基式外交：伊拉克的命運之日 @《基式外交研究》2025年第2期_風聞

**作者：**亨利・A・基辛格

**來源：**大外交青年智庫基式外交研究中心《基式外交研究》2025年第2期

**文源：**Kissinger, Henry A. “A Date of Destiny for Iraq.” The Washington Post, February 11, 2004.

**聲明：**基式外交研究中心轉載、編譯與翻譯的內容均為非商業性引用（學術研究），不作商用，如有問題請即刻聯繫

一、全文翻譯

**美國自行設定的6月30日將主權移交給伊拉克當局的最後期限，常常被視為美國開始脱離伊拉克事務的標誌。**實際上，佔領的正式結束改變的是美國介入的性質，而非介入本身的必要性。這需要一種新的戰略，將權力轉化為合法性，進而為外交事務開啓一個新的維度。

美國在伊拉克的目標常常被抽象地表述，彷彿我們發動戰爭僅僅是為了改革這個國家。但我們不僅在伊拉克的內部結構上有利害關係，在其政治取向方面也有自身的利益訴求。**一個主權獨立的伊拉克，若要讓聯軍部隊基於協議而非佔領的形式繼續駐紮在其領土上，那麼這個國家必須有一個具有代表性、安全穩定、得到國際認可且與和平世界相適應的政府。**承認伊拉克新政府的國家必須採取互補的政策，以免它們之間的競爭撕裂伊拉克新政權那脆弱的架構。伊拉克當局必須接受基本的安排，而不能自視為這一安排的受害者，否則他們的領土收復主義情緒可能會點燃地區局勢。

儘管各大國在戰前存在諸多爭端，但實際上，它們在伊拉克的利益已經變得更加一致。它們都將受到復興的激進伊斯蘭勢力的威脅。這些國家明白，伊拉克局勢的失敗所帶來的後果將跨越國界蔓延；它們能從合作中獲得很多益處，而如果重蹈爭端的覆轍則會損失慘重。如果主權獨立的伊拉克走向激進或原教旨主義，那麼每一個受到恐怖主義或激進伊斯蘭勢力威脅的國家都將處於危險之中。像埃及、沙特阿拉伯、約旦、摩洛哥甚至印度尼西亞這樣的温和伊斯蘭國家都有這樣的認知，儘管有些國家可能因為過於忌憚而不敢公開承認。這種基於共同恐懼的共同目標，或許會成為構建國際秩序新方式的開端，就如同冷戰後的國際秩序那樣。

即使在最理想的情況下，這也將是一項艱鉅的任務。一個主權獨立的伊拉克，其內部動態將極其複雜。美國的傳統是通過制衡體系來保障不受專斷政治行為的侵害。但在伊拉克並沒有類似的經驗。**因此，伊拉克的各個羣體並不指望政府來保護自己；相反，他們通過加強自己所屬的社區、部落、家族或宗教的作用來尋求安全。**因此，民主化的早期階段往往會使這個國家走向分裂，而非實現統一。每個羣體都在尋求最大限度地保障自己不被其他羣體統治，並獲取最大份額的權力和財富。這就是為什麼在6月30日之後，伊拉克的安全局勢可能會惡化——至少是暫時的——因為各個心懷不滿的羣體將把攻擊目標轉向新政府的機構。

這就是經常被提及的與德國和日本被佔領情況的類比站不住腳的地方。德國和日本是民族國家，沒有嚴重的分裂主義運動或國內游擊隊。在戰敗後，它們很快就達成了共識，即與佔領國合作是恢復其社會和國際地位的關鍵。領導人通過表現出與佔領軍的親近關係來獲得支持。

在伊拉克，這些條件一個都不具備。民眾把這場戰爭視為薩達姆・侯賽因的失敗，而非國家的失敗。對被推翻的獨裁者的仇恨並不會自動轉化為對美國的支持。**事實上，許多伊拉克領導人通過與美國保持距離來尋求自身的合法性。**德國和日本用了將近七年的時間才實現了完全的主權獨立。而在伊拉克，目標是在七個月內完成這一進程。

**有三大羣體在新伊拉克中爭奪影響力。****佔多數的什葉派堅持舉行選舉，其實際效果將是讓他們獲得主導地位。**對於其他羣體來説，問題在於什葉派將如何利用他們的多數地位，尤其是考慮到一些什葉派派別要求建立一個伊斯蘭共和國的訴求。到目前為止，伊拉克的激進和原教旨主義阿亞圖拉們還沒有動用他們最有力的武器，即組織大規模示威的能力。伊拉克未來的穩定將取決於他們是在等待佔領結束後展示自己的力量，還是真正接受一個多元、世俗的結果。

相比之下，庫爾德人由於長期受到巴格達的壓迫，他們主張建立一個聯邦制體系，該體系將把中央政府的職能限制在國防、外交政策以及主要的行政職能方面，幾乎不賦予其執法權力或地方治理權力。庫爾德人對自治的定義與獨立幾乎沒有什麼區別。

**到目前為止一直占主導地位的遜尼派正在為他們失去的優勢地位而哀嘆。**由於在伊拉克的歷史上一直佔據統治地位，他們至少目前在維護新興的新政權結構方面沒有什麼利害關係。在組建政府過程中出現的任何妥協，很可能只會緩解他們的敵意，而無法消除這種敵意。因此，在關於新安排的辯論中，什葉派帶來了多元主義限度的挑戰，庫爾德人帶來了聯邦制限度的挑戰，而遜尼派帶來了和解的挑戰。

或許對於美國所扮演角色而言，**最關鍵的單一決定因素是我們的民主理想對伊拉克傳統價值觀的影響。**例如，克服制度化的女性不平等問題，將會使我們與伊斯蘭宗教機構產生衝突，無論是遜尼派還是什葉派的宗教機構。因此，伊拉克最終的國內問題很可能取決於世俗化與伊斯蘭化之間的較量。而伊拉克主要的世俗化力量是復興黨，我們已經將其推翻。在美國的治國方略中，在伊拉克尋找國內合作伙伴將成為一個主要考驗。

**伊拉克的鄰國在這一進程中會有自己的想法。**敍利亞能夠接受一個世俗、發展中的伊拉克，但無法接受一個由什葉派主導的伊拉克，並且它會對伊拉克親西方的傾向感到不安。伊朗害怕一個強大的伊拉克，並且會抵制一個親美的伊拉克。土耳其會歡迎一個親西方的伊拉克，但會對伊拉克的聯邦制感到不安。

伊朗的立場最為複雜。它在巴格達建立一個儘可能弱小的中央政府方面有着戰略利益，以阻止伊拉克重新崛起成為一股能夠平衡德黑蘭地區霸權野心的主要力量。**它支持聯邦制，但又害怕庫爾德人，擔心庫爾德人的自治會挑戰德黑蘭對伊朗境內庫爾德人的統治。**伊朗的王牌是伊拉克南部佔多數的什葉派人口。對於伊拉克什葉派是更珍視國家獨立還是宗教和睦，人們存在不同的看法。一些人認為，由於歷史上伊拉克南部是什葉派正統教義的中心，伊拉克什葉派可能會成為德黑蘭阿亞圖拉們在意識形態上的競爭對手——不過他們肯定會建立起某種自己的伊斯蘭統治，從而削弱伊拉克其他地區實現穩定的前景。

無論如何，伊朗顯然處於一個特殊的位置，能夠在什葉派地區獲得支持，並阻礙任何對其利益不利的整合。但伊朗可能會試圖將我們的不滿情緒控制在不至於引發我們報復的水平之下。因此，美國能否就對伊朗的政策達成一致，將堅定性與外交選擇相結合，這將在很大程度上影響伊朗在伊拉克的行為。

作為北約盟友，土耳其在防止美國遭遇挫折方面有着重大利益。並且它準備為穩定伊拉克局勢提供援助。然而，存在兩個限制因素：奧斯曼帝國時期土耳其的統治歷史，以及庫爾德地區治理方面潛在的衝突。前者阻礙了——或者至少使土耳其參與安全領域的事務變得複雜。而且土耳其在庫爾德地區的利益與美國對庫爾德人自治的支持並不完全一致。土耳其領導人擔心佔土耳其人口20%的土耳其庫爾德人會提出類似的自治要求。如果庫爾德人的自治超出一定程度，那麼土耳其進行軍事幹預的威脅就不可忽視，而且這種干預可能會得到伊朗的支持。

如果説伊拉克的鄰國讓局勢變得更加複雜，那麼其他國家的態度則帶來了一些充滿希望的前景。**法國和德國已經重新思考了與美國的緊張關係：他們要求在聯合國的主持下更快地移交主權的壓力已經被事態的發展所超越。**無論是否有聯合國的支持，伊拉克都將在幾個月內實現主權獨立，而且美國政府已經讓聯合國參與到這一進程的前期準備工作中。未來的關鍵問題是，這些盟友將如何應對新興的伊拉克：他們會在一個共同的進程中與美國團結一致，還是會利用他們與主權獨立的伊拉克政府加強後的接觸機會，開始與我們競爭，以削弱美國在巴格達的影響力呢？歐洲會試圖成為一股平衡力量，還是在規劃伊拉克和中東的未來時成為一個合作伙伴呢？歐洲是否準備好為其增強的影響力做出與之相稱的安全和財政貢獻呢？

矛盾的是，兩年前曾有可能破壞聯盟的伊拉克的未來，如今可能會變成一個重建大西洋聯盟的機會，甚至更廣泛地説，成為重建國際秩序的一個機會。在7月1日之前，美國有能力獨自塑造一個主權伊拉克的制度體系。在那之後，伊拉克的主權將使其他國家不可避免地參與進來。甚至在那之前，美國政府就已經讓聯合國參與進來，以幫助解決選舉問題。因此，明智的美國政策應該在被我們自己啓動的這個進程所迫使之前，就努力塑造事態的發展。

·將主權移交給伊拉克絕不能成為美國從伊拉克撤軍的開始，而應該是美國以一種不同方式介入的新階段的起點。

·安全仍然至關重要，但在這個新階段，伊拉克部隊可能會逐步承擔起國內安全職能，而美國軍隊則負責處理邊境事務、防範滲透路線以及應對大規模部隊的攻擊。

·由於伊拉克政治未來的國際化進程最遲將在7月1日啓動，所以現在美國最好通過北約內部的一個聯絡小組讓更多國家參與到這個進程中來，從而為國際機構在伊拉克採取聯合行動奠定基礎。

如果有必要面對最終的挑戰，即像南斯拉夫一樣，出於戰略原因而建立的伊拉克無法通過代議制機構維持統一，它可能會走向獨裁統治，或者分裂成各個組成部分，那麼這樣的安排就顯得尤為重要。儘管這遠非我們所期望的結果，但事態的發展可能會導致伊拉克分裂成三個國家。但這需要堅定的國際指導。

**這並不意味着美國將其政策拱手讓給多邊共識，而是要以強有力的領導力來塑造政策。**由於我們的軍事和財政貢獻，我們必然會擁有一個主要的——很可能是主導性的——話語權，就如同我們在阿富汗所做的那樣。我們通過領導一個自願聯盟，實現了消除薩達姆・侯賽因所帶來威脅的重要目標。建立一個新的和平架構需要更廣泛的基礎。

二、材料原文

The self-imposed deadline of June 30 for the transfer of sovereignty from American to Iraqi authorities is often treated as marking the start of U.S. disengagement. In fact, the formal end of occupation changes the nature of the American engagement, not the need for it. It requires a new strategy for converting power into legitimacy and hence a new dimension to diplomacy.

American objectives in Iraq are often stated abstractly, as if we went to war exclusively to reform the country. But we have a stake in the political orientation of Iraq, not only its internal structure. A sovereign Iraq on whose soil coalition forces will remain by agreement rather than occupation presupposes a government that is representative, secure, accepted internationally and compatible with a peaceful world. The countries recognizing it must be brought to conduct complementary policies lest their competition rend the delicate fabric of the new Iraqi authority. The Iraqi authorities must accept the basic arrangement and not see themselves as victims of it, lest their irredentism inflame the region.

Despite major powers’ pre-war disputes, their interests in Iraq have, in fact, become more congruent. They would all be threatened by a resurgent, radical Islam. They know that the consequences of failure in Iraq would spread across borders; they have much to gain from cooperation and much to lose from a repetition of their disputes. If the sovereign Iraq turns radical or fundamentalist, every country threatened by terrorism or by radicalized Islam will be in jeopardy. The moderate Islamic countries such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Morocco and even Indonesia share this perception, though some may be too intimidated to avow it. This common purpose based on a common fear could be the beginning of a new approach to international order, much as was the post-Cold War order.

Under the best of circumstances, it will be a daunting task. The internal dynamics of a sovereign Iraq will be extraordinarily complicated. The American tradition seeks a guarantee against arbitrary political acts in a system of checks and balances. But there is no comparable experience in Iraq. As a result, its various components do not look to their government for protection; instead they seek safety through enhancing the role of their communities, tribes, families or faiths. The early stages of democratization thus tend to fragment the country rather than unify it. Each community seeks the maximum guarantee against domination by the others and the maximum share of power and wealth. This is why, after June 30, the security situation in Iraq may worsen – at least temporarily – as the various disaffected groups shift their attacks to the institutions of the new government.

This is where the frequently invoked analogy to the occupations of Germany and Japan breaks down. Germany and Japan were national states without serious separatist movements or internal guerrillas. After their defeats, they quickly came to a consensus that cooperation with the occupying power was the key to restoring their societies and international standings. Leaders achieved support by demonstrating closeness to the occupation forces.

In Iraq, none of these conditions are met. The population treats the war as a defeat for Saddam Hussein, not for the nation. Hatred of the deposed dictator does not translate automatically into support for the United States. Indeed, many Iraqi leaders seek legitimacy by distancing themselves from the United States. It took almost seven years for Germany and Japan to achieve full sovereignty. In Iraq, the goal is to accomplish this process in seven months.

Three major communities are striving for influence in the new Iraq. The Shiites, being a majority, insist on elections whose practical effect would be to give them dominance. The issue for the other groups is to what purpose the Shiites would use their majority, especially in light of the demands by some Shiite factions for the creation of an Islamic Republic. The Iraqi radical and fundamentalist ayatollahs have so far sheathed their most potent weapon, the capacity to organize mass demonstrations. The future stability of Iraq will depend on whether they are waiting on showing their power for the end of the occupation or have genuinely accepted a pluralistic, secular outcome.

By contrast, the Kurds, with their history of oppression by Baghdad, urge a federal system that would confine the central government to defense, foreign policy and largely administrative functions with few, if any, enforcement powers or local governance. Kurds define self-government as only microscopically distinguishable from independence.

The heretofore dominant Sunnis are mourning their lost preeminence. Having dominated Iraq for all of its history, they have no stake – at least yet – in preserving the emerging new structure. Whatever compromise emerges in the formation of a government will likely only mitigate their hostility, not dispel it. Thus, in the debate over the new arrangements, the Shiites pose the challenge of the limits of pluralism, the Kurds of the limits of federalism and the Sunnis the challenge of reconciliation.

Perhaps the single most crucial determinant for America’s role is the impact of our democratic ideals on traditional Iraqi values. Overcoming the institutionalized inequality of women, for example, will bring us into conflict with the Islamic religious establishment, whether Sunni or Shiite. Thus the ultimate domestic issue in Iraq may well turn on secularization versus Islamization. And the main secularizing force in Iraq was the Baathist party, which we have ousted. Finding domestic partners in Iraq will become a principal test of American statesmanship.

Iraq’s neighbors will have their own ideas on this process. Syria can live with a secular, developing Iraq, but not with a Shiite one, and it will be uneasy about a pro-Western orientation. Iran fears a strong Iraq and will resist a pro-American one. Turkey would welcome a pro- Western Iraq but would be uneasy about Iraqi federalism.

Iran’s position is the most complex. It has a strategic interest in the weakest possible central government in Baghdad to forestall Iraq’s reemergence as a major force balancing Tehran’s aspirations to regional hegemony. It favors federalism but fears the Kurds lest their autonomy challenge Tehran’s rule over Iran’s Kurdish population. Iran’s trump card is the majority Shiite population of southern Iraq. Opinion is divided as to whether the Iraqi Shiites prize national independence over religious comity. Some suggest that because historically southern Iraq was the focal point of Shiite orthodoxy, the Iraqi Shiites might emerge as ideological rivals to the Tehran ayatollahs – though surely not without establishing some sort of Islamic rule of their own, weakening prospects for stability in the rest of Iraq.

In any event, Iran is clearly in a special position to generate support in the Shiite region and to hinder a consolidation inimical to its interests. But Iran will probably try to keep our frustration below a level that would cause us to retaliate. Its conduct in Iraq will therefore be heavily influenced by America’s ability to come together on an Iranian policy that combines firmness with a diplomatic option.

Turkey, as a NATO ally, has a significant interest in preventing a setback for the United States. And it is prepared to extend assistance in stabilizing Iraq. There are two limitations, however: the history of Turkish rule during the Ottoman Empire and the potential conflict over governance of the Kurdish regions. The former prevents – or at least complicates – Turkish participation in the security field. And Turkey has an interest in the Kurdish region not entirely compatible with American support for Kurdish autonomy. Its leaders fear similar claims for autonomy among the Turkish Kurds, representing 20 percent of Turkey’s population. If Kurdish autonomy goes beyond a certain point, there is a not negligible threat of Turkish military intervention, perhaps backed by Iran.

If Iraq’s neighbors multiply complexities, the attitude of other countries opens hopeful prospects. France and Germany have had second thoughts about tensions with the United States: Their pressure for a more rapid transfer of sovereignty under U.N. auspices is being overtaken by events. Iraq will have achieved sovereignty in a matter of months regardless of auspices, and the administration has involved the United Nations in the run-up to it. The key question for the future is how the allies deal with the emerging Iraq: Will they close ranks with the United States behind a common process or will they use their enhanced access to the sovereign Iraqi government to begin competing with us to reduce U.S. influence in Baghdad? Will Europe attempt to be a counterweight or a partner in charting the future of Iraq and the Middle East? Is Europe prepared to make a security and financial contribution commensurate with enhanced influence?

Paradoxically, the future of Iraq, which two years ago threatened to destroy the alliance, may turn into an opportunity to rebuild the Atlantic Alliance and, beyond that, the international order in general. Until July 1, the United States is in a position to shape the institutions of a sovereign Iraq by itself. After that, Iraqi sovereignty will give other nations an inevitable participation. And even before that, the administration is involving the United Nations to help resolve the electoral issue. A wise U.S. policy would therefore seek to shape events before it is forced into it by the very process we have started.

·The transfer of sovereignty to Iraq must not be the beginning of U.S. withdrawal from Iraq but the start of a new phase of a different kind of American involvement.

·Security remains essential, but the new phase may permit a gradual assumption of domestic security functions by Iraqi forces, with American troops dealing with frontiers, infiltration routes and attacks by large units.

·Because the process of internationalizing the political future of Iraq will start on July 1 at the latest, it is better for the United States to lead it now by involving more countries in the process by means of a contact group within NATO to bring about a basis for joint allied action in Iraq, in international institutions.

Such an arrangement is all the more important if it becomes necessary to face the ultimate challenge: that like Yugoslavia, Iraq, created for strategic reasons, cannot be held together by representative institutions, that it will tend toward autocracy or break up into its constituent groups. While this is far from the preferred outcome, a breakup into three states may be imposed by events. But it would require firm international guidance.

This implies not an abdication of U.S. policy to a multilateral consensus but shaping it with strong leadership. We are bound to have a major – probably dominant – voice because of our military and financial contributions, much as we have in Afghanistan. We achieved the important objective of removing the threat posed by Saddam Hussein by leading a coalition of the willing. Building a new structure of peace requires a wider basis.