陶勇翻譯 蘭德智庫報告 《大國戰爭的迴歸——美中之間系統性衝突模式》第一章（上）_風聞

​CHAPTER ONE第一章

Introduction報告簡介

This report explores scenarios of systemic U.S.-China conflict in a situation in which China has neared global primacy. To help illuminate how a U.S.- China war might unfold in such a circumstance, the authors examine trends in warfare and geopolitics, the behavior of select past great powers, and relevant patterns of interstate conflict. From these data, the authors formulate two scenarios of systemic U.S. China conflict war—one that is low-intensity and another that is high-intensity.

本報告探討當中國接近全球主導地位的情況下，美中系統性衝突模式。為了有助於説明美中戰爭在此前提下將如何展開，作者研究了戰爭和地緣政治趨勢、既往一些大國行為與國家間衝突相關模式。根據這些數據，作者提出了美中系統性衝突戰爭的兩種模式：一種是低強度的，另一種是高強度的。

Background: An Intensifying Great Power Competition背景：不斷加劇的大國競爭

Following the end of the Cold War, the United States of America enjoyed a position of global supremacy unsurpassedin human history. At the height of its power, the United States accounted for a quarter of global economic activity, deployed the world’s most advanced mil-itary, and experienced unmatched political and cultural influence.1 Currently, however, the nation’s unipolar moment is ending. By virtually every measure of national power, the strate-gic position of the United States has weakened as its economic growth rate has slowed relative to that of many other countries, including China. Whether and how much longer the United States can retain its position of global leadership has proven a topic of intense debate.2 At the very least, experts acknowledge that U.S. primacy can no longer be regarded as uncontested.3 The 2021 Interim National Security Strategy acknowledged that the “distribution of power across the world is changing” and characterized China as the “only competitor” that could “mount a sustained challenge to a stable and open international system.”

冷戰結束後，美國獲得了人類歷史上無可比擬的全球霸主地位。在其權力巔峯時期，美國經濟分量佔據全球四分之一比重，部署了世界上最先進的軍事力量，並擁有無與倫比的政治和文化影響力。然而，目前美國的單極榮光時刻正在結束。從衡量國家實力的幾乎所有標準來看，美國的戰略地位已經減弱，因為相對包括中國在內的許多其他國家，美國經濟增長率已經放緩。事實上，美國是否能夠繼續保持全球領導地位以及還能保持多久，是一個激烈爭論的話題。2至少，專家們承認，美國的首要地位已經不是無可爭議了。3 《2021年國家安全臨時戰略》承認，“全球權力分配正在發生變化”，並將中國定性成 “唯一的競爭者”，可以 “對穩定和開放的國際體系發起持續地挑戰”。

The Return of Great Power WarSecond only to the United States in the size of its economy and with a leadership eager to realize the nation’s revitalization, China stands as the nation’s only credible contender for global leadership. It should be noted that China’s ability to surpass the United States as a global leader is far from clear; there are ample reasons to doubt the prospect. Decades of robust growth obscure a Chinese economy encumbered by severe weaknesses. Moreover, the nation faces a gloomy demographic outlook and restrictive political geography. The apparent strength and resolve of the central political leadership scarcely conceals fragility arising from an overly centralized and repressive authoritarianism.5 China also does not appear to have an ambition to replicate U.S.-style global leadership, which may not be feasible in any case. Yet the possibility that China overcomes many or most of these formidable obstacles and begins to more aggressively contend for global primacy cannot be completely ruled out either. Given the potential implications for U.S. security of such an outcome, an analysis of what conflict under such conditions mean for America’s security seems prudent.

當前，中國的經濟規模僅次於美國，其領導層急於實現民族復興，是中國在全球領導力競爭中唯一可信的代表。應該指出地是，中國是否有能力超越美國成為全球領導者還不明晰；但卻有足夠的理由懷疑這一前景。因為，幾十年的強勁增長掩蓋了中國經濟的嚴重弱點；除此之外，中國還面臨着慘淡的人口前景和限制性的政治地理環境。中央政治領導層表面上的力量和決心幾乎掩蓋了過度集中和壓制的威權主義所帶來的脆弱性。5 中國似乎也沒有複製美國式全球領導地位的雄心，這在任何情況下都是不可行的。然而，也不能完全排除中國克服許多或大部分這些巨大的障礙，開始更積極地爭奪全球主導權的可能性。鑑於這種結果對美國安全的潛在影響，分析這種條件下的衝突對美國的安全意味着什麼似乎不是多餘的。

The intensification of U.S.-China strategic competition introduces political and secu-rity challenges that in key ways exceed what U.S. policymakers faced during the Cold War. Although the U.S.-Soviet zero-sum ideological conflict may be absent, the United States faces a far stronger contender in China than it ever faced in the Soviet Union. Moscow posed a powerful military challenge in Europe and owned a massive nuclear arsenal. It also exercised significant international political influence, especially among decolonizing Third World countries. But outside these areas, Soviet power lagged that of its American competitor by wide margins. Its economy never reached more than a fraction of that of the United States. The Soviet military maintained robust ground forces in Europe, but it suffered an overall technological inferiority and lacked the ability to project power globally.

美中戰略競爭的加劇帶來了政治和安全挑戰，甚至在關鍵方面超過了美國政策制定者在冷戰期間面臨的挑戰。雖然美蘇零和的意識形態衝突可能不復存在，但美國當前面臨的中國競爭者遠比過去面臨的蘇聯競爭者更為強大。莫斯科在歐洲形成了強大的軍事挑戰，並擁有一個龐大的核武庫。它還發揮了重要的國際政治影響，特別是在非殖民化的第三世界國家中。但在這些領域之外，蘇聯的力量遠遠落後於美國競爭對手。它的經濟實力僅佔美國的小部分。蘇聯軍隊在歐洲保持着強大的地面部隊，但它在總體技術上處於劣勢，缺乏全球投射能力。

By contrast, U.S.-China competition has rapidly expanded beyond the military to techno-logical, ideological, political, and economic domains. The two sides continue to face danger-ous flash points near China and argue over the role of human rights, democracy, and indi-vidual freedoms in international politics. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has grown into a formidable force possessing impressive technological capabilities, even if it continues to lag the U.S. military in key ways.6 Moreover, unlike during the Cold War, which saw the United States enter the contest near the zenith of its economic might, in the current rivalry, the nation is in a period of relative decline. Even as its growth trajectory slows, Chinese national power continues to accrue at a faster rate than that of its American competitor. The size of China’s economy could exceed that of the United States in nominal terms by the 2030s, although experts continue to debate that possibility.7 If current trends continue, a U.S. mili-.tary facing flat budgets could confront an increasingly powerful and modern Chinese mili-tary.8 The same trends raise the risk that Chinese leaders could become emboldened in their approach to long-standingflash points such as the South China Sea or Taiwan and might risk conflict to achieve their goals.9 Nor is there likely to be a quick and easy resolution to this imposing strategic challenge. Owing to deep structural drivers, the U.S.-China competition is expected to last many years, if not decades.

相比之下，美中兩國的競爭已經迅速擴大到軍事以外的技術邏輯、意識形態、政治和經濟領域。雙方在中國周邊繼續面臨危險的爆發點，並就人權、民主和個人自由在國際政治中的作用進行爭論。中國人民解放軍（PLA）已經成長為一支強大的力量，擁有令人印象深刻的技術能力，儘管它在關鍵方面仍然落後於美國軍隊。此外，與冷戰時期不同的是，美國是在其經濟實力接近頂峯的情況下參加（軍備）競賽的。而在當下的競爭中，美國正處於一個相對衰落的時期。而中國即使增長有所放緩，但國力的增強速度仍然比競爭對手美國更快。預計到2030年，中國經濟規模按名義價值計算可能超過美國，儘管專家們對這種可能性仍有爭議。如果目前的趨勢繼續下去，面臨預算持平的美國軍隊將面對日益強大和現代化的中國軍隊。同樣的趨勢也使中國領導人在處理南海或台灣等長期存在的熱點問題時更加無所顧忌，並可能冒着衝突的風險來實現其目標。對於這一嚴峻的戰略挑戰，也不可能有一個快速和簡單的解決方案。由於深層次的結構性因素，美中之間的競爭預計將持續多年，甚至幾十年。

Introduction同樣的趨勢也使中國領導人在處理南海或台灣等長期存在的熱點問題時更加膽大妄為，並可能冒着衝突的風險來實現其目標。由於深層次的結構性因素，美中之間的競爭預計將持續多年，甚至幾十年。

Defining a Leading Great Power界定一個領先的大國

Should China successfully realize its ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a Chinese-led effort todevelop a massive trade and infrastructure network spanning much of Africa and Eurasia, the United States could one day find itself confronting a peer rival for global leadership possessing immense national power. Theorists of international relations have long concluded that the struggle for international primacy among rival great powers tends to be prone to systemic conflict. It is this moment of near global primacy—that is, a moment at which China as a peer power begins to more aggressively contend for the mantle of global leadership—that we focus on in this report. But before we can proceed with analyzing such a situation, we will clarify what we mean by global primacy and why this could drive systemic conflict.

如果中國成功實現其雄心勃勃的一個由中國主導的、橫跨非洲和歐亞大陸的大規模貿易和基礎設施網絡之 “一帶一路 “目標（BRI），美國就會發現自己面對的是一個國力強盛的全球領導地位的同級競爭對手。國際關係理論家早就得出結論，競爭大國之間爭奪國際首要地位的拼鬥往往容易發生系統性衝突。我們在本報告中關注的正是這種接近全球主導地位的時刻——即中國作為一個匹敵大國開始更積極地爭奪全球領導地位的時刻。但在我們着手分析這種情況之前，我們將澄清我們所説的全球首要地位是什麼意思，以及為什麼這可能造成系統性衝突。

In every age, one country or set of countries tends to stand out as the most powerful. Yet how to define and measure the strength of these high performers remains much disputed. Scholars have employed a variety of terms to communicate different aspects of national strength, such as great powers, world powers, or first-rate powers. Typically, scholars use the term great power to refer to a class of powerful countries with the ability to profoundly shape international politics. Paul Kennedy has highlighted the importance of economic and military power as essential to this class of nations.11 Realist theorist Kenneth Waltz, by contrast, proposes five criteria for defining a great power: population and territory; resource endowment; economic capability; political stability and competence; and military strength.12 William Wohlforth and Steven Brooks argue against the concept of “polarity” in favor of a method that measures national power in terms of military, economic, and techni-cal capacity.

在各個時代，一個國家或“一羣”國家往往會作為最強大的國家脱穎而出。然而，如何定義和衡量這些崛起國家的實力，仍然存在很大爭議。學者們採用了各種術語、從不同角度表述國家實力，如大國、世界大國或一流大國。通常情況下，學者們用大國這個詞來指代一類有能力深刻影響國際政治的強大國家。保羅——肯尼迪強調了經濟和軍事力量對於這類國家的重要性。11 而現實主義理論家肯尼思——華爾茲則提出了定義大國的五個標準：人口和領土；資源稟賦；經濟能力；政治穩定和能力；以及軍事力量。12 威廉-沃爾福斯和史蒂芬-布魯克斯反對 “極性 “的概念，贊成用軍事、經濟和技術能力來衡量國家實力的方法。

The Return of Great Power WarAmong the great powers, different configurations with different risks of conflict are possible. Some theorists have argued that a diffusion of power among states, such as in “multipolar” situations, may offer the best prospects for international stability.14 Other the-orists have focused on the dynamism of situations featuring a high degree of concentrated power. Specialists in power transition scenarios in particular have claimed that great power wars fundamentally aim to decide the issue of hegemony and leadership in a system or subsystem.15 For these scholars, the terms preeminenceor primacy describe a country that enjoys the first rank, or highest-level status, among other countries. Such countries have an unusually high concentration of national power, as measured by a greater share of eco-nomic, military, and political power than any other country. Such powerful states also are typically understood to have greater international influence than others.

在大國之間，有可能出現具有不同衝突風險的不同配置。一些理論家認為，國家間的權力分散，如在"多極 “情況下，可能為國際穩定提供最佳前景。其他理論家則關注以高度集中的權力為特徵的情況動態。特別是研究權力過渡情況的專家聲稱，大國戰爭的根本目的是決定一個系統或子系統中的霸權和領導權問題。15 對這些學者來説，“優勢"或"首要地位 “這些術語描述了一個國家在其他國家中享有第一等級，或最高級別的地位。這類國家的政府權力異常集中、以比其他國家更多的生態、軍事和政治權力份額來衡量，這種強國通常也被理解為比其他國傢俱有更大的國際影響力。

For such states, scholars have highlighted qualities such as the possibilities of domination and control. The term hegemon, often associated with a variant of realist international relations theory that emphasizes the role of a single, dominant hegemonic power, refers to the idea that one coun-try exercises political, economic, or military predominance or control over other states. Robert Gilpin, a foremost theorist of the role of hegemons, has argued that the international order is most stable when there is one hegemon and that, as the power of the incumbent hegemon wanes, dissatisfied rising hegemons will contend for a position of primacy. The clash between the incumbent and rising hegemons will, according to this theory of “hege-monic stability,” result in war.16 A. F. K. Organski, in particular, has developed the theory of “power transition warfare,” in which the status quo and rising hegemons fight to decide the issue of international primacy. 17 The theory of power transition warfare between rising and declining great powers has found some empirical support.18 However, the theories have been criticized as well. One criticism of the term hegemon is that it implies that a country can exercise a level of oppressive domination and control that most countries might find intolerable and that few countries can exercise in practice. Chinese official documents rou-tinely hurl the accusation of hegemonic behavior against the United States with this argu-ment in mind.

對於這樣的國家，學者們強調了諸如支配和控制的可能性等品質。霸權一詞，通常與現實主義國際關係理論的一個變種相關，強調單一的、占主導地位的霸權國家的作用，指某個國家利用政治、經濟或軍事上的優勢對其他國家實施掌控的企圖。最重要的霸權作用理論家羅伯特-吉爾平認為，當只有一個霸權時，國際秩序是最穩定的，但隨着唯一霸權國家的衰落，挑戰現實的後起霸權將爭奪首要霸權地位。根據這一 “霸權穩定 “理論，現任霸權和崛起霸權之間的衝突將導致戰爭。特別是奧根斯基提出了 “權力過渡戰爭 “的理論，在這個理論中，現任霸權和崛起霸權將為爭奪國際首要地位而戰。大國崛起與衰落之間的權力過渡戰爭理論已經找到了一些經驗上的支持。然而，這些理論也受到了批評。對 “霸權 “一詞的批評是，它意味着一個國家可以行使一定程度的壓迫性統治和控制，而大多數國家可能認為這是不可容忍的，在實踐中，很少有國家能夠行使這種權利。中國的官方文件經常對美國的霸權主義行為提出指責，並以此為論據。