基式外交：實施布什的願景 @《基式外交研究》2025年第11期_風聞

**作者：**亨利・A・基辛格

**來源：**大外交青年智庫基式外交研究中心《基式外交研究》2025年第11期

**文源：**Kissinger, Henry A. “Implementing Bush’s Vision.” The Washington Post, May 16, 2005.

**聲明：**基式外交研究中心轉載、編譯與翻譯的內容均為非商業性引用（學術研究），不作商用，如有問題請即刻聯繫

一、中文

近期全球民主進程取得顯著進展：阿富汗、伊拉克、烏克蘭和巴勒斯坦舉行選舉；沙特阿拉伯進行地方選舉；敍利亞從黎巴嫩撤軍；埃及開啓總統選舉改革；吉爾吉斯斯坦爆發反對專制政權的動盪。這一可喜趨勢部分得益於布什總統的中東政策，而其第二任期就職演説將全球自由進程確立為美國外交政策核心目標，則進一步加速了這一進程。

學界權威人士將這一系列事件詮釋為美國外交政策路線之爭中“理想主義者”對“現實主義者”的勝利。事實上，美國或許是全球唯一將“現實主義”用作貶義詞的國家。真正意義上的現實主義者不會主張權力即正義，理想主義者也不應忽視權力對理想傳播的作用。政策制定的關鍵在於平衡兩者間關係，任何一方的過度強調都將導致戰略停滯或力量透支。

價值觀是確立目標的根本，而戰略則是通過設定優先事項和時機把握來實現目標的藝術。

**制定戰略的前提是承認自由議程並未使地緣政治分析失去意義。**某些領域若以十字軍東征式的狂熱推進改革，往往南轅北轍。中國崛起本質上是地緣政治挑戰，而非意識形態之爭。

美印關係是另一典型案例。冷戰期間，印度認為無需為民主事業對抗共產主義，柏林自由等議題與其國家利益無關。如今兩國成為戰略伙伴，並非源於制度趨同，而是基於東南亞及印度洋地區的安全利益契合，以及在遏制激進伊斯蘭勢力方面的共同訴求。

為有效推進自由議程，需秉持以下原則：

・民主化進程並非一蹴而就，亦非單憑一項決策即可完成。選舉雖為必要起點，但更關鍵的是接受選舉結果的政治意願，而建立少數派可和平轉化為多數派的制度則更為複雜。

・美國必須清醒認識到，成功不僅不會終結其參與，反而可能加深責任。介入國際事務意味着需對意外後果負責，不能因民意波動而隨意改變承諾。

・選舉未必帶來民主結果。真主黨和哈馬斯等激進勢力正利用民主程序破壞民主制度，以實現全面控制。

作為全球主導民主國家，美國必須將價值觀與實力相結合，使政治變革與地緣戰略需求相協調。在存在權力真空且駐有美軍的地區，美國影響力顯著，但不可將歐美同質化社會歷經數百年形成的模式簡單移植到中東、亞洲和非洲的多元族羣社會。在多民族國家，多數決若缺乏強有力的聯邦結構和制衡機制，將導致少數羣體永久被壓制。在相互視對方統治為生存威脅的派別間通過協商建立此類制度堪稱世紀難題，而這將決定伊拉克（及一定程度上阿富汗）民主目標的實現程度。

黎巴嫩局勢揭示了問題的另一面。驅逐敍利亞駐軍的運動既彰顯了民眾覺醒，也反映了戰略環境的變化。敍利亞在實力不濟情況下選擇撤軍，或許盤算着局勢終將重陷混亂，屆時可名正言順再度干預。歷史經驗頗具警示：1958年美國介入、1976年敍利亞出兵、1982年以色列干預，三次外部力量介入均旨在阻止黎巴嫩基督教、遜尼派、什葉派及德魯茲教派間的暴力衝突，以維持各派力量平衡。當前憲法安排已無法反映實際人口結構，導致教派矛盾進一步激化。

當前黎巴嫩政治動力更多源於民粹主義而非民主精神，各派通過競爭性示威試圖壓制對手。考驗在於美國和國際社會能否促成各方接受的政治框架，並建立國際存在以防止衝突重演，遏制外部勢力干預。

在埃及和沙特阿拉伯，權力真空尚屬潛在威脅。**明智政策應在打破停滯與避免現有體制崩潰之間尋求平衡，警惕激進派系鬥爭或某一派系獨大。**沙特地方選舉中宗教極端勢力的勝利即凸顯這一風險。政策偏差可能使這些國家成為整個中東戰略的致命弱點。美國雖明確主張反映民意的民主演進是長期必然，但尚未闡明該進程的具體內涵和實施路徑。

伊朗革命的教訓值得深思：1960-70年代拖延改革導致原教旨主義崛起，而卡特政府的過度施壓則催生了比巴列維王朝更專制的政權。如何妥善處理這些敏感問題，關係包括巴勒斯坦談判前景在內的重大戰略利益。

最後，如何應對中國、俄羅斯等在全球化進程中較少借鑑西方政治傳統的國家，是重大挑戰。這些國家以自身歷史和民族認同為發展指引。美國應通過何種方式、在多大程度上影響這一進程？需要怎樣的歷史文化認知才能確保政策有效性？我們準備為中期戰略利益付出何種代價？

沒有任何國家強大到具備足夠的國力和智慧同時介入全球所有政治變革進程。基於國家利益設定優先事項至關重要，否則可能導致戰略透支和國際反美聯盟的形成。

布什總統提出了宏偉願景，當前國家辯論應聚焦於具體實施路徑。**非政府組織在強調議題重要性後，應積極參與構建負責任的政策框架。**實施自由議程需要國內外共識，這將決定我們是在把握系統性變革機遇，還是僅參與一場歷史插曲。

二、英文

Extraordinary advances of democracy have occurred in recent months: elections in Afghanistan, Iraq, Ukraine, and Palestine; local elections in Saudi Arabia; Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon; the opening up of the presidential election in Egypt; and upheavals against entrenched authoritarians in Kyrgyzstan. This welcome trend was partly triggered by President Bush’s Middle East policy and accelerated by his second inaugural address, which elevated the progress of freedom in the world to the defining objective of U.S. foreign policy.

Pundits have interpreted these events as a victory of “idealists” over “realists” in the debate over conduct of American foreign policy. In fact, the United States is probably the only country in which “realist” can be used as a pejorative epithet. No serious realist should claim that power is its own justification. No idealist should imply that power is irrelevant to the spread of ideals. The real issue is to establish a sense of proportion between these two essential elements of policy. Overemphasis of either leads to stagnation or overextension.

Values are essential for defining objectives; strategy is what implements them by establishing priorities and defining timing.

Strategy must begin with the recognition that the freedom agenda does not make geopolitical analysis irrelevant. There are issues for which crusading strategies tend to be off the mark. The rise of China is, in essence, a geopolitical challenge, not a primarily ideological one.

U.S. relations with India are another case in point. During the Cold War, India saw no imperative to support the cause of democracy against communism. Its national interest was not involved in issues such as the freedom of Berlin. Now India is, in effect, a strategic partner, not because of compatible domestic structures but because of parallel security interests in Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean, and vis-à-vis radical Islam.

In its own terms, a clear-eyed commitment to the freedom agenda should keep these principles in mind:

• The process of democratization does not depend on a single decision and will not be completed in a single stroke. Elections, however desirable, are only the beginning of a long enterprise. The willingness to accept their outcomes is a more serious hurdle. The establishment of a system that enables the minority to become a majority is even more complex.

• Americans need to understand that successes do not end their engagement but most probably deepen it. For as we involve ourselves, we bear the responsibility even for results we did not anticipate. We must deal with those consequences regardless of our original intentions and not act as if our commitments are as changeable as opinion polls.

• Elections are not an inevitable guarantee of a democratic outcome. Radicals such as Hezbollah and Hamas seem to have learned the mechanics of democracy in order to undermine it and establish total control.

As the world’s dominating democratic power, we must relate values to power, institutional political change to geopolitical necessities. In countries where a vacuum must be filled and U.S. forces are present, the American capacity to affect events is considerable. Even then, however, it is not possible to automatically apply models created over centuries in the homogeneous societies of Europe and the United States to ethnically diverse and religiously divided societies in the Middle East, Asia, and Africa. In multiethnic societies, majority rule implies permanent subjugation of the minority unless it is part of a strong federal structure and a system of checks and balances. To achieve this by negotiation between parties that consider dominance by the other groups a threat to their very survival is an extraordinarily elusive undertaking. It will, however, determine the degree to which democratic goals in Iraq and, to a lesser extent, in Afghanistan can be achieved.

Lebanon illustrates another aspect of these considerations. The upheaval that expelled Syrian forces is a testimony to the growth of popular consciousness but also to the changed strategic environment. Syria, too weak to resist international pressures, may calculate that withdrawal eventually will return the situation to the chaos that triggered Syrian intervention in the first place.

Three times since 1958 – the United States that year, Syria in 1976 and Israel in 1981 – foreign intervention held the ring in Lebanon to prevent collapse into violence and to arbitrate among the Christian, Sunni, Shiite and Druze groups that constitute the Lebanese body politic. The internal conflict is made all the sharper because the established constitutional arrangement no longer reflects the actual demographic balance.

At this point, the driving force in Lebanon is less democratic than populist; it is a contest by which the factions organize competitive demonstrations partially designed to overawe their opponents. The test will be whether the United States and the international community are able to bring about an agreed political framework and whether they can mobilize an international presence to guarantee that the conflicting passions do not once again erupt into violence, and that outside adventures are discouraged.

In Egypt and Saudi Arabia, the vacuum is potential, not actual. A wise policy will navigate between efforts to overcome stagnation and pressures that will dissolve the existing political framework into a contest of radical factions or the victory of one of them. The fundamentalist victory in the local elections in Saudi Arabia illustrates this danger. Policies erring in either direction could turn these countries into the Achilles’ heel of the entire Middle East policy. The United States has made clear its conviction that a democratic evolution reflecting popular aspirations is a long-term necessity. But it has not yet defined what it means either by that phrase or an appropriate evolutionary process.

The revolution in Iran teaches the lesson of the risks of procrastination in the 1960s and 1970s before the fundamentalist upheaval, but also of the perils of pressures in the Carter administration that resulted in a system far more autocratic than the shah’s. Major strategic issues are at stake in a sensitive handling of these concerns, including the viability of Palestinian negotiation.

Finally, there is the challenge of how to deal with societies such as China and Russia, which so far have relied on the Western political tradition only to a small degree, if at all, in their transition to the globalized world. They have used their own histories or national senses of identity as guides. To what extent and by what means can the United States influence this process? And in what direction? What level of understanding of domestic context, influenced by centuries of history, is necessary to produce confidence in desired outcomes? What price in medium-term strategic interests are we prepared to pay?

No single nation is strong enough or wise enough to involve itself in every political evolution around the world simultaneously. Priorities based on the national interest are imperative. Otherwise, psychological exhaustion and physical overextension are a real possibility, along with a global coalition of the resentful and nationalistic resisting perceived American hegemony.

President Bush has put forward a dramatic vision. The national debate now needs to focus on the concrete circumstances to which it must be applied. The nongovernmental groups should participate in this process.

Having made their point about the importance of the subject, they should now contribute to the development of a responsible substance. A strategy to implement the vision of the freedom agenda needs consensus-building, both domestically and internationally. That will be the test as to whether we are seizing the opportunity for systemic change or participating in an episode.