陶勇翻譯 蘭德智庫報告 《大國戰爭的迴歸——美中之間系統性衝突模式》第一章（下）_風聞

Under conditions of a China nearing global primacy, the onset of U.S.-China hostilities could raise the risks of militarized crises and military clashes across many parts of the world. The risks of a global confrontation could be amplified by the advent of new, poorly under-stood civilian and military technologies and unprecedented historical developments. As one example, the ability of cybertechnologies to inflict massive damage and dislocation raises problematic new escalation risks. Chinese success in expanding a network of client states could also result in confrontations and crisis situations that appear implausible today.

在中國接近全球主導地位的情況下，美中敵對行動的爆發可能會增加世界許多地區發生軍事化危機和軍事衝突的風險。全球對抗的風險可能會因為新的、鮮為人知的民用和軍用技術的出現以及前所未有的歷史發展而增大。例如，網絡技術造成大規模破壞和混亂的能力引發了新的升級風險。中國在擴大客户端網絡（互聯網根服務器源自美國，所以，其他國家網絡均為客户端應用——譯者注）方面的成功，也可能導致對抗和危機局勢。儘管今天看來頗為不可思議。

Systemic U.S.- China conflict would clearly carry significant implications for the security of the United States, yet to date there has been little serious effort to analyze them. Key questions include: How might China’s national and security goals change in a systemic conflict with the United States? How might the PLA operate and modernize its forces in such a situation? Where might conflict involving Chinese and U.S. forces unfold? How might the two militaries fight each other? What distinctive features of the Chinese military might enable or impede their combat operations against U.S. forces? While the answers to these questions remain ultimately unknowable, this report aims to encourage a preliminary consideration of them.

系統性的美中衝突顯然會對美國國家安全產生重大影響，但迄今為止，幾乎沒人認真分析過這些問題。相關關鍵問題包括：在與美國的系統性衝突中，中國國家安全目標可能發生怎樣的變化？而中國人民解放軍將如何應對並進行現代化建設？中國和美國軍隊可能在哪裏擦槍走火、爆發衝突？中美兩軍將以什麼樣的形式交戰？中國軍方具有哪些明顯的優劣勢支撐或妨礙其對抗美軍作戰行動？雖然這些問題的答案目前仍不可知，但本報告旨在鼓勵人們對這些問題進行初步的思考。

Sources and Methodology來源和方法學

The exploration of hypothetical conflict situations that do not exist today and may never happenposes important methodological challenges for research. What data can we draw on for such hypothetical reasoning? On what basis can we make our judgments? We acknowledge up front that such research unavoidably involves considerable conjecture, and we qualify our findings accordingly. This report aims to provide a form of informed speculation; it is not a prediction. It is designed to provoke thought and consideration of potential futures beyond the most immediate and obvious trends. Yet, to be valuable, such analysis should be as rigor-ous and data-informedas possible. We carried out our analysis through a methodology that synthesized current and historical data on relevant factors with research-grounded specula-tion. For this project, we considered academic findings regarding China’s approach to future warfare, key trends in international politics and warfare that will likely persist through the next few decades, and relevant experiences from previous great powers. Drawing from these findings, we then hypothesized how the Chinese military could fight in low and high inten-sity systemic conflicts.

探討今天不存在甚至永遠不會發生的假設性衝突情形，給研究提出了重大方法論挑戰。對於這種假設性的推理，我們可以借鑑哪些數據？我們憑藉什麼基礎做出判斷？我們首先承認，此類研究不可避免地包含大量猜測，因此，我們對研究發現進行了相應的限定。本報告根據相關信息提供一種推測；但不是預測。它的目的是引發思考並透過現象看本質地關注未來的潛在不測。但是，報告的價值呈現在於，其分析儘可能嚴謹和依據客觀數據。我們通過綜合當前和歷史數據相關要素的方法來研究並進行推測。在這個項目中，我們考慮了有關中國未來戰爭方式的學術研究結果、國際政治和戰爭可能持續到未來幾十年之關鍵趨勢和既往大國的相關經驗。根據這些信息，我們推測中國軍隊在低強度和高強度的系統性衝突中的應對模式。We sought in particular to understand and represent Chinese perspectives as much as possible. However, the limitations of publicly available Chinese-language sources on these topics should be noted up front. Political sensitivities discourage Chinese scholars and experts from exploring in detail the possibilities of a broader, global U.S.-China war. To be sure, PLA scholars have discussed the operational challenges of fighting a “strong enemy,” which is usually a thinly veiled reference to the United States. However, such sourcestend to discuss more general imperatives for military readiness or to consider potential contin-gencies within the context of existing flash points such as Taiwan.28 To date we have found virtually no credible publicly available sources that examine more speculative scenarios of U.S.-China conflict, such as chronic, long-term war, wars of power transition, or U.S.-China conflict scenarios outside the first island chain. Some PLA scholars do acknowledge the pos-sibility of major war with the United States, but they do not examine the possibility in depth, perhaps owing to their judgment that such conflict is improbable or perhaps due to political constraints. In light of such limited sources, we have extrapolatedpossible Chinese political and military strategy precepts and directives to inform our analysis, but we acknowledge that such an approach must be treated as speculation, not fact.

我們力求做到儘可能地瞭解和呈現中國的觀點。然而，我們必須首先指出，有關這些研究課題之公開中文資料信息的侷限性。政治敏感性使中國學者和專家忌諱從細節上探討廣泛的、全球性的美中軍事衝突的可能性。可以肯定的是，解放軍學者已經討論過與 “強敵 ”爆發衝突的挑戰，“強敵”通常是對美國的含蓄指稱。然而，這些資料傾向於討論更普遍的軍事準備的必要性，或在現有的熱點如台灣的背景下考慮潛在的連續性。28 迄今為止，我們幾乎沒有發現任何可信的公開資料來研究美中衝突的更多猜測性情景，如長期的戰爭，權力過渡的戰爭，或第一島鏈之外的美中衝突事件。一些解放軍學者確實承認美中發生重大戰爭的可能性，但他們沒有深入研究這種可能性，也許是由於他們判斷這種衝突是不可能的，也許是由於政治限制。鑑於這些有限的信息來源，我們根據推斷中國可能的政治和軍事戰略戒律和指令來為我們的分析提供信息，但我們承認，這種方法必須被視為猜測，而不是事實。

The first part of this report outlines a series of research findings regarding broad trends related to international politics and war, patterns of interstate conflict among rising great powers, and findings regarding the drivers of great power war. Chapter Two sets the context by outlining key geopolitical and military trends that experts have regarded as likely to per-sist for several decades. It explores how these trends could affect the prospect for U.S. China conflict under conditions in which China nears global primacy. In Chapter Three we exam-ine patterns in the conflict behavior of leading great powers for insight intothe potential forms that systemic U.S.-China conflict might take. We analyze in particular the experiences of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States as global powers. Although the Soviet Union never exercised hegemony on the scale of the United Kingdom or the United States, it did exert considerable influence over large swaths of Eurasia, and its role as the most

本報告的第一章概述了一系列與國際政治和戰爭有關的廣泛趨勢的研究結果，崛起的大國之間的衝突模式，以及有關大國戰爭爆發原因的研究結果。第二章通過闡述專家們認為可能持續數十年的關鍵地緣政治和軍事趨勢來確定背景。它探討了在中國接近全球主導地位的情況下，這些趨勢會如何影響美中衝突的前景。在第三章中，我們研究了主要大國的衝突行為模式，以深入瞭解系統性美中衝突可能採取的形式。我們特別分析了蘇聯、英國和美國作為全球大國的經驗。儘管蘇聯從未成為像英國或美國那樣的霸權大國，但作為世界上最有影響力的大國之一，它也發揮了相當大的作用，確實對歐亞大陸的大片地區施加了相當大的影響。

Introductiosuccessful communist state offers potential insight into how China’s military might behave in a moment of near global primacy as well. To more clearly illuminate the potential pathway to U.S.-China conflict and the characteristics it might manifest, we also consider the experience of past great power rivalries in Chapter Four. We highlight in particular key patterns that have recurred in similar situations of power transition, such as the tendency toward height-ened threat perceptions, issue spiral, arms races, alliance-building activity, and the multilat-eralization of conflict. We contend that similar developments would likely accompany the onset of U.S.-China hostilities.

成功的共產主義國家為中國軍隊在接近全球主導地位的時刻如何表現提供了潛在的洞察力。為了更清楚地説明美中衝突的潛在途徑及其可能表現出的特點，我們在第四章還考慮了過去大國競爭的經驗。我們特別強調了在類似的權力過渡情況下反覆出現的關鍵模式，如威脅感增強的趨勢、問題迭出、軍備競賽、聯盟建設活動以及衝突的多元化。我們認為，類似的發展可能伴隨着美中敵對行動的開始。

The second part of the report builds on this literature review to explore scenarios of hypo-thetical U.S.-China conflict under conditions of Chinese near primacy. In Chapter Five we explore how China’s military might position itself to fight a systemic war with the United States. Since the PLA would have to fight with the military it has built, we briefly review key features of the military’s mission, global footprint, and mode of operation before considering how these might affect the PLA’s ability to wage systemic war. Chapter Six focuses on a sce-nario characterized by low-intensity systemic conflict. Ranging from persistent cyberconflict and economic conflict to proxy conventional wars along the proposed routes of the BRI, it paints a picture of a conflict-plagued, yet paradoxically stable, U.S.-China relationship. In this relationship, some level of trade and cooperation could persist amid largely indirect war.

報告的第二部分在這一文獻回顧的基礎上，探討了在中國近乎首要地位的條件下美中衝突的假想情景。在第五章中，我們探討了中國軍隊如何定位自己與美國進行系統性的戰爭。由於中國人民解放軍必須以其建立的軍隊進行戰鬥，我們在考慮這些因素如何影響中國人民解放軍發動系統性戰爭的能力之前，簡要回顧了軍隊的任務、全球足跡和行動模式的關鍵特徵。第六章重點討論以低強度系統性衝突為特徵的情況。從持續的網絡衝突和經濟衝突到沿着擬定的BRI路線的代理常規戰爭，它描繪了一幅充滿衝突但又矛盾地穩定的美中關係。在這種關係中，某種程度的貿易和合作可以在間接的戰爭中持續存在。

Chapter Seven analyzes a more escalatory possibility featuring conventional U.S.-China high-intensity war under conditions of Chinese near primacy. In this scenario, efforts to con-trol escalation below the threshold of conventional war have failed. To analyze this possibil-ity, we briefly consider how Chinese wars to gain territory, such as Taiwan, could rapidly expand into a larger-scale war of decision. We also consider more limited hypothetical con-flicts in other locations along China’s periphery and beyond the first island chain. As formu-lated by our analysis, these conflicts could take place along the Indian Ocean, in the Middle East, and in Southeast Asia. A major driver could be China’s desire to establish its credibility as a military power and as a security guarantor for clients. Its motives could overlap, perhaps, with resource concerns. Alternatively, China could seek to dominate rival Asian powers and decisively demonstrate China’s military superiority over the United States as part of its bid for leadership. In most conceivable scenarios, these wars would involve clashing coalitions. Any war involving the militaries of both China and the United States would carry a high risk of escalation extending to the nuclear, outer space, and cyberspace domains. A conven-tional high-intensity war could also occur alongside the continuation or aggravation of low-intensity conflicts around the world.

第七章分析了一種更加升級的可能性，即中國幾乎占主導地位的情況下，美中之間發生高烈度的常規戰爭。在這種情況下，控制升級到常規戰爭門檻以下的努力已經失敗。為了分析這種可能性，我們簡要地考慮了中國為“收復”領土（如台灣）而進行的戰爭是如何迅速擴大為一場更大規模的決定性戰爭的。我們還考慮了在中國周邊和第一島鏈以外的其他地方發生的更為有限的假設性衝突。根據我們的分析，這些衝突可能發生在印度洋沿岸、中東和東南亞地區。一個主要的驅動力可能是中國希望建立其作為軍事大國和客户安全保證人的信譽。其動機可能與資源問題相重疊。另外，中國也可能尋求支配亞洲的競爭對手，並果斷地展示中國對美國的軍事優勢，作為其爭奪領導權的一部分。在大多數可以想象的情況下，這些戰爭將涉及到聯盟的衝突。任何涉及中國和美國軍隊的戰爭都會有升級到核、外太空和網絡空間領域的高風險。在世界範圍內的低強度衝突持續或加劇的同時，也可能發生一場高強度的戰爭。

The report concludes with some observations and implications in Chapter Eight. We also offer some recommendations based on our findings. The prospects for China gaining pri-macy in the Asia-Pacific region and as a global leader merit all the debate and analysis that they have garnered, and the fact that the possibility of such an outcome cannot be fully dis-counted underscores the importance of thinking through what such a future might mean for U.S. security. It is our hope that this report contributes to the stimulating of a deeper consid-eration of this important topic.

報告最後在第八章中匯聚了一些觀點和意見。我們還根據我們的研究提出了一些建議。所有關於中國在亞太地區獲得主導地位併成為全球領袖的前景都值得辯論和分析——這種結果的可能很難完全排除，它事實上證明了思考未來中國對美國安全的意味是多麼的重要。我們希望這份報告有助於激發對這一重要議題的深入思考.