洪農：俄烏衝突和對俄羅斯的制裁如何使北極合作陷入僵局

【文/洪農】

2月下旬，北極理事會“成功破冰”，同意理事會的工作組重新以線上形式召開工作會議。自兩年前的2022年3月，在俄羅斯擔任輪值主席國期間，北極理事會的其他七個成員國就一直暫停參加北極理事會及其附屬機構的所有會議，以抗議俄羅斯對烏克蘭發動的軍事行動。

在挪威2023年從俄羅斯手中接任輪值主席國之後，北極理事會過去6個月期間一直依靠“書面程序”維繫其正常工作。北極理事會2月達成的協議有望為其下設諸多工作組增加互動和促進北極事務管理鋪平了道路。除了俄羅斯，北極理事會還包括美國、挪威、加拿大、丹麥、芬蘭、冰島和瑞典。

在過去的兩年裏，北極地區的地緣政治發生了重大變化。俄烏衝突爆發後，瑞典和芬蘭放棄了長期以來的軍事不結盟政策，申請加入北大西洋公約組織（北約）。瑞典本月正式加盟為北約成員，芬蘭則已在去年四月加入了北約。

隨着北約向北方擴展，俄羅斯一直密切關注着“北歐響應”行動，這是芬蘭、挪威和瑞典之間的軍事演習，是今年北約規模最大的“堅定衞士”軍事演習在北極地區的組成部分。

俄羅斯將北約部隊在其邊境附近的增加視為威脅，並已加強了其在北部和西部領土的軍事能力，以應對北約的擴張。此外，雖然俄羅斯尚未考慮退出北極理事會，但已暫停向其支付年度費用。

在外界難以預判俄羅斯行為的背景下，丹麥格陵蘭島正在尋求與美國和加拿大建立更緊密的關係，並推動建立一個高級別的北極-北美論壇，該論壇將包括來自所有土著領土的領導人。與此同時，駐紮在阿拉斯加的美國部隊在2022年被重新劃分為北極部隊，正在發展成為一個強大的北極軍事力量，並與挪威、加拿大、芬蘭和瑞典合作進行聯合演習。

除了地緣環境變化之外，北極還面臨着不可忽視的經濟逆風。西方對俄羅斯施加的經濟制裁以及西方公司（特別是在石油和天然氣行業）的投資撤出，導致了俄羅斯控制的北極主要航運走廊-北方航道（Northern Sea Route）使用量減少。

2010 年至 2022 年間北方航道的過境通行量。（來源：極地與海洋門户）

2022年，該航線的過境貨物從2021年的200多萬噸下降至僅41,000噸。不過，在2023年間，該航線的航運量奇蹟般的恢復至2.1百萬噸，創下了新高，其中超過95%的貨物是來往中國的。一些分析人士認為，這一創紀錄的貨物主要源自中國對俄羅斯原油的巨大需求。在歐盟停止進口俄羅斯石油之後，俄羅斯採取了一些措施，利用北方航道運輸其部分產品。

烏克蘭危機造成的另一經濟挑戰是俄羅斯在北極的液化天然氣2項目（LNG2）的停滯。俄羅斯計劃將其液化天然氣全球市場份額從目前的8％提高到2030年的20％，“LNG2”對此至關重要，該項目一期原計劃於去年年底投產（注：洪農原文為2024年初，但是南華早報的信息似乎確實更準確。）。

除了俄羅斯Novatek持有的60%股份外，該項目的股東還包括法國的TotalEnergies、中國石油天然氣集團公司（中石油）、中國國家海洋石油公司（中海油）以及日本三井物產和JOGMEC組成的財團，後者各佔10%股份。據俄羅斯媒體去年12月報道，這些外國股東在美國實施制裁後暫停了參與。據報道，三井正在撤回其投入該項目的員工，而TotalEnergies已經啓動了不可抗力程序，並將不會在今年從該項目中採購液化天然氣。

就中石油和中海油是否退出了LNG 2項目，中國外交部發言人毛寧表示，中俄開展正常的經貿合作，不應當受到任何第三方的干預和限制。據報道，中石油和中海油已要求美國政府豁免對LNG 2項目的制裁。

歐盟計劃於4月投票決定就是否採取措施阻止從LNG 2進口。但歐盟國家就如何逐步淘汰俄羅斯北極液化天然氣方面存在分歧，一些國家擔心這些舉措沒法取消長期合同。

儘管存在地緣衝突和經濟變化，但北極的科學合作仍然是為數不多的國際各方共識大於分歧的領域之一。

在北極地區，各國長期秉持國際科學合作的傳統，但烏克蘭衝突給研究氣候變化的科學家帶來了不小的挑戰。自2022年3月以來，所有北極理事會的會議都已凍結，八個北極國家之間的科學合作也因此在制度層面停滯不前。

然而，全球迫切需要努力適應氣候變化，並減輕其對北極地區的深遠影響，包括佔該地區十分之一人口的40個原住民部落。

北極理事會恢復對話既意義重大又及時，將有助於理事會履行其作為北極治理領先和永久論壇的使命。北極理事會工作組能有效應對環境、氣候和社會發展問題，對北極地區的福祉至關重要。

儘管如此，圍繞俄羅斯的不確定性仍然存在。

英文原文：

Last month, the Arctic Council broke the ice by agreeing to reconvene its working group meetings virtually, nearly two years after seven of its eight members, including the US, halted participation in protest against the invasion of Ukraine by Russia, which held the council chairmanship then.

The working groups had been relying on “written procedures” for the last six months, after Norway took over the chairmanship and found ways to resume project work. The latest development will hopefully pave the way for increased interaction and engagement between council members, which also include Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland and Sweden.

Over the last two years, there has been a big shift in Arctic geopolitics. After the Ukraine war broke out, Sweden and Finland departed from their long-standing military non-alignment policy and applied to join Nato. Sweden officially became a member of the transatlantic security alliance this month, while Finland joined last April.

With Nato extending its northern reach, Russia has been keeping a close eye on the Nordic Response, military drills between Finland, Norway and Sweden that represent the Arctic arm of the Nato-wide Steadfast Defender military exercise this year, its largest ever.

Russia views the increasing presence of Nato forces near its borders as a threat and has reinforced its military capabilities in its northern and western territories to counter Nato’s expansion. While Russia has not yet considered withdrawing from the Arctic Council, it has suspended its annual payments to it.

Amid Russia’s unpredictability, Greenland is seeking stronger ties with the United States and Canada, and pushing to establish a high-level Arctic-North American forum that would include leaders from all the indigenous territories. Meanwhile, US troops stationed in Alaska, redesignated as the Arctic division in 2022, are developing as an Arctic force and collaborating with Norway, Canada, Finland and Sweden in joint exercises.

Besides the geopolitical shifts, it is imperative to acknowledge the notable economic challenges for the Arctic. Economic sanctions on Russia and the withdrawal of Western companies, particularly in the oil and gas sector, have led to reduced international traffic and operators using the Russian-controlled Northern Sea Route, the Arctic’s main shipping corridor.

Transit cargo along the route plunged to 41,000 tonnes in 2022, from just over 2 million tonnes the year before. Last year, it made a miraculous recovery to 2.1 million tonnes, a record high, with more than 95 per cent of it comprised deliveries to or from China. Some analysts attributed the record tonnage to China’s robust demand for Russian crude oil, with Russia taking steps to ship some of its product using the Northern Sea Route after the European Union stopped importing Russian oil.

The stalling of Russia’s Arctic LNG 2 project is another economic aspect arising from the Ukraine crisis. This liquefied natural gas project, deemed crucial to Russia’s endeavour to increase its LNG market share to 20 per cent by 2030 from 8 per cent, was due to start production last year.

Besides Russia’s Novatek with a 60 per cent stake, the project’s shareholders are France’s TotalEnergies, China National Petroleum Corp (CNPC), China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) and a consortium of Japan’s Mitsui and Co and JOGMEC, each with 10 per cent. These foreign shareholders have suspended participation after the US imposed sanctions, according to Russian news last December. Mitsui is reportedly withdrawing its employees from the project while TotalEnergies has started a force majeure process and will not take any LNG from the project this year.

When asked whether China’s CNPC and CNOOC had pulled out of the LNG 2 project, however, foreign ministry spokeswoman Mao Ning said both countries were continuing “normal economic and trade cooperation” and that this “should not be subject to interference or restrictions from any third party”. Both CNPC and CNOOC have reportedly asked the US government for exemptions from sanctions on the LNG 2 project.

Next month, the EU is expected to vote on proposed measures to block imports from LNG 2. But EU countries remain divided on how to phase out Russian Arctic LNG, with some voicing concern that the proposed moves may not be enough to undo long-term contracts.

Despite the geopolitical and economic shifts, however, scientific cooperation in the Arctic remains one of the few areas where the international community shares more common concerns than divergent views.

There is a long tradition of scientific collaboration between nations in this region, and the conflict in Ukraine has presented a unique challenge for climate researchers and scientists. Official Arctic Council meetings have been paused since May 2022 and with that, scientific cooperation among the eight Arctic states at the institutional level.

Nevertheless, there remains an urgent need for a global effort to adapt to climate change and mitigate its profound effect on communities, including the 40 indigenous peoples who comprise roughly 10 per cent of the Arctic’s total population of four million.

The Arctic Council’s resumption of project-level work is both significant and timely, and will help the council to fulfil its mandate as the leading and permanent forum for Arctic governance. The effectiveness of the Arctic Council’s working groups in tackling environmental, climatic and social development issues is also vital for the welfare of the Arctic communities.

Nonetheless, the uncertainty surrounding Russia’s next steps persists.

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