當年怎麼對付日本，現在美國就想怎麼對付中國_風聞

《世界報業辛迪加》5月27日刊登耶魯大學傑克遜全球事務學院高級研究員斯蒂芬·羅奇文章《彼時日本，現時中國》

文：Stephen S. Roach

譯：由冠羣

1985年9月，美日達成《廣場協議》後，時任美國總統的羅納德·里根評論道：“其他國家政府若許可本國企業偽造或仿製美國產品，則是在偷竊我們的未來，就不再是自由貿易行為。”今天的情況從很多方面來看，都像是在翻拍這部上世紀八十年代的老電影，只不過這次美國總統的扮演者不再是好萊塢影星，而是一個電視真人秀明星，並且這次他們找來另一個國家取代日本扮演反派角色。

回首上世紀八十年代，當時的日本被描繪成美國經濟面對的頭號威脅——它被指控的罪名不光是盜竊知識產權，還包括操縱日元匯率、國家支持產業政策、使美國製造業空心化，造成龐大的美日貿易赤字等等。日本在與美國對峙的過程中，成了那個先眨眼睛的人，併為此付出了極其昂貴的代價——在“失落的三十年”裏，日本經濟停滯、通貨緊縮。現在，有人想讓同樣的劇情上演，只不過把日本換成了中國。

除了重商主義，中日兩國還有另一個共同點：它們都是美國自身經濟問題的替罪羊。美國有個壞習慣，喜歡把自己的問題怪罪在別國頭上。跟上世紀八十年代抨擊日本一樣，今天美國抨擊中國的根本原因還是自身宏觀經濟失衡現象越來越險惡。美國國內儲蓄大幅縮水導致經常賬户逆差和貿易逆差，這是相隔三十年，美國與兩個亞洲經濟巨人開戰的共同背景。

1981年1月，當里根剛就任美國總統時，美國國內淨儲蓄率為國民收入的7.8%，經常賬户基本平衡。但就在接下來兩年半的時間裏，里根廣受歡迎的減税政策導致美國國內儲蓄率驟降至3.7%，經常賬户和商品貿易差額出現了永久性赤字。從這個角度上講，美國所謂的貿易問題很大程度上是自己造成的。

然而里根政府卻不承認這一點。他們幾乎完全沒有認識到儲蓄與貿易失衡之間的聯繫，卻把日本當作的罪魁禍首，後者與美國的貿易差額佔八十年代前五年美國商品貿易逆差的42%。從此美國開始處處抨擊日本，稱其貿易行為不公且非法。當時衝在第一線的美方貿易副代表是個年輕人，他的名字叫作羅伯特·萊特希澤。

快進30餘年來到當下，你會發現此情此景與當年過於相似，以至於有些刺眼。與里根不同的是，特朗普總統接手的美國經濟沒有當年那麼充沛的儲蓄。2017年1月特朗普上任時，美國國內淨儲蓄率僅為3%，不足里根就職初期的一半水平。不過特朗普和他的前輩一樣，也很會説漂亮話：里根連任競選時提出“美國迎春曉”的動人口號來粉飾自己的減税政策，而同樣實行大幅減税的特朗普則提出了“讓美國再次偉大”。

可以預料，這樣做必然導致聯邦預算赤字擴大。一般來説，隨着經濟擴張期走向成熟私人儲蓄往往會飆升，但聯邦預算赤字則極大地抵消了這種週期性的儲蓄增量。因此，到2018年年底，美國國內淨儲蓄率實際上已降至國民收入的2.8%，這使美國的國際收支產生巨大赤字——經常賬户逆差佔GDP的2.6%，商品貿易逆差達到GDP的4.5%。

就在此時，中國登場了，它扮演的角色和日本上個世紀八十年代一樣。表面上看，中國對美國經濟的威脅比當年的日本更大。畢竟，2018年美國商品貿易逆差裏來自中國的份額達到了48%，超過了日本八十年代前期所佔的42%。但這種比較本身是扭曲的，因為上世紀八十年代還沒有全球供應鏈這回事。經合組織和世貿組織的數據顯示，美中雙邊貿易逆差裏有大約35%~40%源於中國以外的產品，它們只不過在中國境內組裝並海運至美國。這意味着在今天美國的貿易逆差裏面，真正由“中國製造”造成的部分實際上小於上世紀八十年代日本的份額。

就像八十年代美國抨擊日本一樣，今天美國在抨擊中國時也頗有心機地忽略了更大的宏觀經濟背景。這是一個嚴重的錯誤。在美國當前的預算形勢下，國民儲蓄率將很難得到提高，而若不提高儲蓄，美國的對外貿易不外乎從對華貿易轉向與其它國家的貿易。這種簡單的貿易轉移可能導致生產流向成本更高的地方，最終落到美國消費者頭上時跟加税沒什麼兩樣。

不論面對的是今天的中國還是當年的日本，美國的做法都是拒不承認現實，幾乎靠虛妄來欺騙自己。里根政府陶醉於未經檢驗的供給側經濟學當中，尤其是所謂減税可以自我負擔成本（譯註：即認為減税有助於刺激經濟增長和就業，從而提高政府税收，抵消政府因減税而失去的收入）的理論，未能理解不斷增加的預算赤字和貿易逆差之間的關係。今天，低利率和現代貨幣理論這種最新的“巫毒經濟學”都充滿魅惑力，吸引着特朗普政府和美國國會兩黨在抨擊中國時達成一致。

儲蓄不足的美國之所以對嚴峻的宏觀經濟限制視而不見，自然有它的理由：因為沒有哪個政治羣體會贊成通過削減預算赤字來提高國內儲蓄，進而減少貿易逆差。美國魚和熊掌都想要，其醫療保健系統開支佔GDP的18%，國防開支超過緊隨其後的七個國家軍事預算的總和，而其減税政策則使聯邦政府收入佔GDP的比重從過去50年的均值17.4%降至現在的16.5%。

今天的美國想要故技重施再次上演美日貿易衝突的橋段，這種做法令人感到十分不安。美國再一次發現，抨擊其他國家要比量入為出簡單得多。然而這一次，電影的結局可能與三十年前大不相同。

Japan Then, China Now

“When governments permit counterfeiting or copying of American products, it is stealing our future, and it is no longer free trade.” So said US President Ronald Reagan, commenting on Japan after the Plaza Accord was concluded in September 1985. Today resembles, in many respects, a remake of this 1980s movie, but with a reality-television star replacing a Hollywood film star in the presidential leading role – and with a new villain in place of Japan.

Back in the 1980s, Japan was portrayed as America’s greatest economic threat – not only because of allegations of intellectual property theft, but also because of concerns about currency manipulation, state-sponsored industrial policy, a hollowing out of US manufacturing, and an outsize bilateral trade deficit. In its standoff with the US, Japan ultimately blinked, but it paid a steep price for doing so – nearly three “lost” decades of economic stagnation and deflation. Today, the same plot features China.

Notwithstanding both countries’ objectionable mercantilism, Japan and China had something else in common: They became victims of America’s unfortunate habit of making others the scapegoat for its own economic problems. Like Japan bashing in the 1980s, China bashing today is an outgrowth of America’s increasingly insidious macroeconomic imbalances. In both cases, a dramatic shortfall in US domestic saving spawned large current-account and trade deficits, setting the stage for battles, 30 years apart, with Asia’s two economic giants.

When Reagan took office in January 1981, the net domestic saving rate stood at 7.8% of national income, and the current account was basically balanced. Within two and a half years, courtesy of Reagan’s wildly popular tax cuts, the domestic saving rate had plunged to 3.7%, and the current account and the merchandise trade balances swung into perpetual deficit. In this important respect, America’s so-called trade problem was very much of its own making.

Yet the Reagan administration was in denial. There was little or no appreciation of the link between saving and trade imbalances. Instead, the blame was pinned on Japan, which accounted for 42% of US goods trade deficits in the first half of the 1980s. Japan bashing then took on a life of its own with a wide range of grievances over unfair and illegal trade practices. Leading the charge back then was a young Deputy US Trade Representative named Robert Lighthizer.

Fast-forward some 30 years and the similarities are painfully evident. Unlike Reagan, President Donald Trump did not inherit a US economy with an ample reservoir of saving. When Trump took office in January 2017, the net domestic saving rate was just 3%, well below half the rate at the onset of the Reagan era. But, like his predecessor, who waxed eloquently of a new “morning in America,” Trump also opted for large tax cuts – this time to “make America great again.”

The result was a predictable widening of the federal budget deficit, which more than offset the cyclical surge in private saving that normally accompanies a maturing economic expansion. As a result, the net domestic saving rate actually edged down to 2.8% of national income by late 2018, keeping America’s international balances deep in the red – with the current-account deficit at 2.6% of GDP and the merchandise trade gap at 4.5% in late 2018.

And that’s where China assumes the role that Japan played in the 1980s. On the surface, the threat seems more dire. After all, China accounted for 48% of the US merchandise trade deficit in 2018, compared to Japan’s 42% share in the first half of the 1980s. But the comparison is distorted by global supply chains, which basically didn’t exist in the 1980s. Data from the OECD and the World Trade Organization suggest that about 35-40% of the bilateral US-China trade deficit reflects inputs made outside of China but assembled and shipped to the US from China. That means the made-in-China portion of today’s US trade deficit is actually smaller than Japan’s share of the 1980s.

Like the Japan bashing of the 1980s, today’s outbreak of China bashing has been conveniently excised from America’s broader macroeconomic context. That is a serious mistake. Without raising national saving – highly unlikely under the current US budget trajectory – trade will simply be shifted away from China to America’s other trading partners. With this trade diversion likely to migrate to higher-cost platforms around the world, American consumers will be hit with the functional equivalent of a tax hike.

Ironically, Trump has summoned the same Robert Lighthizer, veteran of the Japan trade battles of the 1980s, to lead the charge against China. Unfortunately, Lighthizer seems as clueless about the macro argument today as he was back then.

In both episodes, the US was in denial, bordering on delusion. Basking in the warm glow of untested supply-side economics – especially the theory that tax cuts would be self-financing – the Reagan administration failed to appreciate the links between mounting budget and trade deficits. Today, the seductive power of low interest rates, coupled with the latest strain of voodoo economics – Modern Monetary Theory – is equally alluring for the Trump administration and a bipartisan consensus of China bashers in the US Congress.

The tough macroeconomic constraints facing a saving-short US economy are ignored for good reason: there is no US political constituency for reducing trade deficits by cutting budget deficits and thereby boosting domestic saving. America wants to have its cake and eat it, with a health-care system that swallows 18% of its GDP, defense spending that exceeds the combined sum of the world’s next seven largest military budgets, and tax cuts that have reduced federal government revenue to 16.5% of GDP, well below the 17.4% average of the past 50 years.

This remake of an old movie is disconcerting, to say the least. Once again, the US has found it far easier to bash others – Japan then, China now – than to live within its means. This time, however, the movie might have a very different ending.