羅思義：與特朗普的經濟持久戰，中國最具有殺傷力的武器是什麼?

**【**文/觀察者網專欄作者 羅思義】

“至少有其他兩個組織對美國金融市場的影響力大於白宮——美聯儲和中國共產黨。特朗普不能直接控制它們中的任意一個。”

這一直白的分析出自西方最資深、最嚴謹的金融專家之一、彭博社高級編輯和英國《金融時報》前首席評論員約翰·奧瑟斯（John Authers）。這段話概括了美國總統特朗普所面臨的經濟和政治問題。如下文所示，它還概述了中美各自在貿易戰中的相對優勢，點明瞭美國政府攻擊中國的策略，斷言了唯一可以防止特朗普政府實現其阻撓中國發展目標的政策。

約翰·奧瑟斯對美國金融市場和政策的分析，有力地印證了中國國家主席習近平最近在于都縣的重要講話——中國必須自力更生，應對美國政府阻止中國實現繁榮和民族復興的企圖。

習近平在于都縣參觀中央紅軍長征出發地紀念館（圖片來源：新華網）

在中美這場貿易/經濟戰爭中，中國自身的處境固然是最重要的，但中國能否準確預判美國下一步所採取的行動也很重要。這就引出了本文的主題——為何特朗普政府拒絕接受與中國的“雙贏”關係，以及特朗普政府選擇“雙輸”邏輯的必然結果是什麼。

這樣的分析反過來表明，中國將中美貿易戰與“長征”或“持久戰”做對比，不是簡簡單單運用修辭學的隱喻或是僅僅體現對於中國共產黨歷史傳統的繼承，而是為我們理解當前形勢提供了準確的框架。

當然，區別在於，這是一場經濟戰爭，而非軍事戰爭。因此，鬥爭武器也有所不同。這就有必要分析美國最敏感的痛點是什麼，中國最具殺傷力的武器是什麼。反之，對美國經濟形勢的考察，可以充分印證對中國所面臨形勢的分析，以及中國不同社會階層對當前中美摩擦的反應。

中國“示弱”能換來憐憫嗎？

就中美貿易戰中國方面的反應而言，人大重陽研金融究院執行院長王文就中國不同社會階層對特朗普政府“經濟侵略”的反應，進行了極為正確的分析。王文在其題為《不管風吹浪打，勝似閒庭信步》的文章中指出：“絕大多數普通民眾都高度擁護國家對美國霸凌主義行徑的反制政策，當下的恐美情緒主要存在於部分社會精英層中。

比如，在微信、微博、新媒體及坊間、飯局中，常常會出現一些言論、段子、漫畫、數據甚至一些傳言、謠言，論證中國反擊措施的無理，歪曲中國鬥而不破的立場，描述中國正在惡化的現狀，勾勒中國終將失敗的未來。還有一些人片面採用一些數據與事例，誇大美國經濟增長的強勁，美化美國資本市場的穩健，虛構美國與國際盟友們的團結，編造美國社會精英的友善。”

特別值得注意的是，美國的表現以及操縱特朗普政府的各種勢力的所作所為，從外部充分印證了王文對中國國內形勢的分析——中國任何寄希望美國“憐憫”的示弱，都只會換來美國加大對中國的攻擊。

特朗普的軟肋——選舉和金融

任何對美國形勢的分析，都不能忽視特朗普面臨的最重要的日子——2020年11月3日（下一屆美國總統大選日）。確保連任是他的至高目標，並因此決定特朗普政府的政策。為此，三個時間框架至關重要。

1.金融市場事件的影響，可能在很短的時間內發生——在某些情況下是分鐘/小時，幾乎總是在幾天到幾個月內產生強烈影響。

2.2019年到2020年美國經濟增長將放緩，這必然是影響特朗普2020年連任的負面因素。經濟增長放緩會與美國消費税政策產生的不利影響相互作用，導致諸如消費品價格上漲和農產品價格下跌。（我的新書《別誤讀中國經濟》詳細分析了2019-2020年美國經濟放緩的原因）

3.試圖通過強迫或者忽悠中國放棄社會主義發展道路，從而減緩中國中長期經濟增速。這也會導致中國的經濟活力在中短期內減弱，從而降低中國對他國的吸引力，以此削弱中國在貿易戰中與他別國的同盟關係。

這三個時間框架印證了一個基本事實——儘管中國與大多數國家，甚至與一些美國前總統，都可以建立雙贏關係，但特朗普政府是個例外。這是因為特朗普政府已經用事實承認，其政策給美國經濟施加的痛苦將會讓美國成為輸家，而他們現在所作的只是試圖努力確保中國比美國輸得更多。

特朗普政府最近宣佈向美國農民提供160億美元援助的計劃，以補償他們因美中關税戰升級所遭受的損失。但越來越多的美國人認識到，美國農民的救濟金是由其他美國納税人買單。正如美國有線電視新聞網（CNN）指出：“有人認為墨西哥應該支付隔離牆費用，但事實並非如此，現在有人覺得中國應該支付唐納德·特朗普總統拯救美國農民的計劃。當然，這兩種説法都不是真的。”

特朗普在白宮辦公室接見美國農民代表（圖片來源：IC photo）

來自權威的西方經濟研究機構牛津經濟研究院（該機構與中國並無聯繫）的數據顯示，特朗普關税影響更多的是美國民眾：“中國製造業降低了美國消費品價格，抑制通貨膨脹，讓美國消費者的錢包更充裕……與中國的貿易可令美國家庭一年節省850美元。”考慮到對全球經濟，包括美國盟友們的負面影響，彭博社等機構估計，如果中美打一整年的貿易戰，全球經濟的損失將高達6000億美元。

除了這些關税影響外，特朗普政府同樣關注來自消費者的抵制，或針對企業的限制對美國公司造成的影響，這種負面影響將會等同於美國政府施加給華為的傷害。

比如，《金融時報》指出，美國對華為實施制裁的直接目標不是簡單地或主要地停止芯片和軟件的供應，而是要摧毀華為產品在西方的消費市場，因為西方消費者希望保證能夠獲得谷歌產品的後續服務：“谷歌(Google)上週決定停止將其安卓(Android)操作系統出售給華為用於新手機，這在中國掀不起大浪，華為應該能夠説服國內買家切換到其在開發的操作系統。”但在國際市場上，消費者更傾向於安卓系統。

獨立分析師温莎（Richard Windsor）估計，失去谷歌生態系統“很可能會使華為失去中國境外市場的全部智能手機出貨量。”但《金融時報》同時指出，中國消費者的報復將對美國最重要且最具品牌價值的公司之一——蘋果造成毀滅性的財務影響：“北京有報復的餘地。其可以使用的手段包括阻止其進入其市場——高盛分析師估計此舉可能會使蘋果的每股收益減少近30%。”這也是美國公司害怕中國限制稀土出口，以及特別擔心中國公佈的將建立“不可靠實體清單”制度，對其財務狀況造成損害的原因之一。

這些具體的例子清楚地表明，儘管特朗普政府聲稱，其政策可能開始會給美國經濟帶來痛苦，但能限制這種損失。諷刺的是，事實正好相反。因此，中國要想打贏貿易戰，就得給美國經濟造成痛苦，痛到讓想要連任的特朗普難以招架。

製造這種痛苦是可能的，決定性的原因在於，雖然與美國消費者、農民和盟友有關的數額聽起來很大，但實際上特朗普政府還是可以搞定的，比如給美國農民的160億美元的補貼。然而，貿易戰給美國金融市場造成的潛在影響之大，連6000億美元的世界經濟損失與之相比都算是個小數字。全球經濟一年損失6000億美元，低於美國金融市場單日可能損失的數額，而160億美元的損失可能在幾秒鐘內發生。由於美國金融市場規模龐大，特朗普政府沒有足夠的資源，來控制超過30萬億美元的美國股票市場或160萬億美元的美國國債市場。因此，美國金融市場大幅下跌給美國帶來的痛苦，在某種程度上嚴重危害特朗普政府穩定。

對特朗普政府面臨的所有三個時間框架的分析，可能需要單獨寫三篇文章或者一篇長文。由於篇幅有限，這裏暫不作詳細分析，下文將僅就這其中最迫在眉睫且影響最大的首要問題——中美貿易戰對美國金融市場的影響，進行分析。

在美國，總統無法控制金融市場

本文開頭引用的約翰·奧瑟斯的直白分析，準確地反映了一個美國總統在國內經濟中所實際扮演的角色——這與中國普遍的看法不同。與中國相反，在美國政府體制下，總統對最有效的經濟槓桿幾乎沒有直接控制權——美國沒有大型國有經濟部門可由總統指揮以增加經濟的活力，聯邦預算由國會而不是總統決定，根據美國法律利率是由美聯儲而非總統控制。

引起奧瑟斯注意的是，中國自己就是貿易戰中的新要素，這也是美國總統無法控制的。事實充分證明，現在中國的言論和行動對美國金融市場的影響非常大，具體例子見下文。美國前財政部長薩默斯（Larry Summers）在《華盛頓郵報》的一篇評論文章中清楚地用數字描述了這一點：“星期一（5月13日），中國宣佈對美國600億美元商品加徵關税，隨後美國威脅對3000億美元中國商品加徵關税。這些動作被認為是道瓊斯工業平均指數下跌超過600點、跌幅約為2.4%的主要原因。由於美股的總市值約為30萬億美元，這一跌幅代表美股損失7000多億美元。

中國宣佈對美國600億商品加徵關税，道瓊斯工業股指應聲下跌（圖片來源： IC photo）

中國針對特朗普的舉動，將美商品關税從10%提高到25%，直接導致美國股東損失7000億美元。為舉例説明這一直接影響，奧瑟斯指出，當特朗普宣佈對中國加徵關税後的一週內，中國並未做出反應時，美股沒有明顯波動，而當中國宣佈反制措施後，美國股市瞬間做出反應：“公平地説，華爾街沒有預料到中國會對美國加徵中國商品關税進行報復。上週，唐納德·特朗普總統宣佈對中國商品加徵新關税的負面反應出人意料地緩和下來。週一，在中國在美國投市開盤前公佈反制措施後，標準普爾500指數的跌幅超過了上週的水平。”

奧瑟斯認為，中國的應對技巧日益嫺熟，他同時指出此舉對美國市場造成的影響：“問題在於，中國越來越知道如何應對。中國知道，攻擊美國總統的弱點，在於摧毀道瓊斯指數。因此，其不僅對美國商品加徵關税作為報復，而且特意在中國夜間、臨近美國股市開盤前宣佈反制措施，以達到報復的最大效果。”

如上文所述，美國股市單日損失7000億美元，超過了貿易戰帶給全球經濟一年的預期損失，是特朗普對美國農民160億美元補貼的40多倍。但即便如此，與中國的經濟反制措施給美國金融市場帶來的損失相比，這個數字也很小。正如奧瑟斯所説：“過去五年，最令美國市場恐懼的事件是中國人民幣在2015年突然貶值。”

人民幣貶值的影響是顯而易見的。從2015年8月10日至8月24日的僅僅14天間，人民幣匯率下跌3.0%。8月25日，美國標準普爾500指數隨之下跌11.2%。根據當前美國股市市值衡量，這相當於美股損失3.8萬億美元，是中美貿易戰帶給全球經濟一年預期損失總額的6倍，是特朗普對農民補貼金額的200多倍。

上述數據並非是向中國建議任何具體的行動方案。筆者深知，與美國進行貿易談判和製作經濟政策時，中國必須考慮諸多因素。一些關鍵信息只有參與談判的人才知道。此外，中國不僅必須考慮到制定的政策對中國國內的影響，而且還要考慮到它們對美國的影響。但這些數據表明，中國採取的行動對美國金融市場的影響極為深遠，因此特朗普政府對此非常敏感。相關的金融數據清楚地解釋了為什麼這種影響比關税對農民和消費者的影響來得更快更大。

特朗普的真正目標是“雙輸”

鑑定中國可能給美國金融市場和美國經濟造成多大程度的痛苦至關重要，因為事實上，特朗普的關税政策的目的並非為了改善美國自身的現狀。彭博社專欄作家諾亞·史密斯（Noah Smith）在題為《特朗普對華貿易戰的殘酷邏輯:可能並不是以美國利益最大化為目標》中，精闢準確地總結了特朗普政府的真正目標。正如王文指出，除了買辦在為中國向美國道歉外，特朗普政策的這一邏輯在中國現已廣為人知。儘管如此，我們還是有必要引述一下彭博社的分析，以下這段話從美國視角極為貼切地總結了特朗普政府的邏輯：

“貿易戰使美國付出了代價。經濟學家的數據證明，關税的實際負擔主要落在了美國消費者身上。換句話説，消費者為進口商品支付的價格上升了……生產資料和中間產品價格增加提高了美國製造商的開支，降低了他們的競爭力。與此同時，中國的報復傷害了美國農民……因此，隨着損失的增加，似乎沒有理由繼續進行貿易戰。然而，特朗普卻在變本加厲。那麼，原因何在？

如果特朗普想延緩中國作為超級大國的崛起速度，貿易戰可能是一種有效的手段。如果對美國的傷害是適度的，而中國付出的代價是嚴重和持久的，特朗普可能會得出這樣的結論：前一種損失可以接受。基於這種邏輯，‘地緣政治而非美國利益最大化至上’是總統的真正目標。”

換言之，正如在農業補貼方面已經表明的那樣，特朗普政府並不認為，關税和其他針對中國的經濟侵略形式有利於美國經濟繁榮，相反它們會造成經濟損失。但為了推行保守主義政策，阻止中國實現繁榮和民族復興，特朗普還是決定寧願讓美國民眾和企業遭受痛苦。但這項政策要求“對美國的傷害是適度的”。問題在於，加徵關税越多，尤其是如果中國採取報復行動，那麼不僅對美國金融市場，對美國消費者（即美國選民）的傷害就越大。

奧瑟斯指出：“與此同時，未來美國仍然可以加徵更多關税，但目前為止其選擇攻擊的商品在很大程度上都不是受消費者重視的。任何進一步的關税轉嫁到消費品中，價格上漲就將是顯而易見和痛苦的，甚至可能再次推高利率。”正如已經指出的那樣，這對美國金融市場的影響可能比關税的直接影響嚴重得多。

一旦瞭解特朗普政府的真正目標，就會明白特朗普政府的目標不在於改善美國經濟或提高美國民眾的經濟地位，以及特朗普政府的政策為什麼不會因為中國讓步或尋求雙贏而停止。中國一些勢力聲稱，只要中國向美國讓步或求饒，那麼特朗普政府就將會停止攻擊，這有悖於事實。相反，這樣的政策將導致特朗普政府變本加厲。這源於特朗普政府的政策不是為美國尋求雙贏，而是創造雙輸的目標——只要美國遭受的經濟損失是“適度的”就行。特朗普政府的這種立場邏輯意味着，任何中國地位的削弱、任何美國痛苦的減輕，都會加劇特朗普政府的具侵略性，而不減少。

特朗普追求的不是“贏”而是“輸”（圖片來源：IC photo）

這説明，儘管大多數國家都在尋求與中國取得雙贏，並在此基礎上進行適當的接觸，這也是中國外交政策的宗旨。但這不適用於特朗普政府，因為其不想“贏”——它只想尋求某種“輸”——只要這種“輸”在他們的預料之中，不足以威脅特朗普的連任就可以。

從這種情況來看，唯一能阻止或者迫使特朗普政府停止攻擊中國的方法 ，是令美國遭受的損失大於預期。也就是説，從特朗普政府的利益角度來看，經濟損失太大，他們會無法承受。如上文分析，很明顯特朗普的忍受度並非以美國人民的利益為考量，而在於是否會影響其連任。總的來説，只有當美國遭受的經濟損失足夠嚴重，危及特朗普連任的機會，特朗普政府才會停止對中國的攻擊，而去選擇“雙贏”的結果。

讓特朗普迴歸理性，中國應該怎麼做

宣佈將對中國商品關税從10%提高到25%後，特朗普本人對於美國金融市場的反應很快證實了美國政府這種“雙輸邏輯”演化而來的策略：

5月5日，特朗普在推特上宣佈將對中國商品關税從10%提高到25%，當時中國並沒有宣佈對策，標準普爾500指數第二天僅下跌0.5%。

5月13日，中國宣佈反制措施，標準普爾500指數單日下跌2.4%。正如拉里•薩默斯指出，美國股東單日損失7000億美元。

接下來的一週，特朗普政府宣稱貿易談判將恢復，財政部長史蒂文·努欽可能在不久的將來訪問北京，結果標普500指數應聲上漲1.7%。

在美國金融市場有所復甦後，特朗普又對中國發起了新的攻擊，要求美國公司獲得美國政府的許可後，才能向華為出售組件和軟件。

中國隨後在5月23日對此作出強烈回應。正如《華爾街日報》指出：“道瓊斯工業平均指數週四下跌286點……此前一位中國官員表示，如果美國願意繼續談判，應該以誠意，‘調整錯誤行動’。道瓊斯指數本週下跌0.7%，連續第五週下跌，創2011年以來的最長下跌週期。”

為應對美國金融市場的下跌，特朗普隨後在新聞發佈會上軟化立場並當場宣佈，與中國的貿易談判“很有可能”回到正軌，華為問題可能會在該談判中得到解決。

這種短期模式非常清晰：當中國不作出反應，美國金融市場沒有下跌時，特朗普會繼續攻擊中國。相反，當中國作出強烈反應，美國金融市場下跌時，特朗普則會軟化立場，對中國示好。

特朗普的長期應對模式與短期應對模式如出一轍，他會根據中國的反應切換自如地強化或軟化立場：

2018年，當美國經濟增長有所加速、經濟週期經歷正常的上行波動以及股票市場強勁時，特朗普對中國主動出擊，推出第一套反華關税，並威脅將其擴大到更廣泛的商品範圍，將税率提高至25%。

然後，2018年末，美國經濟增長開始放緩，美聯儲不得不加息，美股下跌。為應對這種局面，2019年初特朗普軟化立場，將針對中國商品加徵關税從10%提高至25%的期限推遲。

當美國經濟似乎在2019年第一季度復甦，美聯儲暫停加息，美股上漲時，特朗普隨後宣佈對中國採取新一輪攻擊，將中國商品關税從10%提高到25%。

一言以蔽之，當特朗普政府覺得自己處於強勢地位時，就會加大對中國的攻擊；當特朗普政府因為美國金融市場遭受的痛苦而底氣不足時，其對中國的立場就會迴歸理性。

從真正的戰爭到貿易戰——歷史給出了答案

雖然上述分析清楚地體現了特朗普政府為何不回應雙贏框架，而只在意美國遭受的經濟痛苦會否危及特朗普連任的原因，但為避免任何誤解，有必要指出，美國會避免和中國決一死戰。所有的證據都表明，特朗普對美國長期利益的興趣比大多數總統都要小。對他來説，那些明確危及他2020年連任的經濟痛苦是唯一不可接受的。

舉一場戰爭的例子有助於我們瞭解這一點——這是一場是真正的戰爭，而非貿易戰。這場戰爭——越南戰爭以美國認輸告終。當時的越南政府的應對策略很有技巧，以政治影響達成了軍事目標。越南戰爭中的兩大進攻戰役——1968年的春節攻勢和1972年的復活節攻勢，均是在美國總統選舉年發動的。這兩場戰役都沒有導致美國軍事失敗，但對美國總統的政治傷害確保了越南的勝利——林登·約翰遜在春節後由於連任無望不得不放棄競選，尼克松深信他作為總統的地位將受到戰爭的威脅，於是他於1969年後開始逐步撤軍，1972年復活節攻勢後決定撤出全部美軍。簡言之，越南戰勝美國，並非是在軍事上全面戰勝美國，而是給美國總統帶來政治傷害，以至於其為了維護自己的地位，不得不撤軍。越南的軍事鬥爭是其對美國取得決定性政治勝利的手段。

遭受政治上失敗的美國不得不從越南撤軍（圖片來源：網絡）

但美國遭受政治失敗的前提是越南敢於與美國進行軍事鬥爭。如果越南停止給美國帶去痛苦（比如未讓美國遭受巨大的戰爭代價或人員損失），那麼美國不會撤軍，反而會加大對越南的攻擊。這可以從美國取得巨大勝利的相反例子——蘇聯解體中看出。時任蘇聯總統戈爾巴喬夫選擇向美國求饒。但美國並沒有因此放過蘇聯，反而加大了對蘇聯的攻擊，最終導致蘇聯解體。俄羅斯總統普京把蘇聯解體稱為“20世紀最大的地緣政治災難”。蘇聯解體後，美國並未收手，而是對繼承了蘇聯絕大部分遺產的俄羅斯繼續攻擊，比如將幾乎所有東歐和前蘇聯的大部分地區納入北約，並對在俄羅斯戰略上具有決定性的地位的鄰國烏克蘭發動攻擊。

美國當前攻擊中國的策略，充分印證了習近平在於都發表重要講話時強調的“最重要的還是做好我們自己的事情”。為避免雙輸，中國一直尋求與美國實現雙贏，而非對抗。但是，一旦特朗普政府開始與中國進行雙輸的對抗，那麼這樣的鬥爭只能依靠中國自身的力量來贏得。只有給特朗普政府施加足夠的痛苦，才能讓他們認識到最好拋棄“雙輸”戰略。而他們衡量這種痛苦是否可以承受的標準是特朗普連任的機會。

幸運的是，中美當前的鬥爭是經濟戰爭，而非真正的戰爭。經濟戰爭中的輕型武器，不是步槍和左輪手槍，而是針對農產品的關税和所需要的補貼。中型武器是消費者抵制，重型武器則是上文所分析的對美國金融市場施加的影響。這是自1949年中華人民共和國建國以來取得巨大歷史進步的標誌，因為中國現在只需要應對特朗普政府的經濟攻擊，而在一個多世紀前中國必須應對軍事入侵。

1933年—1934年，國民黨對中央蘇區發動第五次軍事“圍剿”，紅軍反“圍剿”失敗，被迫開始進行長征。即便紅軍當時向國民黨求饒是沒有意義的，因為國民黨決心摧毀後來締造了新中國的這支軍隊。如果當時的紅軍一味的妥協或求饒，只會招致國民黨變本加厲的鎮壓和屠殺。好在這支軍隊從未屈服，憑着鬥智鬥勇，最終戰勝了國民黨，建立了中華人民共和國，從而為中華民族的復興奠定了基礎。

同樣，特朗普政府決心阻止中國實現民族復興。如前所述，中國沒有必要向美國示弱或求饒，否則只會導致其變得更具侵略性。主導特朗普政府政策的新保守主義者們的最終目的，是阻止中國實現民族復興，而確保這一點的最終手段是設法令中國重蹈蘇聯覆轍，如同前蘇聯一樣遭受歷史性災難。

去年早些時候，我曾把特朗普治下的美國比作老虎。中國沒有必要向美國這隻老虎求饒，否則它只會變本加厲攻擊中國，它也會把中國任何軟弱的跡象作為進一步加大攻擊的理由。只有當美國這隻老虎感到害怕時，它才會停止攻擊中國。有些人可能認為這種説法比較殘酷。但上述事例表明，事實就是如此。

面對殘酷的“圍剿”，紅軍並未屈服，最終為民族復興奠定了基礎（圖片來源：網絡）

誰才是中國真正的精英？

最後，特別要提到的是，近來的很多文章提到了中國的“社會精英”——也許還有部分“經濟精英”。中國媒體在定義“精英”時往往遵循非常模糊的標準，而近來發生的事件清楚地表明，這些“精英”並不能真正稱為中國社會精英。中國的情況表明，恰恰是中國的普通民眾，他們瞭解特朗普政權侵略行為，並堅定支持習近平和其他中國領導人採取強硬立場。

而中國社會精英中的一些人完全誤判了形勢，認為綏靖政策和向美國求饒會讓特朗普政府減少對中國的攻擊。中國普通民眾與知識精英的認知正好相反。作為知識精英意味着得準確判斷形勢，但正如近來發生的事件表明，他們完全是錯誤的。正確認識特朗普政權、支持共產黨領導地位的，正是中國普通民眾，這説

明他們才是真正的知識精英。那些誤判形勢的人可能是社會精英，也可能不是社會精英。那些未能準確看清形勢並對美國抱有天真幻想的人充其量只能算是“偽精英”知識分子罷了。

結論

上文對美國經濟和金融市場形勢的分析，充爭印證了其他人對中國形勢的分析。本文解釋了特朗普政府不能在雙贏的基礎上進行合作的原因。同時表明，基於特朗普政府的“雙輸”立場邏輯，美國金融市場形勢是特朗普最敏感的痛點，而這也是中國對付美國的着力點。

附：文章英文原文

What are China’s most powerful weapons in economic ‘prolonged war’ with Trump?

‘At least two other organizations have more power over [US financial] markets than the White House. They are the US Federal Reserve and the Chinese Communist Party. Trump does not directly control either of them.’

This brutal analysis is particularly significant as it is by one of the most senior and accurate Western specialists on financial markets - John Authers, Senior Bloomberg Editor for Markets and former Chief Markets Commentator for the Financial Times. It encapsulates the interaction of economic and political problems facing President Trump. As will be seen it also summarises the relative strengths of China and the US in the ‘trade war’, dictates the US administration’s tactics for attacking China, and determines the only policies which will prevent the Trump administration carrying out its attempt to block China achieving its development goals.

Analysis of these real facts of US financial markets and policy strongly confirms the analysis by Xi Jinping in his recent important speech in Yudu County that China has to rely on its own strength in resisting this attempt by the US administration to prevent China achieving prosperity and national rejuvenation.

While the situation of China itself in the trade/economic war is naturally the most important issue there are of course two sides involved in this conflict – the other aspect of the situation is within the US. Analysis of this, which forms the subject of this article, shows clearly why the Trump administration refuses to accept ‘win-win’ relations with China and what is the inevitable outcome of this administration’s ‘lose-lose’ logic. Such analysis in turn shows that comparisons made in China to the Long March or to protracted war are not simply rhetorical metaphors, or references to the historical traditions of the CPC, but provide an accurate framework to understand the situation.

The difference, of course, is that this is an economic war and not a military one. Therefore, the weapons are different and it is necessary to analyse what are the most sensitive pressure points on the US, and what armaments are most powerful for China. In turn this examination of the situation in the US economy fully confirms the analyses made of the situation in China and the reaction of different social layers to the present conflict with the US.

Trends in China and the US

Examining the Chinese side of the ‘trade war’ Wang Wen has presented an excellent analysis of the reaction of different social strata in China to the Trump administration’s economic aggression. This could only have been written by someone who is Chinese, and it is not appropriate for a non-Chinese citizen to comment on it. But its analysis can be noted: ‘The vast majority of ordinary people are highly supportive of the state’s policy of counter-bullying in the United States, and the current fear of the US exists mainly in some social elites. For example, in WeChat, Weibo, new media and anecdotes, at meals, there are often some words, passages, comics, data and even some rumours attempting to demonstrate the irrationality of China’s counterattack measures, to distort China’s fighting and unbreakable position, to describe China’s deteriorating status quo, to outline the future of China’s eventual failure. Others have used some data and examples to exaggerate the strength of the US economic growth, glorify the soundness of the US capital market, fictitiously exaggerate the unity of the United States and international allies, and fabricate the friendliness of the American social elite.’

But it is particularly striking that this analysis of trends within China, made by a Chinese citizen, is fully confirmed from another ‘external’ angle – that of the situation in the US and the forces operating on the Trump administration. The facts of the US economy and politics show clearly that any weakness by China, in expectation of ‘mercy’ from the Trump administration, will in reality lead to heightened attacks by the US.

Trump’s economic policy is determined by the coming US Presidential election

The starting point of any analysis of the situation in the US is that President Trump is already entirely aware of the most important date he faces - 3 November 2020, the next US Presidential election. Securing re-election is his paramount goal and this therefore determines the shaping of the Trump administration’s policies. Three time frames are crucial for this.

1.The impact of events in financial markets, which can occur in a very short time frame - in some cases minutes/hours and almost invariably having a strong impact over a period of days to months.

2.The medium-term trajectory of the US economy to slow down during 2019 and 2020 – which is necessarily a negative factor for President Trump’s chances of re-election in 2020 and which interacts with the adverse effects of US tariff policy on US consumers such as price rises and falls in prices to farmers. (The reasons for this slowing of the US economy in 2019-2020 are analysed in detail in my book ‘Don’t Misunderstand China’s Economy’)

3.Attempts to slow China’s economy in the medium/longer term, through forcing or persuading it to abandon its socialist path of development – this, however, also has short/medium term effects in that lessening of the successful dynamic of China’s economy makes it less attractive to other countries and therefore weakens China’s alliances in the trade war.

All three time frames however confirm a fundamental reality – that while China’s relations with most countries, and indeed with some previous US presidents, can be most successful based on ‘win-win’ this will not occur with the Trump administration, This is due to the fact that the Trump administration already acknowledges in practice that its policies will be a US ‘lose’, that is they will inflict pain on the US economy, and it is merely attempting to ensure that the ‘lose’ for China is bigger than the ‘lose’ for the US.

The Trump administration’s ‘lose-lose’ analysis

An illustration on a small scale of the Trump administration’s understanding of the need to attempt to limit the extent of economic pain on the US is its recent announcement of $16 billion of subsidies to US farmers – the bill for which will be financed by other US taxpayers as is increasingly understood in the United States. As CNN noted: ‘Just as Mexico was supposed to pay for the wall, but isn’t, now China is supposed to pay for President Donald Trump’s plan to bail out US farmers. Neither statement is true, of course.’

Affecting wider sections of the US population, calculations by the respected Western economics company Oxford Economics, which has no connection with China, found: ‘Chinese manufacturing… lowered prices in the United States for consumer goods, dampening inflation and putting more money in American wallets… trade with China… saved these families up to $850 that year.’ Regarding the overall impact on the global economy, including the adverse effect on US allies, Bloomberg and others calculate that the losses in a full year of the trade war would be $600 billion.

In addition to these tariff effects the Trump administration US is equally concerned about the consequences of consumer boycotts, or restrictions, on US companies which would be equivalent to those it has carried out against Huawei. The Financial Times noted for example that the immediate goal of the US sanctions against Huawei are not simply or primarily to stop the supply of chips and software but to destroy the consumer market for Huawei’s products in the West - where customers want guaranteed access to Google dependent products: ’Google’s decision this week to stop selling its Android operating system to Huawei for new handsets makes little difference in China, where Huawei should be able to convince buyers to switch to its operating system, now under development. But customers are more wedded to Android in international markets. Independent analyst Richard Windsor estimates it will lose all those sales.’ But the Financial Times simultaneously noted that consumer retaliation against China would have a devastating financial effect on Apple, one of the US’s core and most valuable companies: ‘Beijing has scope for retaliation. Levers at its disposal include blocking access to its market — a move that Goldman Sachs analysts estimate could reduce Apple’s earnings per share by nearly 30 per cent.’ This is one of the reason’s US companies are particularly worried about the damage to their financial position by the new ‘unreliable list’ announced by China. It is also a reason US companies fear actions on rare earths by China.

These specific examples clearly illustrate that in practice, despite its claims to the contrary, the Trump administration starts from the framework that its policies will inflict pain on the US economy, but that it will be able to limit this loss. China’s route to success is therefore to inflict pain on the US economy to a point that is unacceptable for Trump in seeking re-election.

US financial markets

A decisive reason that such pain for the US is possible is that while the sums noted in relation to US consumers, farmers, and allies above sound large the Trump administration can in fact deal with amounts such as $16 billion to farmers. But even such sums as the $600 billion loss for the global economy are small compared to potential impacts on the size of US financial markets. The loss of $600 billion in a year for the global economy is less than the amount that can be lost in US financial markets in a single day, while a loss of $16 billion can occur in seconds. Due to the sheer scale of US financial markets the Trump administration does not remotely have the resources to control the more than $30,000 billion US share market or the $16,000 billion US Treasury bond market. Pain inflicted on the US in such financial markets is therefore on a scale which is seriously destabilising to the Trump administration.

Examination of all three time frames operating on the Trump administration considered above would require three separate analyses or an inordinately long article. Therefore, due to their sheer scale, this article examines only the first, most short term, but extremely powerful of these issues – the impact of the trade war on US financial markets.

The real situation facing US presidents

John Authers’ blunt comment cited at the beginning of this article, reveals accurately the real domestic economic situation of a US President – which is very different to the frequent perception in China. Unlike China, under the US governmental system the President has little direct control over the most powerful levers of the economy – there is no large state owned economic sector which can be instructed by the President to increase its activity, the Federal budget is decided by the Congress not by the President, and interest rates are controlled by the Federal Reserve which under US law cannot be instructed by the President.

The new factor in the trade war which Authers drew attention to, which is also outside the US President’s control, is China itself. The facts amply confirm that the impact of China’s statements and actions on US financial markets is now very large – as will be demonstrated. Larry Summers, former US Treasury Secretary, clearly spelt out this numerically in a commentary for the Washington Post: ‘On Monday [13 May], China announced new tariffs on $60 billion of US exports, and the United States threatened new tariffs on up to $300 billion of Chinese goods. These actions were cited as the principal reason for a decline of more than 600 points in the Dow Jones industrial average, or about 2.4 percent in broader measures of the stock market. With the total value of US stocks around $30 trillion, this decline represents more than $700 billion in lost wealth.’

This $700 billion loss to US shareholders directly resulted from China’s response to President Trump’s announcement he was raising US tariffs against China from 10% to 25%. To illustrate this direct impact Authers’ accurately noted the difference on US share markets between the week following Trump’s announcement of raising tariffs against China, during which there was no announcement of a precise Chinese response, and the US financial markets’ reaction when China announced its counter tariffs: ‘It’s fair to say that Wall Street did not anticipate China’s retaliation to US tariffs. Last week, the negative reaction to President Donald Trump’s announcement of new tariffs on China was oddly muted. On Monday, after China’s response was announced just before the market opened, the S&P 500 fell by more than it had done in the entire previous week.’

Authers similarly noted the increasing skill of China’s response and its impact on US markets: ‘The problem is that China knows how to respond. China… knows it can attack the presidential weak spot by acting in a way that damages the Dow. Hence, it not only retaliated with tariffs of its own, but announced them just as the New York market was about to open, at night in China, for maximum effect.’

As already noted, the $700 billion loss in a single day on US share markets was larger than the projected loss to the world economy for an entire year due to the trade war – and over 40 times the $16 billion bill for Trump’s subsidies to US farmers. But even this sum is small compared to losses on US financial markets that can occur due to others of China’s economic actions. As Authers noted: ‘In the last five years, the event that scared the US market the most, by a wide margin, was the surprise Chinese yuan devaluation in 2015.’

The above figures are not given to propose any specific course of action for China. The author knows that numerous factors have to be taken into account both in trade negotiations with the US and in economic policy. Some of the key pieces of information for this are known only to those involved in the negotiations. Also domestic effects of policies, not only their impact on the US, have to be taken into account. But the data is given to indicate the extreme impact of actions by China in affecting US financial markets, and therefore the sensitivity of the Trump administration to this. The financial sums involved make clear why this impact it is much more rapid and greater than effects on farmers and consumers.

The real aim of Trump’s policy

This identification of the degree of pain which can be inflicted by China on US financial markets, and on the US economy, is crucial because Trump’s tariff policies cannot, indeed are not intended to, improve the situation of the US itself. Bloomberg columnist Noah Smith summarised the Trump administration’s real aim very accurately under the self-explanatory headline ‘The Grim Logic of Trump’s Trade War With China - Maximizing American prosperity probably isn’t the goal.’ Apart from comprador apologists for the US within China, noted by Wang Wen, this logic of Trump’s policy is by now well understood in China. But, nevertheless, it is worth quoting this Bloomberg analysis at length as it summarises very accurately from a US perspective the logic of the Trump administration:

‘So with… losses mounting, it looked like there was little reason to continue the trade war. Yet Trump is doubling down. Why?…

‘If Trump wants to slow China’s ascent as a superpower, a trade war might be an effective way to do it. If the harm to the US is modest and the costs for China are severe and lasting, Trump might conclude that the former are acceptable losses.’ On this logic: ‘Geopolitical primacy, not maximum prosperity for Americans’ was ‘the president’s true objective.’

In other words, as was already shown in the case of farm subsidies, the Trump administration quite accurately does not believe that tariffs and other forms of economic aggression against China aid US economic prosperity - on the contrary they cause economic pain. But it decides to inflict this pain on US citizens and companies in order to pursue neo-con policies trying to block China’s prosperity and national rejuvenation. But this policy requires that ‘the harm to the US is modest.‘ The problem is that the more tariffs are imposed , and above all if China retaliates, the greater the pain not only for US financial markets but for US consumers – that is US voters. As Authers noted: ‘Meanwhile, the US can still impose more tariffs, but the goods it has chosen to attack have been largely invisible to consumers. Any further tariffs will take it into consumer products where price rises will be visible and painful, and might even, again, act as a spur to raise [interest] rates.’ The effect on US financial markets, as already noted, can be far more severe than the direct effect of the tariffs.

Why win-win will not work with the Trump administration

Understanding the Trump’s administrations real aim shows not only why its goal is not to improve the economic position of the US economy or US citizens but simultaneously makes clear why its policies will not be stopped by appeals to reason or ‘win-win’. Forces in China claiming that the Trump administrations attacks will be stopped by ‘appeasement’, or by appeals for mercy, are presenting the reverse of the truth – such policies will lead to the Trump administration becoming more aggressive. This flows inevitably from the fact that the Trump administration’s policy is not to seek a ‘win-win’ for the US but to create a ‘lose-lose’ with the aim that the ‘lose’ in terms of economic pain for the US should be ‘modest’. This logic of the Trump administration’s position means that any weakening of China’s position, any alleviation of the pain inflicted on the US, will lead to the Trump administration becoming more aggressive, not less.

This makes clear while most countries seek a ‘win-win’ with China, and can therefore rightly be approached on this basis, and indeed this forms the basis of China’s foreign policy, this will not work with the Trump administration because it is not seeking a ‘win’ – it is merely seeking that the ‘lose’ for the US it knows will occur should not be sufficiently large to threaten Trump’s re-election.

It follows from this situation that the only thing that will deter the Trump administration, and force it off its path of attacks on China, is if the ‘lose’ for the US is bigger than it had anticipated – that is if the economic pain is too large to be bearable from the point of view of the interests of the Trump administration. From what has already been analysed, it is also clear that Trump’s measure of what is bearable is not the interests of the US people, but whether it affects the President’s chances of re-election. In summary, only if the economic pain suffered by the US is sufficiently severe that it endangers Trump’s re-election chances will the Trump administration desist from its attacks on China.

The only ‘win’ which the Trump administration takes into account is, therefore, if the ‘lose/pain’ of the confrontation with China is seen as endangering Trump’s re-election chances and the ‘win’ is then simply the lessening of that pain to a point where it is no longer seen as endangering Trump’s election campaign.

Confirmation of the forces acting on the Trump administration

This situation of the Trump administration which flows from its ‘lose-lose’ logic is fully confirmed even in the extremely short term by the chronology of President Trump’s own personal responses to events in US financial markets in announcing the increase in tariffs against China from 10% to 25%.

On 5 May Trump announced on twitter the raising of tariffs against China from 10% to 25%, there was no immediate announced countermeasure by China, and the S&P 500 US share index fell by only 0.5% on the following day.

In contrast on 13 May China announced counter tariffs and the S&P 500 fell by 2.4% in a single day – costing US shareholders $700 billion as Larry Summers noted.

For the rest of the following week the Trump administration attempted to claim that trade talks would be resuming, and that Treasury Secretary Mnuchin would probably be visiting Beijing in the near future - the S&P500 recovered by 1.7%.

Having achieved this recovery in US financial markets President Trump then initiated a new attack on China by requiring US companies to have permission from the US government to sell components and software to Huawei.

China then responded to this strongly on 23 May. As the Wall Street Journal noted: ‘ The Dow Jones Industrial Average fell 286 points Thursday… after a Chinese official said the US should “adjust its wrong actions” if it would like to continue negotiations. The losses pulled the Dow industrials into the red for the week, continuing a dismal stretch as it hurtled toward its fifth straight weekly loss—which would be its longest such losing streak since 2011. ‘

In response to this fall on US financial markets President Trump then immediately softened his rhetoric by announcing at a press conference that there was a ‘good possibility’ that trade negotiations with China would get back on track and that issues with Huawei might be settled in that deal.

The short term pattern was therefore extremely clear. When there was no reaction from China, US financial markets did not fall, and Trump continued his aggression against China. When, on the contrary, China responded strongly, US financial markets fell and Trump attempted to present a picture he was lessening his attack on China.

In addition to these short-term movements analysed above the same process over a longer term also explains the dynamic of the ‘hardening’ and ‘softening’ of the Trump administration’s positions in the course of its negotiations with China.

During 2018, when the US economy was experiencing economic strengthening, during a normal upswing of a business cycle, and with a strong share market, Trump acted aggressively to China – launching the first set of anti-China tariffs and threatening to expand them to a wider range of goods and increase their rate to 25%.

Then in late 2018 the US economy began to slow, the Federal Reserve was raising interest rates, and the US share market fell. In response to this, at the beginning of 2019, Trump ‘softened’ his position – postponing the raising of US tariffs against China from 10% to 25%.

When the US economy appeared to recover in the first quarter of 2019, with the Federal Reserve suspending increases in interest rates, and the share market rose, Trump then announced new aggressive actions against China by raising tariffs from 10% to 25%.

This therefore clearly reflects the ‘lose-lose’ framework in which the Trump administration operates. When the ‘lose’ or ‘pain’ in US financial markets is not great the Trump administration proceeds to attack China. When, on the contrary, China’s reaction increases pain in US financial markets Trump acts more reasonably. That is, whenever the Trump administration feels in a stronger position it increases its attacks on China, whenever the Trump administration feels weaker due to the pain in US financial markets it acts more reasonably to China.

What is the Trump administration’s bottom line?

While the above clearly shows why the Trump administration will not respond to a ‘win-win’ framework, but only to economic pain, to avoid any misunderstanding it should be made clear that it does not lead to the conclusion that the US and China are locked in a ‘war to the death’. All the evidence is that President Trump is less interested in the long-term interests of the US than most Presidents. The precise economic pain which is unacceptable to his administration is that which would lead to endangering his re-election in 2020.

A relevant comparison which helps understand this dynamic is that is to a real war, not just a trade one, which the US lost – the Vietnam war. Vietnam’s tactics in this were skilful in that political impacts guided military goals. The two largest Vietnamese offensives of the war, the Tet Offensive in 1968 and the Easter Offensive in 1972, were launched in US presidential election years. Neither resulted in US military defeat but the political damage done to US presidents ensured Vietnam’s victory – Johnson was forced to abandon as hopeless any attempt to run for re-election as president after Tet, and Nixon was so convinced that his position as president would be threatened by the war that he started a progressive US military withdrawal after 1968 and decided on a total US withdrawal of US forces after the 1972 Easter Offensive. In short, the ‘bottom line’ for Vietnam’s victory against the US was not total military defeat of the US, which was never achieved, but inflicting such pain on US presidents that to safeguard their own position they were forced to withdraw. The military struggle in Vietnam was the means by which the decisive political victory in the US was achieved.

But the precondition for that US political defeat was the military struggle in Vietnam. If Vietnam had ceased inflicting pain on the US, both economic in terms of the gigantic cost of the war and in terms of losses of American forces, then the US instead of withdrawing would have increased its attacks on Vietnam. This can be clearly seen in the opposite case in which the US achieved a great victory – the destruction of the USSR. Gorbachev attempted to appease the US and beg for mercy. The US did not lessen but increased its attacks as a result - culminating in the catastrophic disintegration of the USSR itself, characterised by Putin as ‘the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the [20th] century’. After this tremendous defeat of Russia this again did not lead to a lessening but to further intensification of attacks on Russia by the US – incorporating almost all of Eastern Europe and large parts of the former USSR into NATO and launching of attacks on Russia’s position in its strategically decisive neighbour of Ukraine.

The strategic conclusion of the present US attacks on China fully confirms the important speech by Xi Jinping emphasising that ‘The most important thing is to do our own thing’. China has not been seeking a confrontation with the US, a lose-lose. On the contrary China has been seeking a win-win. But once the Trump administration embarked on the course of a lose-lose confrontation then such a struggle can only be won by China relying on its own strength. Sufficient pain must be inflicted on the Trump administration that it decides it is better to abandon the lose-lose. And the criteria by which it will judge whether the pain in the ‘lose-lose’ is bearable is the effect on its chances of re-election.

Fortunately, the present struggle is an economic war and not a real war. The ‘small arms’ in that economic war are not rifles and revolvers but tariffs against farmers and the subsidies these require, its medium weapons are consumer boycotts, its heavy artillery are such issues as the impact on US financial markets analysed above. It is a measure of the gigantic historical progress made by China since 1949 under the People’s Republic that it now only has to deal with economic attacks by the Trump administration – for a century before that China had to deal with actual military invasions.

The sacrifices made by the heroes of the Long March were far greater than anything the people of China face today in the economic attacks by the Trump administration – a situation of the strengthening of China that was precisely due to those earlier heroes. But the comparisons made by Xi Jinping to the Long March are entirely apposite and not at all merely references to the CPC’s historical tradition.

The Kuomintang’s Fifth Encirclement Campaign, the origin of Long March, was designed by the KMT to destroy and annihilate the forces opposing it – why it is also called the ‘Fifth Extermination Campaign’. It was purposeless to have attempted to appease or beg for mercy from the KMT, which was determined to destroy the forces which later created the New China. Any appeasement, or appeal for mercy, would have been met by the KMT crushing and massacring the forces they opposed. Only resistance to the KMT created the possibility to later create the People’s Republic of China and lay the basis for China’s national rejuvenation.

Similarly, the Trump administration is determined to block China’s national rejuvenation. As already shown, there is no point to attempt to appease it or beg for mercy from it, this will merely lead to it becoming more aggressive. The ultimate aim of the neo-cons at present directing the Trump administration’s policies is to block China’s national rejuvenation and the final way to ensure that is to ensure that that China should suffer the same historical catastrophe as the USSR under Gorbachev.

Early last year I made a comparison to the polices of the US under the Trump administration as those of a tiger – there is no point to ask for mercy from a tiger, it will only attack you more, and it will also regard any sign of weakness as a further reason to increase its attack. Only if the tiger is scared will it stop its attack. Some people thought that comparison was very harsh. But the facts as shown above show it was totally accurate.

Who is the ‘elite’ of Chinese society?

Finally, as can be seen clearly from outside, it is particularly important that recent articles refer to the ‘social elite’ in China – perhaps also parts of the economic elite. Because sometimes there is a reference in China’s media to the ‘elite’ in an undifferentiated sense. Recent events show clearly why this is incorrect. Analysis in China shows it is ordinary people who have understood the aggressive actions of the Trump regime and supported the firm positions against this taken by President Xi Jinping and other CPC leaders.

It is some parts of the ‘social elite’ which have entirely misunderstood the situation and believed that appeasement and appeals for mercy would lead to the Trump administration lessening its attack on China. The latter forces are the exact opposite of an ‘intellectual elite’ – because to be an intellectual elite means to see the situation accurately and, as seen, they are entirely in error. It is the ordinary people of China who have shown they are the ‘intellectual elite’ in accurately understanding the Trump administration and supporting the positions taken by the CPC leadership. Those who wrongly analysed the situation may or may not be a social elite but they are an intellectual ‘non-elite’ – those who fail to see the situation accurately and have naïve illusions.

Conclusion

The analysis of the situation of the US economy and financial markets therefore fully confirms the analysis made by others of the situation in China.

It shows why the Trump administration cannot be dealt with on the basis of ‘win-win’.

It shows that within the ‘lose-lose’ framework of the Trump administration the situation on US financial markets is such a key point of pressure.

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