基式外交：中東和平的新契機 @《基式外交研究》2025年第8期_風聞

**作者：**亨利・A・基辛格

**來源：**大外交青年智庫基式外交研究中心《基式外交研究》2025年第8期

**文源：**Kissinger, Henry A. “A New Opening for Mideast Peace.” The Washington Post. December 3, 2004.

**聲明：**基式外交研究中心轉載、編譯與翻譯的內容均為非商業性引用（學術研究），不作商用，如有問題請即刻聯繫

一、中文翻譯

三件戲劇性事件重塑了看似死氣沉沉的中東外交格局，併為美國的重大外交行動開闢了道路：布什總統連任、亞西爾・阿拉法特逝世，以及以色列總理阿里埃勒・沙龍承諾從加沙地帶撤軍並拆除當地猶太人定居點。

**成功的外交是必要性與機遇的結合。**布什首屆任期內，大西洋兩岸多次呼籲美國啓動和平進程，但彼時成功條件尚不具備。只要阿拉法特擔任巴勒斯坦權力機構主席，他拒絕放棄恐怖主義、縱容自殺式爆炸襲擊，以及腐敗混亂的領導方式，註定了實質性談判無法開展。阿拉法特的負面存在與聖戰主義壓力交織，使温和阿拉伯國家難以發揮建設性作用。

在以色列，沙龍憑藉拒絕前任巴拉克在戴維營提出的“歸還約旦河西岸90%土地”的綱領上台，其領導的利庫德集團議席翻倍。沙龍堅持將結束巴勒斯坦起義作為談判前提。歐洲領導人呼籲美國更積極介入，但支持的方案不切實際：以色列退至1967年邊界、耶路撒冷分治、拆除1967年後的定居點、國際力量保障難民象徵性迴歸（北約或聯合國）——而這一切僅以巴勒斯坦承認以色列生存權為交換，這在外交中本是默認前提。以色列歷任領導人（即使最鴿派）從未認為退至半個世紀前的停火線符合國家安全，巴勒斯坦亦從未明確承認以色列的合法性。

**拆除定居點違背猶太國家歷史，外部安全保障亦不可靠。**若連以色列軍隊（自身家屬安危繫於一線）都無法保衞邊境，國際部隊更難勝任。此類部隊更可能淪為恐怖分子勒索的人質（如伊拉克案例），或成為恐怖組織策劃襲擊的屏障。

布什政府拒絕將外交資本投入註定失敗的事業，反而使温和勢力利益交匯，有望實現突破。布什是首位贏得以色列深度信任的美國總統，以方明白其不會蓄意危及以色列安全——這是美國行動的心理基礎。同時，以色列政局劇變：沙龍提出歸還加沙並拆除定居點，開啓了基於人口現實分治巴勒斯坦的新思路。

有人質疑沙龍此舉實為鞏固約旦河西岸控制的策略，但沙龍清楚，**若破壞布什任內建立巴勒斯坦國的承諾，將失去美國支持，這就需要在領土問題上做出妥協。**沙龍為此付出利庫德集團多數席位代價，率少數派政府拆除加沙全部及約旦河西岸4個定居點，標誌以色列政策革命性轉折。他還修建安全隔離牆，劃定無需國際干預的分界線，區分了耶路撒冷周邊受保護的定居點與非戰略要地。

阿拉法特去世後，巴勒斯坦新領導層擺脱其陰影，有望建立透明治理、確認與以色列共存並摒棄恐怖主義，消除全面協議的主要障礙。但挑戰嚴峻：加沙派系分裂、哈馬斯暴力肆虐、巴權力機構與武裝分子合作、腐敗橫行。**若撤軍導致權力真空，混亂將葬送和平希望。**巴勒斯坦需建立負責任領導層並放棄恐怖主義，選舉獄中激進分子巴爾古提將背離這一方向。温和派需阿拉伯國家、西方及以色列支持方能推進改革。

**大西洋兩岸漸意識到持續摩擦損及根本利益。**歐洲盟友因缺乏公眾支持或信念參與伊拉克軍事行動，轉而認同將部分美國目標（如伊拉克重建）納入自身議程。通過迎合阿拉伯激進勢力與美國競爭只會導致僵局，並因巴勒斯坦問題懸而未決削弱温和派地位。布什總統似願重建歐美傳統夥伴關係。

**新中東政策的挑戰在於整合多元要素：以色列政策、巴勒斯坦温和化、與友好阿拉伯國家關係、與歐俄中印等關鍵力量的互動，以及伊拉克戰爭。**布什首屆任期各自為政，第二屆任期可制定綜合戰略，構建温和派和平聯盟。此類政策需以積極目標為導向，而非被動緩解矛盾。

這要求各方具備遠見：以色列不能接受以消滅自己為目標的鄰國，但也不應拖延和平進程至西岸完全民主化。其有權要求對方承認共存並解散恐怖機構，再行撤離數萬定居者。美歐應以改善西岸民生、提供治理技術援助等措施，鼓勵巴勒斯坦建立穩定無恐政權。

伊拉克危機將影響温和阿拉伯政權的立場。它們深知自身命運或繫於美國在伊拉克的成敗：若美國失利，鮮有阿拉伯領導人願冒險支持巴方妥協；若1月30日選舉增強合法性且安全改善，阿拉伯或支持巴方倡議。

**巴勒斯坦問題並非緩解伊拉克困境的工具，二者是同一問題的兩面。**各方需直面重大抉擇：以色列需認識到人口與技術趨勢使拖延益發危險；巴勒斯坦若拒妥協將令民眾再陷世代苦難；歐洲需破除“美國是談判救世主”的幻想，推動雙方互讓。

漸進式和平進程已至盡頭，剩餘次要問題無法滿足各方。**既往路線圖因措辭模糊得以談判，此次需更精確的路線圖。**現有四方機制、歐洲盟友及俄羅斯應明確解決方案原則，尋求地區大國支持並主導實施。

以巴美近期變化使領土與巴方義務具體化成為可能：以1967年邊界為基礎、參照戴維營與塔巴原則劃定安全隔離牆，除5-8%戰略防禦用地外，西岸全部歸還巴勒斯坦。以色列可將北部阿拉伯人口密集區領土轉讓巴方以改善人口平衡，分界線外定居點將由巴方管轄（可能被放棄）。計劃需規定加沙撤軍至談判結束期間的臨時政府安排。巴方必須真正承認以色列、建立透明機構並解散境內及鄰國針對以色列的恐怖組織。

我們必須清醒：任何維護以色列的計劃都無法安撫激進勢力，新方案不會贏得各方感激，其部分內容在以色列仍將遭遇抵制，亦無法解決伊拉克困局或終結中東反美情緒。但美國強有力的領導可激勵地區温和派，使其有動力與理由摒棄導致地區世代衝突的政策。

這一方案可為中東未來提供符合各方尊嚴與人類良知的願景，展現一條融合以美友誼、盟友關切及温和派利益的破局之路，使伊斯蘭世界能以符合其偉大傳統的方式——而非作為災難——發揮重要作用。

二、英語原文

Three dramatic events have recast the seemingly moribund Middle East diplomacy and opened the way for a major American diplomatic initiative: the reelection of President Bush, the death of Yasser Arafat, and the commitment of Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon to withdraw from Gaza and dismantle Jewish settlements there.

Successful diplomacy represents a merger of necessity with opportunity. During Bush’s first term there were many appeals from both sides of the Atlantic for American initiatives to start a peace process. But the conditions for success did not exist. So long as Arafat was president of the Palestinian Authority, his refusal to renounce terrorism, his encouragement of suicide bombings, and his corrupt and chaotic leadership doomed meaningful negotiation. And Arafat’s blighting presence, combined with the pressures of jihadism, prevented moderate Arab states from playing a helpful role.

In Israel, Sharon had come to power, more than doubling the seats in parliament of his conservative Likud Party, on the basis of a program that rejected the proposal made at Camp David by his predecessor, Ehud Barak, to return more than 90 percent of the West Bank to Palestinian rule. Sharon insisted, as a precondition to any negotiation, on an end to the intifada.

European leaders appealed for a more active U.S. role, but on behalf of an unfulfillable program: return of Israel to the 1967 frontiers; partition of Jerusalem; abandonment of settlements beyond the 1967 line; and some symbolic return of refugees guaranteed by some kind of international force, (NATO or the United Nations-all this in return for no tangible quid pro quo other than a formal acceptance of Israel’s right to existence, a point generally taken for granted in diplomacy. No Israeli leader-even the most dovish-has ever considered as compatible with Israel’s security a return to the cease-fire line of a war that ended over a half-century ago. Nor have Palestinian leaders ever unambiguously accepted the legitimacy of Israel in any borders.

The abandonment of settlements ran counter to the entire history of the Jewish state, while the idea of a security guarantee by outside forces provided no assurances. If Israeli armed forces, with their own families at risk, are not able to secure Israel’s frontiers, no international contingent is apt to do so. More likely, such a contingent would become hostage to terrorist blackmail, as has happened in Iraq, or become a screen behind which terrorist groups could plan attacks without fear of preemption.

The Bush administration’s refusal to expend U.S. diplomatic capital on a doomed enterprise has brought matters to a point where a confluence of interests of all moderate forces might initiate a breakthrough. No previous president has done as much to earn Israel’s trust as George W. Bush. Israel’s leaders realize that he will not knowingly risk Israel’s security-the psychological precondition for a U.S. initiative. At the same time, the Israeli political scene has been transformed. By offering the return of Gaza to Arab rule and the dismantling of the Jewish settlements there, Sharon has opened the possibility of a new approach based on a partition of Palestine between a Jewish and an Arab state substantially reflecting demographic reality.

Some reject this interpretation of Sharon’s policies, asserting that the surrender of Gaza is only a tactic to solidify Israel’s hold on the West Bank. But Sharon surely knows that he will not be able to maintain U.S. support if he undermines Bush’s repeated commitment to bring about a Palestinian state during his presidency. This requires a territorial compromise.

Sharon has acted on this premise. At the price of losing his Likud majority and governing with a minority coalition, he has taken the crucial step of abandoning all settlements in Gaza and four on the West Bank, marking a revolutionary departure in Israeli policy. He has also established a security fence between Israeli and Palestinian territory, defining a dividing line that provides its own security without the need of a shaky international presence. It also permits a distinction between those settlements close to the 1967 line and protected by the security fence-mostly around Jerusalem-and those not essential to Israel’s security.

Among the Palestinians, Arafat’s death removes a figure who viewed the peace process as at best a tactical pause in a struggle to eventually remove what he considered the illegitimate Israeli presence. A new Palestinian leadership freed of the Arafat incubus has an opportunity to create transparent governance, affirm coexistence with Israel and renounce terrorist tactics, thereby removing major obstacles to an overall agreement.

These obstacles are immense. Gaza is riven by factions. Hamas is a major force for violence; the military units of the Palestinian Authority have been cooperating with the militants. Corruption and lawlessness are endemic. If the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza leads to a collapse of authority, the resulting chaos could destroy all hopes for progress. The Palestinians have an obligation to produce a responsible, transparent leadership and to abandon reliance on terrorism. The election of Marwan Barghouti, the militant serving time in an Israeli prison, would be inconsistent with these prospects. But moderate Palestinians cannot take these steps by themselves. To be able to make the difficult decisions that await them, they need the support of friendly Arab states, the West and Israel.

Both sides of the Atlantic are beginning to recognize that constant friction is against their fundamental interests. Key European allies, unable or unwilling to generate either the public support or the conviction to associate themselves with the military effort in Iraq, understand the importance of making at least some of the American objectives their own (including political and economic reconstruction efforts in Iraq). Competing with the United States by appealing to radical Arab trends guarantees a stalemate and, by keeping open the Palestinian wound, undermines the position of all moderates threatened by fundamentalists and radical jihadists. For his part, President Bush appears receptive to rebuilding the traditional partnership with Europe.

The challenge of a new approach to Middle East policy will be to meld divergent strands into a coherent and compatible whole: the policies of Israel; a moderate Palestinian evolution; relations with friendly Arab states; relations with important players such as our European allies, Russia, and, ultimately, even China and India; and the Iraq war. In Bush’s first term, these issues were handled individually; the second term presents an opportunity to develop an integrated strategy for bringing about a coalition of moderates for peace. Such a policy needs to be put forward with a strong affirmation of positive purposes, not defensively as a means to ease difficulties.

This presupposes farsighted policies by all concerned. Israel cannot be asked to accept as a neighbor a state dedicated to its eradication. At the same time, it must not insist on postponing the beginning of the peace process until democratization on the West Bank is complete. But it has every right to demand the acceptance of genuine coexistence and the disavowal of the apparatus of terrorism before it agrees to move tens of thousands of its settlers from the West Bank. The United States, Europe and Israel should undertake some confidence-building measures to encourage the Palestinians toward a stable, terrorism-free regime by easing the conditions of life on the West Bank and, if asked, extending technical assistance to its governance.

The degree to which the moderate Arab regimes are prepared to abandon their positions on the fence and provide the necessary legitimacy will inevitably be affected by the Iraqi crisis. They are well aware that the fate of moderate regimes in the region may be decided by the outcome of the U.S. efforts in Iraq. If America falters, few Arab leaders will increase their peril by supporting the adjustments in the Palestinian position that a settlement requires. If the Jan. 30 elections lead to enhanced legitimacy, and security improves, Arab support for a Palestine initiative may well be forthcoming.

A Palestinian initiative is not, as is often stated, a way to ease the situation in Iraq. The two problems are two sides of the same coin. All parties will have to come to grips with major decisions. Israel must recognize that demographic and technological trends make procrastination increasingly precarious. Palestinian leaders must understand that if they reject compromise, they doom their people to another generation of suffering and frustration. European leaders need to understand that they contribute most effectively to peace by counteracting the illusion that America is the deus ex machina of negotiations that delivers the maximum Arab program without any sacrifice on the Palestinians’ part. They should foster the recognition that both sides need to make major concessions.

We have come to the end of the step-by-step process. There are not enough peripheral issues left that might satisfy the parties even partially. Heretofore, road maps have been negotiable only if phrased in language so general and ambiguous as to permit each of the parties to interpret it in the manner most closely approximating their position. This time a more precise and specific road map should guide the peace process. The existing Quartet, key European allies and Russia, should define the principles and outlines of a possible settlement, seek the support of regional powers and take a leadership role in its implementation.

The recent changes in Israel, Palestine and the United States permit some specificity, with respect to territory and to Palestinian obligations. The territorial dividing line should be defined by a security fence paralleling the 1967 borders along principles discussed at Camp David and Taba. This would return all of the West Bank to Palestinian rule except the 5 to 8 percent needed for the strategic defense of Israel.

In compensation, Israel would transfer some of its current territory to the Palestinian state. It would be best to transfer territory with significant Arab populations from the northern part of Israel to improve the demographic balance. Israeli settlements located beyond the dividing line would be subject to Palestinian jurisdiction, which would probably imply their abandonment. Finally, such a plan should set forth provisions for the establishment and support of an interim government in Gaza for the time between the withdrawal of Israeli forces and the conclusion of negotiations. The Palestinian contribution to peace must be a genuine recognition of Israel, transparent institutions and a dismantling of the terrorist apparatus on Palestinian territory or aimed at Israel from other neighboring states.

We should have no illusions. No plan that preserves Israel will pacify radical Arabs or those Palestinians who view negotiations as an interim step on the road to eradication of Israel. A new plan would not gain the gratitude of the parties, since they have to make major sacrifices. Aspects of it will be bitterly resisted in Israel, however much implied in current Israeli policy. It will not solve our dilemmas in Iraq or end hostility to America in the Middle East. But strong U.S. leadership could give moderate leaders in the region the incentive and justification to overcome a policy that dooms the region to another generation of struggle and death.

It could provide a vision for the future of the Middle East compatible with the dignity of all parties and our own conscience. It could show a path out of the current impasse that combines our friendship with Israel, concern for the views of our allies, and the stake all moderates have in enabling the Islamic world to play a major role not as a scourge but in a manner compatible with its own great traditions.