周波：朝鮮出兵改變不了歐洲戰局_風聞

編者按：近期，多家媒體報道，朝鮮已開始依據今年簽署的《俄朝全面戰略伙伴關係條約》相關條款，向俄烏衝突前線派遣士兵。美國國務卿安東尼·布林肯於10月31日指出，目前已有多達8000名朝鮮士兵部署在俄羅斯庫爾斯克地區，且即將投入戰鬥。隨着特朗普的再度當選，朝鮮的這一新動向引發了對俄烏戰局可能出現新變數及其更廣泛的地緣政治影響的擔憂。

清華大學戰略與安全研究中心研究員周波，11月7日在南華早報發表題為**（《朝鮮對俄的支持不會使其成為烏克蘭危機的變局者》）的評論文章，表示就算朝鮮派兵屬實，對俄而言更多的也是政治而非軍事意義。朝鮮此舉意在表現存在，打破孤立，換取俄軍事技術。**

觀察者網和北京對話受權翻譯、發佈中文版如下。

（翻譯：王凡非 ｜ 核譯：李澤西）

烏克蘭官員上週一（11月4日）稱，烏軍首次與被俄羅斯部署到其西部庫爾斯克州的朝鮮士兵交火。全世界很快就會知道這一説法是否正確。美國國務卿布林肯10月31日則表示，部署在俄羅斯庫爾斯克地區的朝鮮士兵已多達8000人，並即將投入戰鬥，儘管朝鮮此前已否認。

那麼，朝鮮軍隊能否改變這場長時間僵持的俄烏衝突局勢呢？我的判斷是，不太可能。俄軍在戰場上已佔上風，而烏軍則面臨精疲力竭、彈藥短缺以及兵力不足的困境。因此，儘管朝鮮派兵可以為俄羅斯所用，但其意義更多體現在政治層面。

此外，朝鮮增援的部隊不可能幫助俄羅斯快速贏得戰爭，反而會促使美國和歐洲加大對烏克蘭的支持力度。烏克蘭一直要求美歐提供重型攻擊武器，以便深入打擊俄羅斯腹地。

在歐洲戰場上，唯一受益方似乎是朝鮮這位遲到的參戰者。朝鮮首次派兵前往遙遠的歐洲堪稱是前所未有的公關努力，無疑會吸引全球關注。長期被孤立與制裁的朝鮮，自詡為核大國，其最迫切的願望，是被國際社會視為“正常的”擁核國家。為了這一目標，朝鮮迫切需要在全球舞台上引起廣泛關注，以此為契機，尋求突破國際制裁。

朝鮮頻繁的導彈試射，乃至近期宣佈將韓國視為“敵對”國家，實際上都是為實現這一戰略目的。朝鮮的目的不是有朝一日對韓國進行自殺式襲擊，而是吸引國際社會，尤其是美國的注意。在特朗普上屆2017-2021執政期間，美國曾嘗試接觸朝鮮，而拜登政府則更傾向於戰略忽視。

此外，朝鮮可藉此機會獲得急需的糧食、燃料和其他物資，同時讓其軍隊積累自朝鮮戰爭以來的首次實戰經驗。朝鮮人民軍擁有128萬兵力，他們可以在現代戰爭背景下，檢驗本國製造的彈藥和近程導彈的有效性。他們將學會應對無人機攻防。朝軍士兵將經過戰火的淬鍊。

因此，戰爭越長越對朝鮮有利。即使朝鮮確實決定派遣1.2萬名士兵參與戰鬥，這一數字也不到朝鮮現有軍力的1%。這不會使半島軍力平衡朝着對平壤不利的方向發展。

作為持續提供彈藥和兵力的回報，金正恩希望俄羅斯提供更先進的軍事技術，尤其是在衞星、導彈和潛艇等領域。只要朝鮮軍隊與俄羅斯並肩作戰，金正恩就會指望普京總統予以某種回饋。

美國將如何對朝施壓有待觀察。韓國尹錫悦政府一貫主張通過“壓倒性力量”確保和平，因此可能認為有必要採取更強硬的對朝政策，甚至可能向烏克蘭提供更多經濟和人道主義援助，乃至軍事支持。具有諷刺意味的是，在半島局勢緩和多年之後，朝鮮和韓國可能會成為代理國參與歐洲的戰爭。

中國迄今為止的立場剋制冷靜。中國三緘其口不無道理，畢竟朝鮮明確否認參與烏克蘭戰爭。中國不希望歐洲戰局變得更加複雜。然而，一些認為中國對朝鮮的影響力正被俄羅斯取代的觀點過於簡單。儘管朝鮮與俄羅斯的軍事合作愈加緊密，但對中國的經濟依賴是朝鮮的生存之本。

事實上，朝鮮士兵出現在歐洲戰場上，將進一步增強中國對朝鮮半島的影響力，因為美國和歐洲都在呼籲中國對平壤施加影響。上週，布林肯表示，中美已就此問題“深入交換意見”，並敦促中國“利用其影響力來遏制這些活動”。

許多人聲稱，美韓日同盟與中俄朝軸心對壘正在形成，這是無稽之談。中國、俄羅斯和朝鮮眼中的全球秩序並非完全一樣。朝鮮期待新冷戰，俄羅斯認為我們已處於冷戰之中，但中國則反對新冷戰。

乍一看，朝鮮與中國（1961年）和俄羅斯（2024年）簽訂的條約似乎有某些相似之處，兩個條約都提及共同防禦。實際上，中朝之間的軍事接觸寥寥無。例如，中俄每年幾乎都會舉行聯合軍演，但人們很難想起中朝何時舉行過聯合演習。

中國和朝鮮在 60 多年前結成的聯盟條約，只有在中國希望它發揮作用時才會有用。即便俄羅斯和朝鮮樂見中美競爭加劇，只要中國認為與美國的關係仍在可控範圍內，這份條約將繼續處於休眠狀態，因此中俄朝三國形成同盟的可能性極低。在全球政治的大棋盤上，朝鮮的角色更像是攪局者，而非變局者。

It won’t be long before the world finds out if Ukrainian officials were right in saying on Monday that their forces had fired at North Korean soldiers in combat for the first time since they were deployed by Russia to its western Kursk region. Despite denials from Pyongyang, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken said on October 31 that as many as 8,000 North Korean troops were in Russia’s Kursk region and expected to enter combat.

Are North Korean troops a game changer in the grinding Russo-Ukrainian conflict? I think not. Russia has already gained the upper hand on the battlefield against the Ukrainians, who are weary, short of ammunition and outnumbered. So while a dispatch of North Korean troops may be useful, its significance would primarily be political.

Besides, such added strength from Pyongyang would not help Moscow claim a quick victory. It would, however, most certainly make the United States and Europe more determined to provide extra aid to Ukraine, which has been asking for heavy attack weapons to strike deeper into Russia.

On the European battlefield, the only beneficiary, it seems, is North Korea, a latecomer. First, the unprecedented public relations effort of sending its soldiers to faraway Europe is guaranteed to attract global attention. Isolated and sanctioned, North Korea sees itself as a nuclear power – what it wants most is to be treated as a nuclearised “normal” country. For that to happen, it needs to get the world to sit up so it can attempt to break international sanctions.

North Korea’s periodic missile launches and recent declaration that South Korea was now a “hostile” state are in the same vein. Pyongyang’s campaign is not to launch a suicidal attack against South Korea one day; it is to draw attention, especially from the US. Unlike Donald Trump, who spent time dealing with Pyongyang when he was president between 2017 and 2021, the Biden administration’s attitude has been more one of strategic negligence.

Second, North Korea can benefit from much-needed supplies of food, fuel and other material from Russia even as its soldiers gain their first combat experience since the Korean war. The Korean People’s Army, 1.28 million strong, can find out how effective their munitions and short-range ballistic missiles are on a battlefield. They will learn how to deal with drones and counter-attacks. North Korean soldiers will be combat-hardened.

So, the longer the war, the better it is for North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. Even if he has decided to send 12,000 troops to Russia, as alleged, it is still less than 1 per cent of North Korea’s standing military. This would not tip the military balance on the Korean peninsula unfavourably for Pyongyang.

And, in return for a reportedly steady flow of munitions and soldiers to a most important ally, Kim is hoping for access to Russia’s higher-end military technology, especially regarding satellites, missiles and submarines. As long as North Korean soldiers fight alongside Russian soldiers, Kim is counting on Russian President Vladimir Putin feeling obliged to give something back.

Meanwhile, it remains to be seen how the US administration will turn the screw on North Korea. The Yoon government in South Korea believes in ensuring peace through “overwhelming force” and will almost certainly feel it has to respond more forcefully to the North now, and possibly provide more economic and humanitarian support to Ukraine, even direct military assistance. Ironically, we could see the two Koreas fighting as proxies in Europe after years of detente on the peninsula.

China’s attitude so far is a measured calmness. There is good reason for Beijing not to say too much when North Korea has flatly denied its involvement in the war in Ukraine. Beijing will not be happy to see the situation in Europe become more complex.

Arguing that Beijing is losing its influence over Pyongyang to Moscow is simplistic. However close Moscow and Pyongyang might become militarily, North Korea’s economic dependence on China remains the foundation of its survival.

In fact, the presence of North Korean troops on a European battlefield will bolster China’s influence over the Korean peninsula as Beijing faces calls from Washington and European capitals to use its leverage on Pyongyang. Blinken last week said the US and China have had “a robust conversation” where China was urged to “use the influence that they have to work to curb these activities”.

Much has been said about the alliance between the US, South Korea and Japan battling an axis represented by China, Russia and North Korea. This is bunkum. China, Russia and North Korea do not necessarily see the world through the same prism. North Korea will welcome a new cold war and Russia believes we are already in one – but China is opposed to a new cold war.

At first glance, North Korea’s treaties with China in 1961 and Russia this year look similar when it comes to how one party should render military aid to the other when attacked. In reality, military interactions between Beijing and Pyongyang are scant. For instance, Chinese and Russian militaries have joint exercises practically every year but one would be hard-pressed to think of the last time Beijing and Pyongyang organised a joint military drill.

The treaty alliance between China and North Korea made over 60 years ago is only useful when Beijing wants it to be. Even if Russia and North Korea are happy to see the competition between China and the US intensify, as long as Beijing believes that its relationship with Washington is still manageable, the treaty will remain dormant, making a Beijing-Moscow-Pyongyang alliance impossible. On the grand chessboard, North Korea may look like a spoiler – but it is not capable of being a game changer.