周波：普京很難贏得這場戰爭，但也不會輸掉這場戰爭

【翻譯/李澤西】

**DW記者：**非常感謝你在參加慕尼黑安全會議期間接受德國之聲DW採訪。你是中國人民解放軍一名前大校，現在是參會的中國代表團一員。我們已經聽了中國最高外交官王毅發表的講話，顯然這是一次非常有影響力的演説。其中，他談到了主權和領土完整的重要性。他説，這些是國際體系的基石。我想了解清楚：是否可以將此理解為對俄羅斯入侵烏克蘭的批評，畢竟這是對烏克蘭領土完整的破壞？

**周波：**中國作為一個還沒有完全統一的國家，我們理解主權到底有多重要，無論對於中國還是對世界其他國家。

但我認為中國對這個問題的看法，是要進一步溯源。如果你分析一起謀殺案，調查總是從謀殺開始；但實際上，謀殺是很久以前就計劃好的。我們對俄羅斯有一定程度的同情，知道俄羅斯採取這種軍事行動的根本原因在於北約東擴。實際上，從前蘇聯時期開始，其領導人就一直在談論這個問題，從戈爾巴喬夫到葉利欽再到普京總統。而普京總統與他的前任有何不同？他不僅發出了警告，還將其貫徹到行動中。

那麼，問題就來了，他為什麼會這樣做？ 人們談到了勢力範圍。 勢力範圍不是什麼好詞。但如果俄羅斯認為它有自己的勢力範圍，並願意用軍事手段來捍衞，那麼對俄羅斯來説就存在一個勢力範圍。鑑於（俄烏）兩個國家的歷史和緊密聯繫，我知道普京會從這個角度看問題，當然這並不意味着他是對的。

**DW記者：**基於從中方聽到的這個論點，我想追問，中國一定程度上接受俄羅斯的動機，如你所説，但這不是忽略了烏克蘭人民選擇他們想要什麼的權利嗎？

**周波：**看到在烏克蘭發生的巨大暴行，令人心痛。這是戰爭的後果。看到結果，你當然要知道究竟是誰讓這一切發生的。這是正確的思考方式。你也需要了解，究竟為什麼會發生這一切。而這就是事情的本源。如果我們只是簡單地坐在那裏，看着眼前發生的一切，而不去想它究竟是如何發生的，而如果不知道它是如何發生的，你就不知道最終該如何解決這個問題。

俄烏戰爭一週年之際，赫爾松居民排隊領取食物（圖片來源：ICphoto）

**DW 記者：**但是，有意思的是，中國一直非常公開地批評它所看到的，你所描述的北約東擴，卻沒有批評俄羅斯的入侵。您是怎麼描述這次入侵的？嗯，它是謀殺，而不是動機，它是實際犯罪，而不是犯罪的原因。中國為什麼不直接説這是錯的？

**周波：**我認為中國會以一種更加平衡或精微的方式來表達。通過強調主權的重要性，我相信中國已經表明了自己的態度。在這次會議上，王毅實際上花了更多時間來談論主權的重要性。他把這作為一個原則來談，也提及這是《聯合國憲章》中的一條。因此，我認為中方這一立場對在場人士都是清楚的，不會被誤解。

**DW記者：**但我仍然好奇，因為這依然是在暗示，而不是直接明確的表達。而中國在批評美國方面則用非常明確的語言。那麼，為什麼中國對俄羅斯委婉，而對美國則硬扛？

**周波：**我們在對待美國和對待俄羅斯的態度上確實存在差異，因為這兩個國家對我們的態度並不相同。美國把我們當作主要競爭對手，而俄羅斯則把我們視為戰略伙伴。這兩個國家對中國的態度是不同的。我們必須考慮到，中國是俄羅斯最大的鄰國，反之亦然。在這方面，我們必須確保我們與俄羅斯的關係是一個良好的關係，是一個可持續的關係。

當你看中俄關系時，不要總是從他者的角度來判斷。這種關係必須被置於雙邊關係的背景下。從雙邊關係來看，就會明白我們真的需要與俄羅斯發展這種關係。因為我們不只是鄰居，我們雙方都有彼此需要的東西。這種良好的關係應該是良好的、正常的國與國關係，它不應該被其他國家放在與中國無關的事情上進行考驗。作為一箇中國人，我不時感到有點過於受關注了，因為現在所有的事情似乎都與中國聯繫起來，甚至是發生在歐洲中心地帶的這場戰爭，即便它與中國無關。

但人們還是會問，中國站在哪一邊？而你所有的問題似乎都在間接地暗示中國應該有一個明確的立場。這實際上是要求中國站隊。如果中國站隊了，是否還能成為一個真正的調解人？

這也是我從會議上所瞭解到的：大家都在問，中國能否説服俄羅斯，利用中國的影響力，説服俄羅斯應該做什麼，不應該做什麼。有些人甚至開始想象，説台灣海峽可能發生類似的衝突。我提到所有這些事情都是因為這場（俄烏）戰爭與中國沒有關係，但它仍然引起了許多人對中國角色的想象或討論。從一個方面來説，這是好的。這表明，中國真的很強大，中國真的很重要。而中國也希望以負責任的方式發揮這一作用。

中俄戰略安全磋商機制雙方牽頭人舉行會晤（圖片來源：ICphoto）

**DW記者：**王毅明確説了，中國將很快提出一個和平建議。顯然，中國準備在尋求政治解決方案方面變得更積極。我們能期待該提案中的什麼內容？

**周波：**我不太清楚這一提案的細節。但作為一箇中國人，我也認為這場戰爭不符合中國的利益。如果它能立即停止，我們會非常高興。但我們知道它不會停止，也許今年都不會。所以這場戰爭會持續多久，沒有人知道。我不認為局勢正在降温，實際上，我們看到局勢正在升級。從我在會議上聽到的所有情況來看，西方國家堅決支持烏克蘭。而且他們已經表示，他們將通過一切手段支持烏克蘭。但另一方面，俄羅斯不可能被打敗。人們在談論打敗俄羅斯，這會在什麼場景下？俄羅斯仍是一個擁有最大核武庫的大國。所以我看到的是一種僵局。普京不會贏得這場戰爭，但他也很難輸掉這場戰爭。那麼屆時會發生什麼？這是一個悲慘的局面。

**DW 記者：**您認為普京會動用核武器嗎？

**周波：**我不知道，但我確實擔心。這就是為什麼我作為中國人，首先出來 （在西方媒體）説他不應該使用核武器。

**DW 記者：**德國總理舒爾茨在北京訪問時與中國國家主席交流，中方隨後發表了一份聲明，批評核威脅。中國是否準備對莫斯科施加影響，使其至少不採取使用核武器這一極端措施？

**周波：**我認為中國在勸阻俄羅斯不要使用核武器方面已經發揮了舉足輕重的作用。我只是一名中國軍隊前軍官，我曾（在金融時報）發表評論主張，中俄兩國之間的關係是好的，但使用核武器是反人道的，核武器在任何情況下都不應該被使用。令我非常高興的是，中國國家主席在隨後的一週內就談到了這個問題。而德國總理舒爾茨説，即便只有這個共識，他對中國的訪問就值了。在G20會議上，習主席在與拜登總統的雙邊會談中，重申了中國關於不使用核武器的明確立場。而這不僅是中國的立場，這也是俄羅斯自己的承諾。五個核武器國家在發表的聯合聲明中説，核戰爭打不贏也打不得。 這是俄羅斯自己的承諾。

**DW記者：**你提到台海發生衝突的潛在可能，你説中國還沒完全統一。因為在北京看來，台灣應該與中國統一。近幾個月來，那裏顯然出現了嚴重的緊張局勢。王毅在演講後被問到可否向在場代表們保證，中國沒有很快攻打台灣的計劃。他迴避了直接回答，而是“回懟”台灣政府，指責後者的分裂主義。他為什麼要回避這個問題？為什麼他不能説，別擔心，我們不會打台灣，至少在未來幾年不會？

**周波：**我無法預測他在想什麼。但我知道，而且我想讓德國人民知道，中國從來沒有為與台灣的統一制定過時間表。這是首先要説的。第二是看國防預算，就像地理環境一樣，是不會説謊的。這意味着什麼？通常情況下，如果一個國家擔心其安全環境，就會增加國防預算。而中國今年的國防預算，是在俄烏衝突爆發之後宣佈的，仍然不到2%，就像過去幾十年一樣。

請記住，這是在戰爭爆發後宣佈的。歐洲的這場戰爭並沒有改變中國的心態。中國仍然保持平靜，儘管面臨諸多壓力，儘管我們在二十大報告中談到（國際環境）“風高浪急甚至驚濤駭浪”。中國對自己安全環境的信心，對其他國家也很重要。中國可以設想，美國把我們視作極限競爭對手，所以我們也必須與美國競爭。但幸運的是，中國仍然在談論合作。而美國則將這種關係描述為一種競爭關係。

**DW 記者：**但我的意思是，即使軍費開支在國內生產總值中的百分比沒有增加，總量也在增加。中國軍力正在快速擴張。去年8月，美國眾議院議長佩洛西去台灣後，中國就在台灣周圍開展重大演習。她的繼任者新任眾議院議長麥卡錫據説也想去台灣，甚至可能正在計劃一次訪問。如果他去，中國會怎麼做？

**周波：**即使在理論上，中國的反應也必須更大。佩洛西的訪問沒有得到拜登總統和五角大樓的同意，但她仍然堅持要去。而我們史無前例的大規模軍事演習就是一種回應。如果美國堅持“一箇中國“立場，為什麼要挑釁中國到這種程度？有什麼事情表明中國大陸馬上就會打台灣嗎？根本就沒有這樣的跡象。因此，我的回答是，美國現在實際上是高度分裂的。這種分裂不僅是在普通人和精英之間。它也是在不同權力部門之間，如立法部門與行政部門。

這種分裂甚至在軍隊內部也有。例如，美國四星上將談到中國大陸將在2025年攻打台灣，説只是出於他的直覺。沒有任何證據，沒有任何統計數據，他就可以給他的下屬寫一份備忘錄，告訴他們中國大陸即將打台灣。而這甚至沒有得到五角大樓的同意。他怎麼能發表這種不負責任的言論？五角大樓為什麼沒有對他進行監管？因此，這引發了許多問題，而不是中國大陸是否真的會在2025年攻打台灣的問題。

**DW記者：**目前，關於美中關係的穩定性也存在重大問題，這部分是“間諜氣球”的戲劇性事件引起的。氣球本身不一定構成任何威脅，但它引起了對中美之間危機管理能力的擔憂，如果意外危機出現的話。雙方之間確實沒有合適的熱線電話來處理這個問題。您對這個問題有多擔心？

**周波：**這是關於我們如何給中美關係加“護欄“的問題。我們必須使其穩定。而具有諷刺意味的是，雙方都有同樣的良好願望，但不知道如何去做。談論設置“護欄”是困難的，因為較弱的一方可能會認為較強的一方想要鎖定現狀，以保持優勢。因此，只有在雙方實力大致相當的情況下，才能建立“護欄”。

美方指責中方的民用氣象氣球為“間諜氣球”並用戰鬥機進行擊落（圖片來源：網絡）

這一點在冷戰時期就可以發現。從冷戰一開始，兩個超級大國的實力就大致相當，因此，他們可以建立諸多建立信任的機制，特別是在核領域。而中國和美國的軍事力量對比不是這樣的情況，我們比美國弱得多。當然，在某種程度上這並不重要。

**DW記者：**但這不會持續太久。預計中國軍隊在2030年到2039年間，在很多重要領域接近或與美軍平起平坐。 那麼，這是否意味着，在2030年之前，我們將不得不在中美沒有熱線和護欄的情況下過日子？

**周波：**我不認為到2030年，中國軍隊會追上美國軍隊的實力。以前我們只談中國在本世紀中期建成世界一流軍隊。我們還有很長的路要走。問題是，世界一流軍隊意味着什麼？當然美國擁有世界一流的軍隊。但對於中國來説，要趕上美國，必須等到本世紀中期。但在二十大報告中，我們談到了加快這一進程，我仍然相信它不會早於2030年。

但請記住一件事。這種實力上的差距，在西太平洋地區並不那麼重要了。因為，從全球來看，中國軍隊不會與美軍爭奪主導地位，只要我們有能力捍衞我們在西太平洋地區的主權和領土完整，這對我們來説就足夠了。

**DW 記者：**您認為到時候是不是中美在西太平洋地區攤牌的時候？這一刻是否變得越來越不可避免了？

**周波：**不，我不這麼認為。相反，我相信那時候將是雙邊關係開始變得穩定的時候。而在它變得穩定之前，才是最危險的時候。從現在到那時，是最危險的。

**DW記者：**最後讓我回到那個向王毅提出的有關打台灣的風險的問題。各國人民真的很關心這個問題。大家看到了烏克蘭戰爭所產生的影響。對台灣的戰爭可能在世界範圍內造成更大的不穩定。您曾是中國軍官，您能説些什麼來讓大家放心，也許這（攻打）根本不會發生？

**周波：**這種比較，或者説人們看到歐洲的戰爭，並不表明台海一定會發生一場類似的戰爭。我們希望和平統一，因為這當然符合我們自己的利益。一個完全被打爛了的台灣有什麼用？所以人們不應該懷疑我們對和平統一的誠意。我們不會放棄非和平的手段，但那只是保留給一些極端情況。

**DW 記者：**非常感謝您接受我們的採訪，周大校。

採訪英文原文實錄：

DW Richard Walker: Zhou Bo, thank you very much for joining DW here at the Munich security conference. Now, you’re a former senior colonel in China’s military and the PLA. You’re a member of the Chinese delegation here, and we’ve heard from Wang yi, China’s top diplomat, making a speech here. A very impactful speech, certainly. Let’s pick up on one thing. He spoke about the importance of sovereignty and territorial integrity. He said, these are cornerstones of the international system. Now, I just want to be clear: should we understand that as a criticism, then, of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, which was, of course, a breach of Ukraine’s territorial integrity?

Zhou Bo: Well, China, as a country that is not fully re-united, certainly is more concerned with this issue of sovereignty. So we understand how sovereignty matters really, be it in China or in the rest of the world. Talking about this war, I’m sure Mr. Wang Yi is referring to the war in Ukraine. And clearly, I believe this is the violation of sovereignty of one country by another country. This is clear.

But I think China’s thoughts on this issue, it just goes a bit further to the root causes. Because if you talk about a murder, an investigation always started from murder. But actually the murder was planned long time ago. Because we have some sympathies with Russia in knowing that the fundamental reason for Russia to take this kind of military action is because of NATO’s expansion. And actually, Russian leaders have been talking about this ever since the Soviet time, from Mikhail Gorbachev to Boris Yeltsin to President Putin. And what makes President Putin different from his predecessors? He’d not only give a warning, but he also carried it into action.

So then we have this question. Why would he do this? So people talk about the sphere of influence. Sphere of influence is a dirty word. But if Russia believes it has a sphere of influence that would like to defend it with military means, then there is a sphere of influence for Russia. And given the history of the two countries and think of  the great connectivity between these two countries, so I kind of know what Putin would look at this issue from this perspective, which of course doesn’t mean he’s right.

DW Richard Walker: But just to drill down into this argument, which we’ve heard from the Chinese side. So sort of accepting Russia’s motivations, as you suggest, but doesn’t this ignore the right of the people of Ukraine to choose what they want?

Zhou Bo: I think that it is really miserable to see the great atrocities that occurred in Ukraine. And this is the aftermath of the war. So to see the results, you of course need to know who actually has made this possible. That is the right way of thinking. But you also need to know why this has happened at all. And that is the root cause of this thing. We just sit simply look at these things in front of eyes without thinking about how it actually has happened. And without knowing how it has happened, you don’t know how to resolve this eventually.

DW Richard Walker: But it is interesting to see, China has been very openly critical of what it sees, what you describe as NATO expansion into eastern Europe, but it has not been critical of Russia for the invasion. And you describe the invasion? Well, it is the murder, not the motive. It is the actual crime, not the reason for it. Why doesn’t China simply say this is wrong?

Zhou Bo: I think China would put it in a more balanced or subtle way. Because by stressing the importance of sovereignty, I believe that China has already made its attitude clear. And I believe at this conference, Mr. Wang Yi has actually spent more time talking about the importance of sovereignty. And he talked about this as a principle. And he talked about this as found in the UN Charter. So I think this message should already be clear to all the people here. It cannot be misunderstood.

DW Richard Walker: But I’m still curious because it’s still leaving it on the level of implication rather than outright, explicit language. Whereas China is very clearly using explicit language with respect to its criticism of the United States. So why is it holding back on Russia but not holding back on America?

Zhou Bo: Well, I think there is a difference indeed, in an attitude toward the United States and toward Russia, because we were taken differently by these two countries as well. We were taken as the primary competitor by United States, and we were taken as the strategic partner by Russia. Therefore, the attitude of these two countries are different toward China. And we have to consider China is also Russia’s largest neighbor and vice versa. In this regard, we have to make sure that our relationship with Russia is a good one, is a sustainable one.

When you look at the China-Russian relationship, do not always judge it from the eyes of a third person. This relationship has to be put into context of bilateral relationship. But if you look at this from the bilateral relationship, then you would understand we really need to develop this relationship with Russia. Because we’re not just a neighbor, because both of us have all what we need from each other. This kind of a good relationship should be good and normal state to state relationship. It should not be put on the test by other countries on something that China has nothing to do with. Being a Chinese, I sometimes feel flattered in that nowadays everything seems to be related to China. Even about this war in the heart of Europe, which has nothing to do with China.

But people would still say, which side do you want to take? And all your questions seem to be suggesting indirectly that China should have a clear cut position. And this actually is a kind of asking China to take a side. And then we have this question whether China would be that serious mediator.

This is what I learned at this conference: could China just persuade Russia, make use of your influence towards what Russia should or should not do. And then it even give people some imagination as to how a similar conflict might occur in Taiwan Strait. So all these things what I mentioned is because this war has nothing to do with China. But still it invites so many people’s imagination or discussion about the role of China. In the one aspect, this is good. This shows that China is really powerful, China is really important. And China also wants to play this role in a responsible manner.

DW Richard Walker: So Wang Yi did say that China will soon present a peace proposal. So it is becoming evident China is prepared to become quite active in the search for a political solution. What can we expect in that proposal?

Zhou Bo: Well, I’m not so sure what are the details of his proposal. But as a Chinese, I believe I share the same feeling that this war is not in China’s interest. If it can stop immediately, we would be most happy. But we know it won’t stop. Probably not at all this year. And so how long this war will last, nobody knows, but I don’t believe right now we are seeing de-escalation of the situation. We’re actually seeing escalation of the situation. Because from all what I heard at the Munich Security conference, the west is adamantly supportive of Ukraine. And they have expressed that they would support Ukraine by all means. But on the other hand, Russia could not be defeated. So people talk about defeating Russia, but in what context? Russia will still remain a large country with the largest nuclear arsenal. So I see a stalemate. Putin will not win the war. But he can hardly lose the war. So what would happen then? It is a miserable situation.

DW Richard Walker: Do you think Putin might use nuclear weapons?

Zhou Bo: I don’t know, but I worry about this. So that is why I’m the first Chinese who talked he should not use nuclear weapon.

DW Richard Walker: When Olaf Schulz, the German chancellor was in Beijing, he spoke to Xi Jinping. And there was a statement that came out also from Xi Jinping criticizing nuclear threats even. Is China prepared to use influence on Moscow to at least not go to that grim step of using nuclear weapons?

Zhou Bo: I think China has already played a pivotal role in dissuading any possible use of nuclear weapons by Russia. I’m only a former PLA officer, I wrote this opinion: I know the relationship between our two countries are good, but this is about humanity. Nuclear weapons should not be used in any cases. So I wrote it. But I was most happy that my president talked about it in a week’s time. And the German chancellor Schulz said that even with just this agreement, his visit to China was worthwhile. And my president in his bilateral talks with president Biden at the G20, reiterated China’s clear cut position about no use of nuclear weapon. And this is not only China’s position, this is Russia’s own promise. Because in a joint statement by five nuclear weapon states, they have made a joint statement that a nuclear war cannot be won. So therefore should not be fought. This is Russia’s own promise.

DW Richard Walker: you mentioned that the prospect of a potential conflict in the Taiwan Straits, and also referred to China as a not united country. Because in the view of Beijing, Taiwan should be reunified with China. There have obviously been serious tensions there in recent months. Wang Yi, again from his speech, he was asked at the very end whether he could reassure the people, the delegates here in Munich, that China is not planning an imminent attack on Taiwan. He dodged the question. He essentially turned it around and put the blame on the Taiwanese government, accusing it of being separatist. Why did he dodge that question? Why can’t he say, don’t worry, we’re not going to attack, at least in the next few years?

Zhou Bo: I cannot predict what is on his mind. But I know, and I would like your people to know that China has never laid down a timetable for reunification with Taiwan. This is the first thing. The second thing is, defense budget, like geography, would not lie. What do I mean by that? Normally, if you are worried about your security environment, you would increase defense budget. And China’s defense budget this year, that was announced after this war, was still less than 2%, like in decades. Remember, this is announced after the war. This war in Europe didn’t change China’s mentality. China still remains calm, although it has a lot of pressures, although in our 20th congress report, we talked about the high wind, the heavy storm. So China’s confidence about its own security environment matters even to the rest of the world. If China believes, OK, the United States takes us as an extreme competitor, so we have to compete with the United States. It’s good that China, is still talking about cooperation, while United States describes this relationship as one of a competition.

DW Richard Walker: And yet, I mean, even if it’s not increasing as a percentage of GDP, military spending is increasing. Certainly the Chinese military is expanding at a significant level. And we saw major exercises around Taiwan after the US house of representative speaker Nancy Pelosi visited there last August. Her successor , speaker of the house, Kevin McCarthy is said to want to go to Taiwan, he is maybe even planning a trip. What will China do if he goes?

Zhou Bo: I think even in theory, China’s response would have to be greater. Because Nancy Pelosi’s visit was not agreed by president Biden, by the pentagon, but she still insisted to go. And our unprecedented large scale exercise was a response. If United States believe in one China, why would you provoke China to this extent? Did anything happen that shows that mainland China would attack Taiwan tomorrow? There’s no such indication at all. And so my answer for this is that the United States right now actually is highly divided. This kind of division is not only between the ordinary people and the elite. It’s also between the different branches. The legislative versus the executive branch.

And this kind of division is also found even within the military. For example, four star American general talked about mainland China about to attack Taiwan in 2025, only out of his gut feelings, without any proof, without any statistics, he could give his subordinates a memo telling that China was about to attack Taiwan because of his gut feeling. And this is not even agreed upon by pentagon. So there have come this question, how could he make such irresponsible remarks? And why didn’t Pentagon regulate him? So it just raises many questions, rather than this genuine question on whether mainland China would really attack Taiwan in 2025.

DW Richard Walker: And there are significant questions at the moment also about the stability of the US-China relationship, which have been thrown up partly by this drama over spying balloons, which in themselves don’t necessarily pose any threat, but they’ve raised concerns of the ability of China and the US to manage a crisis, if an accidental crisis could come up. It said that there really aren’t proper hotlines between the two sides to deal with that. How concerned are you about that?

Zhou Bo: This question basically is about how possibly we could have some kind of guardrails about the relationship. You have to make it stable. And ironically, both sides have the same good wish, but they don’t know how to do it. You see, because if you talk about the setting of guardrails, it’s difficult in that the weaker side probably would consider the stronger one want to freeze the status quo, so as to maintain a kind of superiority. So guardrail can only be established when the strength of the 2 sides is more or less equal. And this is found either during cold war. Because ever from the very beginning of the cold war, the strength of the two superpowers were more or less equal. So they could establish so many confidence building measures, especially in nuclear fields. And this is not the case between Chinese and America’s military strength. We are much weaker than the United States. But in a way it doesn’t matter.

DW Richard Walker: But not for much longer. It’s anticipated that the Chinese military will approach parity with the United States in quite important ways, say in the 2030s. So does that mean that until the 2030s we’re going to have to get by with none of these hotlines and guardrails between the US and China?

Zhou Bo: Well, I don’t think by 2030 the Chinese military will be as strong as the US military. Because previously we only talk about China becoming world class military by mid-century. We still have a long time to go. So the question is, what does a world class military mean? So of course, the United States is a world class military. For China to catch up with the United States, you have to wait until mid-century. But in the latest report of the 20th congress, we talked about speeding up this process. But still, I would believe it won’t be as early as 2030. But remember one thing. This kind of disparity in strength doesn’t matter that much in the Western Pacific. Because globally speaking, Chinese military won’t compete with United States for global dominance. So long as we are capable of defending our sovereignty, territory integrity in the Western Pacific, that’s good enough for us.

DW Richard Walker: And that is the time when you feel that there will be some kind of showdown, do you feel, between the US and China in the coming years in the western pacific? Is that becoming more and more inevitable?

Zhou Bo: No, I don’t think so. On the contrary, I believe that will be the time when this relationship become somewhat stabilized. And before it becomes stabilized, this is the most dangerous time. From now to that time, this is the most dangerous time.

DW Richard Walker: And let me finally return to the question that was posed to Wang Yi about the risk of some attack on Taiwan. People around the world are really concerned about that. They’ve seen the impact that the Ukraine war has had. A war on Taiwan could create even greater destabilization in the world. You’re ex-military in China. What can you say to reassure people that maybe it will simply never happen?

Zhou Bo: I think this kind of comparison, or just because people have seen a war in Europe, doesn’t suggest that another similar war will necessarily occur in Taiwan strait. We want peaceful reunification because that is of course in our own interest. What is the use of Taiwan that is totally battered and shattered? So people should not doubt about our sincerity to have peaceful reunification. But we won’t just relinquish non-peaceful means. But that is only reserved for different extreme situations.

DW Richard Walker: thank you very much for speaking to us, Senior Colonel Zhou Bo.

Zhou Bo: Thank you very much indeed.

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