“百位中國通”聯名信粉碎了“美國對華共識”嗎？_風聞

編者按：7月3日，由近百名美國對華研究領域頂級專家、學者和前官員聯署的致美國總統和國會議員的公開信在《華盛頓郵報》發表，公開信的題目是“美國與中國為敵事與願違”。公開信反對美國政府在每個領域都與中國進行對抗，認為北京不是一個經濟上的敵人或是對美國國家安全的威脅。信中指出，視中國為敵人並將之與全球經濟脱鈎的做法將損害美國的國際角色和聲譽，最終孤立的是自己，而不是北京。

這是近期以來美國精英層發出的反對現行對華政策的最強大聲音。此信在國內引起巨大反響，也值得我們認真思考如何應對中美關係。大國策智庫特邀知名專家從不同視角解讀此信的意義。

公開信原文附在文末。

日前美國百餘位專家學者聯名錶態，實際目的就是在為遏制中美關係蜕變為敵人關係作最後的努力。在英文世界，敵人的定義是：遇事的第一本能反應是要傷害對方。當事雙方如果相互確認過眼神，雙邊關係未來發展的軌跡將呈螺旋式下降之勢。

過去的中美關係四十年，是雙方各界在排除困難和阻力推石頭上山的艱苦過程。現在，前途愈發陡峭，峯迴路不轉，中美關係開始了新一輪調整，全世界的戰略智庫都在設身處地地推演：眼見巨石滑落，如何當現有支撐框架傾覆時保持完卵。在這封公開信件上簽名的重要人士，實際上是在當前的關鍵時刻試圖在巨石滑落形成巨大勢能之際，在做最後關頭的剎車努力。

情況進入不可逆轉的狀況的關鍵，就是雙方定義對方為“敵人”。對這個定位絕不可舉重若輕，一定要三思而行。

兩個令人無法反駁的經驗事實是：敵人是互相建構出來的。如果把對方當作敵人對待，對方就一定會成為敵人。  

避免互相開啓敵對範式的可行之路就是要關注、發現、培育雙方的共同利益。把共同利益放在各自利益之上的適當位置上。通過擴大共同利益正向影響雙方各自利益的衝突之處。用共同利益的擴展，覆蓋各自利益的矛盾與痛點。

總之，不踹石頭下坡，不把雙邊關係推向敵人的心理設定，這本身就需要眼界，勇氣與力量。四十年後，中美關係變化前景再一次成為世界的中心。沒有欣喜，我們將冷靜對待。

這封聯名信代表的應該是對華接觸派對目前對華關係、戰略發展趨勢的嚴重擔憂，因為這種政策基於對中國力量與意圖的判斷過度，不符合美國利益。為此，他們需要發聲來影響輿論與社會認知，並試圖牽制華盛頓政客進一步推進中美關係向敵對方向發展的態勢。從中可以有以下幾種認識：

1. 這種平衡的聲音很可能在當前華盛頓鷹派主導的對華對抗政策的大氛圍遭到淹沒，不會產生很大的政策影響。

2. 這種聲音代表着美國在對華政策上並沒有形成完全的共識，對華接觸、合作加制衡的戰略仍然可能在未來的政府中復活。

3. 它會激起更多的辯論、討論，甚至影響民主黨總統候選人在選戰中如何框定對華政策基調。

4. 美國對華政策不會再完全回覆到過去民主黨政府的樣子，這些人的觀點也在變化，不同程度上對中國外交與國內政策存在嚴重不滿，主張加大對華多管齊下施壓，但核心（底線）是保持接觸、經濟合作、軍事交流與危機管控，同時擴大在國際問題與全球治理上的合作。

5. 中國既要保持與這一派的溝通、協調，吸收他們合理建設性的意見，支持他們繼續發聲，為他們提供有利的中美繼續合作證據。但也需要看到他們的兩面性，中國目前國內政治與對外政策已經造成的戰略困境減弱了我們與他們的共同性，要避免刻意擴大他們的作用，過度解讀他們的觀點，不能完全按照他們的提供的路線走，主要是保持我們的基本定力。

關於百名美國的“中國通”致特朗普的公開信，已經被一些中國學者理解為美國對華政策並未定型的強烈依據。位列公開信六位發起人之一的布魯金斯學會李成博士在接受財新記者的訪問中也表示，“美國學界與政府的對華情緒和政策非常不同，並非是一致的立場”，他甚至認為這標誌着對華政策的鐘擺“開始往另一個方向擺”。筆者對此有所保留。在我看來，這封公開信反對的是美國把中國當作敵人，這本來就不是普遍被接受的共識，而是特朗普政府內少數強硬派與美國深暗勢力（deep state)的主張與看法。

可是，對於把中國當作戰略競爭對手，則是美國左右派別、學界與政府都能接受的，也是2010-2015期間各界辯論所達成的共識。百位中國通這一公開信的一大目的，是提醒特朗普：戰略競爭對手與敵人之間並沒有絕對的界限，明確認定競爭對手是可以的，也是必要的，但明確認定敵人則是危險的，在損害敵人的同時，也將嚴重損害美國的利益。這實際上凸顯了一點：美國學界內外有一大批人並不同意把中國界定為“新版的蘇聯”，也警告特朗普政府中的強硬派別走得太遠。

首先，這種觀點在對中國崛起給美國主導的國際秩序帶來挑戰的嚴重性上與特朗普政府所代表的右翼並無根本區別，指出：中國近年來的令人不安的行為——包括其轉向更大的內部壓制，增加國家對私營企業的控制，未能履行若干貿易承諾，更大的努力來控制外國輿論和更進取的外交政策，對世界其他國家提出了嚴峻的挑戰。實際上是認同中國屬於“修正主義國家”。

其次，這些接觸派實際上是奧巴馬對華政策主張的延續，迴歸到了接觸加對沖的傳統二軌政策，而美國內相當一部分人認為是不成功甚至是失敗的，現美國政府，國會及部分民意是反對的。

第三，其開出的藥方：盟友，威懾及與中國的開明力量接觸是過去幾十年美對華政策的一貫，也是自由派的主流觀點，更是其目前遭到詬病的原因。

最後，經過中美貿易戰的一輪僵持博弈，雙方重啓談判，表明強硬派的攻勢有所式微，接觸派的力量正在增大。未來，美對華政策走向將取決於二者的力量消長。

美國百名學者聯名信是經過深思熟慮的，時間節點也選擇恰當。特朗普政府的對華政策和作法大阪G20後可能會有所調整。至今其對華的經貿戰、科技戰、地緣政治戰都沒有取得預期效果。因為所有這些“戰爭”沒有盟國和友好國家支持，靠美國一己之力是打不贏的。而恰恰對於美國發起的對華“戰爭”，絕大多數在旁觀，不配合，甚至拉美國後退，形成美國單打獨鬥。以現在的中國政治、經濟、社會狀況，僅美國的單打獨鬥，別説打贏，恐怕傷害中國的幾率都不大，反倒倒逼中國下決心做一些重要事情，倒逼中國民心凝聚，倒逼中國發展更好。

所以，美國的中國問題專家學者意識到了特朗普政府的對華政策和作法需要調整，這樣做下去於美國不利。因為他們瞭解中國，瞭解中國人。在美國曆屆總統中，最瞭解中國和中國人的當屬老布什。在八十年代末的緊張環境中，西方制裁中國，老布什就呼籲，過度的“外壓”會使中國人更加團結。

由於處在結構性的對抗中，中美關係大幅下滑可能是一個長期的問題。儘管美國沒有把中國看成敵人，但是在兩年之內中美關係下滑到如此程度，對於大多數普通中國人而言是非常意外的。理性的中國人會看到，自己還有1660萬的農村貧困人口問題需要解決，中國沒有實力、也沒有必要取代美國成為全球的領導者，中國需要把更多的精力放在解決自身存在的問題上。改革開放成就了今天的中國、融入國際體系發展了中國。“世界好，中國才能好；中國好，才能世界好，”這是中國對現行國際體系的基本認識。作為現行國際體系的受益者，中國主張改革而不是推翻現行國際體系，目的是推動國際秩序更加公正合理，這樣才能保證國際秩序的穩定和可持續性。美國選擇孤立主義可能代表了公眾意志，但這不能成為質疑中國推動的“一帶一路”理由。因為絕大多數“一帶一路”在建項目都是發達國家不願意做的，自己不願意做又不讓中國做，這對中國非常不公平。當然，對於中國而言，國家實力的增長要與建設法治國家同步，甚至要先於國家實力的增長。這樣不僅能提高發展對外關係的能力，而且能增加與其它國家的合作基礎。最後，中美關係牽一髮而動全身，中國需要對中美關係保持戰略定力和理性認識，避免帶有情緒化的政策和認識，讓中美關係在相對寬鬆的空間內互動，生成符合中美兩國國家利益的共識。

《把中國當作敵人適得其反》，這封選擇在美國獨立日前、習特會之後發表在《華盛頓郵報》的公開信，似乎想要為當前日趨緊張的中美關係注入一點冷靜劑。綜觀全信七條內容，不可不謂深諳“話語平衡術”：顯然，這封信不僅是寫給美國人看的，也是送給中國人讀的。作為一箇中國學者，我最感興趣的是信的末尾那句話：在華盛頓並沒有一些人所相信的那樣，有一個必須與中國為敵的壓倒性共識。

自從2017年12月18日，美國《國家安全戰略報告》將中國列為戰略競爭對手以來，關於美國國內是否存在着對華共識一直為戰略學界所關注。有研究者指出，美對華的戰略報告執筆人來自兩黨資深人士，並非特朗譜團隊的鷹派一家之言，説明“對付中國”是他們的共識。也有研究者指出，基於美國政治的制衡特點，加上中美貿易額如此之大，不可能存在一個這樣的共識。誰是誰非呢？這封“百名中國通”的公開信似乎佐證了後者，果真如此嗎？

事實上，根據阿羅不可能定理，根本不存在一個面向所有者的“共識”。因此，重要的不是去論證有沒有“共識”，而是找到“共識”的限度。就政治話語來説，話語是一種權力，“共識”的限度在於當權者的“話語圈”，如果當權者的話語圈內存在共識，則其話語指向就要值得關注了。特朗普的決策話語圈內有沒有關於中國的“共識”？話語指向何方？答案不言自明。鑑於特朗普執政團隊及美國政治的特點，我們只能謹言如斯：美國當前政府也許存在着一個反華“共識”，但不是“壓倒性”的。

從2019年1月謝淑麗開始提出防止美國對華政策的過度反應開始，美國關於重新反思對華強硬而僵化的政策的趨勢開始出現。近日美國100名左右政商學界精英給特朗普寫公開信，反對美國把中國定義為敵人，主張平衡中美的競爭與合作，主張對華接觸政策，聯合盟友與夥伴威懾中國，並堅持多邊主義政策來約束中國的激進政策。

這説明，近半年來美國精英對美國對華政策的過度反應的認知開始擴大，起碼在美國的中國通羣體中，謝淑麗式的認知從少數異議派，走向多數派。如果這種趨勢繼續下去，再加上普通消費者及其它涉華經濟利益集團的正面努力，美國對華極端化政策有望得到控制，中美關係有望在未來恢復到理性發展的軌道上。

建立互信的關鍵是調整相互政策與認知，雙方皆應該對目前的局勢冷靜對待、理性分析。中方調整其“過度擴張”的政策或採取措施防止戰略透支，而美方剋制其過度反應或調整“遏制政策”。這是中美重建互信關係的關鍵性開始。公開信事件是一個好的開始，但結果仍難以預料。

對於這封聯名信，我的看法有四：

第一，中方的表態是非常得體且積極的。中國外交部表態充分肯定了這封公開信中的正面內容，但也非常謹慎地避免對全信所有的觀點下定論。因為公開信中也有不少內容、主張，和中國政府的一貫立場是有相當差距的。

第二，儘管仍然存在認知、立場上的差距，但該公開信相對特朗普政府，尤其是相對其內閣中較為鷹牌的主政者，在立場、話語方面都拉開了相當的距離。這既是其進步性的體現，也在一定程度上代表了美國對華政策精英圈的呼聲。

第三，這封公開信也打破了美國強硬派在過去2年來所極力營造所謂“全美上下一心，全力打壓中國”的幻象。公開信明確向全美國、中國和國際社會展現出美國社會的多元性，以及這個成熟國家內在的糾錯機制，使美國自身的發展方向、中美關係的發展方向有可能轉到正確、健康、互利、可持續發展的方向。

第四，美版“清流上書”發出後，已經成為一個媒體事件，一個帶有濃重政策含義的文本（text）也已經生成。它對華總體而言當然利好，但中方怎麼打好這張牌，同時打贏外宣、內宣兩場輿論戰，為其在中美新型大國博弈中贏得更多主動權，仍費思量。

這封信最重要的意義不在於改變特朗普政府的對華政策。美國社會的多元性、複雜性決定了任何人和羣體的作用都是有限的。尤其是特朗普政府和大部分智庫間的距離更讓這種政策影響力大打折扣。

儘管如此，特朗普政府畢竟是暫時的存在。美國社會和精英層才是需要長久應付的羣體。這封信的社會和輿論影響力不可低估。

對中國而言，這封信的最大意義在於破除了國內輿論中關於“美國對華共識”的迷信，認識到美國精英層的共識並非我們之前所擔心的那麼強，至少應該分層次地予以區別。即便美國精英層普遍把中國視為一個需要着力應付的強大對手，但是此信的主旨--“不可與中國為敵”-是與特朗普團隊的認知根本不同。在“如何應付中國”這個問題上美國精英層尤其存在巨大分歧，這對中國而言意義不可估量。

這封信提醒我們這邊要同樣理性冷靜地看待中美關係。一方面不要把特朗普政府和美國精英甚至美國社會等同，應該更冷靜更剋制地處理中美關係。另一方面也要理性看待這些專家，以及那些沒有簽名的專家，避免過分解讀。這裏面的很多專家對中國可能很不客氣，頗多批評。但是此信中“中美不可為敵”的主旨是被所有簽名者接受的。因此必須認識到，這封信不是要表達這些專家親華或反華的態度，而是如何理性的對待中國。我們不能從選邊站隊、非友即敵的慣性思維對待這些專家，而是積極尋找與這些專家之間的契合點，讓中美關係在競爭中防控衝突，促進合作。

公開信原文

Making China a U.S. enemy is counterproductive

By M. Taylor Fravel , 

J. Stapleton Roy , 

Michael D. Swaine , 

Susan A. Thornton and 

Ezra Vogel 

July 3

Dear President Trump and members of Congress:

We are members of the scholarly, foreign policy, military and business communities, overwhelmingly from the United States, including many who have focused on Asia throughout our professional careers. We are deeply concerned about the growing deterioration in U.S. relations with China, which we believe does not serve American or global interests. Although we are very troubled by Beijing’s recent behavior, which requires a strong response, we also believe that many U.S. actions are contributing directly to the downward spiral in relations.

The following seven propositions represent our collective views on China, the problems in the U.S. approach to China and the basic elements of a more effective U.S. policy. Our institutional affiliations are provided for identification purposes only.

1. China’s troubling behavior in recent years — including its turn toward greater domestic repression, increased state control over private firms, failure to live up to several of its trade commitments, greater efforts to control foreign opinion and more aggressive foreign policy — raises serious challenges for the rest of the world. These challenges require a firm and effective U.S. response, but the current approach to China is fundamentally counterproductive.

2. We do not believe Beijing is an economic enemy or an existential national security threat that must be confronted in every sphere; nor is China a monolith, or the views of its leaders set in stone. Although its rapid economic and military growth has led Beijing toward a more assertive international role, many Chinese officials and other elites know that a moderate, pragmatic and genuinely cooperative approach with the West serves China’s interests. Washington’s adversarial stance toward Beijing weakens the influence of those voices in favor of assertive nationalists. With the right balance of competition and cooperation, U.S. actions can strengthen those Chinese leaders who want China to play a constructive role in world affairs.

3. U.S. efforts to treat China as an enemy and decouple it from the global economy will damage the United States’ international role and reputation and undermine the economic interests of all nations. U.S. opposition will not prevent the continued expansion of the Chinese economy, a greater global market share for Chinese companies and an increase in China’s role in world affairs. Moreover, the United States cannot significantly slow China’s rise without damaging itself. If the United States presses its allies to treat China as an economic and political enemy, it will weaken its relations with those allies and could end up isolating itself rather than Beijing.

4. The fear that Beijing will replace the United States as the global leader is exaggerated. Most other countries have no interest in such an outcome, and it is not clear that Beijing itself sees this goal as necessary or feasible. Moreover, a government intent on limiting the information and opportunities available to its own citizens and harshly repressing its ethnic minorities will not garner meaningful international support nor succeed in attracting global talent. The best American response to these practices is to work with our allies and partners to create a more open and prosperous world in which China is offered the opportunity to participate. Efforts to isolate China will simply weaken those Chinese intent on developing a more humane and tolerant society.

5. Although China has set a goal of becoming a world-class military by midcentury, it faces immense hurdles to operating as a globally dominant military power. However, Beijing’s growing military capabilities have already eroded the United States’ long-standing military preeminence in the Western Pacific. The best way to respond to this is not to engage in an open-ended arms race centered on offensive, deep-strike weapons and the virtually impossible goal of reasserting full-spectrum U.S. dominance up to China’s borders. A wiser policy is to work with allies to maintain deterrence, emphasizing defensive-oriented, area denial capabilities, resiliency and the ability to frustrate attacks on U.S. or allied territory, while strengthening crisis-management efforts with Beijing.

6. Beijing is seeking to weaken the role of Western democratic norms within the global order. But it is not seeking to overturn vital economic and other components of that order from which China itself has benefited for decades. Indeed, China’s engagement in the international system is essential to the system’s survival and to effective action on common problems such as climate change. The United States should encourage Chinese participation in new or modified global regimes in which rising powers have a greater voice. A zero-sum approach to China’s role would only encourage Beijing to either disengage from the system or sponsor a divided global order that would be damaging to Western interests.

7. In conclusion, a successful U.S. approach to China must focus on creating enduring coalitions with other countries in support of economic and security objectives. It must be based on a realistic appraisal of Chinese perceptions, interests, goals and behavior; an accurate match of U.S. and allied resources with policy goals and interests; and a rededication of U.S. efforts to strengthen its own capacity to serve as a model for others. Ultimately, the United States’ interests are best served by restoring its ability to compete effectively in a changing world and by working alongside other nations and international organizations rather than by promoting a counterproductive effort to undermine and contain China’s engagement with the world.

We believe that the large number of signers of this open letter clearly indicates that there is no single Washington consensus endorsing an overall adversarial stance toward China, as some believe exists.

M. Taylor Fravel is a professor of political science at MIT. J. Stapleton Roy is a distinguished scholar at the Wilson Center and a former U.S. ambassador to China. Michael D. Swaine is a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Susan A. Thornton is a senior fellow at Yale Law School’s Paul Tsai China Center and a former acting assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs. Ezra Vogel is a professor emeritus at Harvard University.

The above individuals circulated the letter, which was signed by the following:

1. James Acton, co-director, Nuclear Policy Program and Jessica T. Mathews Chair, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

2. Craig Allen, former U.S. ambassador to Brunei from 2014–2018

3. Andrew Bacevich, co-founder, Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft

4. Jeffrey A. Bader, former senior director for East Asia on National Security Council 2009-2011 and fellow, Brookings Institution

5. C. Fred Bergsten, senior fellow and director emeritus, Peterson Institute for International Economics

6. Jan Berris, vice president, National Committee on United States-China Relations

7. Dennis J. Blasko, former U.S. Army Attaché to China, 1992-1996

8. Pieter Bottelier, visiting scholar, School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University

9. Ian Bremmer, president, Eurasia Group

10. Richard Bush, Chen-Fu and Cecilia Yen Koo Chair in Taiwan Studies, Brookings Institution

11. Jerome A. Cohen, faculty director, US-Asia Law Institute, New York University

12. Warren I. Cohen, distinguished university professor emeritus, University of Maryland

13. Bernard Cole, former U.S. Navy captain

14. James F. Collins, U.S. ambassador to the Russian Federation 1997-2001

15. Gerald L Curtis, Burgess Professor Emeritus, Columbia University

16. Toby Dalton, co-director, Nuclear Policy Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

17. Robert Daly, director, Kissinger Institute on China and the U.S., Wilson Center

18. Michael C. Desch, Packey J. Dee Professor of International Affairs and director of the Notre Dame International Security Center

19. Mac Destler, professor emeritus, University of Maryland School of Public Policy

20. Bruce Dickson, professor of political science and international affairs, George Washington University

21. David Dollar, senior fellow, Brookings Institution

22. Peter Dutton, senior fellow, U.S.-Asia Law Institute; adjunct professor, New York University School of Law

23. Robert Einhorn, senior fellow, Brookings Institution; former assistant secretary of state for nonproliferation, 1999-2001

24. Amitai Etzioni, University Professor and Professor of International Affairs, George Washington University

25. Thomas Fingar, Asia Pacific Research Center, Stanford University; former deputy director of national intelligence for analysis, 2005-2008

26. Mary Gallagher, political science professor and director of the Lieberthal-Rogel Center for Chinese Studies, University of Michigan

27. John Gannon, adjunct professor, Georgetown University; former chairman of the National Intelligence Council, 1997-2001

28. Avery Goldstein, David M. Knott Professor of Global Politics and International Relations, University of Pennsylvania

29. Steven M. Goldstein, associate of the Fairbank Center; director of the Taiwan Studies Workshop at Harvard University

30. David F. Gordon, senior advisor, International Institute of Strategic Studies; former director of Policy Planning at the U.S. State Department, 2007-2009

31. Philip H. Gordon, Mary and David Boies Senior Fellow in U.S. Foreign Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations; former special assistant to the president and Coordinator for the Middle East and assistant secretary of state for European and Eurasian Affairs

32. Morton H. Halperin, former director of Policy Planning Staff at State Department, 1998-2001

33. Lee Hamilton, former congressman; former president and director of the Wilson Center

34. Clifford A. Hart Jr., former U.S. consul general to Hong Kong and Macau, 2013-2016

35. Paul Heer, adjunct professor, George Washington University; former National Intelligence Officer for East Asia, 2007-2015

36. Eric Heginbotham, principal research scientist, Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Center for International Studies

37. Ambassador Carla A. Hills, former United States Trade Representative, 1989-1993; chair & CEO Hills & Company, International Consultants

38. Jamie P. Horsley, senior fellow at the Paul Tsai China Center, Yale Law School

39. Yukon Huang, senior fellow, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

40. Frank Jannuzi, president and CEO, Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation

41. Robert Jervis, Adlai E. Stevenson Professor and Professor of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University

42. Marvin Kalb, nonresident senior fellow, Brookings Institution

43. Mickey Kantor, former secretary of commerce,1996-1997; U.S. trade representative, 1993-1996

44. Robert Kapp, president, Robert A. Kapp & Associates, Inc.; former president, U.S.-China Business Council; former president, Washington Council on International Trade

45. Albert Keidel, adjunct graduate professor, George Washington University; former deputy director of the Office of East Asian Nations at the Treasury Department, 2001-2004

46. Robert O. Keohane, professor of International Affairs emeritus, Princeton University

47. William Kirby, Spangler Family Professor of Business Administration at Harvard Business School; T. M. Chang Professor of China Studies at Harvard University

48. Helena Kolenda, program director for Asia, Henry Luce Foundation

49. Charles Kupchan, professor of International Affairs, Georgetown University; senior fellow, Council on Foreign Relations

50. David M. Lampton, professor emeritus at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies; Oksenberg Rholen Fellow, Stanford University Asia-Pacific Research Center; former president, National Committee on U.S.-China Relations

51. Nicholas Lardy, Anthony M. Solomon Senior Fellow, Peterson Institute for International Economics

52. Chung Min Lee, senior fellow, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

53. Herbert Levin, former staff member for China on National Security Council and Policy Planning Council

54. Cheng Li, director and senior fellow, John L. Thornton China Center, The Brookings Institution

55. Kenneth Lieberthal, professor emeritus, University of Michigan; former Asia senior director, National Security Council, 1998-2000

56. Yawei Liu, director of China Program, The Carter Center

57. Jessica Mathews, distinguished fellow, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

58. James McGregor, chairman, Greater China, APCO Worldwide

59. John McLaughlin, distinguished practitioner in residence, School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University; former deputy director and acting director of the CIA, 2000-2004

60. Andrew Mertha, Hyman Professor and Director of the China Program, School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University

61. Alice Lyman Miller, research fellow, Hoover Institution, Stanford University

62. Mike Mochizuki, Japan-U.S. Relations Chair in Memory of Gaston Sigur, George Washington University

63. Michael Nacht, Thomas and Alison Schneider Professor of Public Policy, University of California, Berkeley; former assistant secretary of defense for global strategic affairs, 2009-2010

64. Moises Naim, distinguished fellow, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

65. Joseph Nye, University Distinguished Service Professor emeritus and former dean, Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University

66. Kevin O’Brien, political science professor and director of Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, Berkeley

67. Jean Oi, William Haas Professor of Chinese Politics, Stanford University

68. Stephen A. Orlins, president, National Committee on U.S.-China Relations

69. William Overholt, senior research fellow, Mossavar-Rahmani Center for Business and Government, Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University

70. Douglas Paal, distinguished fellow, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

71. Margaret M. Pearson, Dr. Horace V. and Wilma E. Harrison Distinguished Professor, University of Maryland, College Park

72. Peter C. Perdue, professor of history, Yale University

73. Elizabeth J. Perry , Henry Rosovsky Professor of Government, Harvard University; director, Harvard-Yenching Institute

74. Daniel W Piccuta, former deputy chief of mission and acting ambassador, Beijing

75. Thomas Pickering, former under secretary of state for political affairs, 1997-2000; former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations from 1989-1992

76. Paul R. Pillar , nonresident senior fellow at the Center for Security Studies, Georgetown University

77. Jonathan D. Pollack, nonresident senior fellow, John L. Thornton China Center, Brookings Institution

78. Barry Posen, Ford International Professor of Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; director, MIT Security Studies Program

79. Shelley Rigger, Brown Professor of East Asian Politics, Davidson College

80. Charles S. Robb, former U.S. senator (1989-2001) and former chairman of the East Asia subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee; governor of Virginia from 1982 to 1986

81. Robert S. Ross, professor of political science, Boston College

82. Scott D. Sagan, the Caroline S.G. Munro Professor of Political Science, Stanford University

83. Gary Samore, senior executive director, Crown Center for Middle East Studies at Brandeis University

84. Richard J. Samuels, Ford International Professor of Political Science and director, Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Center for International Studies

85. David Shear, former assistant secretary of defense, 2014-2016; former U.S. ambassador to Vietnam

86. Anne-Marie Slaughter, former director of policy planning, State Department, 2009-2011; Bert G. Kerstetter ‘66 University Professor Emerita of Politics and International Affairs, Princeton University

87. Richard Sokolsky, nonresident senior fellow, Russia and Eurasia Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

88. James Steinberg, former deputy secretary of state, 2009-2011

89. Michael Szonyi, Frank Wen-Hsiung Wu Memorial Professor of Chinese History Director, Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies, Harvard University

90. Strobe Talbott, former deputy secretary of state, 1994-2001

91. Anne F. Thurston, former senior research professor, School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University

92. Andrew G. Walder, Denise O’Leary and Kent Thiry Professor, School of Humanities and Sciences, Stanford University

93. Graham Webster, coordinating editor, Stanford-New America DigiChina Project

94. David A. Welch, University Research Chair, Balsillie School of International Affairs

95. Daniel B. Wright, president and CEO, GreenPoint Group; former managing director for China and the Strategic Economic Dialogue, Treasury Department

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