聽説美國6代機全尺寸驗證機已經試飛？_風聞

據説是美國軍方人士在社交媒體發佈，ngad全尺寸樣機已經試飛？

真實性如何？

​以下內容轉載至B站用户@飛羽社，【breaking news】美第六代戰鬥機全尺寸驗證首飛 - 嗶哩嗶哩 (bilibili.com)

侵刪。

美國國防新聞週刊在當地時間9月15日午間發佈了一則對美國空軍後勤部副部長威爾·羅珀的採訪。

在採訪中，威爾·羅珀聲稱下一代戰鬥機項目NGAD的全尺寸演示機已經首飛。

但相關性能指標不會透露。

我們也會盡快插更一期視頻詳細解釋NGAD相關的一些問題。

採訪鏈接以及原文+翻譯發佈如下:

https://www.defensenews.com/breaking-news/2020/09/15/the-us-air-force-has-built-and-flown-a-mysterious-full-scale-prototype-of-its-future-fighter-jet/

WASHINGTON — The U.S. Air Force has secretly designed, built and flown at least one prototype of its enigmatic next-generation fighter jet, the service’s top acquisition official confirmed to Defense News on Sept. 14.

美國國務院國際信息局（IIP）《防務新聞》9月14日消息，美國空軍已秘密設計、製造和飛行了至少一架神秘的下一代戰鬥機原型。

The development is certain to shock the defense community, which last saw the first flight of an experimental fighter during the battle for the Joint Strike Fighter contract 20 years ago. With the Air Force’s future fighter program still in its infancy, the rollout and successful first flight of a demonstrator was not expected for years.

這一進展肯定會震驚國防界，他們上一次看到實驗戰鬥機首次飛行是在20年前聯合攻擊戰鬥機合同的競標中。由於美國空軍未來的戰鬥機項目仍處於初級階段，多年來，演示機的首次試飛和首次試飛都是意料之中的事。

“We’ve already built and flown a full-scale flight demonstrator in the real world, and we broke records in doing it,” Will Roper told Defense News in an exclusive interview ahead of the Air Force Association’s Air, Space and Cyber Conference. “We are ready to go and build the next-generation aircraft in a way that has never happened before.”

威爾·羅珀（Will Roper）在美國空軍協會（Air Force Association）舉行的空中、太空和網絡會議前接受《防務新聞》（Defense News）專訪時説：“我們已經在現實世界中建造並試飛了一架全尺寸飛行演示機，我們在這方面打破了紀錄。”。“我們已經準備好以前所未有的方式製造下一代飛機。”

Almost every detail about the aircraft itself will remain a mystery due to the classification of the Next Generation Air Dominance program, the Air Force’s effort for fielding a family of connected air warfare systems that could include fighters, drones and other networked platforms in space or the cyber realm.

由於下一代空中優勢計劃的分類，關於飛機本身的幾乎每一個細節都將仍然是一個謎。下一代空中優勢計劃是美國空軍部署一系列相互連接的空戰系統的努力，其中可能包括戰鬥機、無人機和其他空間或網絡領域的網絡平台。

Roper declined to comment on how many prototype aircraft have been flown or which defense contractors manufactured them. He wouldn’t say when or where the first flight occurred. And he refused to divulge any aspect of the aircraft’s design — its mission, whether it was uncrewed or optionally crewed, whether it could fly at hypersonic speeds or if it has stealth characteristics.

羅珀拒絕就已經試飛了多少架原型機或是哪家國防承包商製造的原型飛機置評。他不願透露第一次飛行的時間和地點。他拒絕透露飛機設計的任何方面——它的任務，無論是無人駕駛的還是可以選擇載人的，它是否能夠以高超音速飛行，或者是否具有隱身特性。

Those attributes, he said, are beside the point.

他説，這些屬性與重點無關。

The importance, Roper said, is that just a year after the service completed an analysis of alternatives, the Air Force has proven it can use cutting-edge advanced manufacturing techniques to build and test a virtual version of its next fighter — and then move to constructing a full-scale prototype and flying it with mission systems onboard.

羅珀説，重要的是，美國空軍在完成對替代方案的分析僅僅一年之後，就證明了它可以使用尖端的先進製造技術來製造和測試下一架戰鬥機的虛擬版本，然後着手建造一個全尺寸的樣機，並在飛機上搭載任務系統進行飛行。

“This is not just something that you can apply to things that are simple systems” like Boeing’s T-7 Red Hawk trainer jet, the first Air Force aircraft to be built using the “holy trinity” of digital engineering, agile software development and open architecture, Roper said.

羅珀説：“這不僅僅是你可以應用於簡單系統的東西”，比如波音公司的T-7紅鷹教練機，這是第一架使用數字工程、敏捷軟件開發和開放式架構的“神聖三位一體”建造的空軍飛機。

“We’re going after the most complicated systems that have ever been built, and checked all the boxes with this digital technology. In fact, [we’ve] not just checked the boxes, [we’ve] demonstrated something that’s truly magical.”

“我們正在尋找有史以來最複雜的系統，並用這種數字技術檢查所有的盒子。事實上，[我們]不僅檢查了這些方框，[我們]展示了一些真正神奇的東西。”

Now, the Next Generation Air Dominance program, or NGAD, sits at a decision point. Roper declined to say how quickly the Air Force could move its next-gen fighter into production, except to say “pretty fast.” But before the service decides to begin producing a new generation of fighters, it must determine how many aircraft it will commit to buy and when it wants to start purchasing them — all choices that could influence the fiscal 2022 budget.

現在，下一代空中優勢計劃（NGAD）正處於一個決定點。羅珀拒絕透露美國空軍能以多快的速度將下一代戰鬥機投入生產，只是説“相當快”。但在空軍決定開始生產新一代戰鬥機之前，它必須確定它將承諾購買多少架飛機以及何時開始購買這些飛機——所有這些選擇都可能影響2022年財政預算。

The program itself has the potential to radically shake up the defense industry. Should the Air Force move to buy NGAD in the near term, it will be adding a challenger to the F-35 and F-15EX programs, potentially putting those programs at risk.

該計劃本身有可能徹底改變國防工業。如果美國空軍近期購買NGAD，它將給F-35和F-15EX項目增加一個挑戰者，可能會使這些項目面臨風險。

And because the advanced manufacturing techniques that are critical for building NGAD were pioneered by the commercial sector, the program could open the door for new prime contractors for the aircraft to emerge — and perhaps give SpaceX founder Elon Musk a shot at designing an F-35 competitor.

而且，由於製造NGAD的關鍵先進製造技術是由商業部門首創的，該計劃可能會為新的主承包商打開大門，讓新的主承包商出現——或許還能讓SpaceX的創始人埃隆·馬斯克（Elon Musk）嘗試設計F-35的競爭對手。

“I have to imagine there will be a lot of engineers — maybe famous ones with well-known household names with billions of dollars to invest — that will decide starting the world’s greatest aircraft company to build the world’s greatest aircraft with the Air Force is exactly the kind of inspiring thing they want to do as a hobby or even a main gig,” Roper said.

“我不得不想象，會有很多工程師——也許是那些家喻户曉、投資數十億美元的著名工程師——將決定創辦世界上最偉大的飛機公司，與空軍一起製造世界上最偉大的飛機，正是他們想做的一種鼓舞人心的事情，作為一種愛好，甚至是一種“主唱，”羅珀説。

The disclosure of a flying full-scale fighter prototype could be just what the Air Force needs to garner more financial support from Congress during a critical time where the service is facing budget constraints and needs to gain momentum, said Mackenzie Eaglen, a defense budget analyst with the American Enterprise Institute.

美國企業研究所（American Enterprise Institute）國防預算分析師麥肯齊·伊格倫（Mackenzie Eaglen）表示，在美國空軍面臨預算緊張、需要獲得動力的關鍵時刻，美國空軍需要從國會獲得更多財政支持。

“If you can quickly get to something and show progress through product, it just changes the whole dynamic for the Hill,” she said. “[Roper has] got so many headwinds, it seems this would be a likely avenue to show conceptual success for his ideas.”

她説：“如果你能很快找到一些東西，並通過產品展示進展，這隻會改變整個山丘的動態。”。“（羅珀）遇到了太多不利因素，看來這將是一條展示其理念成功的可能途徑。”

A radical new acquisition

新採購模式

Flying a prototype of its future fighter was the easy part. Now the Air Force must choose whether to commit to a radical method of buying it.

駕駛未來戰鬥機的原型是最簡單的部分。現在，空軍必須選擇是否要採取激進的購買方式。

Over the last 50 years, the U.S. industrial base has dwindled from 10 manufacturers capable of building an advanced fighter to only three defense companies: Lockheed Martin, Boeing and Northrop Grumman. The time it takes the Air Force to move a new fighter from research and development to full-rate production has stretched from a matter of years to multiple decades.

在過去的50年裏，美國的工業基地已經從10家有能力製造先進戰鬥機的製造商縮減到只有3家國防公司：洛克希德馬丁公司、波音公司和諾斯羅普格魯曼公司。空軍將一種新型戰鬥機從研發轉移到全速生產所需的時間從幾年延長到幾十年。

The result is that every fighter program becomes existential for companies, who fight to prove that they can meet technical requirements during the development and production phase at a lower cost than their competitors. The companies are finally able to turn a profit during the later years of a program, when they become locked in as sustainment providers with the technical knowledge necessary for upgrading, repairing and extending the life of their product — often with little congressional interest or scrutiny.

其結果是，每一個戰鬥機項目對公司來説都是存在的，這些公司都在努力證明自己能夠以比競爭對手更低的成本在開發和生產階段滿足技術要求。這些公司最終能夠在項目的最後幾年實現盈利，因為它們被鎖定為具有升級、維修和延長產品壽命所需的技術知識的維持性保障供應商，而國會通常對此興趣不大，也很少進行審查。

“The sustainment account is a black hole that nobody understands. The [operation and maintenance] account is a black hole that no one can figure out,” Eaglen said. “The person who can change sustainment can change the acquisition game, writ large.”

“維持賬户是一個沒有人理解的黑洞。伊格倫説：“（運營和維護）賬户是一個沒有人能搞清楚的黑洞。”。“能改變維持的人可以改變採辦遊戲，寫得很大。”

For the Air Force, the turning point is when an aircraft hits 15 years old. At that age, maintenance costs compound rapidly, growing another 3-7 percent every year, Roper wrote in a Sept. 15 document titled “Take the Red Pill: The New Digital Acquisition Reality.”

對於空軍來説，轉折點是當一架飛機撞上15歲時。羅珀在9月15日的一份題為“吃紅色藥丸：新的數字化收購現實”的文件中寫道，在這個年齡段，維護成本迅速複合，每年再增長3-7%

But what if instead of spending significant funds on sustaining old jets, the Air Force used that money to buy new ones?

但是，如果空軍沒有花費大量資金來維持舊飛機，而是用這些錢購買新飛機呢？

Instead of buying a large quantity of a single fighter over decades and retaining each plane for 30 years or more — as is currently the norm — the “Digital Century Series” model, proposed by Roper, posits that advanced manufacturing and software development techniques make it possible for the Air Force to rapidly develop and buy aircraft more frequently, much as the service did during the 1950s when it bought six fighters from six companies just years apart from each other during the original Century Series.

與過去幾十年大量購買一架戰鬥機，並將每架飛機保留30年或更長時間——這是目前的慣例——由Roper提出的“數字世紀系列”模型，假設先進的製造技術和軟件開發技術使得空軍能夠快速開發和更頻繁地購買飛機，就像20世紀50年代空軍從相距僅幾年的6家公司購買了6架戰鬥機一樣。

In August, Air Force’s advanced aircraft program office completed a business case analysis of the Digital Century Series model meant to validate whether the idea was technically feasible and, more importantly, whether it could save money.

今年8月，美國空軍先進飛機項目辦公室完成了數字世紀系列模型的商業案例分析，旨在驗證這一想法在技術上是否可行，更重要的是，它是否能夠節省資金。

Leaders found that by applying digital manufacturing and development practices — as used by the T-7 program, as well as in the development of the NGAD prototype — it could drop the total life cycle cost of a next-gen fighter by 10 percent over 30 years compared to legacy fighters like the F-35 and F-15, Roper wrote.

領導人們發現，通過應用數字化製造和開發實踐——正如T-7項目所使用的，以及NGAD原型的開發——與F-35和F-15等傳統戰鬥機相比，下一代戰鬥機的總壽命週期成本可在30年內降低10%。

But for the same price as a single variant of a digitally manufactured fighter produced with a 30-year life cycle, the Air Force could buy a new fighter every eight years and replace them after 16 years — before the plane reaches the 3,500 flight-hour mark here it starts needing heavy overhauls and expensive modifications to extend its service life.

但與30年生命週期的數字化製造戰鬥機的單一變體價格相同，美國空軍可以每8年購買一架新戰鬥機，16年後更換——在飛機達到3500飛行小時標誌着它開始需要大修和昂貴的改裝來延長它的使用壽命之前。

“I don’t think it’s smart thinking to build one and only one aircraft that has to be dominant for all missions in all cases all the time,” he said. “Digital engineering allows us to build different kinds of airplanes, and if we’re really smart … we ensure smart commonality across the fleet — common support equipment, common cockpit configurations, common interfaces, common architecture, even common components like a landing gear — that simplify the sustainment and maintenance in the field.”

他説：“我不認為製造一架而且只有一架飛機必須在所有情況下一直主導所有任務是明智的想法。”。“數字工程允許我們製造不同種類的飛機，如果我們真的很聰明的話……我們確保整個機隊的智能通用性——通用的支援設備、通用的駕駛艙配置、通用的接口、通用的體系結構，甚至是起落架等通用部件——這些都簡化了飛機的維護和維護“字段。”

The main difference is that the Air Force would flip from spending the majority of fighter program costs upfront instead of at the end of the aircraft’s life. To continuously design new fighter jets, the service would keep multiple vendors constantly under contract for the development of new planes, choosing a new design about every eight years. To make a business case that is profitable for industry, it would then buy batches of about 50-80 aircraft every year.

主要的區別在於，空軍將把戰鬥機項目的大部分費用預先花掉，而不是在飛機壽命結束時。為了不斷地設計新的戰鬥機，這項服務將使多個供應商不斷地簽訂新飛機的開發合同，大約每八年就要選擇一種新的設計。為了創造一個能為工業帶來利潤的商業案例，它每年都會購買大約50-80架飛機。

The result is a 25 percent increase in development costs and an 18 percent increase in production costs. However, the price of modernizing aircraft would drop by 79 percent while sustainment costs are basically cut in half, Roper wrote in the paper.

結果是開發成本增加了25%，生產成本增加了18%。然而，現代化飛機的價格將下降79%，而維持費用基本上減半，羅珀在論文中寫道。

“I can’t make both ends of the life cycle go away; industry has to make a profit somewhere,” Roper said. “And I’m arguing in the paper that if you get to choose what color of money you use for future air superiority, make it research, development and production because it’s the sharp point of the spear, not the geriatric side that consumes so much of our resources today.”

“我不能讓生命週期的兩端都消失；工業必須在某個地方盈利，”Roper説。“我在報紙上説，如果你要為未來的空中優勢選擇什麼顏色的錢，那就讓它成為研究、開發和生產，因為今天消耗我們這麼多資源的是長矛的尖頭，而不是老氣橫秋的一面。”

There is also a strategic benefit to continuous fighter production and development, Roper said. It puts China on the defense, having to respond to U.S. technical advances as new capabilities — whether they’re hypersonic missiles or drone wingmen — are matured and spiraled into the fighter’s production.

羅珀説，持續的戰鬥機生產和發展也有戰略上的好處。它使中國處於防禦狀態，必須對美國的技術進步作出反應，因為新的能力——無論是高超音速導彈還是無人機翼手——都已經成熟，並逐步進入戰鬥機的生產。

“This speeds up the pace at which we can do things so that we can be the disrupter instead of the disrupted, but it does so in a way that can’t be undermined by throwing cheap labor at the problem,” he said.

他説：“這加快了我們做事的速度，這樣我們就可以成為破壞者，而不是被打亂的人，但這樣做的方式不會因為在問題上投入廉價勞動力而受到損害。”。

The next step is for Air Force leadership to decide how much it can afford for the program in FY22 and whether it will adopt the Digital Century Series model for developing the aircraft.

下一步是由空軍領導層決定其在FY22中能負擔多少費用，以及是否將採用數字世紀系列模型來開發飛機。

“What we need to do going forward is simply understand the [Department of the Air Force’s] level of financial commitment and the date they want us to charge towards for initial operations, and we can fit the acquisition strategy for [NGAD] to it, and explain how quickly we can afford to spiral and when we need to retire the aircraft to generate enough savings to afford those spirals,” he said.

“我們今後需要做的只是簡單地瞭解[空軍部]的財政承諾水平以及他們希望我們在初期運營中收取費用的日期，然後我們就可以為[NGAD]制定收購戰略，並解釋我們能多快地承受螺旋式上升，以及何時我們需要讓飛機退役，以產生足夠的儲蓄來負擔這些螺旋式飛機，”他説。

“Perhaps getting to the fastest [initial fielding date] may not be the most important thing. It may be important for us to push the [technical] boundaries more. Those are decisions that I’ve given for leadership to think about. But every decision I’ve given them is a better decision over the legacy ones.”

“也許最快的[最初的部署日期]可能不是最重要的事情。對我們來説，進一步突破（技術）界限可能很重要。這些都是我給領導層考慮的決定。但我給他們的每一個決定都是比傳統決定更好的決定。”

If the Air Force is going to get financial support for a business plan that requires taxpayers to pay a higher upfront cost for fighter aircraft, it must clearly identify desired combat capabilities, said Rebecca Grant, an aerospace analyst with IRIS Independent Research.

IRIS獨立研究公司（IRIS Independent Research）的航空航天分析師麗貝卡•格蘭特（Rebecca Grant）表示，如果美國空軍要為一項商業計劃獲得財政支持，該計劃要求納税人為戰鬥機支付更高的前期成本，那麼它必須清楚地確定所需的作戰能力。

“Now we have the F-35, F-15EX and the Digital Century Series’ small batch costs,” she said. “If it’s that great, maybe it’s worth the upfront cost. I could argue that, for sure. Is this the new F-117, which was similar batch size at similar cost and worth every penny? We just don’t know.”

“現在我們有了F-35、F-15EX和數字世紀系列的小批量成本，”她説。“如果這麼好的話，也許它值得前期的花費。我當然可以這麼説。這是新的F-117嗎？它的批量大小和成本差不多，而且每一分錢都值？我們只是不知道。”

On the technical side, the Air Force needs to solidify a rigorous, standardized method of conducting test activities in a virtual environment using modeling and simulation tools that can cut down the amount of time needed for live flight tests. It also needs industry to buy in to coding via a government-owned computing environment, Roper said.

在技術方面，空軍需要鞏固一種嚴格的、標準化的方法，在虛擬環境中使用建模和仿真工具進行測試活動，這樣可以減少實飛測試所需的時間。它還需要業界通過政府擁有的計算環境來接受編碼，Roper説。

“We can’t have every industry partner creating their own mechanism,” Roper said. “We have to have just as rigorous a process for digital design and assembly as we do for physical design assembly. So we will own that in the government, we will certify that in the government.”

“我們不可能擁有自己的產業合作伙伴。“我們必須有一個嚴格的數字設計和裝配過程，就像我們對物理設計裝配一樣。因此，我們將在政府中擁有這些權利，我們將在政府中證明這一點。”

And — perhaps most critically — the Air Force will have to sell the concept to Congress. Roper has briefed staff members on the defense committees, and he held classified sessions with many of the lawmakers who sit on those panels to present findings of the business case study as well as the detailed progress of NGAD development and test activities.

或許最關鍵的是，空軍將不得不向國會推銷這一概念。Roper向工作人員簡要介紹了國防委員會的情況，他與參加這些委員會的許多議員舉行了秘密會議，介紹了商業案例研究的結果以及NGAD開發和測試活動的詳細進展。

“I had some tough audiences on this. I’ve had people that I’ve been told want to cut the program or they don’t understand why we need it,” he acknowledged. “But I have not left a single one of those briefings with anything other than [lawmakers saying]: ‘This is the future, we ought to do it now. And why aren’t we going faster?’ And the answer [to] why we aren’t going faster is simply money. We can push the accelerator down more today because the digital technology allows it.”

“在這件事上，我遇到了一些難纏的聽眾。他承認：“有人告訴我要削減這個項目，或者他們不明白我們為什麼需要它。”。“但我沒有在這些簡報中留下任何一個，除了（議員們説的）以外：“這是未來，我們應該現在就做。為什麼我們不快點？“而我們為什麼不能更快的答案就是錢。今天我們可以把加速器推得更慢，因為數字技術允許它。”