一屋子人用空調，為什麼美國拿着遙控器？_風聞

**Club提要：“**美元對全球經濟週期和利率週期的單邊控制，就像大家同處一個有中央空調的房間，遙控器卻被美國握在手裏”。

　　在北京對話和聯合國南方中心South Center共同主辦、中國公共外交協會指導的“金磚國家貨幣和金融體系改革”對話會上，中國人民大學區域國別研究院院長、北京對話特約專家翟東昇教授以上述比喻，批評美元霸權。

　　翟東昇提出，全球貨幣體系應迴歸“硬錨”，建立一種新的可兑付貨幣，以實現更公平合理的全球金融秩序。他並從歷史角度審視了世界經濟分裂的可能性，並以蘇聯經濟為例，強調建立平行經濟體系的重要性。

　　8月下旬，北京對話將邀請國內外專家繼續就“金磚國家與多極世界構建”展開對話。為了更好地承上啓下，我們精選部分特約專家在五月份研討會上的發言，以中英文形式陸續發佈。‍‍‍‍‍‍‍‍

　　以下為翟東昇發言：

　　翟東昇在“金磚國家貨幣和金融體系改革”對話會發言 （圖源：北京對話）

　　首先我要回應一下今天的主題，當前貨幣體系的缺陷。正巧，我曾撰寫過相關的論文，並且在教授的一門課中詳細探討了這個主題。當前貨幣體系的主要特點及其形成可以追溯到1971年的一次違約。這一體系並非通過合法的國際組織、談判、協議形成，而是由於美國在1971年單方面採取的行動所導致的。

　　二戰後，44個國家簽署並認可了佈雷頓森林體系，該體系以黃金作為“硬錨”。如今使用各國貨幣進行兑付只能兑付到美元，但在1945年至1971年間，持有美元的人還可以按照固定價格兑換黃金。因此，儘管這一規則存在邏輯缺陷，但其合法性是得到國際協議認可的。然而在1971年，美國尼克松政府單方面進行了所謂的“軟違約”，宣佈“暫時關閉黃金窗口”。盡**管當時美國強調關閉是“暫時”的，但事實上這一狀態到現在已持續了半個多世紀。**如今的體系可以説是不合法的，它沒有得到任何國家的官方認可。這是我想強調的第一點。

　　在“軟違約”之後，世界進入了複雜的互動博弈階段。如今，全球貨幣秩序有兩個顯著特點：第一，主權貨幣主要是美元，成為全球儲備資產。其他貨幣，如歐元、日元和英鎊，在一定程度上也具有儲備功能。這種分佈呈冪律分佈，主要特點是一種貨幣佔據絕大部分，其餘依次遞減。第二，現代貨幣與實際商品或資產脱鈎，即不可兑付。換言之，現在持有美元已無法在美聯儲兑換黃金。

　　這兩個特點塑造了今天經濟金融世界的諸多奇怪現象。例如，每當美國經濟出現問題，美元反而上漲，而非下跌。就如同**一個將死之人，其信用沒有崩塌反而大漲。**這些反直覺現象源自上述兩個結構性缺陷。我用一個比喻來形容這種不公平性：假設我們在一個大房間裏，有中央空調，但遙控器在我手中。我根據個人喜好調控温度，忽視他人的感受。問題在於遙控器和空調都是公器，卻被我一個人霸佔。這就好比全球經濟週期取決於美國的債務週期，全球利率週期取決於美聯儲的利率週期。我認為，拋開所有這些金融學的專業術語，這個比喻可以更清楚地解釋當前這種安排的不合理性和它的危害。

　　另一個不公平之處在於，全世界的錢，本質上儲存在美國的主權信用裏，即你們辛勤勞動所賺的錢都在我的口袋裏，我需要時可以隨時支取，無需你們同意。例如，在新冠疫情期間，美國、歐洲應對疫情不力，但經濟卻依舊繁榮，一個主要原因就是因為美國、歐洲、英國、日本這四大央行的資產負債表擴張了10萬億美元。相當於我在替大家保管錢時挪用大家的錢支付我自己的鉅額賬單。這10億人口占全世界80億人的一小部分，但是他可以隨意的支取其它國家的人的錢，在這兩年裏每人平均支取1萬美元。

　　基於以上論述，我與IMF特別提款權部門的長期負責人沃倫·科茨博士合寫了一篇英文論文，主張全球貨幣體系應迴歸“硬錨”，即建立一個可兑付的、有硬錨的新貨幣。我們兩個人一個是忠誠的美國共和黨人，一個是忠誠的中國共產黨人，但是我們可以在這個問題上達成一致。這種新貨幣將使全球貨幣體系更加公平合理，長期來看對美國也是有利的。雖然短期內美國享有特權，但長期將導致其產業空心化、經濟泡沫化及社會分裂。

　　當前國際形勢為我們提供了一個良好的機會之窗，以金磚國家為抓手，加上上海合作組織，以及“一帶一路”沿線國家，甚至歐洲、美洲國家，共同推進一個新的、可兑付、有硬錨的貨幣單位。

　　剛才有老師提到大宗商品加權平均，這是一個可行的做法。這一新貨幣關聯的商品可以包括黃金、白銀等貴金屬，以及鋼、鋁、鋰、鎳等卑金屬，以及其它所有可以在大宗交易市場兑付的大宗商品。持有該貨幣的人可以在相應網絡中按照固定價格兑換大宗商品，其他貨幣如人民幣，盧布，盧比將參照該貨幣浮動。這種貨幣可以用於貿易和債權債務結算，避免基準單位被敵對國家或者懷有惡意的國家操控。具體利益分享和責任分擔需進一步討論，但必須強調的一點是不能只有一個國家説了算或者有一票否決權。另外鑄幣税分享機制也尤為重要，是另一個重中之重。

　　最後我還想談論一下對這個想法的反對意見，及對其反駁。最常見的一種反對意見認為，這個想法已經有前車之鑑了，類似歐元一體化的失敗會重演。理由就是一個地區貨幣一體化了，但財政沒有一體化，兩者之間的這種不匹配將會導致危機。但我認為**金磚幣並非金磚國家貨幣一體化，而是一種防禦性做法，是對當前不合理和潛在危機的邊際改善。**很顯然它不是一個能讓從此以後世界太平的方案，而是一個面對當下的不合理和潛在的危機的一些防禦性的安排。各個國家的貨幣仍然存在，各國並沒有放棄自己的貨幣主權，只不過創造了一種新的工具，避免美元和美元相關的支付體系，金融體系潛在帶來的權利和傷害。

　　翟東昇在“會議一：當前全球貨幣金融體系的缺陷”與其他專家交流（圖源：北京對話）

　　自由問答環節：

　　剛才幾位老師的提問都涉及到我所説的遙控器的比喻，我在這裏再稍作回應。一個是李世默的觀點，認為遙控器為美國帶來了巨大的益處。一個非常準確的描述是，美國曾經是一個偉大、甚至是最偉大的製造業國家，但正是由於這樣的美元化全球貨幣體系，其虛擬經濟環境反過來重塑了其實體經濟。今天，美國成為一個龐大的金融帝國，但製造業佔比大幅下降。目前，其製造業就業人口僅佔總就業人口的8%，並且自2008年以來一直穩定在這一水平，儘管採取了各種措施卻未能反彈。

　　因此，可以説美國經濟已經對這種貨幣霸權上癮。曾經“肌肉發達”的它現在變得“脂肪堆積”，而為了維持這種舒適的生活，它必然會努力維持貨幣霸權。就像Marco剛才提到的那樣，他們的反抗是完全可以理解的。而且儘管我剛才強調，我們創建一個新的、有實物可兑付、無法輕易違約的貨幣單位看起來是防禦性的措施，但實際上它客觀上具有進攻性和破壞性效果。因為一旦這個貨幣單位被創建出來並穩定運行一段時間後，連華爾街的大家族，包括控制美聯儲的或對美聯儲有投票權和分紅權的大家族，也會將部分資金投入這種資產，因為這對他們是一個巨大的誘惑。

　　另外，我想再補充一點，根據我的研究，在沒有硬錨的貨幣體系中，也就是過去五十年的貨幣體系，誰的主權債務越大，誰的金融越安全。因此，**債務率越高越安全，**債多不愁。而且這種債務必須是以本幣計價的國債，越多越安全，越少越不安全。但是，如果我們將規則改變為可兑付的、有硬錨的貨幣體系，整個邏輯就會反轉。債權人將擁有巨大的權力，而債務人的債務越多越麻煩。這是一個規則的重大變化。可惜的是，在我讀過的金融學教科書裏，沒有老師明確指出這一點。這也可以理解，因為中國的金融學教科書和經濟學教科書主要是翻譯自英語，而英語教科書中的知識構造許多停留在金本位時代的邏輯之下。這是我想補充的第一點。

　　第二點，關於龔剛老師提到的經濟循環問題。我最近正帶領一個小團隊研究蘇聯經濟。因為我們正重新面對一種可能性，儘管我們中國人不願意，但不得不面對這種可能性，即世界經濟正在分裂。那麼分裂之後會怎麼樣？前幾年我出版了一本書，叫做《平行與競爭》，可能是最近一輪中文世界中較早提出平行體系、再造平行體系的書。經過研究，我驚訝地發現，蘇聯從未建成平行體系。只有在斯大林的最後幾年裏，他試圖建設一個平行的經濟體系。但赫魯曉夫上台後立刻飛到戴維營去和美國談和平競爭。結果就是蘇聯失敗垮台，因而才有今天的俄烏衝突。蘇聯的失敗恰恰在於當年毛澤東提出的建議未被採納。毛澤東曾建議，東風壓倒西風，蘇聯要多少個師中國都可以提供。赫魯曉夫在回憶錄中寫道，他當時回應毛澤東説在核武器時代這個想法是錯誤的，一百個師、一千個師在核武器時代都是炮灰。現在回過頭來看，我認為毛澤東其實是正確的。核武器不能真正使用。它只有在核國家對無核國家時有核訛詐功能，但在核大國之間是無法使用的。假如當年赫魯曉夫聽從了毛澤東的意見，可能垮台的根本不會是蘇聯。

以下為英文全文：

First, I would like to respond to today’s topic: the flaws in the current monetary system. It so happens that I have written papers on this subject and have taught a course that studies this topic in detail. The main characteristics of the current monetary system can be traced back to its formation in 1971 due to a “default”. This system was not formed through legitimate international organizations, negotiations, or agreements, but rather was the result of unilateral actions taken by the United States in 1971.

After World War II, 44 countries signed and recognized the Bretton Woods system, which used gold as a “hard anchor”. Today, various national currencies can only be exchanged for US dollars. However, from 1945 to 1971, holders of the US dollar could also convert them to gold at a fixed price. Therefore, despite the logical flaws in this system, its legality was recognized by international agreements. However, the Nixon Administration unilaterally conducted a so-called “soft default” and announced the “temporary suspension of convertibility into gold” in 1971. Although the US emphasized at the time that the suspension was “temporary”, this state of affairs has actually gone on for more than half a century. The current system can be said to be illegitimate, as it has not been officially recognized by any country. This is the first point I want to emphasize.

After the soft default, the world entered an era of complex geopolitical jostling. Today, the global monetary order has two notable characteristics. First, sovereign currencies, in particular the US dollar, have become global reserve assets. Other currencies such as the euro, yen, and pound also have serve as reserve currencies to some extent. Their relative usage follows a power-law distribution, where the US dollar holds the dominant position, followed by others in exponentially decreasing order. Second, exchange rates are floating and fiat. Modern currencies are decoupled from actual goods or assets, meaning they are fiat. In other words, US dollars holders can no longer exchange for gold at the Federal Reserve. These two characteristics lead to many peculiar phenomena in today’s economic and financial world. For example, whenever the US economy encounters problems, the US dollar appreciates instead of depreciating. It’s as if a dying person’s credit does not collapse but soars instead. These counterintuitive phenomena stem from the two structural flaws mentioned above. Let me use an analogy to describe this unfair situation: imagine we are in a large room with central air conditioning, but I hold the remote control. I adjust the temperature according to my personal preference, ignoring others’ feelings. The problem is that both the remote control and the air conditioner are public goods but are used for my personal preferences. Basically, the global economic cycle depends on the US debt cycle, and the global interest rate cycle depends on the US Federal Reserve’s interest rate cycle. I believe that by setting aside financial jargon, this analogy can drive home the illogical and dangerous nature of the current arrangement.

Another unfair aspect lies in the fact that the world’s money is essentially stored in the US sovereign credit. Thats is, the money earned through your hard work is in America’s pocket, they can withdraw it whenever they need it, without your consent. For example, during the COVID-19 pandemic, while the US and Europe have responded poorly to the pandemic, their economies remained prosperous. One main reason is that the central banks of the US, Europe, UK, and Japan expanded their balance sheets by $10 trillion. It’s as if I embezzle the money I was safeguarding for everyone to pay my own huge bills. This group of one billion people, a small part of the world’s eight billion, can freely withdraw money from others, getting an average of $10,000 per person over two years.

Based on the above, I co-authored an English paper with Dr. Warren Coats, the long-term head of the IMF’s Special Drawing Rights department. We advocated that the global monetary system should return to a “hard anchor” by establishing a new currency that is redeemable and anchored to real goods. Despite our different political backgrounds—he is a loyal American Republican, and I am a loyal Chinese Communist—we reached a consensus on this issue. This new currency would make the global monetary system fairer and more reasonable, and in the long run, it would benefit the US as well. Although the US currently enjoys short-term privileges, it will lead to industrial hollowing, economic bubbles, and social division in the long run.

The current international situation provides us with a good opportunity. By starting with BRICS countries at the core, with the addition of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the countries along the Belt and Road, and even inviting interested countries from Europe and the Americas, we can jointly promote a new currency unit that is redeemable and hard-anchored.

Professor Cao mentioned a feasible approach of weighted average of commodities. This new currency could be linked to commodities such as gold, silver, and other precious metals, as well as base metals like steel, aluminum, lithium, and nickel, and other commodities tradable in bulk commodity markets. Holders of this currency could legally exchange a basket of commodities at a fixed price within a corresponding network. Other currencies, including the RMB, Ruble, and Rupee, would float relative to this new currency. This baseline currency could be used for trade and debt settlement, avoiding manipulation or control by a hostile or malicious country. The specific distribution of benefits and sharing of responsibilities need further technical discussions, but it must be emphasized that it is not acceptable for just one country to have the final say or veto power. Another crucial point is a mechanism for sharing of seigniorage, which is of paramount importance.

Finally, I want to address objections to this idea and my rebuttal to that. The most common objection is concern that this would just repeat the failure of the Euro integration, where regional currency integration without fiscal integration leads to crises. However, I believe that the BRICS currency is not trying to integrate the BRICS countries’ currencies. It is a defensive measure rather than an offensive one, a marginal improvement to address the current illogical situation and avert potential crises. It is clear that this is not designed to solve every problem forever, but a defensive measure to address the present illogical situation and avert potential crises. Each country’s currency would still exist, and countries would not give up their monetary sovereignty. Instead, a new tool would be created to avoid the potential dangers and harms brought by the dollar and the dollar-based payment and financial systems.

Several of your questions addressed my analogy regarding a remote control, so I would like to respond further. One point is from Eric, who believes that the remote control has brought enormous benefits to the United States. A more precise description is that the United States was once a great, even the greatest, manufacturing country. However, due to the dollarized global monetary system, its financial economy has reshaped its real economy. Today, the US has become a major financial empire, but the relative contribution of its manufacturing sector has significantly decreased. Currently, its manufacturing employment accounts for only 8% of total employment, and has remained stable at this level since 2008, despite various measures that have been taken to stimulate it.

Thus, it can be said that the US economy is addicted to this dollar hegemony. The U.S. was once “muscular”, but it has now become “fat-laden”. To maintain this comfortable lifestyle, it inevitably strives to maintain dollar hegemony. As Marco mentioned earlier, their resistance is entirely understandable. Although our creation of a new, non-fiat, and non-defaultable currency unit appears to be a defensive measure, it actually has offensive attributes. Once this currency unit is created and operates stably for some time, even the major families on Wall Street, including those who control the Federal Reserve or have voting rights and dividend rights in the Federal Reserve, will also invest part of their funds in this asset, because it looks very attractive.

Additionally, I want to add one more point. According to my research, in a monetary system without a hard anchor, which describes the world’s monetary system over the past 50 years, rising sovereign debt makes your financial system more secure. Hence, the higher the debt ratio, the more secure it is, and the less you need to be worried about it. Also, this debt must be government bonds denominated in your own currency—the more, the safer, and vice versa. However, if we change into a redeemable, hard-anchored monetary system, the entire logic reverses. Creditors will have enormous power, and the more debtors owe, the more trouble they run into. This would be a significant change in the rules. Unfortunately, in the financial textbooks I have read, no one has explicitly pointed this out. This is also understandable, because China’s financial and economic textbooks are mainly translated from English, and the logic within English textbooks largely carries over from the time of the gold standard era. This is the first point I want to add.

The second point concerns the economic cycle mentioned by Professor Gong Gang. Recently, I have been leading a small team to study the Soviet economy. We are facing a possibility, a possibility that we Chinese do not like but have to confront: the world economy is decoupling. What will happen after this split? A few years ago, I published a book called “Parallel Competition”, which might be one of the earlier books in the Chinese world to propose the idea of parallel systems and rebuilding parallel systems. Through my research, I was surprised to find that the Soviet Union never built a parallel system. Only in Stalin’s final years did he attempt to build a parallel economic system. But once Khrushchev came to power, he immediately flew to Camp David to negotiate peaceful competition with the U.S. The result was the failure and collapse of the Soviet Union, leading to today’s Russia-Ukraine conflict. The failure of the Soviet Union lies precisely in Khrushchev’s failure to adopt Mao Zedong’s suggestions. Mao Zedong had proposed that, as “the East wind prevails over the West wind”, China was willing to provide as many divisions as the Soviet Union needed. As Khrushchev wrote in his memoirs, his response to Mao was that in the nuclear age, Mao’s idea was wrong, even hundreds or thousands of divisions would end up as just cannon fodder in the nuclear age. Looking back now, I think Mao Zedong was actually right. Nuclear weapons cannot be used; they can only be used for nuclear blackmail by nuclear-weapon states over states without nuclear weapon, but they cannot be used between nuclear powers. If Khrushchev had followed Mao’s advice back then, the Soviet Union might not have collapsed at all.

（翻譯：王樟宸）