基式外交：摒棄中東問題上的固有觀念 @《基式外交研究》2025年第3期_風聞

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**作者：**亨利・A・基辛格

**來源：**大外交青年智庫基式外交研究中心《基式外交研究》2025年第3期

**文源：**Kissinger, Henry A. “Discarding Blinders in the Middle East.” The Washington Post, May 9, 2004.

**聲明：**基式外交研究中心轉載、編譯與翻譯的內容均為非商業性引用（學術研究），不作商用，如有問題請即刻聯繫

一、中文翻譯

對中東和平的追求，其矛盾之處可謂層出不窮。

在阿里埃勒・沙龍總理所在的利庫德集團以壓倒性多數票反對他從加沙地帶的所有以色列定居點以及約旦河西岸的四個定居點撤軍計劃的同一個週末，亞西爾・阿拉法特在向歐盟發出的呼籲中，譴責這一撤軍行動是“和平進程的終結”。布什總統支持這樣一種觀點，即作為最終解決方案的一部分，一些以色列定居點可以繼續留在約旦河西岸，而且尋求迴歸的巴勒斯坦難民應在未來規劃的巴勒斯坦國境內定居，而非在以色列，這一觀點也遭遇了類似的命運。

沙龍的計劃因被廣泛指責為搶先採取行動而繞過談判，這使得52名退休的英國外交官聯名致信英國首相托尼・布萊爾以示抗議，他們指責這是“對原則的背棄”。60名退休的美國外交官員也提交了類似的抗議。

這裏頗具諷刺意味。指責繞過談判的聲音，大多來自那些一直譴責美國外交消極被動，並堅持認為美國應迫使以色列採納一項詳細計劃的陣營。該計劃包括回到1967年的邊界線、對耶路撒冷進行分割，以及制定一個關於難民問題的模糊方案——而所有這些舉措的回報，是阿拉伯國家對以色列的承認以及國際社會提供的某種保障。然而，真正的問題不在於外部勢力對和平進程的影響，而在於和平進程的本質以及推進的時機。美國的立場是，通過設定一些框架參數，讓各方隨後就這些參數的細節展開談判，從而使和平進程擺脱先入為主觀念的束縛。美國在歐洲和國內的批評者則專注於啓動和平進程，然後在不可避免地出現僵局時，強行推行他們所青睞的解決方案。

儘管這一觀點可能與傳統觀念相悖，但我認為，美國的立場通過明確幾十年來外交中一直隱含的主題，為取得重大進展創造了機會。和平進程之所以陷入僵局，是因為各方一直拒絕面對一個根本現實，即任何解決方案都不會回到1967年的邊界線，因為這些邊界線從來都不是國際公認的邊界，而只是1948至1949年戰爭結束時的停火線。1967年的聯合國第242號決議提到的是被佔領土的歸還，而不是“全部”被佔領土。儘管阿拉伯國家的發言人從未接受這一解釋，但自1969年的羅傑斯計劃以來，美國的政策一直承認有必要對停火線進行調整。在卸任前的最後一週，克林頓總統詳細闡述了他對這些調整的理解，並將他的提議標註為“個人觀點”。

**布什總統消除了大家心知肚明卻一直不願明説的含糊之處。但他不僅認可了分界線的改變，還對這種改變的程度進行了限制。**美國政策所認可的定居點集羣，是2000年各方在戴維營以及在塔巴的相關談判中討論過的那些，這些定居點約佔約旦河西岸領土的5%，與此同時，以色列將向未來規劃的巴勒斯坦國讓出與其現有領土相當面積的土地。如果認為美國通過確定可能的談判框架參數就破壞了談判，那就是把口號置於實質內容之上了。只有當各方都認可對方的最低需求時——以色列的安全需求以及阿拉伯方面的尊嚴需求，才能達成持久的解決方案。

歐盟以及許多美國中東問題專家所秉持的傳統立場，無法滿足這些需求。要回到1967年的邊界線並放棄所有定居點，將需要以色列人做出如此巨大的犧牲，放棄其基本信念，這將動搖這個猶太國家的心理基礎。自1967年戰爭以來，沒有一位以色列總理或參謀長曾動搖過這樣一種觀點，即以色列的長期安全與回到1967年的邊界線是不相容的。即使放棄那些明顯起到緩衝脆弱邊界作用的定居點，也會使以色列淪為一個類似保護國的境地，其國防將依賴於一些國家的保障，而這些國家的領導人不可靠，無法理解以色列安全問題的微妙之處，並且這些國家的民眾也不願為以色列的安全做出重大犧牲。這樣一種強加的解決方案，遠不會像其倡導者所宣稱的那樣對穆斯林世界起到緩和作用，反而更可能被激進分子視為徹底消滅猶太國家道路上的第一步。

為了使談判進程擺脱固有觀念的束縛，美國的政策還試圖打破在巴勒斯坦難民迴歸權問題上的僵局。沒有一位巴勒斯坦領導人曾經處於，或者可能處於能夠正式放棄巴勒斯坦人迴歸他們認為是自己家園的領土的立場。沒有一位以色列領導人能夠提出更低的要求，因為大量散居海外的巴勒斯坦人的迴歸將等同於猶太國家的毀滅。美國的提議試圖彌合這一差距；沙龍放棄了以色列方面要求巴勒斯坦人正式放棄迴歸權的主張，以換取美國承諾利用其影響力將難民的迴歸範圍限制在未來規劃的巴勒斯坦國境內。

出現敵對反應的另一個原因是，人們普遍對沙龍不信任，這源於他長期主張擴大猶太人定居點，以及他對以色列安全需求的強硬解讀。從這個角度來看，以色列從加沙地帶撤軍被解讀為沙龍畢生致力於推動以色列在約旦河西岸擴張，並操縱談判以使任何最終建立的巴勒斯坦國被限制在一系列不相連的飛地內的行動的一部分。

**美國通過宣佈結束在實質問題上的幻想，也使得重新審視以色列總理在和平進程中的角色成為可能。**沙龍如今已經75歲了。他不可能對不僅來自穆斯林國家，而且來自歐洲以及大多數其他國家的公眾輿論的敵意視而不見。如果以色列繼續佔領約旦河西岸，即使它允許存在一系列阿拉伯飛地，它也將被人口結構變化的趨勢所壓倒。在可預見的時間內，巴勒斯坦人將成為以色列人口中的多數。他們將通過選舉程序改變以色列這個國家。

也許沙龍明白，他對這個他曾助力塑造，並一直以無比的奉獻精神和堅定態度捍衞的國家所能做出的最後貢獻，是達成一項解決方案，儘管這一方案極其痛苦，但能維護以色列安全的核心，並防止其完全孤立。落實與總統達成的諒解的精神，對於維護與美國的長期關係而言是必要的，而沙龍深知這一點。這也是他敢於冒着導致執政黨內部分裂的風險的最佳解釋。

顯然，美國的中東政策不能基於對一個盟友領導人動機的猜測。美國外交必須堅持沙龍在華盛頓所承諾的原則，即使對他動機的這種解讀被證明是錯誤的，或者即使他因以色列國內政治因素而無法將這些原則付諸實施。我們在中東的總體立場要求採取重大的外交舉措，以充分實現與沙龍在華盛頓達成的諒解的全部意義。為了推行這一戰略，美國需要與包括巴勒斯坦人在內的所有各方保持接觸。但它必須避免陷入盲目給予過多保證的陷阱，因為這些保證可能會相互抵消。

與此同時，穆斯林世界，尤其是阿拉伯國家必須承擔起自己的責任。**其中首要的責任是克服那些激進分子，他們將以色列的任何撤軍行動都視為對暴力的屈服，以及逐步消滅猶太國家進程中的一個階段。**公眾輿論——尤其是美國以外的輿論——嚴厲批評以色列採取的強硬措施，這些措施是以色列用以保護自己免受自殺式炸彈襲擊者攻擊的手段。但它卻很少理解以色列人對和平的深切渴望，以色列人在其歷史的大部分時間裏都未得到阿拉伯鄰國的承認，並且他們每天都能在阿拉伯國家的出版物上讀到、在阿拉伯國家的電視上看到要求摧毀以色列的激烈言辭。改變官方宣傳口徑將是阿拉伯國家對和平進程的一項重要貢獻。最後，巴勒斯坦人不能僅僅以承認猶太國家作為唯一的貢獻，卻堅持要得到一個理想的結果而不做出任何其他犧牲。在正常的國家間關係中，相互承認並非是一種獎賞；它是外交政策的起點，而非終點。

以色列從加沙地帶撤軍將迫使人們面對一個核心問題：**是否有可能在以色列撤軍後留下的真空地帶建立一個和平、進步且富有成效的、不受外國勢力控制的巴勒斯坦實體。**這樣一個舉措，比任何談判方案都更能讓該地區的人們切實感受到和平共處的機會。温和的阿拉伯國家在提供資源以及認可為實現和平所需做出的犧牲方面可以發揮重要作用。

歐盟的貢獻同樣重要。幾十年來，我們的歐洲盟友一直專注於發表支持巴勒斯坦最大訴求的勸誡性聲明——這種做法要麼無法實現，要麼一旦實施，就會損害以色列的長期安全。他們政策的主要方向一直是促使美國強行推行他們所青睞的解決方案，並利用他們的外交手段來迎合阿拉伯民眾的情緒。

在這個過程中，他們無意中加劇了外交上的僵局。如果歐洲能夠在阿拉伯國家中支持制定一個靈活方案的必要性，那麼實現突破的可能性將大大增加。

因此，美國外交有三項任務：貫徹總統所概述的談判立場的內涵；爭取歐洲盟友的支持，以幫助在阿拉伯世界推動實現這樣的結果；促使一些温和的阿拉伯國家承擔起在阿拉伯方面進行談判和實施解決方案的部分責任。

關於這一談判進程，還應該重新審視以色列對那些繼續保留的以色列定居點向未來規劃的巴勒斯坦國提供的領土補償問題。此前的設想是，以色列將割讓沙漠地區的一些領土——比如南部的內蓋夫沙漠。一種更周全的做法是割讓那些靠近1967年分界線、有巴勒斯坦人居住的土地。這樣，分界線將更符合人口分佈的現實情況。

這樣的做法必然會面臨來自雙方的初步抵制。以色列可能不願意確立這樣一個原則，即目前在以色列境內的阿拉伯社區今後應生活在巴勒斯坦國。**以色列的巴勒斯坦人可能不願意接受——至少在最初階段——與較為繁榮的以色列分離後，巴勒斯坦國較低的生活水平。**目前的巴勒斯坦領導人可能會反對任何使巴勒斯坦分治對以色列來説更容易接受的結果。然而，這些都是如果現在不加以解決，將會給未來帶來隱患的問題。維持移交給巴勒斯坦控制地區的生活水平這一問題，可以由國際社會，尤其是歐洲和美國來解決。

**為推動中東和平進行重大努力的時機正在臨近。現在就必須奠定基礎。但真正的障礙在於實質問題，而非程序問題。**而且，最近發生的一系列事件為在美國的領導下實現概念上的突破提供了一個獨特的機會。

二、英語原文

The quest for peace in the Middle East never exhausts its incongruities.

On the same weekend that an overwhelming majority of Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s own Likud party voted against his plan to withdraw all Israeli settlements in Gaza and four on the West Bank, Yasser Arafat, in an appeal to the European Union, denounced the withdrawal as “the death of the peace process.” President Bush’s endorsement of the idea that some Israeli settlements could remain on the West Bank as part of an ultimate resolution and that Palestinian refugees seeking to return should be settled in the projected Palestinian state, not in Israel, suffered a similar fate.

Widely condemned as preempting negotiations, Sharon’s plan moved 52 retired British diplomats to protest in an open letter to Prime Minister Tony Blair, charging “an abandonment of principle.” Sixty retired U.S. foreign service officers filed a similar protest.

There is no little irony here. The charge of preempting negotiations comes largely from quarters that have been denouncing U.S. diplomatic passivity and have insisted that the United States oblige Israel to adopt a detailed program that includes return to the 1967 borders, the partition of Jerusalem and an undefined formula on refugees – all this in return for recognition of Israel by the Arab states and some sort of guarantees by the international community. Yet the real issue is not the influence of outside powers on the peace process but its nature and timing. The U.S. position seeks to liberate the peace process from the blinders of its preconceptions by establishing parameters whose details are then negotiated by the parties. Its European and domestic critics concentrate on starting a peace process and then imposing their preferred solution when the inevitable deadlock occurs.

However counterintuitive it may appear to conventional wisdom, I believe that the U.S. position, by making explicit what has been an implicit theme of diplomacy for decades, creates the opportunity for significant progress. The peace process has been deadlocked by the refusal to face the root reality that any settlement would not return to the 1967 lines, which were never an international border but the cease-fire positions at the end of the 1948-49 war. U.N. Resolution 242 of 1967 spoke of a return of occupied territories, not of “the” occupied territories. Though Arab spokesmen have never accepted that interpretation, U.S. policy going back to the Rogers plan of 1969 has avowed the need for adjustments in the cease-fire lines. In his last week in office, President Clinton detailed his interpretation of these adjustments, labeling his proposal as “personal.”

President Bush has removed all ambiguity about what everybody knew but has been reluctant to express. But he not only accepted a change in the dividing line; he also limited the extent of the change. The settlement blocs accepted by U.S. policy are those discussed by the parties at Camp David in 2000 and during related negotiations in Taba, comprising some 5 percent of West Bank territory in the context of Israel’s yielding to the projected Palestinian state a comparable amount of its current territory. To imply that the United States sabotages negotiations by defining the parameters of the possible is to put slogans above substance. A lasting settlement will come about only if each party recognizes the minimum necessities of the other: security for Israel, dignity for the Arab side.

The standard position held by the European Union and many American Middle East experts does not meet these necessities. To return to the 1967 borders and to abandon all settlements would require so massive a renunciation of fundamental convictions as to shake the psychological basis of the Jewish state. No Israeli prime minister or chief of staff since the 1967 war has wavered from the view that the long-term security of Israel was incompatible with a return to the 1967 frontiers. The abandonment of even settlements clearly buffering vulnerable frontiers would turn Israel into the equivalent of a protectorate, dependent for its defense on guarantees by countries whose leaders could not be relied on to understand the nuances of Israel’s security and on the sentiments of a public reluctant to sustain major sacrifices on behalf of Israel’s security. Such an imposed settlement, far from having the moderating effect on the Muslim world claimed by its advocates, would more likely be viewed by militants as a first step on the road to eliminating the Jewish state altogether.

In the effort to liberate the negotiating process from its blinders, U.S. policy has also sought to break the deadlock over the right of return of Palestinian refugees. No Palestinian leader has ever been – or is likely to be – in a position formally to renounce a return of Palestinians to territory they consider their homeland. No Israeli leader can ever ask for less, since a massive return of diaspora Palestinians would be equivalent to the destruction of the Jewish state. The U.S. proposal has sought to bridge this gap; Sharon abandoned the formal Israeli demand for renunciation of the Palestinians’ right of return in exchange for a promise by the United States to use its influence to confine the return of refugees to the territory of the proposed Palestinian state.

Another reason for the hostile reaction is a general distrust of Sharon based on his long advocacy of extending Jewish settlements and his harsh interpretation of Israeli security requirements. In this light, Israeli withdrawal from Gaza is interpreted as part of Sharon’s lifelong campaign to further Israeli expansion on the West Bank and to manipulate negotiations so that any eventual Palestinian state is confined to a series of non-contiguous enclaves.

The United States, by declaring an end to illusions on substance, makes possible as well a reconsideration of the role of the Israeli prime minister in the peace process. Sharon is now 75 years old. He cannot be oblivious to the hostility not simply of the Muslim countries but of European and most other public opinions. If Israel remains in occupation of the West Bank, even if it allows a series of Arab enclaves, it will be overwhelmed by demographic trends. Palestinians would, within a measurable time, become a majority of the population in Israel. They would transform the Israeli state by an electoral process.

Perhaps Sharon sees that his last service to the country that he helped shape, and that he has defended with such dedication and ferocity, is a settlement that, while extremely painful, preserves the essence of Israel’s security and prevents its total isolation. Implementing the spirit of the understandings with the president is a necessity for maintaining a long-term relationship with the United States, and Sharon knows it. It is the best explanation for his daring to risk a split in his governing party.

Obviously, U.S. Middle East policy cannot be based on speculation about the motives of an allied leader. U.S. diplomacy will have to pursue the principles to which Sharon committed himself in Washington, even if this interpretation of his motives proves incorrect or if he is prevented by Israeli domestic politics from carrying them out. Our overall Middle East position requires a significant diplomatic initiative to achieve the full implications of the Washington understandings with Sharon. In pursuit of that strategy, the United States needs to be in contact with all parties, including the Palestinians. But it must avoid being tempted into multiplying assurances that could cancel themselves out.

At the same time, the Muslim world and especially the Arab countries must assume their own responsibilities. Foremost among them is to overcome radical elements that see in any Israeli withdrawal a capitulation to violence and a stage in the step-by-step elimination of the Jewish state. Public opinion – especially outside the United States – judges harshly the tough measures by which Israel seeks to protect itself against suicide bombers. But it shows far too little understanding for the deep yearning for peace on the part of Israelis who have lived unrecognized by their Arab neighbors for most of their history and who daily read in Arab publications and see on Arab television fervent exhortations to destroy Israel. A change of official propaganda would be an important Arab contribution to the peace process. Finally, the Palestinians cannot insist on an outcome to which their sole contribution is the recognition of the Jewish state without any other sacrifice. In normal relations between states, mutual recognition is not a prize; it is where foreign policy begins, not where it ends.

The Israeli withdrawal from Gaza will force the central issue: whether it is possible for a peaceful, progressive and productive Palestinian entity not dominated by a foreign power to be established in the vacuum left by Israeli withdrawal. Such a step, more than any negotiating formula, would bring home to the region the opportunities of peaceful coexistence. The moderate Arabs states have an important role in contributing resources and legitimizing the sacrifices required for peace.

A contribution by the European Union is equally important. For decades our European allies have concentrated on hortatory declarations in support of the maximum Palestinian program – an approach that is either unachievable or, if implemented, undermines Israel’s long-term security. The major thrust of their policy has been to induce the United States to impose their preferred solution and to use their diplomacy to appeal to the Arab street.

In the process they have unintentionally fostered the stalemate in diplomacy. If Europe were to support, among Arab states, the need for a flexible program, the possibilities of a breakthrough would be greatly enhanced.

U.S. diplomacy, therefore, has three tasks: to carry through on the implications of the negotiating position outlined by the president; to seek to enlist the European allies to help promote such an outcome in the Arab world; and to induce a group of moderate Arab states to assume some responsibility for negotiations and implementation on the Arab side.

In regard to this negotiating process, another look should be taken at the Israeli territorial compensation to the projected Palestinian state for those Israeli settlements that remain. Heretofore the assumption has been that Israel would cede some territory in the desert – the Negev in the south. A more thoughtful approach would be to cede land populated by Palestinians close to the 1967 dividing line. In this manner, the dividing line would more closely follow demographic realities.

Such an approach would have to overcome initial resistance on both sides. Israel might be reluctant to establish the principle that Arab communities now in Israel should live henceforth in a Palestinian state. The Israeli Palestinians would be reluctant to accept the lower standard of living – at least initially – of the Palestinian state separated from a more prosperous Israel. The current Palestinian leaders would probably object to any outcome that makes the partition of Palestine more tolerable for Israel. Yet these are all problems that, if not dealt with now, will mortgage the future. The issue of sustaining the standard of living of the areas that move to Palestinian control could be dealt with by the international community, especially Europe and the United States.

The time is approaching for a major effort on Middle East peace. The groundwork must be laid now. But the real obstacle is substance, not process. And recent events have provided a unique opportunity to make a conceptual breakthrough under U.S. leadership.