《金融時報》副主編：若幫着流氓超級大國打壓中國，就太沒良心了_風聞

《金融時報》5月21日刊登副主編、首席經濟評論員馬丁·沃爾夫文章《中美之爭對世界構成了挑戰》

文：Martin Wolf

譯：Kris

隨着中美之間的經濟衝突愈演愈烈，世界其他地區——尤其是美國過去的盟友們——將如何自處？尋常情況下，美國是能夠得到盟國支持的，畢竟歐盟本身也和美國一樣，對中國的某些行為有所顧慮。但今天的情況非比尋常：在特朗普的領導下，美國已經成為流氓超級大國，對許多事物——包括建立在多邊協議和約束性規則之上的貿易體系的根本規範——充滿敵意。事實上，美國已經連續對各個盟國分別進行了“一對一”的霸凌。

那麼在中美展開搏鬥的時候，美國的盟友們應該怎麼做呢？中美之間的問題不僅僅是特朗普這麼簡單。甚至可以説，他關注的雙邊貿易平衡問題是相對比較容易管控的。更糟糕的是，很大一部分美國人之所以對中國抱有敵意，不僅因為中國採取了某些具體行動，更來自於中國崛起這一事實。

當前，保守主義思想正在發生重大轉變。2005年，美國前副國務卿羅伯特·佐利克提出，中國應該“成為國際體系中負責任的利益攸關者”。最近，美國現任國務卿邁克·蓬佩奧傳遞出一種非常不同的觀點。外交事務專家沃爾特·拉塞爾·米德對蓬佩奧的思想進行如下描述：“自由派的國際主義者認為美國參與全球事務的目標應該是促生一種新的世界秩序，其中國際機構越來越多地取代民族國家作為全球政治的主要行為體；而保守派國際主義者則認為美國的參與全球事務應該以狹義的美國利益為指導。”簡單來説，就是美國不認為自己應該繼續扮演國際體系中“負責任的利益攸關者”的角色，它的觀念回到了19世紀的強權政治，一切憑實力説話。

這種轉變影響到國際貿易。許多人受到誤導，以為貿易體系的根基在於以國際機構取代民族國家。其實國際貿易建立在兩大基石之上，一是國家應該達成多邊協議，二是通過具有約束力的爭端解決機制加強各國對協議的信心。由此而產生的穩定的貿易環境，正是國際企業高度依賴的。

如今，這一切都面臨危險。隨着關税戰蔓延到其他領域，美國開始限制世界領先的中國高科技製造商華為獲取美國技術，其目的似乎是永遠使中國低它一等——至少中國人是這樣看的。

貿易戰也使美國變成了一個保護主義傾向嚴重的國家。按加權平均計算，美國的關税水平可能很快就要超過印度。彼得森國際經濟研究所的報告指出，“特朗普威脅對中國徵收關税，幾乎快要達到美國1930年頒佈《斯姆特-霍利關税法》後的平均水平。”關税可能將保持在這樣的高位上，因為美國在談判中對中國提出的要求幾乎是羞辱性的，後者絕對難以接受。美國徵收關税的做法也將導致其他供應商打退堂鼓，因為他們也可能成為關税的犧牲品：這種雙邊主義做法具有傳染病。與特朗普的説法相反，關税的成本也要落到美國人頭上，特別是消費者和農產品出口商。具有諷刺意味的是，美國許多受關税戰影響最嚴重的縣都是由共和黨控制的。

有些人可能會得出結論，高昂的代價意味着衝突無法一直持續下去，特別是如果股票市場也受到衝擊。另一種更合理的結果是，中美兩國的強勢領導人都不能輕易屈服。隨着兩個超級大國之間的關係益將繼續凍結，甚至進一步惡化。

那麼美國的盟國面臨怎樣的處境呢？它們不應該支持美國阻撓中國的崛起，那樣做太沒有良心。它們應該表明在哪些地方認同美國的貿易和技術目標，並且儘量保持共同立場，特別是歐盟和日本。它們也應該在世貿組織的主持下維護多邊貿易體系的基本原則。如果美國成功使爭議解決機制失效，那麼其他成員應該同意遵守另一套非正式機制。

最重要的是，即使在傷害中美利益的情況下，仍然有可能維持自由主義貿易。國際貨幣基金組織前副總裁安妮•克魯格在一篇專欄文章中指出，由於美國愚蠢地決定退出跨太平洋夥伴關係協定（TPP），美國對“全面與進步跨太平洋夥伴關係協定”（CPTPP，即美國退出後的TPP）成員國的出口受世貿組織的法律歧視。歐盟也與加拿大和日本簽訂了自由貿易協定。

這是好事，但還可以做得更好。認識到牢固的貿易秩序有好處的國家應該將這種自由貿易協定變成“自願加入的全球自由貿易協定”，任何願意承諾履行自貿義務的國家都可以加入其中。我們甚至可以構想，未來這個全球自由貿易協定的成員國在遭受非成員國非法貿易攻擊的時候，可以採取協調一致的反制措施來保護自身利益。

中美之間的敵對關係對全球和平與繁榮構成了威脅。局外人雖然無法阻止這場衝突，但也沒有陷入無助的境地。如果大國要退出多邊貿易體系，恰好是其他國家上場的機會。它們加在一起能形成巨大的體量，也應該拿出重量級玩家的勇氣。

The US-China conflict challenges the world

Where does deepening economic conflict between the US and China leave the rest of the world, especially historic allies of the US? In normal circumstances, the latter would stand beside it. The EU, after all, shares many of its concerns about Chinese behaviour. Yet these are not normal circumstances. Under Donald Trump, the US has become a rogue superpower, hostile, among many other things, to the fundamental norms of a trading system based on multilateral agreement and binding rules. Indeed, US allies, too, area target of the wave of bilateral bullying.

So what are American allies to do as the US and China battle? This is not just about Mr Trump. His focus on bilateral trade balances may evenbe relatively manageable. Worse, a large proportion of Americans shares a deepening hostility not just to China’s behaviour, but to the fact of a rising China.

We are also seeing a big shift in conservative thinking. In 2005, Robert Zoellick, deputy secretary of state, argued that China should“become a responsible stakeholder” in the international system. Recently, Mike Pompeo, secretary of state, has indicated a different perspective. Foreign affairs specialist Walter Russell Mead describes Mr Pompeo’s animating idea as follows: “Where liberal internationalists believe the goal of American global engagement should be to promote the emergence of a world order in which international institutions increasingly supplant nation-states as the chief actors in global politics, conservative internationalists believe American engagement should be guided by a narrower focus on specific US interests.” Inbrief, the US no longer sees why it should be a “responsible stakeholder” in the international system. Its concept is, instead, that of 19th century power politics, in which the strong dictate to the weak.

This is relevant to trade, too. It is a canard that the trading system was based on the notion that international institutions should supplant nation states. The system was built on the twin ideas that states should make multilateral agreements with one another and that confidence in such agreements should be reinforced by a binding dispute settlement system. This would bring stability to the conditions of trade, on which international businesses rely.

All this is now at risk. The spread of the tariff war and the decision to limit the access to US technology of Huawei, China’s only world-leading advanced technology manufacturer, seem aimed at keeping China in permanent inferiority. That is certainly how the Chinese view it.

The trade war is also turning the US into a significantly protectionist country, with weighted-average tariffs possibly soon higher than India’s. A paper from the Peterson Institute for International Economics states, that “Trump is . . . threatening tariffs on China that are not far from the average level of duties the United States imposed with the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930.” Tariffs may even stay this high, because the US’s negotiating demands are too humiliating for China to accept. These levies will also lead to diversion to other suppliers. Tariffs may then spread to the latter, too: bilateralism is often a contagious disease. Contrary to Mr Trump’s protestations, the costs are also being borne by Americans, especially consumers and farm exporters. Ironically, many of the worst hit counties are in Republican control. 

Some might conclude that the high costs mean that the conflict cannot be sustained, particularly if stock markets are disrupted. An alternative and more plausible outcome is that Mr Trump and China’s Xi Jinping are “strongmen” leaders who cannot be seen to yield. The conflict will then either remain frozen or, more likely, worsen as relations between the two superpowers become increasingly poisoned.

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Where does this leave US allies? They should not support American attempts to thwart China’s rise: that would be unconscionable. They should indicate where they agree with US objectives on trade and technology and, if possible, sustain a common position on these issues, notably between the EU and Japan. They should uphold the principles of a multilateral trading system, under the auspices of the World Trade Organization. If the US succeeds in rendering the dispute system inquorate, the other members could agree to abide by an informal mechanism instead.

Most significantly, it should be possible to sustain liberal trade, at the expense of the US and China. Anne Krueger, former first deputy managing director of the IMF, notes in a column that, by its own foolish decision to reject the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the US suffers from WTO legal discrimination against its exports to members of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, which replaced TPP. The EU also has free trade agreements with Canada and Japan.

This is good. But they can go further. Countries that see the benefits of a strong trading order should turn such FTAs into a “global FTA ofthe willing”, in which any country willing to accept the commitments could participate. One might even envisage a future in which participants in such a global FTA would defend its members against illegal trade assaults from non-members, via co-ordinated retaliation.

Hostility between the US and China is a threat to global peace and prosperity. Outsiders cannot halt this conflict. But they are not helpless. If the big powers stand outside the multilateral trading system, others can step in. They are, in aggregate, huge players. They should dare to act as such.

(End)