陶勇翻譯 蘭德智庫報告 《大國戰爭的迴歸——美中之間系統性衝突模式》第一章（中）_風聞

IntroductionAnother criticism of realist theory is its lack of attention to the structureand dynamics of the world economy.20 Critics Richard Lebow and Benjamin Valentino have also questioned the theory, arguing that power transitions have been “remarkably rare” and “tended to happen peacefully.”21Politicals cientists have offered alternative terms to describe a supremely powerful nation, such as that of a leading power or system leader. Associated with the theories of world systems or long cycle theory, such terms emphasize the role played by an exceptionally capable nation in organizing and leading the global economy. These experts tend to emphasize the way eco-nomic power underpins global military and political power. Immanuel Wallerstein’s “world systems” theory describes a group of core leading economies that dominated the global econ-omy.22 Long cycle theorists George Modelski and William Thompson have defined global system leaders as specialists in “long-distance commerce and advanced industrial produc-tion,” which also provide “political and military leadership at the global (intercontinental) level.” 23 The systems approach has drawn attention to the critical role that powerful nations play in leading and organizing global economic activity.

、對現實主義理論的另一個批評是它缺乏對世界經濟結構動態的關注。20 批評家理查德萊博和本傑明瓦倫提諾也對這一理論提出質疑，認為權力過渡 “非常罕見”，“往往是和平發生的 “21。政治學家們提供了另一種術語來描述極其強大的國家（超級大國——譯者注）——如領導國或系統領導者。與世界體系或長週期理論相關，這些術語強調了特別有能力的國家在組織和領導全球經濟方面的作用。這些專家特別強調國家經濟實力是支撐軍事和政治力量的後盾。伊曼紐爾-沃勒斯坦的 “世界體系"理論描述了一批主導全球經濟的核心經濟體。22 長週期理論家喬治-莫德斯基和威廉-湯普森將全球體系的領導者定義為 “遠程商業和先進工業生產 “的專家，他們還提供 “全球（洲際）層面的政治和軍事領導力。“23 體系方法使人們注意到強國在領導和組織全球經濟活動中的關鍵作用。它們還為經濟優勢、地緣政治優勢和權力過渡戰爭之間的聯繫提供了有趣的解釋。然而，基於系統的方法經受了一些批評，因為它過分關注技術和經濟能力，而對政治和軍事力量的重要性強調不足。

They also offer an intriguing expla-nation for the connection between economic predominance, geopolitical primacy, and wars of power transition. The systems-based approach has enduredsome criticism, however, for focusing excessively on technological and economic capabilities and underemphasizing the importance of political and military power.Both schools of thought have their advantages and disadvantages. The hegemonic stability/ realist approach notes the importance of preponderance in economic, political, and mili-tary power among top-tier powers. It also emphasizes the importance of international influ-ence as an aspect of strength. The system leader school complements these insights with its valuable insight into the way internationally preeminent nations organize and shape the structure of the global economy. We wish to capture these insights in our understanding of global primacy. Accordingly, we use the term leading great power to mean a country that has achieved a level of global preeminence—first rank—in terms of concentrated economic, political, and military power. Such a nation exerts a preponderant international influence and is also dominant in organizing and leading the global economic system. Global primacy is used interchangeably as the condition that characterizes the situation of the leading great power.

這兩個學派都有其優點和缺點。霸權主義穩定/現實主義方法注意到頂級大國在經濟、政治和軍事力量上佔優勢的重要性，它還強調了國際影響力作為實力方面的重要性。系統領袖學派通過國際領軍國家如何組織和塑造全球經濟結構之高屋建瓴觀點補充了這些見解。我們希望在對全球主導地位的理解中抓住這些見解。因此，我們使用領先大國一詞，指的是在經濟、政治和軍事力量等方面達到全球領先水平的國家。這樣的國家發揮了突出的國際影響力，並且在組織和領導全球經濟體系方面具有主導地位。全球首要地位可交替使用，作為主導大國狀況的特徵條件.

The Return of Great Power WarDefining Systemic Conflict Among Rival Leading Powers界定對立領軍國家之間的系統性衝突

Although both the hegemonic stability/realist and system leader schools of thought disagree on definitions and key points of emphasis, they agree that the global leading power tends to exert a stabilizing influence when at the height of its power, but that its ascent or descent is likely to coincide with considerable instability and/or conflict. The period of instability accompanying the rise or decline of great powers is, per Organski, often referred to as one of “power transition.”25 Since we are interested in analyzing potential scenarios of U.S.-China conflict, we focus on such a hypothetical period of Chinese ascent and U.S. relative decline. In our hypothetical scenarios, China may not have decisively achieved a position of global primacy yet, but it is poised to do so. Its situation may be described as one of nearing global primacy, but still in the processing of contending with the United States for that position. By many, but perhaps not all, measures of national power, China would have roughly equaled, slightly surpassed, or fallen just shy of those of the United States. China may be nearing or have gained a modest edge over the United States as a leading organizer of the global economy as well. In such a situation, Beijing’s claims to have secured global primacy would strike many people as plausible, though the claims could be debated given the intensity of U.S. efforts to fend off China’s challenge. It is important to emphasize how this hypothetical situation dif-fers from today. In 2022 China may be regarded as a serious competitor to the United States, but few would regard as credible any claim that it has neared the point of displacingUnited States to become the leading global power.

儘管霸權主義穩定/現實主義學派和體系領袖學派在定義和強調的關鍵點上都有分歧，但他們都認為，全球領先大國在其力量最強大的時候往往會發揮穩定的作用，但其上升或下降很可能與相當的不穩定/或衝突同時出現。按照奧根斯基的説法，伴隨着大國崛起或衰落的不穩定時期通常被稱為"權力過渡”。25 因為我們對分析潛在的美中衝突情形感興趣，我們將重點放在中國崛起和美國相對衰落的這種假設時期。在我們的假設情景中，中國可能還沒有決定性地取得全球首要地位，但它已準備好這樣做。中國當前的狀態可以被描述為接近全球首要地位，但卻在與美國爭奪這一地位的過程中。根據許多但也許不是所有的國力衡量標準，中國將大致等同於、略微超過或略微落後於美國。作為全球經濟的主要組織者，中國也可能接近或獲得對美國的適度優勢。在這種情況下，北京聲稱已經獲得了全球首要地位，這讓很多人覺得頗有道理——儘管考慮到美國為抵禦中國的挑戰所做的努力，這種説法可能會引起爭論。重要的是要強調這種假設的情況與今天有什麼不同。2022年，中國可能被視為美國的強力競爭對手，但很少有人會認為任何關於中國已接近取代美國成為全球領先大國的説法是可信的。

We focus on this hypothetical moment of aggressive Chinese efforts to contend for global primacy because it carries the highest risks of major war according to the established find-ings of international relations theory.26 How the two countries manage that moment could carry immense implications for both countries and for the world. Although the possibility of a peaceful power transition exists, in this report we focus on the possibilities of systemic conflict. A key assumption of the report is that the United States has both the capability and the determination to resist its supersession and that both sides thus face compelling incen-tives to resort to force to assert or defend global primacy. Because this type of conflict is intricately related to the question of international leadership, it would not likely be resolved by a single battle. Rather, the conflict would assume a chronic, systemic form. As in past examples of power transition warfare, the two countries could fight in multiple engagements over a relatively long span of time, perhaps lasting for many years, and in a geographically unconstrained manner. Extensive conflict could involve many partner nations and manifest in various forms of interstate and intrastate conflict with varying levels of involvement by the two rivals as well. The escalation risks would remain high due to the underlying drive for supremacy. Conflict would thus assume a serial, persistent condition that could endure for years and that would end only when one side exhausted its ability to keep fighting and accordingly acknowledged its subordination to the other.

我們關注的是中國為爭奪全球首要地位而進行的挑戰性努力這一假設，因為根據國際關係理論的既定結論，它具有最高的大規模戰爭風險。兩國如何應對這種狀況可能對兩國和世界產生巨大影響。雖然和平的權力交接的可能性是存在的，但在本報告中，我們關注系統性衝突的可能性。本報告的一個關鍵假設是，美國有能力也有決心遏制對它的超越，因此雙方都面臨着訴諸武力來維護或捍衞全球首要地位的強烈動機。由於這種類型衝突錯綜複雜地與國際領導權問題糾纏一起，它不可能一勞永逸地解決。相反，衝突會呈現出一種長期、系統性的形式。就像過去的權力過渡戰爭一樣，兩個國家可能在相對較長的時間內多次交戰，可能會持續很多年，而且在地理上不受限制。廣泛的衝突可能涉及許多夥伴國，表現為各種形式的國家間和國內衝突，兩個對手也會有不同程度的參與。由於爭奪霸權的潛在動力，衝突升級的風險仍然很高。因此，衝突將成為一種連續的、持續的狀況，可以綿延數年。只有當一方耗盡其繼續戰鬥的能力並相應地承認其對另一方的從屬地位時才會結束。

IntroductionAn adversarial China that had neared a position of global primacy could pose an excep-tionally formidable challenge to the United States, which has not fought a great power from a position of parity or inferiority since the War of 1812. By the mid-1800s, the U.S. economy had already surpassed in size and wealth that of the United Kingdom—the leading great power of its day. By any economic measure, the United States became the world’s most powerful­ nation by 1916, although Washington resisted assuming global responsibilities commensu-rate with its strength until after World War II.27 The United States fought formidableCen-tral and Axis power adversariesin the two World Wars, but its industrial might gave it aninsuperable advantage. Even against the Soviet Union, the United States competed from a position of strength, with an economy many times more productive and richer than that of its communist rival. Lessons from past wars are also constrained by the fact that those wars happened in the past. Distinctive features of geopolitical arrangements, the state of military technology, and the nature of war all shaped past rivalries and conflicts in ways that may not be relevant today.

一個已接近全球首要地位的對手中國可能會對美國構成特別可怕的挑戰，因為自1812年戰爭以來，美國還沒有從平等或劣勢的位置上與一個大國作戰。到19世紀中期，美國的經濟規模和財富已經超過了英國——當時的領先大國。從任何經濟角度來看，美國在1916年成為世界上最強大的國家，儘管華盛頓一直到二戰後才承擔與其實力相稱的全球責任。27美國在兩次世界大戰中跟強大的同盟國與軸心國敵手作戰，憑藉的就是其工業實力帶來的不可超越之優勢。即使是對陣蘇聯，美國也是以實力取勝，其產業生產力和富裕程度比其蘇聯對手高出許多倍。從過去的戰爭中得到的教訓對於今天的警示有限，因為這些戰爭發生在過去。地緣政治安排的獨特特點、軍事技術的狀況和戰爭的性質形成了過去的競爭和衝突，而那些既有的“經驗”在今天可能已經不適用了。