田士臣、張博涵：美國是如何利用其亞洲盟友與中國展開大國競爭的

【文/經士智庫總裁，中國論壇特約專家 田士臣；經士智庫實習生 張博涵】

美國副國務卿舍曼在前陣子結束了對於中國的“順道兒”訪問，由於就會談議題討論激烈，直到最後一刻雙方才就訪問議程達成一致。值得注意的是，幾乎是在同一時間，美國國防部長勞埃德·奧斯汀在五角大樓的新聞發佈會上宣佈了他對於美國東南亞諸盟友，即新加坡、越南、菲律賓的訪問。

奧斯汀高調的亞洲之行旨在重申美國新政府作為“可靠夥伴”的承諾。在開啓訪問前的講話中，他將此行目的地稱為美國的“優先行動區域”，並表示此行的主要目標是加強“該地區強大的盟友和夥伴網絡”。

此外，他表示，他將藉此機會明確美國在挑戰中國在南海“無益且毫無根據”的主張方面的立場。

奧斯汀近日在新加坡的講話中，也傳達了類似的關鍵信息。

7月27日，來訪的美國國防部長勞埃德奧斯汀和新加坡國防部長黃永亨在新加坡國防部檢閲儀仗隊。（圖源：美聯社）

為了增強盟國對美國軍事承諾的信心，奧斯汀試圖展示美國的軍事實力: 在飛往亞洲之前，他參觀了阿拉斯加的艾爾森空軍基地。在那裏，他在三架美國F-35閃電II型飛機前發表了演講。

美國近期的種種跡象表明其正在嘗試推動在印太地區的軍事行動力，以應對所謂的中國威脅。甚至幾天前，在印度太平洋地區有豐富工作經驗的潛艇指揮官邁克爾·拉基特（Michael Luckett）上校接任了關島海軍司令部司令一職。

與此同時，總部位於華盛頓的智庫新美國安全中心（Centre for a New American Security） 表示，美國似乎正朝着“全方位競爭”（full spectrum competition）戰略邁進，為可能發生的大國衝突做準備。

所有這些新的動向似乎都與近期拜登“美國回來了”的誓言相一致。但美國真的能像二戰後那樣回到亞太地區嗎? 這個問題引發的爭論恐怕要比答案更多。

奧斯汀表示，“我們相信我們是一支穩定的力量; 無論我們在哪裏，在世界的哪個地方，我們都為該地區的穩定增加了價值。”然而，在他發表這些漂亮的官方聲明的同時，美國和北約在阿富汗的撤軍，也正在造成巨大的混亂。

在阿富汗，以美國為首的“反恐戰爭” 摧毀了成千上萬的平民和軍人的生活, 但國家的和平與穩定的前景依然暗淡。經過近20年的戰爭, 人們不禁思考：美國真的導致了該地區的穩定麼？

人們也不該忘記越南和朝鮮半島。位於這兩個地方的朝鮮戰爭和越南戰爭是一場人道主義災難，那些炮火的的陰霾至今仍在人們的心中——尤其是那些因敵對行動而淪為難民的越南人，以及因戰爭而離散的朝鮮家庭。

試想如果奧斯丁在訪問越南時稱讚美國在越南扮演了“維穩”的角色，那將會多麼的荒誕。

在新加坡，奧斯汀鄭重承諾，美國將建立使各國能夠自行做出決定的夥伴關係。而在漂亮的諾言背後，對於美國否能信守承諾的質疑聲也接連不斷。

以史為鏡，我們不難發現，亞太地區有一個長期存在的共識，即該地區的經濟增長依賴中國的發展，而安全方面則依賴美國。但隨着中國經濟增長成為世界第二大經濟體，其日益增長的全球影響力不可避免地挑戰了美國對亞洲盟友安全承諾的基礎，即二戰後建立的同盟體系。

過去幾十年，中國巨大的市場和豐富的經濟機會吸引了無數的亞洲國家前來進行經貿往來，並與中國建立戰略伙伴關係。到現在，那些從中國崛起中受到恩惠的亞洲小國開始發現，自己比以往任何時候都更加依賴中國。

在大國競爭的背景下，同時實現亞地區的安全保護和經濟發展越來越成為悖論，這對亞洲國家而言已經變成了一個兩難的選擇。隨着美國拜登政府延續特朗普政府強加給中國的美國鷹派政策，這種局面被進一步複雜化了。

可是，當奧斯丁誓言要加強美國的盟友和夥伴網絡時，這明擺着就是在要求這些盟友和夥伴在中美之間選擇立場，就像美國在歐洲所做的那樣。如果這種立場是被迫選邊站隊的結果，亞洲國家怎麼可能像奧斯丁承諾的那樣可以行使自己做主的主權權利呢?

中國巨大的市場和豐富的經濟機會對其他亞洲國傢俱有很大的吸引力。（圖源：美聯社）

最後，沒有人知道拜登政府的回到亞洲的政策會持續多久。實際上在2012年， 時任美國總統的奧巴馬就宣佈了美國要“重返亞洲”(pivot to Asia)的戰略，旨在重建美國的領導地位。然而，奧巴馬的努力很快就被他的繼任者特朗普總統破壞了。特朗普傾向於單邊決定，並放棄了美國與亞洲的許多夥伴關係。

美國引以為傲的民主制度下政府隨黨派選舉結果自由更迭，恰恰給包括亞洲國家在內的整個國際社會帶來了巨大的不確定性。疫情當前，抗擊新冠肺炎和恢復經濟是世界的當務之急，國際合作比以往任何時候都更有必要。然而，美國忽略了合作的重要戰略性意義，而動用了它所能動用的一切手段——包括以合作為名，來推動大國之間的競爭。

當它在亞洲的盟友和夥伴網絡也被用來推動大國競爭時，不得不站隊的兩難境地將被強加到幾乎每個國家身上，不管它們喜不喜歡。我們能在多大程度上相信美國會兑現其在該地區發揮穩定作用的承諾?  這是個值得令人深思的問題。

（英文原文見下頁）

How the US uses its Asian allies in great-power competition with China | South China Morning Post

As US Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman wrapped up her by-the-way visit to China – the subject of intense negotiation, with the two countries unable to agree on the proposed engagement until the very last minute – US Secretary of Defence Lloyd Austin kicked off his visit to America’s allies in Southeast Asia, namely Singapore, Vietnam and the Philippines.

Austin’s high-profile visit to Asia aims to reaffirm the new administration’s commitment as “a reliable partner”. In remarks before the trip, Austin referred to these destinations as America’s “priority theatre of operations” and said the major goal of his visit was to strengthen the “powerful network of allies and partners in the region”.

Further, he said, he would take the opportunity to make clear the US stance on challenging what he called “unhelpful and unfounded” claims by China in the South China Sea.

His key message was echoed in his speech in Singapore.

To boost allies’ confidence in America’s military commitment, Austin showcased America’s military muscles: before flying to Asia he visited Alaska’s Eielson Air Force Base, where he made a speech against the backdrop of three F-35 Lightning II aircraft.

In fact, the US is pushing to boost its military presence in the Indo-Pacific to counter the alleged China threat. A few days ago, Captain Michael Luckett, a submarine commander with experience in the Indo-Pacific, took over command of the Guam Naval Command.

Meanwhile, according to the Centre for a New American Security, a Washington-based think tank, the US appears to be moving towards a strategy of “full spectrum competition” in preparation for a possible great-power conflict.

All of the above is consistent with a single message that corresponds to US President Joe Biden’s declaration that “America is back”. But could the US really be back in the Asia-Pacific as it used to be after World War II? Asking this brings more questions than answers.

“We believe that we’re a stabilising force; no matter where we are, what part of the world, we add value to the stability of the region,” said Austin. But while he was making these beautiful official statements, the drawdown of American and Nato forces in Afghanistan is causing chaos.

Hundreds of thousands of civilian and military lives have been lost in the US-led “war on terror” in Afghanistan, yet the prospects for peace and stability in the country remain dim. After nearly 20 years of war, one might ask how the US has contributed to the stability of that region.

And let’s not forget Vietnam and the Korean peninsula. The Korean war and the Vietnam war were humanitarian catastrophes and the aftermath of both wars is still being felt – not least by the Vietnamese who were made refugees by the hostilities and the Korean families parted by war.

It would be interesting to hear Austin extol America’s role as a “stabilising force” in Vietnam when he visits.

In Singapore, Austin pledged that the US would build partnerships that would allow countries to make their own decisions. This is doubtful.

There is a long-standing consensus in Asia and the Pacific that the region depended on China for economic growth and the US for security. But as China’s economy grew to be the world’s second-largest, its increasing global influence inevitably challenges the alliance system that forms the basis for America’s security commitment to its Asian allies.

China’s huge market and abundant economic opportunities are a big draw for other Asian countries. Smaller Asian nations that benefited from the prosperity brought by China’s boom now find themselves more dependent on China than ever before.

This security-versus-development dilemma is further complicated by big-power competition as the hawkish US policy that was imposed on China by the Trump administration is inherited by the Biden administration.

When Austin vows to strengthen America’s network of allies and partners, no one doubts that he is asking these allies and partners to choose sides, the same as the US has done in Europe. Forced to choose, how could these Asian countries exercise their sovereign right of making their own decisions, as Austin promised?

People walk past shops in Beijing on May 12. China’s huge market and abundant economic opportunities are a big draw for other Asian countries. Photo: AP

People walk past shops in Beijing on May 12. China’s huge market and abundant economic opportunities are a big draw for other Asian countries. Photo: AP

Last but not least, no one knows how long this policy of Biden’s administration may last. In 2012, then-US president Barack Obama announced America’s “pivot to Asia”, a doctrine aimed at rebuilding America’s leadership role. Obama’s efforts, however, were soon undermined by his successor, Donald Trump, who preferred unilateral decisions and abandoned many of America’s partnerships with Asia.

The change of government under the US democratic system brings huge uncertainty not only to Asian countries but also to the whole international community.

At a time when fighting the Covid-19 pandemic and restoring the economy are top priorities for the world, international cooperation is more necessary than ever. Yet the US has used every lever it has to push big-power competition.

When its Asian network of allies and partners is also being used to push big-power competition, the dilemma of having to choose a side will be thrust upon nearly every state, like it or not. How much can the US be trusted to deliver on its boast that it plays a stabilising role in the region? That’s the question.

Captain (Retired) Tian Shichen is founder and president of the Global Governance Institution and director of the Centre for International Law of Military Operations in Beijing. He is also a China Forum expert

Leon Zhang is an intern at the Global Governance Institution

（https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3142888/how-us-uses-its-asian-allies-great-power-competition-china）