周波：台海衝突？錯，更危險的是南海！

【文/觀察者網專欄作者 周波】

對於那些關注俄烏局勢並對台海爆發類似衝突表達所謂擔心的人，我的回應很簡單：笨蛋，是南海！

隨着台海局勢日益緊張，南海問題似已平息，事實並非如此。2022年12月21日，一架中國戰鬥機和一架美國偵察機在南海上空擦肩而過，相距僅僅數米。兩方都發布了視頻片段，並指責對方。

南海比台海要危險得多。中美如在台海開戰，不太可能是因為意外事件。而在南海，我們已經目睹了意外的發生。

鑑於台灣問題的高度敏感，北京和華盛頓的每句表態都會被各方仔細研判。美國總統拜登聲稱美國將“軍事保衞台灣”的幾次"口誤"很快就被白宮工作人員澄清，後者堅稱白宮沒有改變其“一箇中國“政策。

如果在空中再發生一次致命碰撞，就像2001年的那一次，會怎麼樣？二十多年來，兩國軍隊之間關於減少風險的會談一直圍繞“安全”兩字針尖對麥芒。

中方指出，美國的偵察損害中國的安全，而美國則希望討論如何確保艦機相遇時的安全。美國要求中國的軍艦和軍機保持安全距離，中國則反駁道：“你如果根本不來，肯定就會安全”。

現在發生的事情與冷戰時期頗有類似之處。在冷戰初期，有100多名美國和蘇聯飛行員因空中衝突而死亡。兩國因此最終簽署了1972年的《防止海上意外事件協定》。

中國和美國也簽署了類似的協議來緩和緊張局面。但是，無論美蘇還是中美的協議都沒有完全發揮其控制風險的作用。

如何避免中美的空中衝突成為亟待思考的問題（作者供圖）

為了避免事故發生，最終的解決方案在於雙方軍事力量的平衡。冷戰的真正教訓不是兩個超級大國建立了一系列信任措施來避免事故，而是因為軍力的平衡，雙方才願意坐下來談。

美國和蘇聯曾是旗鼓相當的敵人，而中國和美國是競爭對手，軍事差距正在迅速縮小。中國誓言要在本世紀中葉將中國人民解放軍建設成為世界一流軍隊，現在正加速這一進程。

問題是：在此之前會發生什麼？軍事力量尚未平衡的時候可能是最危險的時候。

有幾個建議已經擺到桌面上了。首先，中國可以派遣軍艦在美國水域進行對等的監視和偵察任務。歷史上，中國軍艦確實幾次曾在關島、夏威夷和阿留申羣島附近水域航行。

但是，在沒有前沿軍事基地存在的情況下，中國海軍如何能常態化在美國沿岸監視和偵察？再説，既然中國的戰略重心是維護其在西太平洋的合法權益，為什麼要常態化在美國沿海監視和偵察？

第二，中國可以修改其海洋法。世界上大多數國家，包括美國，都允許外國軍艦在其領海內無害通過。中國是否有朝一日會允許外國軍艦在自己的領海內無害通過嗎？如果中國這樣做，美國會放棄其“航行自由”行動嗎？

在1988年發生的黑海撞船事件中，兩艘蘇聯護衞艦奉命將一艘美國巡洋艦和一艘驅逐艦撞出蘇聯領海。之後，即1989年，美國和蘇聯發表聯合聲明，同意所有船隻，包括軍艦，享有無害通過對方領海的權利，幾十年的海上爭霸就此結束。

最容易辦到的則是恢復兩軍對話。在美國前眾議長佩洛西竄訪台灣後，中國取消了該對話。如果恢復，則不應該老調重彈。

自1998年以來，兩國海軍一直在磋商，並至少進行過三次旨在培養海上“良好船藝”的演習。現在亟需的是進行飛行員空中相遇時專業操守的演習。鑑於飛機的速度，要在特別近的距離內避免碰撞是非常困難的。

根據中美關於《空中和海上相遇安全行為規則》的備忘錄，雙方的飛行員在飛行時有責任使用專業的方式飛行，並適當顧及對方飛機的安全。

兩軍還應探索在差距不大的新領域中建立信任。在我參加的一次專家對話中，雙方專家一致認為，通常用來形容美蘇之間核武器數量平衡的“戰略穩定”一詞， 並不適用於當下的中美關係。

相反，中美之間的戰略穩定必須包括外太空、網絡和人工智能等新領域。溝通可以先從專家層面開始。清華大學戰略與安全研究中心和布魯金斯學會正在開展的關於減輕人工智能的軍事風險的探討，是朝着正確方向邁出的大膽一步。

冷戰變成了長長的和平，這並非單純的運氣，而是兩個超級大國一心想要避免熱戰的結果。同樣，中國和美國面臨的真正挑戰不是避免新的冷戰，而是避免很可能由意外引發的衝突。南海的最新事件告訴我們，和平不會從天而降，和平是需要努力爭取的。

翻譯：李澤西

英文原文：

For those watching the war in Ukraine and worrying that a similar conflict might occur in the Taiwan Strait, my response is simple: it’s the South China Sea, stupid.

With tensions in the Taiwan Strait rising, the South China Sea issue has seemingly died down. This is not the case. On December 21, a Chinese fighter jet and a US surveillance plane flew within metres of each other over the South China Sea. Both sides released video clips and pointed fingers at each other.

The South China Sea is far more dangerous than the Taiwan Strait. A war in the Taiwan Strait between China and the US, if it is likely at all, is very unlikely to be triggered by an accident like we have seen in the South China Sea.

The Taiwan issue is so flammable, every word from Beijing and Washington would be scrutinised. US President Joe Biden’s “gaffes” on defending Taiwan were quickly walked back by his aides, who insisted that the White House had not changed its one-China policy.

What if another fatal collision occurred in the air, like the one in 2001? For over two decades, bilateral talks on risk reduction between the two militaries have been just tit-for-tat, focusing on safety versus security.

The Chinese side points out that the United States’ reconnaissance is detrimental to China’s security while the US wishes to discuss ways to ensure safe encounters. The Americans ask Chinese ships and aircraft to keep a safe distance and the Chinese say, “You are certainly safe if you don’t come at all.”

What is happening today is very much like what happened during the Cold War. In the early decades of the Cold War, more than 100 American and Soviet pilots died as a result of air clashes. This led to the 1972 US-Soviet Incident at Sea agreement.

China and the US have similar agreements to reduce tension. But, in both cases, the agreements didn’t fully play their roles in risk reduction.

To avoid an accident, the eventual solution lies in an equilibrium of military strength. The real lesson from the Cold War is not the two superpowers establishing a litany of confidence-building measures to avoid accidents but that, because of the balance of power, both were willing to sit down to talk.

While the US and the Soviet Union were enemies of almost equal strength, China and the US are competitors with a military gap that is quickly closing. China has vowed to speed up building the People’s Liberation Army into a world-class military by mid-century.

The question is: what could happen before that? Short of an equilibrium, this might turn out to be the most dangerous time.

A few suggestions are already on the table. First, China could send ships on reciprocal surveillance and reconnaissance missions in American waters. Historically, Chinese ships did sail sporadically in the waters off Guam, Hawaii and the Aleutian Islands.

But how can the PLA Navy do that routinely along the American coast without a forward military presence such as bases? And why should it do that at all if China’s focus is on maintaining its legitimate rights and interests in the Western Pacific?

Second, China could amend its maritime law. Most countries in the world, including the US, allow innocent passage of foreign vessels in their territorial waters. Will China allow innocent passage in its own territorial waters one day? And if China does, would the US give up its freedom of navigation operations?

This is what happened after the 1988 Black Sea bumping incident in which two Soviet frigates were ordered to push an American cruiser and a destroyer out of Soviet territorial waters. In 1989, the US and USSR issued a joint statement agreeing that all ships, including warships, enjoy the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea of another. The decades-old rivalry at sea came to an end.

The easiest thing to do is to resume the military-to-military dialogues that China cancelled in the wake of former US House speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan. But it should not be business as usual.

The two navies have been talking to each other since 1998 and have done at least three exercises aiming for good seamanship. What is sorely needed are exercises to ensure good airmanship in an air-to-air encounter. Given the speed of today’s aircraft, it is extremely difficult to disengage in proximity.

According to the China-US memorandum on rules of behaviour for safety of air and maritime encounters, the pilots of both sides are responsible for operating with professional airmanship and paying due regard to the safety of the other side’s aircraft.

The two militaries should explore building confidence in new fields where the gaps are not huge. In a track II dialogue I attended, experts from both sides concurred that strategic stability, which normally refers to US-Soviet nuclear equilibrium, won’t be applicable to China-US relations.

Instead, China-US strategic stability has to include new fields such as outer space, cyber and artificial intelligence. Talks could start at the track II level first. The ongoing talks between the Center for International Security and Strategy at Tsinghua University and the Brookings Institution on mitigating the risks of artificial intelligence in the military domain are a bold step in the right direction.

That the Cold War turned out to be a long peace is not sheer luck, but the result of the two superpowers being hell-bent on preventing a hot war. Similarly, the real challenge for China and the US now is not to avoid a new Cold War, but avoiding conflict most likely triggered by an accident. The latest incident in the South China Sea tells us that peace has to be earned.