要求中國核裁軍荒謬至極

【文/周波，翻譯/觀察者網 楊瑞賡】

今年4月，中國政府派國務院副總理劉鶴訪美，以解決中美之間的貿易爭端問題。但在一次介紹貿易談判進展的白宮橢圓形辦公室新聞發佈會上，特朗普總統突然改變了話題：“在俄羅斯、中國和美國之間，我們都在製造包括核武器在內的價值數千億美元的武器，這很荒謬。”自那以後，特朗普總統下令其政府準備推動與俄羅斯和中國達成新的美俄中軍備控制協議。

如果劉鶴副總理對話題突然從貿易轉到軍備控制感到意外的話，那麼他並不是唯一對此感到驚訝的人。對於中國人而言，特朗普總統的説法毫無道理。據斯德哥爾摩國際和平研究所的數據顯示，美國和俄羅斯擁有世界上90%的核武器，而中國擁有的核彈頭（290枚）少於法國（300枚）。

瑞典斯德哥爾摩和平研究所公佈2019年全球核彈頭數據（製圖：SIPRI）

難怪中國國防部對美國、俄羅斯和中國就軍備控制達成三方協議的想法嗤之以鼻。要想達成這樣的協議，除非美國和俄羅斯都將各自的核武庫降低到中國的水平，或者中國大幅增加核武庫達到美國和俄羅斯同等規模——這兩種情況都不現實。

目前，特朗普政府正在增強美國的核能力，開發用於潛射彈道導彈的低當量彈頭和在戰場上使用的戰術核武器。俄羅斯總統弗拉基米爾·普京於2018年3月宣佈，莫斯科正在研製一種擁有“無限射程和無限機動能力”的核動力巡航導彈。

由於中國承諾不首先使用核武器，只保持精幹有效的核威懾，它必須擁有較多的陸基中程導彈，以實現與其他核大國之間的戰略平衡。換句話説，如果中國減少其大部分受中導條約限制的陸基中程導彈數量，就必須大幅提高其核打擊能力。對西方來説，兩“害”相權，哪個輕?

中國對核裁軍並未置身事外。1994年，中國向當時核俱樂部的其他四個國家即法國、俄羅斯、美國和英國提交了一份不首先使用核武器的草案。在印度和巴基斯坦於1998年進行核試驗後，中國和美國同意不再將各自的核導彈瞄準對方。其他核國家於2000年紛紛效仿。

我們真的需要像特朗普總統建議的那樣，再簽訂一個無效的核裁軍條約嗎?

《不擴散核武器條約》（Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons）只承認1967年1月以前進行核試驗的國家為有核國家，但未能阻止印度、以色列和巴基斯坦——更不用説朝鮮——成為事實上的擁核國家。

2017年的《禁止核武器條約》（Treaty on Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons）反映了人們對“核裁軍進程緩慢”的失望，這是可以理解的，但它可能並不會生效。到目前為止，只有23個國家批准了該條約，距離使其生效的50國門檻差距不小。具有諷刺意味的是，連唯一受到過核打擊的日本也拒絕加入該條約，聲稱該條約毫無用處。

如果華盛頓和莫斯科想要生活在一個核武器更少的世界，它們就需要在這個問題上發揮帶頭作用，削減各自的核武庫規模。但這種情況發生的前景似乎遙不可及。美國將於8月2日退出《中導條約》。朝鮮拒絕在沒有安全承諾的情況下做出哪怕只是表面的讓步，如果伊朗決定製造核武器，沙特阿拉伯也會效仿。在那之後，埃及和土耳其的多米諾骨牌可能也會接着倒下。

全世界的核彈頭數量已從上世紀60年代中期冷戰高峯期的約6.5萬枚下降到2019年初的13865枚。這個進步不是偶然取得的。它需要勇敢的領導人做出明智的決定。

中央軍委國際軍事合作辦公室安全合作中心主任周波7月31日在華爾街日報發文，指責美國無理要求中國核裁軍

（觀察者網楊瑞賡譯自《華爾街日報》，翻頁閲讀英文原文。）

Zhoubo：It’s Absurd To Ask China To Disarm

The Chinese government sent Vice Premier Liu He to the U.S. in April with a brief to settle the tariff war between Beijing and Washington. But during an Oval Office news conference to address the progress of trade negotiations, President Trump abruptly changed the subject: “Between Russia and China and us, we’re all making hundreds of billions of dollars’ worth of weapons, including nuclear, which is ridiculous.” Mr. Trump has since ordered his administration to prepare a push for new arms-control agreements with Russia and China.

If Mr. Liu was surprised by the pivot from trade to arms control, he wasn’t alone. To Chinese ears, Mr. Trump’s claims make no sense. Between them, the U.S. and Russia possess 90% of the world’s nuclear weapons. China has fewer nuclear warheads (290) than France (300), according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

No wonder China’s Ministry of National Defense essentially laughed at the idea of a three-way deal on arms control involving the U.S. and Russia. For such an agreement to work, either the U.S. and Russia would need to bring their nuclear arsenals down to China’s level, or China would need to increase the size of its arsenal drastically. Neither scenario is realistic.

At the moment, the Trump administration is building up U.S. nuclear capability, developing low-yield warheads for submarine-launched ballistic missiles and tactical nukes for use in battlefield situations. Russian President Vladimir Putin announced in March 2018 that Moscow is developing a nuclear-powered cruise missile with “unlimited range and unlimited ability to maneuver.”

Since China has pledged no first use of nuclear weapons and only seeks a small and effective deterrent force, it has to keep a larger arsenal of ground-based intermediate-range missiles for strategic equilibrium with other nuclear powers. In other words, if China reduces the number of its ground-based intermediate-range missiles, most of which are subject to the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, it has to increase its nuclear-strike capabilities massively. Which is the “lesser evil” for the West?

China is no stranger to nuclear disarmament. In 1994 China presented a draft of a no-first-use policy to France, Russia, the U.S. and the U.K.—the four other countries in the nuclear club at the time. After India and Pakistan conducted nuclear tests in 1998, China and the U.S. agreed to point their nuclear missiles away from one another. Other nuclear powers followed suit in 2000.

Do we really need another ineffective nuclear-disarmament treaty, as Mr. Trump suggested? The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons only recognizes the nuclear powers that conducted tests before January 1967. It hasn’t prevented India, Israel and Pakistan—not to mention North Korea—from becoming de facto nuclear states. The 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons understandably reflects frustration over “the slow pace of nuclear disarmament,” but it probably won’t come into effect. So far only 23 nations have ratified the treaty, which requires 50 to go into force. Ironically, Japan refuses to join. The only country to have suffered a nuclear attack claims to see no use in the treaty.

Washington and Moscow need to take the lead on this issue and reduce the size of their nuclear arsenals if they want to live in a world with fewer weapons. The prospect of this happening appears remote. The U.S. is set to withdraw from the INF treaty on Aug. 2. North Korea refuses to make even superficial concessions without the promise of an economic payoff, and if Iran decides to go for a bomb, Saudi Arabia will follow. Dominoes in Egypt and Turkey would likely fall after that.

The number of nuclear warheads in the world has fallen from about 65,000 at the peak of the Cold War in the mid-1960s to 13,865 at the start of 2019. That’s progress but it didn’t happen by accident. It required brave leaders to make smart decisions.

本文系觀察者網獨家稿件，未經授權，不得轉載。