基式外交：變遷中的全球秩序 @《基式外交研究》2025年第5期_風聞

**作者：**亨利・A・基辛格

**來源：**大外交青年智庫基式外交研究中心《基式外交研究》2025年第5期

**文源：**Kissinger, Henry A. “A Global Order in Flux.” The Washington Post, July 9, 2004.

**聲明：**基式外交研究中心轉載、編譯與翻譯的內容均為非商業性引用（學術研究），不作商用，如有問題請即刻聯繫

一、中文翻譯

當後世史家回顧這段歷史時，或許會驚訝地發現：今日佔據頭條的伊拉克戰爭及其引發的爭議，相較於我們時代正在發生的其他國際劇變，終將顯得微不足道。世界事務的重心正加速向太平洋轉移，國際舞台上的幾乎所有主要力量都在重新定位自身角色。

**這場變革觸及的是國際關係的底層邏輯，而非戰術層面的博弈。**以美歐關係為例，雙方的分歧既深刻又具有結構性。儘管雙方都付出了真誠努力，但近期跨大西洋外交對話的結果仍令人沮喪，根源在於大西洋兩岸正在經歷不同的歷史演進路徑。歐洲正在發生的最重大事件，是民族國家體系的漸進式消解——自17世紀威斯特伐利亞體系確立以來，這一體系始終是國際政治的基石和政治忠誠的核心。**歐洲領導人將更多精力投入到歐洲一體化進程中，這些議題涉及的不是傳統外交博弈，而是晦澀複雜的憲法機制設計。**由於歐洲歷史上的地緣對抗已被轉化為內部治理共識，歐洲外交家們試圖將這種新型治理經驗投射到國際舞台。他們堅持認為，只有獲得聯合國安理會授權的軍事行動才具備合法性。倘若美國在冷戰時期對柏林危機採取類似立場，歐洲的政治家們恐怕早已不寒而慄。在戰爭與和平問題上，歐洲正陷入制度困境：既缺乏足以支撐戰略外交的統一機制，又因一體化進程導致各國喪失了傳統的國家外交意志。

與此形成鮮明對比的是，美國依然保持着傳統民族國家的行為模式，強調主權行動自由。歐洲大陸在接納美國流行文化的同時，卻在政治認同層面悄然與美國拉開距離。由於尚未形成統一的歐洲國家利益觀，這種非國家行為體的國際關係思維正逐漸滲透到歐洲公眾意識中。堅定的大西洋主義者們開始擔憂：歐洲一體化的非國家屬性能否與美國的國家主權理念，以及傳統意義上的聯盟概念再度兼容？

頗具諷刺意味的是，正當美歐關係出現結構性疏離時，國際政治的重心卻在向衝突性較低的亞洲轉移。俄羅斯、中國、日本和印度等國仍秉持着與美國（以及二戰前歐洲國家）相似的民族國家觀念。對這些國家而言，地緣政治並非洪水猛獸，而是制定內外政策的基本框架。國家利益概念依然能有效凝聚公眾與領導層共識，權力平衡原則仍然主導着他們的戰略決策。

由於對國家利益的認知高度相似，俄、中、印、日等國與美國的關係遠較部分歐洲盟友融洽。**儘管它們反對美國政策中的霸權傾向，但這種反對是以傳統外交方式逐案處理的，並且普遍傾向於通過戰略對話而非對抗來解決分歧。**對這些國家來説，伊拉克戰爭的意義不在於檢驗美國的道德領導力，而在於觀察美國實現戰略目標的決心與能力。至少在避免美國在伊拉克失敗這一點上，這些國家存在共同利益：印度擔憂國內1.5億穆斯林羣體的反應；俄羅斯害怕南部邊疆出現動盪；日本希望在轉型期維持日美同盟的穩定；中國則認為中美合作是實現十年戰略機遇期的關鍵。

**所有相關國家都在經歷深刻的身份重構。**俄羅斯正面臨着自彼得大帝時代以來從未有過的地緣政治困局：邊境地區的非殖民化進程充滿陣痛，放棄帝國思維轉而構建平等夥伴關係與俄羅斯的歷史經驗背道而馳。俄羅斯人不得不反覆追問：如果不再是帝國，我們將何去何從？這個國家正面臨着一系列創傷性選擇：如何重新定義與“近鄰國家”（尤其是西部和南部的前蘇聯加盟共和國）的關係；如何應對崛起中的中國帶來的地緣壓力；如何解決西伯利亞地區的人口空心化問題；以及如何處理中亞能源資源的歸屬——圍繞這一戰略資源，19世紀曾在俄、中、印、美之間上演的“大博弈”正在重新上演。美國可以通過持續對話發揮建設性作用，既關注俄羅斯的合理關切，又不盲目接受其所有解決方案。

**中國的崛起為全球秩序轉型注入了關鍵變量。**隨着中國對革命意識形態的重新詮釋，民族主義情緒可能成為新的凝聚力量，這使得台灣問題被賦予了深刻的象徵意義。中國似乎已做出長期合作的戰略選擇，我們必須抓住機遇將中美關係提升至超越戰術博弈的層面，幫助新一代領導人理解兩國長遠利益的兼容性。

朝鮮核問題是需要戰略視野的典型案例。表面上看，這只是“流氓國家”引發的軍控問題，但深層解決方案必須觸及東北亞政治演變的核心：中美需要就朝鮮的未來走向、半島統一進程以及東北亞核約束機制達成共識。這不是北京六方會談助理國務卿級官員能夠解決的技術性問題，而是需要超越無核化本身，着眼於東北亞政治軍事格局的長遠規劃。

或許最具戲劇性的轉型發生在日本。二戰後的半個世紀裏，日本在美國的安全庇護下，以特有的自律專注於經濟復甦和政治重塑。千年歷史上首次，日本將外交政策完全置於他國卵翼之下。**隨着國際環境的快速變化，日本正以特有的堅韌與狡黠，系統性地拓展自身行動空間。除了反恐戰爭中的輔助角色，日本正在為以獨立政治實體身份重返國際舞台做準備——這對美國而言既是挑戰也是機遇。****朝鮮核威脅加速了這一進程。**鑑於歷史上日本將朝鮮半島視為國家安全的核心關切，若無有效的反制措施，日本絕不會接受朝鮮擁有核武器。如果六方會談最終默許朝鮮保留部分核能力，日本將被迫考慮自身核選項，至少會做好快速實施的技術準備。

中國的持續崛起將進一步加劇這種趨勢。**未來十年，日本可能面臨三種戰略選擇：（a）繼續以日美同盟為基軸；（b）嘗試建立類似歐盟的亞洲政治實體，可能與中國開展某種形式的合作；（c）保持戰略模糊，通過不結盟政策最大化國家利益。**目前，日本選擇靜觀其變，同時以特有的含蓄與堅定，在未來十年內構建國內共識——這正是日本微妙外交藝術的典型體現。

**印度崛起為全球大國將是未來十年的重要歷史事件。**尤其值得關注的是，印度的戰略關切區域（穆斯林世界與中亞）與美國的核心利益高度重合，兩國在這些地區存在重要的合作空間。

**自大英帝國時代以來，印度始終抵制在新加坡至亞丁的弧形地帶出現外部主導力量。**其龐大的穆斯林人口（目前1.5億，一代人後將超過3億）使印度比任何國家都更關切伊拉克戰爭（以及更廣泛的反恐戰爭）的結局——這場戰爭絕不能成為激進伊斯蘭主義的催化劑，因為其後果將跨越印度國界。

**當前的國際體系正經歷着幾個世紀以來最劇烈的變動。美國的歷史使命是塑造這種變革進程。**正如二戰後十年成功構建國際秩序一樣，美國外交需要為新的全球治理體系奠定基礎。然而，當前的挑戰更為複雜：整合範圍從大西洋擴展到全球，危機表象往往掩蓋深層結構變化。在跨大西洋關係問題上，即使最密集的磋商最終也會遭遇哲學困境：在當前歷史條件下，大西洋聯盟的特殊性究竟何在？作為一個超國家組織，歐盟可能只會在安理會一致同意的情況下使用武力——這實際上剝奪了北約的特殊地位。大西洋政策的核心挑戰在於，同盟國家能否重新找到共同的歷史使命感。否則，大西洋國家將陷入類似一戰前的國際體系：各國追逐狹隘利益，聯盟格局不斷變幻。

亞洲國家的發展軌跡則呈現出不同特徵。它們與美國的磋商機制有效且運作良好，短期利益驅動着合作進程。然而，存在三個中期挑戰：這些國家將根據伊拉克戰爭的結果判斷美國的戰略可靠性。矛盾的是，對美國霸權的擔憂可能促使它們探索制約美國的選項——儘管動機與歐洲不同：這不是道德或法律層面的考量，而是權力平衡的現實選擇。美國政策必須對這些心態保持敏感。**美國實力是客觀存在，但外交藝術在於將實力轉化為共識。**這不僅需要與各國保持良好關係以拓展政策空間，更需要一個具有凝聚力的全球願景，尤其是在涉及全人類共同利益的領域：核不擴散、疫情防控、可持續發展。

**一個健康的國際體系需要滿足兩個條件：成員國將體系維護置於具體分歧之上；體系本身具備捕捉創新機遇的能力。**在中東動盪的漩渦中，美國外交必須超越眼前的挫折，着眼於構建一個更具包容性的世界秩序。

二、英語原文

When the history of these times is written, it may well be that the headlines of the day – Iraq and the controversies it has aroused – will pale in comparison to other international upheavals of our period. The center of gravity of world affairs is moving to the Pacific, and almost all major actors on the international stage are defining new roles for themselves.

The transformation is about basic concepts rather than tactical issues. For example, differences between America and Europe are serious and substantive. But the reason the results of recent U.S.- European diplomatic encounters have proved so disappointing – despite serious efforts on both sides – is that the historic evolutions underway on the two sides of the Atlantic are different. The most important event in Europe is the progressive erosion of the European nation-state, which has been the foundation of international politics and the focus of political loyalties since the 17th century. European leaders spend more time on issues of European unification than any other. And these issues involve not traditional diplomacy but esoteric constitutional arrangements. Because the historic rivalries of Europe have been civilized into a domestic consensus, European diplomats seek to apply their new domestic experience in the international arena. They insist that resorting to military force is legitimate only if sanctioned by the U.N. Security Council. The proposition that the alliance involves no special obligations would have sent shivers down the spines of European statesmen had America applied it to the Berlin crisis during the Cold War. On issues of war and peace, Europe finds itself suspended between institutions not yet sufficiently cohesive for a strategic foreign policy and nations sufficiently advanced on the road toward European unification to have lost their historic convictions about a national foreign policy.

By contrast, America remains a traditional nation-state, insistent on sovereign freedom of action. Europe, even as it embraces American pop culture, almost subconsciously edges towards identifying itself politically with what is not American. With a European national interest yet to be defined, these non-state attitudes towards international relations are becoming deeply embedded in European public opinion. Confirmed Atlanticists are increasingly troubled by whether the non-state aspect of European unification can ever be again fully reconciled with the experience of a country driven by state concepts or with the notion of alliance as traditionally conceived.

Paradoxically, the structural estrangement of America from Europe is taking place as the center of gravity of international politics is shifting to Asia, where relations have been far less confrontational. Countries such as Russia, China, Japan and India still view the nation-state as the United States does, and as European states did before World War II. To them, geopolitics is not anathema; it is the basis of their internal analysis and their external actions. The concept of national interest still rallies public and leadership opinion. The balance of power affects their calculations.

Because their perceptions of national interest are so comparable to ours, Russia, China, India and Japan have had far less fractious relations with America than some European allies. Though they reject what they consider hegemonical aspects of U.S. policy, they do so on a case-by-case basis via traditional diplomacy, and they generally prefer a strategic dialogue to a test of will. To these countries, Iraq is not a litmus test of American moral fitness to lead but of American endurance in pursuit of strategic insights. It affects their judgment about America’s reliability as a partner and its capacity to achieve its goals. For each of these countries has an interest, at a minimum, in averting U.S. defeat in Iraq: India because of its large Muslim population; Russia because of its fear of turmoil on its southern flank; Japan because of its continued stake in a strong America and the American alliance during its period of transition; China because it believes a partnership with America is the best road to a decade of stability.

All the countries involved are redefining their identities. Russia, returned to frontiers it has not known since Peter the Great, finds decolonization involving countries at its borders particularly painful. To give up imperial rule and rely on cooperative relationships runs counter to Russian historical experience. Russians are bound to ask themselves the nagging question: If we are not an empire, what are we? Russia is facing traumatic choices: redefining its relations to what it calls the near- abroad – the former republics, especially to the west and south; the proximity of a dynamic China; the emptiness of its Siberian space; the future of the energy resources of Central Asia, around which what, in the 19th century, was called the “great game” between Russia, China, India and America is restarting. America can play a constructive role through permanent dialogue that is sensitive to Russia’s concerns without acquiescing in all of Russia’s answers to them.

China’s emergence as a great power – and potential superpower – is already a principal element in shifting the international center of gravity to Asia. As China reinterprets the ideological premise of its revolution, the temptation of nationalism may become a substitute endowing the issue of Taiwan with a profoundly symbolic aspect. China seems to have made a decision for an extended period of cooperation. The opportunity must be used to lift the relationship above the tactical and to encourage in a new generation of leaders a sense of compatibility between U.S. and Chinese long-range purposes.

The issue of nuclear weapons in North Korea is a good example of the need for a long-range approach. On one level, it has been treated as an arms-control problem caused by a rogue state and has therefore been confined to North Korean-American issues. But a fundamental solution must go deeper. It requires a Chinese-American understanding regarding the political evolution of Northeast Asia, including the future of North Korea, the pace of Korean unification and nuclear restraint in Northeast Asia. This is not a task to be brought to a conclusion at the assistant secretary level of the six-party talks in Beijing; it requires a concept that goes beyond the technical issues of denuclearization, addressing the broad direction of the political and military evolution of Northeast Asia.

Perhaps the most complex transition is taking place in Japan. For a half-century after World War II, Japan, sheltered under a bilateral security treaty with the United States, concentrated with characteristic self-discipline on its economic recovery and return to political respectability. For the first time in its millennia-old history, Japan subordinated its foreign policy to another country. As its international environment is in rapid transition, Japan tenaciously, subtly, indirectly, is systematically widening the margin of action available to it. Beyond the war on terrorism, Japan is adapting its role as an American auxiliary and is preparing to enter the international arena as a principal – a challenge and also an opportunity for America. The North Korean challenge has accelerated this process. Since Japan has historically considered Korea an essential aspect of Japanese security, it will not accept nuclear weapons in North Korea without offsetting measures. To the extent that the six-power talks in Beijing legitimize the retention of some nuclear military capacity in North Korea, Japan will consider a nuclear option for itself and will, at a minimum, place itself in a position to implement it rapidly.

These trends will be accelerated by China’s growth. As time goes on, Japan will examine at least three options: (a) to continue a foreign policy based on U.S. alliance; (b) to seek to develop an Asian political entity analogous to the European Union, perhaps in some sort of partnership with China; (c) to refuse to make a choice and adopt a kind of nonalignment to maximize its national interest. For the moment, Japan is content to await developments while building a consensus over the next decade with the indirection and stern insistence on the national interest that are the hallmarks of the subtle Japanese diplomacy.

The rise of India to great-power status is one of the principal events of the next decade. This is all the more true because the geographic area of most interest for India – the Muslim world and Central Asia – coincides with a major concern of the United States, and the interests of the two countries run parallel there in important respects.

Since the days of the British Empire, India has resisted the emergence of a dominant outside power in the arc between Singapore and Aden. With its Muslim population of 150 million, which in a generation will exceed 300 million, India has a greater stake than almost any other country in the outcome of the war in Iraq – and in the wider sense of the war on terrorism – not providing an impetus to radical Islam, because the consequences could not be arrested at its borders.

The global scene is more fluid than it has been for centuries. America’s task is to contribute to shaping this ferment. U.S. diplomacy is asked to bring about the elements of a new world order much as it successfully did in the decade immediately after World War II. Yet current conditions are more complex because the area to be integrated is global rather than Atlantic and because the symptoms of crisis often mask the underlying reality. With respect to Europe, even the most intense consultation will ultimately come up against the philosophical question of what makes the Atlantic relationship special under current circumstances. As an institution, the European Union is likely to recoil from the use of force except under conditions – unanimity in the Security Council – that deprive the alliance of its special status. The challenge of Atlantic policy is whether the nations of the alliance can regain a sense of common destiny. In its absence, the Atlantic nations will drift into a world order of constantly shifting constellations in pursuit of narrow national or regional concerns not unlike that preceding World War I.

The Asian countries discussed here march to a different drummer. Their consultation procedures with America are adequate and functioning. The short-term incentives are for collaboration. There are, however, three medium-term challenges. The nations involved will judge our relevance to their concerns by the outcome of Iraq. Somewhat contradictorily, concern over U.S. hegemonical power may tempt these countries to explore options for constraints on American power, though for motives opposite those of Europe – as an exercise not of moral or judicial principles but of the balance of power. U.S. policy needs to be sensitive to these attitudes. American power is a fact of life, but the art of diplomacy is to translate power into consensus. This requires more than good relations with all countries to provide the greatest number of options. It implies, above all, a unifying vision especially on challenges that affect all countries: proliferation; control of epidemics; development.

An international system is vital if its members consider maintaining it more important than the inevitable difficulties that arise in its operation and when it is alive to opportunities for creativity. Amidst the passions of the Middle East, American foreign policy must look beyond immediate frustrations to the vision of a world waiting to be built.