基式外交：對華遏制政策行不通 @《基式外交研究》2025年第12期_風聞

**作者：**亨利・A・基辛格

**來源：**大外交青年智庫基式外交研究中心《基式外交研究》2025年第12期

**文源：**Kissinger, Henry A. “China: Containment Won’t Work.” The Washington Post, June 13, 2005.

**聲明：**基式外交研究中心轉載、編譯與翻譯的內容均為非商業性引用（學術研究），不作商用，如有問題請即刻聯繫

一、中文

**美中關係始終籠罩在不確定性之中。**一方面，這一關係或許是美國兩黨長期外交政策中最為連貫一致的體現。自理查德・尼克松總統以降，七位美國總統均重申了對華合作關係的重要性，以及美國對“一箇中國”政策的承諾——儘管里根、克林頓和小布什政府執政初期曾出現短暫偏離。布什總統及其國務卿康多莉扎・賴斯、科林・鮑威爾多次強調，當前美中關係已達到1971年兩國關係正常化以來的最佳狀態。布什總統與胡錦濤主席計劃互訪，並將在多邊論壇中多次會晤。

然而，矛盾心態突然再度浮現。美國政府官員、國會議員及媒體正從匯率政策到軍事建設等多個領域對中國展開批評，諸多言論暗含中國正處於某種“觀察期”的意味。對許多人而言，中國崛起已成為美國國家安全面臨的最重大挑戰。

在探討如何避免兩國關係因相互摩擦而陷入僵局之前，我必須聲明：本人擔任董事長的諮詢公司為全球（包括中國）商業利益相關客户提供諮詢服務。此外，今年五月初，我以中國政府特邀嘉賓身份對中國進行了為期一週的訪問。

未來數十年，中國與亞洲的崛起將深刻重塑國際體系格局。世界事務重心正從維繫三百年主導地位的大西洋向太平洋轉移。亞洲聚集着全球發展最快的經濟體，其維護國家利益訴求的能力與日俱增。

中國的崛起常被類比為20世紀初的德意志帝國，暗含戰略對抗不可避免、美國需做好準備之意。這一假設既危險又謬誤。19世紀歐洲體系篤信列強終將通過武力實現利益訴求，各國均認為戰爭將速戰速決，並在戰後鞏固自身戰略優勢。

**在核武器全球化的當今世界，唯有魯莽之輩才會重蹈覆轍。大國衝突將是全人類的災難：沒有贏家，重建成本將遠超衝突根源。**試想，若1914年輕率捲入一戰的決策者能預見1918年的世界慘狀，又豈會不望而卻步？

一個世紀前，德國挑釁性外交風格成為國際體系走向對抗的關鍵誘因。1900年，俄、法、英三國因彼此矛盾看似絕無聯合可能，但十四年後，德國霸凌式外交迫使三國結成同盟——通過海軍擴張挑戰英國，1908年波斯尼亞危機羞辱俄國，1905年與1911年兩次摩洛哥危機中挑釁法國。

軍事擴張主義絕非中國行事邏輯。西方戰略思想鼻祖克勞塞維茨強調“決戰”的籌備與實施，而中國兵學聖祖孫子則注重“不戰而屈人之兵”。中國始終通過審慎研究、戰略耐心與細節積累實現目標，極少採取孤注一擲的攤牌行動。

**以冷戰思維將中國等同於蘇聯、推行軍事遏制政策實為不智之舉。**蘇聯繼承了自彼得大帝至二戰結束的帝國擴張傳統，將勢力從莫斯科周邊延伸至歐洲心臟。而當今中國的疆域版圖已延續兩千年之久。沙俄以武力維繫統治，中華帝國則以文化認同為根基、輔以必要武力保障。二戰結束時，蘇聯面對孱弱鄰邦，錯誤採取超出國力的佔領威懾政策。

亞洲戰略格局截然不同。美國在亞洲的政策不應被中國軍事現代化所迷惑。誠然，中國正加強曾在經濟改革初期被忽視的國防力量，但即便按最高估算，其軍費僅為美國的20%，勉強與日本持平（若確實存在優勢），更遠遠低於中日印俄四國總和——遑論美國2001年決策支持下的台灣軍事現代化。俄印擁有核武器，日本在生存危機下可迅速獲取核能力，若朝核問題無解甚至可能公開擁核。中國反覆申明合作意願、否認軍事威脅，這更多是對戰略現實的清醒認知，而非主觀選擇。未來中期，中國的挑戰將集中於政治經濟領域，而非軍事層面。

**台灣問題是唯一例外，常被視作潛在衝突導火索。若任何一方打破維繫數十年的剋制，危機確有可能爆發，但絕非必然。幾乎所有國家——包括主要大國——均承認中國對台灣的主權主張。**美國七任兩黨總統亦均確認此原則，小布什總統態度尤為堅決。雙方以高超政治智慧管控着這一複雜局面：1972年北京接待尼克松訪華時，美國仍承認台北為“中國首都”；1975年福特總統在同樣框架下訪華；1979年兩國正式建交。儘管美國持續對台軍售，但基於三項原則，中美關係穩步發展：美國承認一箇中國原則並反對台獨；中國理解美國要求和平解決台灣問題並準備捍衞該原則；各方保持克制，避免台海局勢升級。

當前要務是將台灣問題納入談判框架。台灣三大政黨中兩黨領袖近期訪京或為積極信號，削減台海軍事部署的對話具備可行性。

從全局平衡看，中國龐大的高素質人口、廣闊市場、在全球經濟金融體系中的影響力與日俱增，預示其運用激勵與威懾手段的能力將持續增強——這正是國際影響力的核心要素。然而，除非美國試圖摧毀中國作為現代國家的存在，否則這種能力是美國主導構建的全球經濟金融體系的必然產物。

檢驗中國意圖的關鍵在於：其增長的實力將用於將美國逐出亞洲，還是融入合作框架。矛盾的是，實現反霸權目標的最優策略恰恰是與包括中國在內的亞洲主要力量保持緊密關係。從這個意義上説，亞洲崛起將考驗美國在新興世界格局中的競爭力，特別是在亞洲地區的領導力。美國反對亞洲霸權的歷史目標——1972年《上海公報》與中國共同確立的原則——至今仍具現實意義。實現這一目標需以政治經濟手段為主導，輔以必要的軍事存在。

**若中美陷入對抗，絕大多數國家將保持中立。但相較於排他性的亞洲民族主義，它們更傾向於參與美國主導的多邊體系。各國不願被視為美國戰略棋盤上的棋子。**以印度為例，其在反恐、防擴散及維護東盟完整性等領域與美國利益趨同，但拒絕將這些合作意識形態化或賦予反華色彩。印度在深化美印關係的同時發展對華戰略伙伴關係，認為二者並無矛盾。美國若堅持意識形態對抗與冷戰式遏制，可能迫使更多國家採取類似策略，並激化印度國內宗教矛盾。

出於自身利益考量，中國尋求與美國合作有多方面動因：縮小區域發展差距的現實需求、政治體制適應經濟科技變革的迫切任務、以及冷戰對民生改善的災難性影響——後者關乎政權合法性基礎。但這並不意味着冷戰對中國的損害會轉化為美國的收益。在亞洲，美國將難尋盟友，而亞洲國家將繼續與中國保持經貿往來。無論發生何種情況，中國都不會消失。美國對華合作的根本利益在於構建穩定的國際秩序。

對中國這樣量級的國家，先發制人政策不可行。讓中國新生代形成“美國永久敵對”的認知不符合美國利益；讓美國社會認為中國僅關注狹隘的國內或地區利益亦不符合中國利益。

朝鮮核問題是重要試金石。該問題常被用以指責中國未能充分發揮作用，但熟悉中國過去十年外交實踐的觀察家皆知，中國在確立無核化共同利益方面已取得重大進展。中國在處理該問題上的耐心雖令部分美國決策者感到挫敗，但這反映了一個現實：朝鮮問題對中國而言更為複雜——美國聚焦核武本身，中國則擔憂邊境動盪風險。二者並非不可調和，或許需要將討論框架擴展至整個東北亞地區。

心理層面的態度至關重要。中國需審慎處理可能被解讀為“排美”的政策，同時關注美國在人權問題上的敏感性——這將影響美國對華立場的彈性空間。美國則需認識到，居高臨下的口吻會喚醒中國對“帝國主義傲慢”的歷史記憶，這種態度不適用於與一個擁有四千年連續自治傳統的文明對話。

新世紀伊始，中美關係或將決定人類命運：我們的後代將面臨比20世紀更劇烈的動盪，還是見證一個符合全人類和平發展願景的新秩序？

二、英文

The relationship between the United States and China is beset by ambiguity. On the one hand, it represents perhaps the most consistent expression of a bipartisan, long-range American foreign policy. Starting with Richard Nixon, seven presidents have affirmed the importance of cooperative relations with China and the U.S. commitment to a one-China policy – albeit with temporary detours at the beginning of the Reagan, Clinton and George W. Bush administrations. President Bush and Secretaries of State Condoleezza Rice and Colin Powell have described relations with China as the best since the opening to Beijing in 1971. The two presidents, Bush and Hu Jintao, plan to make reciprocal visits and to meet several times at multilateral forums.

Nevertheless, ambivalence has suddenly reemerged. Various officials, members of Congress and the media are attacking China’s policies, from the exchange rate to military buildup, much of it in a tone implying China is on some sort of probation. To many, China’s rise has become the most significant challenge to U.S. security.

Before dealing with the need of keeping the relationship from becoming hostage to reciprocal pinpricks, I must point out that the consulting company I chair advises clients with business interests around the world, including China. Also, in early May I spent a week in China, much of it as a guest of the government.

The rise of China – and of Asia – will, over the next decades, bring about a substantial reordering of the international system. The center of gravity of world affairs is shifting from the Atlantic, where it was lodged for the past three centuries, to the Pacific. The most rapidly developing countries are in Asia, with a growing means to vindicate their perception of the national interest.

China’s emerging role is often compared to that of imperial Germany at the beginning of the 20th century, the implication being that a strategic confrontation is inevitable and that the United States had best prepare for it. That assumption is as dangerous as it is wrong. The European system of the 19th century assumed that its major powers would, in the end, vindicate their interests by force. Each nation thought that a war would be short and that, at its end, its strategic position would have improved.

Only the reckless could make such calculations in a globalized world of nuclear weapons. War between major powers would be a catastrophe for all participants; there would be no winners; the task of reconstruction would dwarf the causes of the conflict. Which leader who entered World War I so insouciantly in 1914 would not have recoiled had he been able to imagine the world at its end in 1918?

Another special factor that a century ago drove the international system to confrontation was the provocative style of German diplomacy. In 1900, a combination of Russia, France and Britain would have seemed inconceivable given the conflicts among them. Fourteen years later, a bullying German diplomacy had brought it about, challenging Britain with a naval buildup and seeking to humiliate Russia over Bosnia in 1908 and France in two crises over Morocco in 1905 and 1911.

Military imperialism is not the Chinese style. Clausewitz, the leading Western strategic theoretician, addresses the preparation and conduct of a central battle. Sun Tzu, his Chinese counterpart, focuses on the psychological weakening of the adversary. China seeks its objectives by careful study, patience and the accumulation of nuances – only rarely does China risk a winner-take-all showdown.

It is unwise to substitute China for the Soviet Union in our thinking and to apply to it the policy of military containment of the Cold War. The Soviet Union was heir to an imperialist tradition, which, between Peter the Great and the end of World War II, projected Russia from the region around Moscow to the center of Europe. The Chinese state in its present dimensions has existed substantially for 2,000 years. The Russian empire was governed by force; the Chinese empire by cultural conformity with substantial force in the background. At the end of World War II, Russia found itself face to face with weak countries along all its borders and unwisely relied on a policy of occupation and intimidation beyond the long-term capacity of the Russian state.

The strategic equation in Asia is altogether different. U.S. policy in Asia must not mesmerize itself with the Chinese military buildup. There is no doubt that China is increasing its military forces, which were neglected during the first phase of its economic reform. But even at its highest estimate, the Chinese military budget is less than 20 percent of America’s; it is barely, if at all, ahead of that of Japan and, of course, much less than the combined military budgets of Japan, India and Russia, all bordering China – not to speak of Taiwan’s military modernization supported by American decisions made in 2001. Russia and India possess nuclear weapons. In a crisis threatening its survival, Japan could quickly acquire them and might do so formally if the North Korean nuclear problem is not solved. When China affirms its cooperative intentions and denies a military challenge, it expresses less a preference than the strategic realities. The challenge China poses for the medium-term future will, in all likelihood, be political and economic, not military.

The problem of Taiwan is an exception and is often invoked as a potential trigger. This could happen if either side abandons the restraint that has characterized U.S.-Chinese relations on the subject for over a generation. But it is far from inevitable. Almost all countries – and all major ones – have recognized China’s claim that Taiwan is part of China. So have seven American presidents of both parties – none more emphatically than George W. Bush. Both sides have managed the occasional incongruities of this state of affairs with some skill. In 1972, Beijing accepted a visit by President Nixon, even while the United States recognized Taipei as the capital of all of China, and by another president – Gerald Ford – under the same ground rules in 1975. Diplomatic relations were not established until 1979. Despite substantial U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, Sino-American relations have steadily improved based on three principles: American recognition of the one-China principle and opposition to an independent Taiwan; China’s understanding that the United States requires the solution to be peaceful and is prepared to vindicate that principle; restraint by all parties in not exacerbating tensions in the Taiwan Strait.

The task now is to keep the Taiwan issue in a negotiating framework. The recent visits to Beijing by the heads of two of Taiwan’s three major parties may be a forerunner. Talks on reducing the buildup in the Taiwan Strait seem feasible.

With respect to the overall balance, China’s large and educated population, its vast markets, its growing role in the world economy and global financial system foreshadow an increasing capacity to pose an array of incentives and risks, the currency of international influence. Short of seeking to destroy China as a functioning entity, however, this capacity is inherent in the global economic and financial processes that the United States has been preeminent in fostering.

The test of China’s intentions will be whether its growing capacity will be used to seek to exclude America from Asia or whether it will be part of a cooperative effort. Paradoxically, the best strategy for achieving anti-hegemonic objectives is to maintain close relations with all the major countries of Asia, including China. In that sense, Asia’s rise will be a test of U.S. competitiveness in the world now emerging, especially in the countries of Asia. The historical American aim of opposing hegemony in Asia – incorporated as a joint aim with China in the Shanghai Communique of 1972 – remains valid. It will have to be pursued, however, primarily by political and economic measures – albeit backed by U.S. power.

In a U.S. confrontation with China, the vast majority of nations will seek to avoid choosing sides. At the same time, they will generally have greater incentives to participate in a multilateral system with America than to adopt an exclusionary Asian nationalism. They will not want to be seen as pieces of an American design. India, for example, perceives ever closer common interests with the United States regarding opposition to radical Islam, some aspects of nuclear proliferation and the integrity of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. It sees no need to give these common purposes an ideological or anti-Chinese character. It finds no inconsistency between its dramatically improving relations with the United States and proclaiming a strategic partnership with China. American insistence on an ideological crusade and on a Cold War-type of containment might accelerate such gestures. And it would risk inflaming India’s Muslim population.

China, in its own interest, is seeking cooperation with the United States for many reasons, including the need to close the gap between its own developed and developing regions; the imperative of adjusting its political institutions to the accelerating economic and technological revolutions; and the potentially catastrophic impact of a Cold War with the United States on the continued raising of the standard of living, on which the legitimacy of the government depends. But it does not follow from this that any damage to China caused by a Cold War would benefit America. We would have few followers anywhere in Asia. Asian countries would continue trading with China. Whatever happens, China will not disappear. The American interest in cooperative relations with China is for the pursuit of a stable international system.

Preemption is not a feasible policy toward a country of China’s magnitude. It cannot be in our interest to have new generations in China grow up with a perception of a permanently and inherently hostile United States. It cannot be in China’s interest to be perceived in America as being exclusively focused on its own narrow domestic or Asian interests.

The issue of nuclear weapons in North Korea is an important test case. It is often presented as an example of China’s failure to fulfill all its possibilities. But anyone familiar with Chinese conduct over the past decade knows that China has come a long way in defining a parallel interest with respect to doing away with the nuclear arsenal in North Korea. Its patience in dealing with the problem is grating on some U.S. policymakers, but it partly reflects the reality that the North Korean problem is more complex for China than for the United States. America concentrates on nuclear weapons in North Korea; China is worried about the potential for chaos along its borders. These concerns are not incompatible; they may require enlarging the framework of discussions from North Korea to Northeast Asia.

Attitudes are psychologically important. China needs to be careful about policies seeming to exclude America from Asia and our sensitivities regarding human rights, which will influence the flexibility and scope of the U.S. stance toward China. America needs to understand that a hectoring tone evokes in China memories of imperialist condescension and that it is not appropriate in dealing with a country that has managed 4,000 years of uninterrupted self-government.

As a new century begins, the relations between China and the United States may well determine whether our children will live in turmoil even worse than the 20th century’s or will witness a new world order compatible with universal aspirations for peace and progress.