美國網友:西方制裁,沒美國技術,中國能造出芯片來嗎（上）_風聞

Yes, China must develop its own modern advanced immersion lithography machine because the West has drawn up the hostile and unfair Wassenauer Agreement against China, the Agreement on Export Control of Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies.

是啊，中國必須發展自己的現代先進的浸沒式光刻機，因為西方對中國擬定了敵對和不公平的《瓦森納協議》，即《常規武器和軍民兩用貨物和技術出口管制協議》。

Chinese companies need to participate more in the semiconductor industry chain, which may not have much impact now, but its importance will be highlighted in the future. There is still a big gap between the Chinese semiconductor industry and its international counterparts, and overall, they are still trying to catch up.

中國企業需要更多地參與到半導體產業鏈中，這一點現在可能沒有太大的影響，但未來的重要性將會凸顯出來。中國半導體產業與國際同行之間仍有很大差距，總體而言，他們仍在努力追趕。

Some small specialized, refined, characteristic, innovative companies, although rarely appear in the spotlight, but they silently target market segments, and strive to polish some products, successfully gain a foothold in the global semiconductor industry chain, and stabilize this trillion-level market.

一些小的專業化、精細化、有特色、有創新的公司，雖然很少出現在聚光燈下，但他們默默地瞄準細分市場，努力打磨一些產品，成功地在全球半導體產業鏈中站穩腳跟，穩定了這個萬億級的市場。

The above image shows an interior view of the Thinkon Semiconductor monocrystalline silicon rod workshop.

上圖顯示了Thinkon半導體單晶硅棒車間的內部視圖。

Thinkon Semiconductor started producing monocrystalline silicon for etching because it was also quite profitable and had a lot in common with wafer production.

Thinkon半導體(Thinkon Semiconductor)開始生產用於蝕刻的單晶硅，因為利潤也相當可觀，而且與晶圓生產有很多共同點。

During wafer etching, silicon electrodes made of monocrystalline silicon are consumed at the same time as the wafer and need to be larger than the wafer size. For example, to process a 12-inch wafer, the size of the corresponding monocrystalline silicon material used for etching is usually at least 14 inches. In order to reduce costs, as the chip manufacturing process has advanced from 28 nm to 7 nm or even 5 nm, the mainstream wafer size used in advanced processes has increased from 8 inches to 12 inches or larger. This also means that the size of the monocrystalline silicon used for etching must be increased accordingly.

在晶圓刻蝕過程中，由單晶硅製成的硅電極與晶圓同時消耗，需要比晶圓尺寸更大。例如，要加工12英寸的晶圓，用於蝕刻的相應單晶硅材料的尺寸通常至少為14英寸。出於降低成本的考慮，當芯片製造工藝從28納米推進到7納米甚至5納米時，先進工藝中使用的主流晶圓尺寸已經從8英寸增加到12英寸甚至更大。這也意味着用於蝕刻的單晶硅的尺寸必須相應增大。

Its 8-inch semiconductor silicon polished wafer products.

這是8英寸半導體硅拋光晶圓產品。

Within a few months of its founding, the company achieved volume production of 14 inches to 19 inches. In May 2020, a high quality silicon single crystal with a diameter of 22 inches was successfully grown.

在成立後的幾個月裏，公司實現了14英寸到19英寸的量產。2020年5月，成功生長出直徑為22英寸的高品質硅單晶。

The company’s high level of product yield and quality have been recognized by foreign customers, and become a partner of competitors. The company’s international market share continues to increase, successfully entered the international advanced semiconductor material industry chain system, and formed a global advantage in related segments.

公司高水平的產品良率和質量得到了國外客户的認可，併成為競爭對手的合作伙伴。公司國際市場佔有率持續提升，成功進入國際先進半導體材料產業鏈體系，並在相關細分領域形成全球優勢。

The successful development of low-defect growth technology of 8-inch crystal (i.e., wafer substrate) chip without magnetic field assistance has laid a good foundation for the development and mass production of the next 12-inch low-defect crystal chip. Many of the company’s technologies are at the international advanced level.

成功開發出無需磁場輔助的8英寸晶體(即晶圓基材)芯片低缺陷生長技術，為下一階段12英寸低缺陷晶體芯片的研發和量產奠定了良好的基礎。公司多項技術處於國際先進水平。

The lithography process requires more than 100 electronic grade high-purity industrial gases to cooperate with each other, each of which is indispensable.

光刻工藝需要100多種電子級高純工業氣體相互配合，每一種都是不可或缺的。

In 2018, Hunan Kemet Gas, which purifies food-grade carbon dioxide from industrial waste gas, has become an important supplier to many international food and beverage companies. In the same year, the company made the decision to climb the new peak of electronic special gas, invested 230 million yuan, and built a new factory in Yueyang, Hunan Province, with a strong R & D team.

2018年，從工業廢氣中淨化食品級二氧化碳的湖南凱美特氣體已成為許多國際食品和飲料公司的重要供應商。同年，公司做出了勇於攀登電子特種氣新高峯的決定，投資2.3億元，在湖南嶽陽新建工廠，擁有強大的研發團隊。

After two years of hard technical research, the series of products will be launched in 2020. The technical team continuously sends the sample data to the major international factories, and carries out multiple certification procedures in parallel and in parallel, so as to obtain the admission ticket as soon as possible.

經過兩年艱苦的技術攻關，系列產品於2020年推出。技術團隊不間斷地將樣品數據發送到各大國際工廠，並行、並行地進行多個認證程序，爭取時間儘快獲得准考證。

25 sets of electronic special gas and mixture production and processing equipment have been built, extending to a full range of electronic special gas fields, forming a professional electronic special gas and mixture research and development and production and processing base with greater influence in the industry. The company will contribute to expanding market supply.

建成電子特種氣和混合氣生產加工設備25套，延伸到全系列電子特種氣田，形成了行業內具有較大影響力的專業電子特種氣和混合氣研發和生產加工基地。該公司將為擴大市場供應作出貢獻。

The import and export control measures of the United States will not bring any benefits, but will only promote the progress and rise of China’s technology, causing many American companies to suffer certain economic losses, while seriously hurting the European semiconductor industry. The ASML CEO said that if this behavior in the United States is not stopped, European chips could disappear from the Chinese market within 15 years. The revised U.S. rules are aimed not at China but at Europe, Taiwan, South Korea and Japan, preventing other foreign chip and semiconductor equipment companies from competing with U.S. companies in the Chinese market.

美國的進出口管制措施不會帶來任何好處，只會促進中國技術的進步和崛起，使許多美國企業遭受一定的經濟損失，同時嚴重傷害歐洲半導體產業。ASML首席執行官表示，如果不停止美國的這種行為，歐洲芯片可能會在15年內從中國市場消失。美國修訂後的規則並非針對中國，而是針對歐洲、台灣地區、韓國和日本，阻止其他外國芯片和半導體設備企業與美國企業爭奪中國市場。

For mainland China, only by giving up illusions, focusing on solving problems, building its own core technology, strengthening national strategic scientific and technological manpower, and building an industrial ecology of its own core technology can it have a bright future.

對於中國大陸來説，只有放棄幻想，集中精力解決問題，建設自己的核心技術，加強國家戰略科技人力，構建自己核心技術的產業生態，才會有光明的未來。

In 2002, the lithography machine was officially included in the “863 major scientific and technological research plan”. Subsequently, under the leadership of the Ministry of Science and Technology and the Shanghai Municipal Government, a number of domestic technology companies jointly established Shanghai Microelectronics to undertake key research tasks. Among them, the focus of research and development is 100nm step scan projection lithography machine.

2002年，光刻機正式列入“863重大科技攻關計劃”。隨後，在科技部和上海市政府的領導下，多家國內科技企業聯合成立了上海微電子，承擔攻關攻關任務。其中，重點研發的是100nm步進掃描投影光刻機。

Today, Shanghai Microelectronics has become the most advanced lithography equipment manufacturer in China, with 80% of the domestic market share of packaged lithography products and 40% of the global market share. In addition, its LED/MEMS/ power device lithography machine performance indicators are leading, and its LED lithography machine market share is the largest. However, in the field of front-end lithography machines for chip manufacturing, the most advanced equipment that Shanghai Microelectronics can currently mass produce is only at the 90nm process node. Although it said that it will launch a 28-nanometer process lithograph machine in 2021, it is far from the 5-nanometer process equipment of the Dutch company ASML.

如今，上海微電子已成為國內最先進的光刻設備製造商，封裝光刻產品的國內市場佔有率為80%，全球市場佔有率為40%。此外，其LED/MEMS/功率器件光刻機性能指標領先，其LED光刻機市場份額最大。但在用於芯片製造的前端光刻機領域，上海微電子目前能夠量產的最先進設備僅在90nm工藝節點。雖然表示將在2021年推出28納米制程光刻機，但與荷蘭阿斯麥公司(ASML)的5納米以下製程設備相差甚遠。

By 1965, the first batch of integrated circuits were born in Beijing, Shijiazhuang, Shanghai and other places. This marked the beginning of the application of lithography technology in chip manufacturing.

1965年，第一批集成電路在北京、石家莊、上海等地誕生。這標誌着光刻技術在芯片製造中的應用的開始。

In 1980, Tsinghua University developed a distributed projection lithography machine with an accuracy of 3 microns. In 1981, the Institute of Semiconductors of the Chinese Academy of Sciences developed the JK-1 semi-automatic proximity lithography machine. In 1982, the Chinese Academy of Sciences 109 plant developed ka-75-1 lithography machine.

1980年，清華大學研製出精度為3微米的分佈式投影光刻機。在1981年，中國科學院半導體研究所發展了JK-1半自動接近光刻機。1982年，中國科學院109廠研製了ka -75-1光刻機。

The level of equipment is not low, and even close to the international mainstream level at that time. In 1985, the step projection lithography machine developed by CEC 45 was certified by the Electronic Technology Department as being up to the level of the 4800DSW lithography machine introduced by GCA in 1978.

裝備水平不低，甚至接近當時的國際主流水平。1985年，CEC 45研製的分步投影光刻機被電子技術部鑑定為達到了GCA公司1978年推出的4800DSW光刻機的水平。

However, affected by this, at the beginning of the market, it conquered technology and manufacturing equipment, and it has a representative of core strength. If you look at the early development of domestic lithography machines, you can also find that the foundation was laid in the 1950s, and in the 1960s and 1970s, it took a step forward. In the early 1980s, it was second only to the United States and even ahead of Japan and Taiwan.

但受此影響，在市場化剛起步的時候就征服了技術和製造設備，更具有核心實力的代表。如果梳理一下國內光刻機的早期發展，也可以發現，50年代奠定了基礎，到了60、70年代，又向前邁進了一步。在20世紀80年代初，它僅次於美國，甚至領先於日本和台灣地區。

In general, for more than two decades, the older generation of revolutionaries and builders dedicated their youth to creating a special glory for China’s semiconductor industry: self-sufficiency of the whole industry chain from single crystal preparation, equipment manufacturing to integrated circuit manufacturing. The strength of self-sufficiency has gradually reached its peak, basically not dependent on foreign imports.

總的來説，二十多年來，老一輩的革命者和建設者奉獻了他們的青春，為中國半導體產業創造了一個特殊的榮耀:從單晶製備、設備製造到集成電路製造的全產業鏈自給自足。自給自足的實力已逐漸達到頂峯，基本不依賴國外進口。

In 1985 and 1994, the 45 Research Institute of China Electronics Group developed G-line 1.5 micron and 0.8 micron step projection lithography machines respectively. In 1991, the Institute of Optoelectronics of the Chinese Academy of Sciences developed a synchrotron radiation X-ray engraving machine with a resolution of 1 micron.

1985年和1994年，中國電子集團45研究所分別研製了g線1.5微米和0.8微米分步投影光刻機。1991年，中國科學院光電子研究所研製出分辨率為1微米的同步輻射x射線雕刻機等。

In addition, in the context of opening up to the outside world, the trend of “buying is better than doing” has spread rapidly in China. Therefore, local governments have purchased and introduced a large number of foreign semiconductor equipment and production lines. A large number of enterprises have given up the policy of independence, self-reliance, blind acquisition, blind opening up, and embarked on the “trade, industry, technology” oriented development route.

此外，在對外開放的背景下，“買不如做”的趨勢在中國迅速蔓延。因此，地方政府購買並引進了大量的國外半導體設備和生產線。大量企業放棄了獨立自主、自力更生的政策，盲目收購、盲目開放，走上了“貿、工、技”為導向的發展路線。

Since then, due to the lack of support and top-level design, there has been a disconnect between domestic IC research, education and industry. In terms of scientific research, China follows the technical standards and systems formulated abroad. In terms of education, majors related to finance and trade became popular, while software engineers became less popular.

此後，由於缺乏支持和頂層設計，國內集成電路的研究、教育和產業出現了脱節。在科學研究方面，中國遵循國外製定的技術標準和技術體系。在教育方面，與金融和貿易相關的專業變得流行，而軟件工程師變得不受歡迎。

In the semiconductor industry, some semiconductor companies are keen to assemble for foreign companies in exchange for the economic benefits of a large number of cheap labor. The few firms that still stick to their own path are squeezed by comprador and foreign capital. As a result, since 1987, China’s original independent semiconductor research and industrial system has collapsed.

在半導體行業，部分半導體企業熱衷於為外國企業組裝，以換取大量廉價勞動力的經濟利益。極少數仍然堅持自主路線的公司只能在買辦和外國資本的擠壓下生存。因此，自1987年以來，中國原有的獨立半導體研究和工業體系已經崩潰。

In the entire 1990s, without the support of the market, funds and talents, domestic lithography machines did not achieve greater achievements, and the gap with the international level is getting larger and larger.

在整個90年代，沒有市場、資金和人才的支持，國產光刻機並沒有取得更大的成就，與國際水平的差距越來越大。

In addition, changes in the international political environment have brought enormous challenges. As early as under the framework of the “Paris Coordination Association”, the West has been implementing high-tech embargoes on socialist countries, including restricting the export of lithography machines. With the end of the Cold War and the collapse of Batumi, China became a prime target.

此外，國際政治環境的變化也帶來了巨大的挑戰。早在“巴黎協調協會”框架下，西方就一直對社會主義國家實施高科技禁運，包括限制光刻機出口。隨着冷戰的結束和“巴統”的解體，中國成為主要目標。

In July 1996, under the leadership of the United States, 33 Western countries signed the Wassenaar Agreement on the Control of Exports of Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Items and Technologies. Batumi used to have only 17 members, while the Wassenaar Agreement now has 42, including Russia.

1996年7月，在美國的領導下，33個西方國家簽署了《關於控制常規武器和兩用品及技術出口的瓦森納協定》。“巴統”過去只有17個成員國，而“瓦森納爾協定”現在有包括俄羅斯在內的42個成員國。

Under this framework, Western countries generally follow the “N-2” principle to approve the export of semiconductor technology and lithography machines, which are always at least two generations behind the most advanced technology. If there is a proper delay in the approval process, basically China’s existing equipment technology will be intentionally three generations or more behind (just second best, highest priced). Needless to say, the export of lithography machines even have more reservations, such as prohibiting the production of domestic independent chips, and prohibiting the production of chips for military scientific research and national defense. In addition, the Wassenaar Agreement also restricts the access of Chinese engineers to the core departments of well-known semiconductor companies in Europe and the United States to prevent technology leakage.

在這一框架下，西方國家一般遵循“N - 2”原則批准出口半導體技術和光刻機，這些技術總是落後於最先進的技術至少兩代。如果在審批過程中有適當的延遲，基本上中國現有的設備技術將故意落後三代或更多(只是第二好，價格最高)。不用説，出口的光刻機甚至有更多的保留，比如禁止為國產自主芯片代工，禁止為軍事科研和國防生產芯片。此外，《瓦森納協議》還限制中國工程師進入歐美知名半導體公司的核心部門，防止技術泄露。

It is also worth noting that although the Wassenaar Agreement allows member states to exercise controls on their technology exports on a voluntary basis, in practice member states are influenced by the United States on important technology export decisions. For example, the United States has intervened to block the export of lithography machines and radar systems to China.

同樣值得注意的是，雖然《瓦森納協定》允許成員國在自願的基礎上對其技術出口實施控制，但實際成員國在重要的技術出口決策上都受到美國的影響。例如，美國曾干預阻止向中國出口光刻機和雷達系統。

In the case of increasingly limited external development space, in order to find a way out, China has proposed “market for technology” and significantly reduce tariffs. However, this has dealt a serious blow to the domestic integrated circuit industry, including lithography machines. Since then, the domestic lithography machine market has gradually been dominated by European, American and Japanese companies.

在外部發展空間日益受限的情況下，為了尋找出路，中國曾提出“以市場換技術”，大幅降低關税。然而，這對包括光刻機在內的國內集成電路產業造成了嚴重打擊。此後，國內光刻機市場逐漸被歐美和日本公司所主導。

In 1999, when NATO invaded Kosovo, U.S. electronic information warfare paralyzed nearly all of Yugoslavia’s Internet communications systems. This shocked the Chinese government. At that time, the Ministry of Information Industry and the Ministry of Science and Technology held several emergency meetings to discuss how to respond to such a war.

1999年，當北約入侵科索沃時，美國的電子信息戰幾乎癱瘓了南斯拉夫所有的網絡通信系統。這震驚了中國政府。當時，信息產業部和科技部召開了幾次緊急會議，討論如何應對這樣一場戰爭。

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