周波：紐約時報説中俄朝要搞核聯盟？我就問一個問題

編者按：清華大學戰略與安全中心研究員周波在South China Morning Post(《南華早報》)上發文回應New York Times（《紐約時報》）有關拜登批准美國核部署機密文件的報道。周波表示，足夠的核威懾力量和絕對的核反擊能力，是中國倡導“不首先使用核武器“的前提條件。

此前，周波在美國Foreign Policy(《外交政策》)雜誌發文，論述五個正式核大國都應該承諾“不首先使用核武器”。

【文/ 觀察者網專欄作者 周波，翻譯/ 李澤西 核譯/ 韓樺】

這可真新鮮：據《紐約時報》報道，美國總統拜登於今年3月批准了一份名為《核部署指南》（Nuclear Employment Guidance）的機密文件。知情人士稱，文件中闡述的戰略強調，美軍可能需要為俄羅斯、中國和朝鮮的“協作核對抗”做好準備。

我的首要問題是：都沒有中俄朝聯盟，哪來的核聯盟？中俄關系雖密切，但北京並未在俄烏衝突期間向其提供任何直接軍事援助，這表明中俄關系並非聯盟性質。

與此同時，儘管北京與平壤之間數十年前簽訂了條約（編者注：中朝友好合作互助條約），要求在戰時相互提供軍事援助，但如今，中國與朝鮮的軍事互動可能比中國與大多數非洲國家的軍事互動還要少。那麼，這三個國家如何協調所謂針對美國的核戰略或核行動呢？

相較俄羅斯，美國在核武器上沒有明顯優勢，未來也不會有，因為俄羅斯擁有更多的核彈頭。蘇聯解體後，俄羅斯的常規力量急劇下降。正因為如此，俄羅斯現在比以往任何時候都更加依賴核武器。

這就解釋了為什麼俄羅斯在烏克蘭戰爭期間數次發出使用核武器的隱晦威脅，並將在未來幾十年繼續實施“核模糊”策略。

DF-41新華網

斯德哥爾摩國際和平研究所6月發佈的一份報告認為，中國的核武庫已從2023年1月的410枚彈頭增加到今年1月的500枚，而且中國可能已首次在和平時期在導彈上加裝少量彈頭。

在2019年國防白皮書中，中國表示將“把自身核能力維持在國家安全需要的最低水平”。顯然，這個“最低水平”是無法量化的，因為不同時期、不同環境下的國家安全需求是不同的。

即便根據五角大樓的估計，中國的核武庫已經增加到500枚核彈頭，到2035年還可能增加到1500枚，但與俄羅斯的約6000枚彈頭和美國的5400枚彈頭相比，中國的核武庫仍然很小。在冷戰最激烈的時期，蘇聯一度擁有4萬多枚核彈頭，而美國一度擁有2.3萬多枚核彈頭，足以摧毀整個地球。中國為何要捲入如此瘋狂的競賽？

我的理解是，“最低水平”是指，即使中國堅持“不首先使用”核武器的政策，其他核大國也不敢越過這個門檻，對中國實施先發制人的核打擊。正因為這一政策，中國必須建立足夠的威懾力量。這就要求中國擁有足夠的核彈頭來抵禦敵人的第一次打擊，確保中國擁有反擊的能力。

擁有這樣的核能力，中國軍隊就更有可能在常規戰爭（如台海戰爭）中戰勝美國。鑑於中美常規軍事力量的差距已經在縮小，中國擁有了足夠大的核武庫，就能迫使美國放棄首先使用核武器的任何想法。

中國倡導“不首先使用核武器”的政策，在一些人看來可能是一廂情願的想法，因為在烏克蘭和加沙正在進行的戰爭中，核武器的重要性似乎正在增加，但事實並非如此。核武器不是萬能的，擁有核武器也不能保證在衝突中取得勝利。如果中國、美國、俄羅斯、英國和法國都同意“核戰爭打不贏也打不得”，那麼為什麼各國不能都採納“不首先使用核武器”政策呢？

各方最近經常討論的一個話題是，世界是否已經進入新冷戰？如果美國真的像某些報道所説的那樣準備恢復核試驗，這就等於正式宣佈了新冷戰的爆發。

幾乎可以肯定，美國重新開始核試驗將引來其他核大國效仿，給核不擴散努力帶來毀滅性的打擊。這樣一來，擁有核武器的國家數量很可能會超過目前的九個，從而導致美國及其盟國的常規力量優勢大打折扣。

“和平衞士”導彈彈頭Atomic Archive

此外，如果世界上所有核大國都提高核力量的戰備狀態，就會增加像冷戰時期“虛警”事件的可能性。在早期的遠程雷達時代，即使是升起的月亮也可能被誤認為是導彈襲擊。鑑此，隨着更多核武器國家進入高度戒備狀態，很可能會出現更多“虛警”或重大事故。

拜登政府的核戰略令人遺憾，尤其是因為他在自己政治生涯的大部分時間都在倡導核不擴散。自二戰以來，我們已經有大約80年沒有發生過全球大國之間的重大戰爭。

如果這算是一種安慰，那麼在冷戰結束後約30年，我們會再次陷入冷戰的可能性，又令人不安。我只能祭出牛頓的這句話：“我能計算星辰的運行，卻無法計算人類的瘋狂"。

（翻頁查看英文）

This really is an eye-opener. According to The New York Times, US President Joe Biden approved a classified document in March called the “Nuclear Employment Guidance”. Sources familiar with the situation say that the strategy laid out in the document emphasises the need for US forces to prepare for possible coordinated nuclear confrontations with Russia, China and North Korea.

My first question is this: where is a China-Russia-North Korea alliance, let alone nuclear alliance? China-Russia relations are close, but Beijing not having provided any direct military assistance to Moscow in its invasion of Ukraine suggests their relationship is not an alliance.

Meanwhile, in spite of a decades-old treaty between Beijing and Pyongyang that calls for mutual military assistance in time of war, China’s military interactions nowadays with North Korea are perhaps fewer than its interactions with most African countries. So how could the three countries coordinate these nuclear strategies or operations against the United States?

The US has no clear advantage in terms of nuclear weapons over Russia, which has more warheads, and it won’t in the future. Precisely because its conventional forces have drastically declined since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia now relies more than ever on nuclear weapons.

This explains why Moscow has made several thinly veiled threats of using nuclear weapons during its war in Ukraine and will continue to play with nuclear ambiguity in the decades to come.

China’s nuclear capabilities, including the number of nuclear warheads, are considered state secrets. Therefore, it is unlikely that anyone in China will publicly confirm the accuracy of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s estimates. The think tank released a report in June indicating China’s nuclear arsenal had increased from 410 warheads in January 2023 to 500 this January and that for the first time China could be deploying a small number of warheads on missiles during peacetime.

In a 2019 defence white paper, China said it would “keep its nuclear capabilities at the minimum level required for national security”. Evidently this “minimum level” cannot be quantified because national security needs vary in different times and environments.

Even if China’s nuclear arsenal has grown to 500 warheads and could grow as large as 1,500 by 2035, according to Pentagon estimates, Beijing can still argue that it is still much smaller than Russia’s roughly 6,000 warheads and the 5,400 of the US. At the height of the Cold War, the Soviet Union had more than 40,000 nuclear warheads while the US had more than 23,000 – enough to destroy the whole planet. Why would China choose to become involved in such madness?

In my understanding, “minimum level” refers to a threshold that no other nuclear power would dare to cross with a pre-emptive nuclear strike on China, even if China maintains a policy of “no first use” of nuclear weapons. Precisely because of this policy, China has to build adequate strength for deterrence. It requires China to have sufficient nuclear warheads to resist an enemy’s first strike and ensure China has second-strike capability.

With such nuclear capabilities, China’s military could have a better chance of emerging victorious over the US in the event of a conventional war, such as one in the Taiwan Strait. Given that the gap between the conventional military forces of China and the US is already closing, China having a large enough nuclear arsenal would force the US to give up any ideas of using nuclear weapons first.

China call for a “no first use” policy might look to some people like wishful thinking at a time when nuclear weapons seem to be growing in importance amid the ongoing wars in Ukraine and Gaza, but it isn’t. Nuclear weapons are not an omnipotent force, and having them is no guarantee of success in a conflict. If China, the US, Russia, Britain and France can all agree that a nuclear war cannot be won and therefore should never be fought, then why can’t they commit to their own “no first use” policy?

Much has been written about whether the world has entered a new cold war. If the US really is poised to resume conducting nuclear tests, as some reports suggest, this would be tantamount to an official announcement of a new cold war.

The sight of renewed US nuclear testing would almost certainly usher in tests by other nuclear powers, spelling doom for nuclear non-proliferation efforts. This would likely swell the number of states with nuclear weapons beyond the current nine, resulting in a considerable reduction in the conventional force superiority of the US and its allies.

Furthermore, if all the world’s nuclear powers increase the readiness of their nuclear forces, it could increase the chances of false alarms, like those seen during the Cold War. During the early days of long-range radar, even a rising moon could be misinterpreted as a missile attack. One can easily conclude that with more nuclear weapons states on high alert, there could be more false alarms or significant incidents.

The Biden administration’s nuclear strategy is a shame, not least because the president spent so much of his political career advocating for nuclear non-proliferation. We have had no significant wars between global powers for some 80 years since World War II.

If this is a solace, it is also disturbing to think we might enter into another cold war some 30 years after the first. I can only concur with these words attributed to Isaac Newton: “I can calculate the movement of the stars, but not the madness of men.”

本文系觀察者網獨家稿件，文章內容純屬作者個人觀點，不代表平台觀點，未經授權，不得轉載，否則將追究法律責任。關注觀察者網微信guanchacn，每日閲讀趣味文章。