基式外交：伊拉克問題的關鍵是成果而非時間表 @《基式外交研究》2025年第9期_風聞

**作者：**亨利・A・基辛格、喬治・P・舒爾茨

**來源：**大外交青年智庫基式外交研究中心《基式外交研究》2025年第9期

**文源：**Kissinger, Henry A., and George P. Shultz. “Results, Not Timetables, Matter in Iraq.” The Washington Post, January 25, 2005.

**聲明：**基式外交研究中心轉載、編譯與翻譯的內容均為非商業性引用（學術研究），不作商用，如有問題請即刻聯繫

一、中文翻譯

關於伊拉克問題的爭論正出現新的變化。原定於1月30日舉行的伊拉克選舉，就在不久前還被視為一個重要的階段性成果，現在卻被形容為引發內戰的開端。選舉的時間安排和投票方式都引發了爭議。所有這些都預示着人們對一項撤離戰略的需求，許多批評者所説的撤離戰略，指的是對美國在伊拉克行動設定某種明確的時間限制。

**我們不認同這種建議。“撤離戰略”這個詞的含義必須被清晰地理解，其後果不容敷衍。一項可接受的撤離戰略的基本前提是取得可持續的成果，而不是一個隨意設定的時間限制。**因為伊拉克局勢的結果將塑造美國未來十年的外交政策。如果在伊拉克遭遇失敗，將會在該地區引發一系列動盪，因為激進分子和原教旨主義者會趁機爭取主導權，而且他們似乎正得勢。在任何有大量穆斯林人口的地方，激進分子都會受到鼓舞。當世界其他國家面對這一現即時，美國在伊拉克的混亂表現會削弱他們的方向感。美國倉促撤軍幾乎肯定會引發一場比南斯拉夫內戰規模還要大的內戰，而且隨着鄰國將目前的介入升級為全面干預，情況會變得更加複雜。

我們有責任明確：怎樣的選舉後格局既符合美國價值觀，又能維護全球安全？我們也有責任為伊拉克人民努力爭取一個能提升他們塑造自身未來能力的結果。

從具體層面來説，成功的要素相對容易界定：建立一個被伊拉克人民認為具有足夠合法性的政府，這樣才能招募一支有能力且願意捍衞國家體制的軍隊。這個目標無法通過一個隨意設定的最後期限來加快實現，因為這樣的期限首先很可能會讓盟友和敵人都感到困惑。政治努力和軍事努力是不可分割的。歷史證明，脱離政治土壤的單純軍事訓練難以為繼。軍政任務必須雙軌並進，否則將一事無成。

但這樣的政府是什麼樣的呢？樂觀主義者和理想主義者認為，在美國政治進程能夠維持的時間框架內，可以建立一整套西方民主制度。但現實很可能會讓這些期望落空。**伊拉克是一個被幾個世紀的宗教和民族衝突所撕裂的社會，它幾乎沒有或根本沒有實行代議制機構的經驗。面臨的挑戰是確定政治目標，即使這些目標達不到最高理想，卻仍能代表重大進展，並獲得各個不同民族羣體的支持。**因此，1月30日的選舉應該被看作是從軍事佔領到實現政治合法性這一政治演變過程中不可或缺的第一步。

樂觀主義者還認為，由於什葉派占人口的大約60%，庫爾德人佔15%到20%，而且這兩個羣體都不希望由遜尼派統治，所以幾乎自然而然地就形成了一個民主多數派。按照這種觀點，伊拉克什葉派領導人通過目睹鄰國伊朗的什葉派神權統治下缺乏民主和世俗國家所帶來的後果，已經認識到了民主化和世俗國家的好處。

**一個由什葉派領導的多元化社會確實會是一個令人滿意的結果。**但我們必須小心，不能僅憑願望就制定政策。如果民主進程要和平地統一伊拉克，在很大程度上取決於什葉派多數派如何定義多數統治。

到目前為止，那些精明的什葉派領導人在經歷了薩達姆・侯賽因幾十年的暴政後變得更加老練，他們對自己的目標一直含糊其辭。他們堅持提前舉行選舉——事實上，1月30日這個選舉日期是基於最傑出的什葉派領導人、大阿亞圖拉阿里・西斯塔尼近乎最後通牒式的要求確定的。什葉派還敦促採用基於全國候選人名單的投票程序，這不利於聯邦和地區政治機構的發展。最近什葉派的聲明肯定了建立世俗國家的目標，但對多數統治的解釋卻沒有明確。絕對地實行多數統治將很難實現政治合法性，庫爾德少數民族和伊拉克國內的遜尼派部分將永遠處於反對地位。

西方民主是在同質化社會中發展起來的。少數羣體認為多數統治是可以接受的，因為他們有成為多數羣體的可能性，而且多數羣體在行使權力時會受到其暫時地位以及司法保障的少數羣體權利的限制。在少數羣體的地位因宗教信仰而被永久確定，並且因民族差異和幾十年的殘酷獨裁統治而更加複雜的情況下，這種平衡機制並不適用。在這種情況下，多數統治會被視為強者壓迫弱者的另一種形式。在多民族社會中，少數羣體的權利必須通過結構和憲法保障措施來保護。聯邦制可以減輕多數羣體在數量上可能出現的專斷行為的影響，並在特定範圍內界定自治權。

對頑固不化的遜尼派暴行的反應以及相對平靜的什葉派局面，絕不能誘使我們將伊拉克的合法性等同於不受約束的什葉派統治。自1979年以來美國在伊朗經歷的什葉派神權統治，並沒有讓我們對預測什葉派的發展演變或者什葉派主導的勢力擴展到地中海地區的前景充滿信心。一項深思熟慮的美國政策不會在一場激烈進行了一千年的宗教衝突中偏袒任何一方。

選舉產生的制憲會議在一定程度上會擁有主權。但美國持續的影響力應該集中在四個關鍵目標上：

（1）防止任何團體利用政治進程建立遜尼派以前所享有的那種統治地位；

（2）防止任何地區陷入類似塔利班控制下的狀況，成為恐怖分子的庇護所和招募中心；

（3）防止什葉派政府變成伊朗式的或本土的神權政體；

（4）在伊拉克的民主進程中為地區自治留出空間。

美國完全有理由與各方進行對話，以鼓勵出現由民族主義者和地區代表組成的世俗領導力量。**制憲的結果應該是建立一個聯邦制國家，重點強調地區自治。**任何提出超出這些界限要求的團體都應該明白，伊拉克國家分裂成各個組成部分會帶來什麼樣的後果，包括伊朗控制的南部地區、伊斯蘭主義者-侯賽因派遜尼派控制的中部地區，以及鄰國對庫爾德地區的入侵。

經過精心調整的美國政策將努力把渴望過上正常生活的遜尼派羣體與試圖重新建立遜尼派控制的羣體區分開來。美國需要繼續組建伊拉克軍隊，在遜尼派叛亂的情況下，這支軍隊將越來越多地由什葉派新兵組成——這會讓拒絕接受現狀的遜尼派陷入必敗的境地。但必須把握分寸，絕不能以什葉派神權取代遜尼派獨裁。這條微妙的平衡線，將決定伊拉克政策的成敗。

**在伊拉克新出現的政治機構的合法性在很大程度上取決於國際社會對新政府的認可。**應該成立一個國際聯絡小組，就伊拉克的政治和經濟重建提供建議。此舉既是展現領導力的自信姿態，也符合美國持續提供安全與資金保障的現實需求。我們的歐洲盟友不能再繼續對這一政治進程袖手旁觀，無論他們對近期歷史有何看法，這一進程對他們未來的影響甚至比對我們的影響更大，否則他們會讓自己和傳統聯盟蒙羞。我們也不應該把印度和俄羅斯等擁有大量穆斯林人口的國家當作旁觀者，因為伊拉克局勢的發展很可能關係到這些國家的國內穩定。

**在伊拉克建立起足夠的安全保障之前，理想的政治目標仍將停留在理論層面。**在政治暗殺、大規模屠殺和搶劫橫行的氛圍中，當從巴格達通往其國際機場的道路每天都發生恐怖主義或犯罪事件時，沒有哪個政府能夠長期維持公眾的信心。訓練、裝備並激勵一支有效的伊拉克武裝部隊是其他所有努力的前提條件。**然而，無論訓練和裝備多麼精良，那支軍隊如果對政府沒有信心，就不會為其作戰。**這種惡性循環需要被打破。

不言而喻，**游擊隊員如果不被打敗就算是勝利。**在伊拉克，游擊隊員沒有被打敗，至少在遜尼派地區是這樣，至少從表面上看是這樣。一項成功的戰略需要回答這些問題：

我們是否正在進行一場軍事和政治努力相互促進的“統一戰爭”？

指導和監督這些任務的機構是否充分協調？

**我們的戰略目標是否是在至少一些關鍵城鎮和主要交通線路上實現完全的安全（定義為將暴力程度降低到歷史犯罪水平）？**這將符合這樣一條準則，即在全國70%的地區實現完全安全要好於在全國100%的地區實現70%的安全——因為完全安全的地區可以成為那些處於不安全地區的人們的榜樣和嚮往之地。

我們是否有一項政策來消除敍利亞和伊朗境內的庇護所，敵人可以在這些地方接受訓練、獲得補給、得到庇護並有時間重新集結？

我們是否正在制定一項能夠為人民帶來實際成果並防止為爭奪國家控制權和石油收入而發生內亂的政策？

我們是否在維持美國公眾的支持，以便在敵人實際上可能即將失敗的時候，人為製造的極端暴力事件不會破壞國內公眾的信心？

我們是否在獲得國際社會的理解，並讓他們願意在這個對全球和平與安全構成威脅的問題上發揮建設性作用？

**一項基於實際表現而非人為設定時間限制的撤離戰略，將根據對這些問題能否給出肯定答案來判斷進展情況。**在近期內，很大一部分平叛工作將不得不由美國來承擔。**過早地從作戰行動轉向訓練任務可能會留下一個缺口，讓叛亂分子有機會重振旗鼓。**但隨着伊拉克軍隊數量和能力的增加，以及選舉後政治建設的推進，一項現實可行的撤離戰略將會出現。

沒有什麼神奇的公式能讓我們迅速且平安無事地撤離。但我們有責任盡最大努力實現一個結果，這個結果將標誌着在反恐戰爭中、在中東地區的轉型以及在建立一個更加和平與民主的世界秩序方面邁出重大一步。

二、英語原文

The debate on Iraq is taking a new turn. The Iraqi elections scheduled for Jan. 30, only recently viewed as a culmination, are described as inaugurating a civil war. The timing and the voting arrangements have become controversial. All this is a way of foreshadowing a demand for an exit strategy, by which many critics mean some sort of explicit time limit on the U.S. effort.

We reject this counsel. The implications of the term “exit strategy” must be clearly understood; there can be no fudging of consequences. The essential prerequisite for an acceptable exit strategy is a sustainable outcome, not an arbitrary time limit. For the outcome in Iraq will shape the next decade of American foreign policy. A debacle would usher in a series of convulsions in the region as radicals and fundamentalists moved for dominance, with the wind seemingly at their backs. Wherever there are significant Muslim populations, radical elements would be emboldened. As the rest of the world related to this reality, its sense of direction would be impaired by the demonstration of American confusion in Iraq. A precipitate American withdrawal would be almost certain to cause a civil war that would dwarf Yugoslavia’s, and it would be compounded as neighbors escalated their current involvement into full-scale intervention.

We owe it to ourselves to become clear about what post-election outcome is compatible with our values and global security. And we owe it to the Iraqis to strive for an outcome that can further their capacity to shape their future.

The mechanical part of success is relatively easy to define: establishment of a government considered sufficiently legitimate by the Iraqi people to permit recruitment of an army able and willing to defend its institutions. That goal cannot be expedited by an arbitrary deadline that would be, above all, likely to confuse both ally and adversary. The political and military efforts cannot be separated. Training an army in a political vacuum has proved insufficient. If we cannot carry out both the political and military tasks, we will not be able to accomplish either.

But what is such a government? Optimists and idealists posit that a full panoply of Western democratic institutions can be created in a time frame the American political process will sustain. Reality is likely to disappoint these expectations. Iraq is a society riven by centuries of religious and ethnic conflicts; it has little or no experience with representative institutions. The challenge is to define political objectives that, even when falling short of the maximum goal, nevertheless represent significant progress and enlist support across the various ethnic groups. The elections of Jan. 30 should therefore be interpreted as the indispensable first phase of a political evolution from military occupation to political legitimacy.

Optimists also argue that, since the Shiites make up about 60 percent of the population and the Kurds 15 to 20 percent, and since neither wants Sunni domination, a democratic majority exists almost automatically. In that view, the Iraqi Shiite leaders have come to appreciate the benefits of democratization and the secular state by witnessing the consequences of their absence under the Shiite theocracy in neighboring Iran.

A pluralistic, Shiite-led society would indeed be a happy outcome. But we must take care not to base policy on the wish becoming father to the thought. If a democratic process is to unify Iraq peacefully, a great deal depends on how the Shiite majority defines majority rule.

So far the subtle Shiite leaders, hardened by having survived decades of Saddam Hussein’s tyranny, have been ambiguous about their goals. They have insisted on early elections – indeed, the date of Jan. 30 was established on the basis of a near-ultimatum by the most eminent Shiite leader, Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani. The Shiites have also urged voting procedures based on national candidate lists, which work against federal and regional political institutions. Recent Shiite pronouncements have affirmed the goal of a secular state but have left open the interpretation of majority rule. An absolutist application of majority rule would make it difficult to achieve political legitimacy. The Kurdish minority and the Sunni portion of the country would be in permanent opposition.

Western democracy developed in homogeneous societies; minorities found majority rule acceptable because they had a prospect of becoming majorities, and majorities were restrained in the exercise of their power by their temporary status and by judicially enforced minority guarantees. Such an equation does not operate where minority status is permanently established by religious affiliation and compounded by ethnic differences and decades of brutal dictatorship. Majority rule in such circumstances is perceived as an alternative version of the oppression of the weak by the powerful. In multiethnic societies, minority rights must be protected by structural and constitutional safeguards. Federalism mitigates the scope for potential arbitrariness of the numerical majority and defines autonomy on a specific range of issues.

The reaction to intransigent Sunni brutality and the relative Shiite quiet must not tempt us into identifying Iraqi legitimacy with unchecked Shiite rule. The American experience with Shiite theocracy in Iran since 1979 does not inspire confidence in our ability to forecast Shiite evolution or the prospects of a Shiite-dominated bloc extending to the Mediterranean. A thoughtful American policy will not mortgage itself to one side in a religious conflict fervently conducted for 1,000 years.

The Constituent Assembly emerging from the elections will be sovereign to some extent. But the United States’ continuing leverage should be focused on four key objectives: (1) to prevent any group from using the political process to establish the kind of dominance previously enjoyed by the Sunnis; (2) to prevent any areas from slipping into Taliban conditions as havens and recruitment centers for terrorists; (3) to keep Shiite government from turning into a theocracy, Iranian or indigenous; (4) to leave scope for regional autonomy within the Iraqi democratic process.

The United States has every interest in conducting a dialogue with all parties to encourage the emergence of a secular leadership of nationalists and regional representatives. The outcome of constitution-building should be a federation, with an emphasis on regional autonomy. Any group pushing its claims beyond these limits should be brought to understand the consequences of a breakup of the Iraqi state into its constituent elements, including an Iranian-dominated south, an Islamist-Hussein Sunni center and invasion of the Kurdish region by its neighbors.

A calibrated American policy would seek to split that part of the Sunni community eager to conduct a normal life from the part that is fighting to reestablish Sunni control. The United States needs to continue building an Iraqi army, which, under conditions of Sunni insurrection, will be increasingly composed of Shiite recruits – producing an unwinnable situation for the Sunni rejectionists. But it should not cross the line into replacing Sunni dictatorship with Shiite theocracy. It is a fine line, but the success of Iraq policy may depend on the ability to walk it.

The legitimacy of the political institutions emerging in Iraq depends significantly on international acceptance of the new government. An international contact group should be formed to advise on the political and economic reconstruction of Iraq. Such a step would be a gesture of confident leadership, especially as America’s security and financial contributions will remain pivotal. Our European allies must not shame themselves and the traditional alliance by continuing to stand aloof from even a political process that, whatever their view of recent history, will affect their future even more than ours. Nor should we treat countries such as India and Russia, with their large Muslim populations, as spectators to outcomes on which their domestic stability may well depend.

Desirable political objectives will remain theoretical until adequate security is established in Iraq. In an atmosphere of political assassination, wholesale murder and brigandage, when the road from Baghdad to its international airport is the scene of daily terrorist or criminal incidents, no government will long be able to sustain public confidence. Training, equipping and motivating effective Iraqi armed forces is a precondition to all the other efforts. Yet no matter how well trained and equipped, that army will not fight except for a government in which it has confidence. This vicious circle needs to be broken.

It is axiomatic that guerrillas win if they do not lose. And in Iraq the guerrillas are not losing, at least not in the Sunni region, at least not visibly. A successful strategy needs to answer these questions: Are we waging “one war” in which military and political efforts are mutually reinforcing? Are the institutions guiding and monitoring these tasks sufficiently coordinated? Is our strategic goal to achieve complete security in at least some key towns and major communication routes (defined as reducing violence to historical criminal levels)? This would be in accordance with the maxim that complete security in 70 percent of the country is better than 70 percent security in 100 percent of the country – because fully secure areas can be models and magnets for those who are suffering in insecure places. Do we have a policy for eliminating the sanctuaries in Syria and Iran from which the enemy can be instructed, supplied, and given refuge and time to regroup? Are we designing a policy that can produce results for the people and prevent civil strife for control of the state and its oil revenue? Are we maintaining American public support so that staged surges of extreme violence do not break domestic public confidence at a time when the enemy may, in fact, be on the verge of failure? And are we gaining international understanding and willingness to play a constructive role in what is a global threat to peace and security?

An exit strategy based on performance, not artificial time limits, will judge progress by the ability to produce positive answers to these questions. In the immediate future, a significant portion of the anti-insurrection effort will have to be carried out by the United States. A premature shift from combat operations to training missions might create a gap that permits the insurrection to rally its potential. But as Iraqi forces increase in number and capability, and as the political construction proceeds after the election, a realistic exit strategy will emerge.

There is no magic formula for a quick, non-catastrophic exit. But there is an obligation to do our utmost to bring about an outcome that will mark a major step forward in the war against terrorism, in the transformation of the Middle East and toward a more peaceful and democratic world order.