周波：烏克蘭戰爭將加速地緣政治自西向東轉移

【文/周波，翻譯/中國論壇 韓樺】

如果敵人的敵人是我的朋友，那麼朋友的敵人也是我的敵人嗎？不見得。俄烏間戰火紛飛的當下，中國的考慮大抵如此。一方面，中國是俄羅斯的戰略伙伴，另一方面，中國是烏克蘭的最大貿易伙伴。因此，北京竭盡全力，在兩個朋友之間的戰爭中尋求平衡：中國表示理解俄羅斯對北約擴張的“合理關切”，同時強調，“所有國家的主權和領土完整都必須得到尊重”。

對交戰雙方來講，這種精心考量的中立也許並不是他們真正想要的，但卻是可以接受的。如果中國與西方一起譴責俄羅斯，華盛頓和大多數歐洲國家都會鼓掌歡呼， 但中國卻會因此失去俄羅斯這個夥伴，而且，用不了多久，美國就會調轉頭來對付中國。拜登政府對華政策是隻要不發生戰爭，就放手進行“極限競爭”。

顯然，烏克蘭衝突對中國的利益，包括“一帶一路”倡議的歐洲部分，都造成了巨大損害。 但是北京同情莫斯科的説法，即衝突的根源是北約在蘇聯解體之後無休止的東擴。自戈爾巴喬夫以來，所有俄羅斯領導人都在警告這種擴張的後果。俄羅斯感到他無法容忍其烏克蘭兄弟離開俄羅斯世界而加入到另外一個陣營。如果北約在俄羅斯看來像一個弗蘭肯斯坦的怪物，到處張牙舞爪，那麼，普京就可能認為他必須斬妖除魔。

歐洲的未來不難猜測。普京針對烏克蘭的全面戰爭已經失敗。恰恰因為如此，他必須要一直打下去，直到宣佈某種勝利。這可能包括烏克蘭要接受克里米亞是俄羅斯的一部分，承諾不加入北約以及承認頓涅茨克和盧甘斯克兩個“共和國”的獨立。挑戰在於，俄軍在佔領頓巴斯後能否守得住它。

雖然不能肯定，但俄烏戰爭很可能走向曠日持久。 這種情況有點類似蘇聯80年代入侵阿富汗後，美國所率領的聯軍向阿富汗的聖戰民兵源源不斷地提供武器，最終消耗、拖垮了蘇軍。

一個已經“腦死亡”的北約因危機再次復活。今年2月，德國總理舒爾茨設立了一個1000億歐元的防務基金，並宣佈德國將從今年開始，按照北約要求將每年GDP的2%用於防務。這將加強北約並充實歐洲“戰略自主”。迄今為止，“戰略自主”僅僅是法國的一個口號而已。

諷刺的是，北約越受歡迎，歐洲越不安全。如果芬蘭真的加入北約，那麼北約的軍隊將距聖彼得堡僅一箭之遙。克里姆林宮已經警告，此舉將會終結“波羅的海無核地位”，這有可能是虛張聲勢，但誰知道呢？如果北約最擔心的莫過於俄羅斯使用戰術核武器發動進攻，為什麼要不斷挑釁，去戳普京的眼睛呢？歐洲只有一如既往同俄羅斯合作，才有可能安全。

最近幾個月，對中俄夥伴關係的猜測甚囂塵上。原因是普京2月來華出席冬奧會時雙方宣佈中俄友好“沒有止境”，外界猜測中俄會因此締結軍事聯盟。但是烏克蘭戰爭恰好證明，北京和莫斯科之間的友誼不是軍事聯盟。中國並沒有向俄羅斯提供軍事援助，相反，中國兩次向烏克蘭提供了包括食品和睡袋等人道主義援助和善款，並承諾將繼續“發揮建設性的作用”。

中俄不結盟的一個原因是，它使兩個夥伴之間有舒適的靈活度。儘管中俄都呼籲多極化，但是因為他們對這個世界的看法不盡相同，彼此不結盟最好。普京領導下的俄羅斯懷念蘇聯帝國的昔日榮光，普京本人曾經悲嘆蘇聯的解體是“20世紀最大的地緣政治災難”。俄羅斯認為它是現有國際秩序的受害者。相比之下，中國是二戰之後西方建立的全球貿易金融規章制度的最大受益者，因此捍衞現有的國際秩序對中國利益攸關。 這也是為什麼，儘管有意識形態上的分歧，有時甚至關係緊張，中國和西方最起碼保持了強勁的經濟往來，雙方都不願意割捨這種關係。

美國如何能夠同時應付印太地區和歐洲戰場有待觀察。拜登曾經希望能夠讓美國對俄政策“穩定、可測”，這樣，美國就可以專注其印太戰略。烏克蘭的戰爭毫無疑問分散了美國的注意力和資源，將進一步使拜登的印太戰略空心化。印太戰略目標很多，但手段很少，而且支持者寥寥。烏克蘭會在多大程度上使拜登分心尚不清楚。在本地區，中國是大多數國家的最大貿易伙伴，甚至美國最好的盟友也不願意為了美國的利益而犧牲同中國的雙邊關係。

俄烏戰爭是不是世界陷入新的無序的轉折點？據説，中國總理周恩來在被問到如何看待1789年法國大革命時説，現在下結論為時過早。但現在説一句“烏克蘭戰爭加速了世界地緣政治和經濟由西向東轉移的趨勢”也許不算為時過早。中國屹立於中央，舉足輕重。它應站穩立場，成為世界的穩定之源。

Senior Colonel Zhou Bo says the war in Ukraine will accelerate the geopolitical shift from West to East

If the enemy  of my enemy is my friend, is the enemy of my friend also my enemy? Not necessarily. Or so China’s thinking goes when it comes to the raging Russian-Ukranian war. On the one hand China is Russia’s strategic partner. On the other, China is the largest trading partner of Ukraine. Beijing therefore tries painstakingly to strike a balance in its responses to the war between two of its friends. It expresses understanding of Russia’s “legitimate concerns” over NATO’s expansion, while underlining that “the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries must be respected”.

Such carefully calibrated neutrality may not be what the warring parties really want, but it is acceptable to both. If China joins the West in condemning Russia, it will be much applauded in Washington and most European capitals. But it will lose Russia’s partnership. And it is only a matter of time before America takes on China again. The Biden administration’s policy towards my country is “extreme competition” that stops just short of war.

Obviously, the confict in Ukraine has done tremendous damage to Chinese interests, including its Belt and Road initiative in Europe. But Beijing sympathises with Moscow’s claim that the root cause of the confict is NATO’s inexorable expansion eastward after the fall of the Soviet Union. All Russian leaders since Mikhail Gorbachev have warned of the consequences of such expansion. Russia feels that it cannot allow its Ukrainian brethren to leave Russkiy mir—the Russian world—to join another camp. If NATO looks like Frankenstein’s monster to Russia, with new additions here and there, Vladimir Putin probably believes he must slay the creature.

The future of Europe is not hard to fathom. Mr Putin’s all-out war against Ukraine has failed. Precisely because of that, he will fight until he can declare some sort of “victory”. Presumably this will involve Ukraine’s acceptance that Crimea is part of Russia, its promise not to join NATO and the independence of the two “republics” of Donetsk and Luhansk. The challenge is whether Russian troops are able to control Donbas after occupying it.

A protracted war looks probable, if not inevitable. The situation bears similarities to the one in Afghanistan during Russia’s war there in the 1980s. An American-led alliance sent endless weapons to the mujahideen who managed to bog down and exhaust the invading Soviet soldiers.

Thanks to the crisis, a brain-dead NATO has revived. In February Germany’s chancellor, Olaf Scholz, created a special €100bn ($105bn) fund for defence and announced that his country would spend 2% of its GDP on defence every year—a NATO guideline. It will beef up the alliance and bolster the idea of European “strategic autonomy” (little more than a French slogan until now).

The irony is that the more popular NATO becomes, the more insecure Europe will be. If Finland joins NATO, as looks likely, the alliance’s troops would be a stone’s throw from St Petersburg. The Kremlin has warned that such a move would end the “non-nuclear status of the Baltic Sea”. This could be a bluff. But who knows? If NATO’s worst fear is that Russia might launch a tactical nuclear attack, then why keep poking Mr Putin in the eyes? Europe’s security, now as in the past, can only be achieved with Russia’s co-operation.

In recent months speculation abounded that Beijing and Moscow’s “unlimited” partnership—announced during Mr Putin’s visit to China in February for the Winter Olympics—might usher in a military alliance. But the war in Ukraine has inadvertently proved that Beijing and Moscow’s rapprochement is not an alliance. China didn’t provide military assistance to Russia. Instead it provided humanitarian aid and money to Ukraine twice, including food and sleeping bags, and has pledged to continue to “play a constructive role”.

One reason behind the Sino-Russian non-alliance is that it allows a comfortable flexibility between two partners. And in spite of the fact that China and Russia both call for a multipolar world, a non-alliance suits them because they see such a world differently. Mr Putin’s Russia is nostalgic for the heyday of the Soviet empire. (He lamented its demise as “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe” of the 20th century.) Russia sees itself as a victim of the existing international order. By contrast China is the largest beneficiary of the rules and regulations of global commerce and finance made by the West after the second world war. China has a huge stake in safeguarding the existing international order. This is why, despite ideological differences and even tensions sometimes, China has at least maintained robust economic ties with the West. Neither side wishes to sever them.

How America can focus simultaneously on two theatres—the Indo-Pacifc and war in Europe—remains to be seen. Joe Biden had hoped to put Russia policy on a “stable and predictable” footing in order to focus on America’s Indo-Pacifc strategy. The war in Ukraine undoubtedly will distract America’s attention and syphon away resources. It will further hollow out Mr Biden’s Indo-Pacifc strategy, which already has too many aims and too few tools and not enough supporters. The question is for how long Mr Biden will allow Ukraine to remain a distraction. In a region where China is the largest trading partner of most countries, even America’s greatest allies wouldn’t wish to sacrifice their relationship with China for the benefit of America.

Is the Russia-Ukraine war a turning point that heralds new global disorder? Rumor has it that when China’s Premier Zhou Enlai was asked what he thought of the French Revolution of 1789, he supposedly said that it was too early to tell. But perhaps it isn’t too early to say that the war in Ukraine will accelerate the geopolitical and economic shift from the West to the East. China standing in the centre matters all the more, and it should stand firm as a stabiliser.

（Senior Colonel Zhou Bo is a retired officer of the People’s Liberation Army and a senior fellow at the Centre for International Security and Strategy at Tsinghua University, Beijing and a China Forum expert.）

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