因為受到類似壓力而與俄羅斯越走越近。

美國還進一步假定，北約盟友萬分迫切地希望美軍駐守歐洲，以至於它們願意接受美國再三的羞辱，還會追隨美國去對抗中國——儘管越來越多的證據表明，實際情況並非如此。這種心態還導致美國看不到把寶全壓在埃及、以色列、沙特阿拉伯和海灣地區有什麼壞處，也不認為與伊朗或其他國家關係惡化甚至開戰會造成太大風險。

美國鷹派人士覺得至少在短期內可以採取這種對外政策，其實這也不難理解。因為儘管美國近年來有許多失誤，但它仍然非常強大。美國的積極援助是一些國家渴望獲得的，美國“專注的敵意”則是任何國家都不能忽視的。

美國仍然是一個巨大而有價值的市場，美元仍然是世界上主要的儲備貨幣，美國有能力切斷其他國家或金融機構與全球金融基礎設施之間的聯繫，這給了華盛頓方面非同尋常的影響力。許多美國盟友習慣於順從華盛頓，不願做任何可能導致美國撤銷支持的事情，這些都是可以理解的。

特朗普之流還可以得到波蘭、匈牙利等歐洲右翼威權國家，以及道德敗壞的中東盟國的支持。大多數美國人對外交政策並不那麼在意，只要不付出過高的代價或過於丟人，大家一般對行政部門的主導沒有太多異議。

即便美國具有以上優勢，仍然有更具説服力的理由能解釋為何這種具有霸凌性質的外交手段迄今沒有取得重大成功，而且未來也不太可能成功。

首先，即使是實力比美國弱小得多的國家，也不願屈服於美國的勒索。原因在於，一旦你在威逼之下露出屈從的跡象，接下來的要求可能就沒有止境了。此外，當美國堅持讓一個國家徹底投降時（比如讓朝鮮全面解除武裝或呼籲伊朗政權更迭），完全不提供任何好處來激勵對方遵照美國的意願。此外，由於特朗普在外交上表現得狡詐且反覆無常，外國領導人又怎麼會相信他（或蓬佩奧）給出的保證呢？把這些因素結合在一起，就知道美國很難達成協議。

其次，美國霸凌的對象幾乎包括所有國家，這使它很難建立強大的聯盟並依靠盟友支持來增進外交槓桿。這個問題在美國政府雜亂無章的對華經濟外交中暴露無遺。由於美國退出了《跨太平洋夥伴關係協定》，並與關鍵夥伴產生貿易爭端，美國政府錯過了組建工業強國大聯盟以迫使中國改變經濟行為的機會。

同樣的教訓也來自伊朗。特朗普政府有意扼殺伊朗核協議，這是顯而易見的。它如此專注於撕毀協議，甚至有意懲罰其他簽署國，徒勞地試圖讓伊朗臣服。儘管華盛頓背棄了協議，但德黑蘭仍在繼續遵守協議條款，但它的耐心不是無限的，特別要考慮到美國政府已經亮明其真實目標：政權更迭。

如果伊朗最終重新啓動已擱置十多年之久的核武器計劃，世界其他國家將不會站到美國一邊支持其採取更有力的行動。為什麼？因為所有人都知道，殺死伊核協議的是美國而不是伊朗，所以當美國控訴伊朗的行動時，不會有太多國家對美國抱以同情。如果華盛頓決定為自己的中東代理人出頭再打一場戰爭，它們無疑會感到高興，但不要指望它們或其他任何國家提供太多幫助。

第三，所有國家都不願意接受他國擺佈，更遑論這個國家還表現得自私、無常，並且對他國利益毫不掩飾的蔑視。因此，其他國家開始制定旨在限制美國影響力的變通方案也就不足為奇了，其中最突出的是它們開始設計全新的金融安排，避開那些華盛頓賴以脅迫盟國和對手的金融機構。正如亨利·法雷爾和亞伯拉罕·紐曼最近在《外交政策》雜誌中所指出的，特朗普政府的強硬戰術可能“不但不會讓各國和企業減少與美國製裁對象的接觸，反而可能導致各國和企業儘量減少接觸美國領導的全球金融體系，並慢慢找到變通辦法。隨着時間的推移，這些變通辦法甚至可能形成一整套行之有效的替代體系”。

最後，恃強凌弱只會刺激對手出於自身利益的考慮而聯合起來，同時也推開了潛在的盟友。儘管中國和俄羅斯並非天然的盟友，但兩國關係越來越密切絕非偶然。如果美國採取更明智的做法，也許會讓莫斯科與北京保持距離。如果美國繼續採取同樣的霸凌手段衝動行事，將把像伊朗這樣的國家也推向中俄。博爾頓之輩可能會給這些國家起一些老套的綽號，既然“邪惡軸心”和“暴政三套車”已經用過了，那麼“滋事三合會”或“混亂聯盟”也湊合能用。這樣做忽略了一個事實，正是美國自己的政策推動了這些勢力的結合。

因此，我們正在見證一場現實考驗，兩種關於當代地緣政治的願景正在相互競爭。其中一種認為，美國實力基本上沒有減弱，並相信美國的物質能力、地理優勢和牢固的制度能力可以結合起來，使它能以很小的代價和很高的成功率推行其野心勃勃的修正主義對外政策。我所贊同的第二種觀點認為，美國非常強大，並且由於許多原因它具備先天優勢；但其實力是有限的，必須設定待解決事項的優先次序，並在許多問題上與其他國家合作。這種觀點還強調，其他國家不可能因受到脅迫就卑躬屈膝，有效和持久的國際協議需要一定程度的相互妥協，即便與敵對國家之間也是如此。

美國已經在2001年到2004年測試過第一種觀點，結果是幾乎徹底失敗。我知道，科學進步需要我們複製過去的試驗結果，但美國真的需要把這個試驗再做一遍嗎？

America Isn’t as Powerful as It Thinks It Is

Just how powerful is the United States? Is it still the unipolar power, able to impose its will on adversaries, allies, and neutrals, and force them—however reluctantly—to go along with policies they think are foolish, dangerous, or simply contrary to their interests? Or are there clear and significant limits to U.S. power, suggesting that it should be more selective and strategic in setting goals and pursuing them?

The Trump administration has embraced the first position, especially since John Bolton became White House national security advisor and Mike Pompeo took over assecretary of state. Whatever President Donald Trump’s initial instincts may have been, their arrival marked a return to the unilateralist, take-no-prisoners approach to foreign policy that characterized George W. Bush’s first term as president, when Vice President Dick Cheney and the neoconservatives held sway.

A key feature ofthat earlier period was the assumption that the United States was so powerful that it could go it alone on many issues and that other states could be cowed into submission by demonstrations of U.S. power and resolve.

As a senior advisor to Bush (reportedly Karl Rove) told the journalist Ron Suskind: “We’re an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality.” Compromises and coalition-building were for wimps and appeasers; as Cheney himself reportedly said in 2003: “We don’t negotiate with evil; we defeat it.”

The Bush-Cheney approach produced a string of failures, but the same unilateral arrogance lives on in the Trump administration.

It is evident in Trump’s decision to threaten (or in some cases, to actually begin) trade wars not just with China but with many of America’s economic partners. It was part and parcel of the impulsive decisions to abandon the Trans-Pacific Partnership and leave the Paris climate accord.

It is the basis ofthe administration’s “take it or leave it” approach to diplomacy with North Korea and Iran, wherein Washington announces unrealistic demands and then ratchets up sanctions in the hope that the targets will capitulate and give the United States everything it wants, even though this approach to both countries has repeatedly failed in the past.

It is even more obvious in the recent decision to impose secondary sanctions on states that are still buying Iranian oil, a move that threatens to drive up oil prices and damage U.S. relations with China, India, Turkey, Japan, South Korea, and others.

It is almost certainly true of the so-called peace plan that nepotist-in-chief Jared Kushner, Trump’s son-in-law and senior advisor, keeps promising to reveal, a proposal likely to make Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Republican donor Sheldon Adelson, and other fans of the concept of Greater Israel happy but won’t advance the cause of peace in the slightest.

A similar faith in America’s vast ability to control outcomes can also be seen in the premature recognition of Juan Guaidó as interim president of Venezuela and the strident U.S. demands that “Maduro must go.” However desirable that outcome would be, it would be nice if we had some idea how to bring it about.

The underlying assumption behind all of these policies is that U.S. pressure—you know, what Pompeo likes to call “swagger”—will eventuallyforce acknowledged adversaries to do whatever it is the United States demands of them, and that other states won’t find ways to evade, obstruct, divert, dilute, hedge, hinder, or otherwise negate what Washington is trying to do. It assumes we are still dwelling in the unipolar moment and that all that matters is the will to use the power at America’s disposal.

Perhaps most important, this approach denies that there are any real trade-offs between any of these objectives. If the United States is really all-powerful, then sanctioning China over oil purchases from Iran won’t have any impact on the trade talks that are now underway with Beijing, and Turkey won’t respond to the same pressure by moving closer to Russia.

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It further assumes that America’s NATO allies are so desperate to keep the U.S. military in Europe that they will accept repeated humiliations and follow the U.S. lead against China, despite the growing evidence that this is not the case. It sees no downsides to going all-in with Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf, and it sees little risk should relations with Iran or others escalate to war.

To be fair, it is not hard to understand why hawks think they can get away with this approach to foreign policy, at least in the short term. Despite many recent missteps, the United States is still very powerful. Its active assistance is still something that some other states want, and its “focused enmity” is something no state can completely ignore.

The United States is still a vast and valuable market, the dollar remains the world’s main reserve currency, and the ability to cut other states or financial institutions off from the infrastructure of global finance gives Washington unusual leverage. Many U.S. allies are accustomed to deferring to Washington and are understandably reluctant to do anything that might encourage the United States to withdraw support.

Trump and company can also count on the support of authoritarian soul mates in the European right (including the present rulers in Poland and Hungary), as well as America’s morally compromised allies in the Middle East. Plus, most Americans don’t care all that much about foreign policy and are usually willing to go along with whatever the executive branch is doing, provided that it doesn’t prove too costly or embarrassing.

Nonetheless, there are even more potent reasons why this bullying approach has produced no major foreign-policy successes so far and is unlikely to yield significant success in the future. First of all, even much weaker states are loath to succumb to blackmail, for one very good reason: Once you’ve shown you can be coerced, there may be no end to subsequent demands. Moreover, when the United States insists on complete capitulation (i.e., by calling for total North Korean disarmament or regime change in Iran), it gives the target state zero incentive to comply. And given Trump’s amply demonstrated dishonesty and fickle approach to diplomacy, why would any foreign leader believe any assurances he (or Pompeo) might give? Put all this together, and you have a perfect recipe for“no deal.”

Second, bullying nearly everyone makes it much harder construct powerful coalitions whose support can enhance America’s diplomatic leverage. This problem is perhaps most apparent in the administration’s haphazard approach to economic diplomacy with China. By leaving the Trans-Pacific Partnership and picking trade fights with other key partners, the administration missed an opportunity to organize abroad coalition of industrial powers united by a desire to get China to reform its own economic practices. Trump’s trade team may still get some sort of deal with Beijing, but it won’t be as good as what they could have achieved with a more sophisticated and cooperative effort.

Much the same lesson applies to Iran. The Trump administration deliberately set out to killthe Iran nuclear deal, and it did it in plain sight. It is so focused on this goal that it is even willing to punish the other signatories in a vain attempt to get Iran to say uncle. Tehran has continued to abide by the terms of the agreement despite Washington’s reneging on the deal, but its patience is probably not infinite, especially when the administration has made it clear that regime change is its real objective.

Should Iran eventually restart its nuclear weapons program—which has been in abeyance for more than a decade—the rest of the world is not going to suddenly line up behind the United States and support more forceful action. Why? Because everyone knows that it was the United States—not Iran—that killed the deal, and there won’t be a ton of sympathy for America when it starts bleating about Iran’s response. America’s Middle East clients will no doubt be happy if Washington decides to fight another war on their behalf, but don’t count on a lot of help from them or from anyone else.

Third, other states don’t like being beholden to the whims of others, and especially when others behave selfishly, erratically, and with ill-disguised contempt for others’ interests. Not surprisingly, therefore, other states are starting to develop workarounds designed to limit U.S. leverage, most notably by designing financial arrangements outside the network of institutions that Washington hasbeen using to coerce allies and adversaries into compliance. As Henry Farrell and Abraham Newman recently wrote in FP, “instead of leading states and businesses to minimize contact with the targets of U.S. sanctions,”  the Trump administration’s strong-arm tactics“may lead states and businesses to minimize their contact with the U.S.-led global financial system and to start to construct their own workarounds. Overtime, those workarounds might even begin to accumulate into an effective alternative system.”

Lastly, being abully encourages adversaries to join forces out of their own self-interest, while giving potential allies more reason to keep their distance. It is no accident that Russia and China continue to move closer together—even though they are not natural allies, and a smarter U.S. approach could give Moscow reasons to distance itself from Beijing—and America’s same bullying impulses are going to push states like Iran even closer to them. Bolton and those of his ilk will probably come up with some trite new moniker for this group—“Axis of Evil” and“Troika of Tyranny” are taken, so perhaps “Triad of Troublemakers” or“Coalition of Chaos”—ignoring the fact that their own policies have helped push these powers together.

What we are witnessing, therefore, is a real-world test of two competing visions of contemporary geopolitics. One version sees U.S. power as essentially undiminished and believes that a combination of material capabilities, favorable geography, and entrenched institutional capabilities will allow it topursue an ambitious and revisionist foreign policy at little cost and with a high probability of success. The second version—to which I subscribe—sees the United States as very powerful and in a privileged position (for various reasons) but also believes there are limits to U.S. power and that it is necessary to set priorities, minimize trade-offs when possible, and collaborate with others on many issues. It also assumes that others cannot be browbeaten into abject capitulation and that effective and durable international agreements require a degree of mutual compromise, even with adversaries.

The United States tested Version #1 from 2001 to 2004, and the results were a near-total failure. I realize that trying to replicate past results is important to scientific progress, but does America really need to repeat this particular experiment again?

(End)