基式外交：退出戰略的教訓 @《基式外交研究》2025年第13期_風聞

**作者：**亨利・A・基辛格

**來源：**大外交青年智庫基式外交研究中心《基式外交研究》2025年第13期

**文源：**Kissinger, Henry A. “Lessons for an Exit Strategy.” The Washington Post, August 12, 2005.

**聲明：**基式外交研究中心轉載、編譯與翻譯的內容均為非商業性引用（學術研究），不作商用，如有問題請即刻聯繫

一、中文

關於美軍撤離伊拉克的時間表，近期出現了相互矛盾的報道。駐伊美軍司令喬治·凱西將軍宣佈，在預定於12月舉行的選舉產生憲法政府後，美國將啓動“相當規模”的撤軍行動。另有消息源透露此次撤軍規模或達三萬人，約佔駐伊美軍總兵力的22%。而巴格達方面的高級官員暗示，撤軍起始時間可能推遲至明年夏季。無論採取何種時間表，推進進程都取決於安全局勢的改善及伊拉克部隊訓練成效。

此時系統審視撤軍戰略正當其時。首要問題是：**如何界定“進展”與“改善”這兩個關鍵概念？在沒有明確戰線的非對稱戰爭中，暫時的平靜究竟意味着戰略成功，還是對手的戰術調整？**敵方襲擊頻率的下降，究竟源於其實力耗損，還是蓄意保存戰力以誘使美軍撤離的謀略？當前態勢是否類似1968年越南春節攻勢後的局面？當時該事件被普遍視為美軍挫敗，但歷史證明這實為河內方面遭遇的重大失利。

作為曾親歷肯尼迪與約翰遜政府時期越戰決策困局，後又在尼克松政府參與撤軍決策的見證者，凱西的聲明令我憶及錐心往事。**在戰事持續階段決定大規模撤軍，實屬牽動全局的戰略抉擇。**此舉將同時影響叛亂勢力與政府軍的戰略盤算，使得對“進展”的界定不僅成為軍事判斷，更演變為心理博弈。每撤出一名士兵，都意味着剩餘部隊戰力的更大比例折損。留守部隊的攻勢能力隨之遞減。一旦啓動撤軍程序，決策過程恐將受制於慣性而非戰略研判，且逆轉餘地將日益收窄。

儘管存在這樣的困難，越南戰爭期間用當地軍隊取代美軍的決定——被稱為“越南化”——從安全的角度來看，總體上是成功的。1969年至1972年末，逾50萬美軍完成撤離。1971年初，美軍停止地面作戰。美軍周均傷亡從1968至1969年初的400人降至1972年的20人。

這些成果的取得，源於河內春節攻勢失敗後遊擊威脅的實質性消除。當時的西貢及其他中心城市安全係數，遠勝今日伊拉克主要城市。西貢政府控制約80%國土，戰線相對明晰。南越軍隊逐步具備抵禦北越正規軍攻勢的能力。

1972年，在北越發動全面攻勢之際，南越軍隊在美軍空中支援下粉碎其攻勢脊樑，標誌着越南化戰略的成功。北越當局隨即接受其拒絕四載的談判條件。（但此舉仍未終結歷史爭議：若採取不同撤軍節奏——或更緩、或更急、或待協議達成後撤軍——是否可能加速這一進程？）三年後局勢逆轉，非因內部動盪，而是北越公然違反《巴黎協定》所有條款，發動傳統軍事力量入侵。

美國因戰爭創傷後遺症及水門事件引發的國內動盪，對越援助削減三分之二，國會更立法禁止對受困盟友提供包括空中支援在內的軍事援助。作為協議擔保方的各國，竟無一方願施以援手。

這段歷史揭示兩條適用於伊拉克的原則：缺乏國內支持的軍事勝利難以持久；必須構建容納新伊拉克的國際秩序框架。

當然，歷史從不會簡單重演。**越南是冷戰博弈的戰場，伊拉克則是抗擊激進伊斯蘭鬥爭的關鍵節點。冷戰時期的戰略關切聚焦於蘇聯周邊親美主權國家的政治存續，而伊拉克戰爭的核心矛盾已超越地緣政治，演變為意識形態、文化信仰與宗教理念的深層碰撞。**鑑於伊斯蘭極端主義的全球滲透力，伊拉克戰局的影響將遠比越南深遠。若巴格達或伊拉克任何區域出現塔利班式政權或原教旨激進國家，衝擊波將席捲整個伊斯蘭世界。伊斯蘭國家的激進勢力及非伊斯蘭國家的穆斯林少數羣體，將更肆無忌憚地衝擊現政權。所有處於激進伊斯蘭勢力輻射範圍內的社會，其安全與內部穩定皆將面臨威脅。

正因如此，諸多伊拉克戰爭反對者亦認同：災難性結局將引發嚴重的全球性後果——這與關於越戰的爭論有着本質區別。但另一方面，伊拉克的軍事挑戰更具複雜性。伊拉克本土部隊接受的訓練，完全不同於越戰末期的傳統地面作戰模式。這裏沒有傳統戰線，戰場無處不在。我們面對的隱秘敵人懷揣四大戰略目標：其一，驅逐外國勢力；其二，懲戒與佔領方合作的伊方人員；其三，製造亂局以扶植符合其意識形態的政權，樹立伊斯蘭國家範式；其四，將伊拉克打造為下一輪對抗的練兵場，矛頭或指向埃及、沙特、約旦等温和阿拉伯國家。

北越軍隊曾擁有重型裝備、毗鄰庇護所及逾50萬經訓兵力。伊拉克叛亂分子僅數萬之眾，輕武裝為主。其最具殺傷力的武器是簡易爆炸裝置，最有效的投送方式是自殺式襲擊，最頻繁的襲擊目標則是手無寸鐵的平民。

面對這種蓄意的、系統性屠殺，伊拉克民眾展現出非凡的鎮定。最終決定戰局走向的，不僅是軍事態勢，更是民眾的認知判斷。民眾將切身感知安全程度，並據此決定願承受的犧牲代價。

**本質上，伊拉克戰爭是交戰雙方戰略判斷正確性的終極較量。**叛亂勢力押注：通過打擊政府支持者及美方合作者，可迫使更多平民保持中立，從而瓦解政府根基，坐收漁利。伊政府與美方的戰略則基於另一種消耗邏輯：叛亂分子專注於平民屠殺，或因其兵力有限而不得不保存實力、迴避硬目標，因此叛亂勢力可能被逐漸削弱。

根據“游擊戰不敗即勝”的戰爭公理，僵持局面不可接受。美國戰略（包括撤軍方案）成敗的關鍵，不在於能否維持現有安全態勢，而在於能否增強改善態勢的能力。擊敗叛亂勢力，方為唯一具有實質意義的退出戰略。

**情報質量將成為決定性因素。**以下問題亟待釐清：如何評估叛亂分子的戰鬥力及其戰略？在宣佈某省份實現穩定前，需在多長時間內將針對平民的襲擊降至何種程度？伊拉克安全部隊的真實戰力幾何？可應對何種級別的威脅？伊安全部隊遭滲透程度如何？面對叛亂分子要挾（如將領子嗣遭綁），伊軍將作何反應？鄰國滲透扮演何種角色？如何遏制此類滲透？

**越戰經驗表明，本土部隊效能深受政治架構影響。**南越曾編列11個師，四大軍區各駐2個師，另設3個預備師。實際運作中，僅預備部隊具備全國機動能力。駐防本省且兵源來自當地的師級單位往往表現優異，曾在1972年挫敗北越攻勢。但若調往陌生軍區，其戰鬥力則顯著下降，這也成為1975年軍事災難的誘因之一。

伊拉克的等效癥結在於遜尼派、什葉派與庫爾德人的教派族羣對立。越戰時期部隊效能依託地域紐帶，但各省間並無根本衝突。在伊拉克，各教派族羣將彼此關係視為不可調和的生死對抗。每個羣體都擁有實質性的地域化民兵組織。例如庫爾德地區，內部安全基本由庫爾德武裝維持，國民軍存在被嚴格限制甚至完全排除。什葉派區域情況亦大同小異。

如此背景下，“國民軍”概念是否仍具實質意義？當前伊武裝力量以什葉派為主，而叛亂活動多集中於傳統遜尼派區域。這預示遜尼派與什葉派傳統衝突的迴歸，唯實力對比已然逆轉。這些部隊或願合作鎮壓遜尼派叛亂。但即便完成充分訓練，他們是否願意以國家名義鎮壓什葉派民兵？其效忠對象是阿亞圖拉（特別是阿里·西斯塔尼大阿亞圖拉），還是巴格達中央政府？

若這兩大權威實質合一，國民軍在非什葉派區域除作為鎮壓工具外，能否真正施政？民主政體在此情境下是否仍可存續？

因此，衡量進展的終極標準在於：伊拉克武裝力量在何種程度上體現國家族羣多樣性（至少部分體現），並被國民普遍接納為國家象徵。將遜尼派領袖納入政治進程，是平叛戰略的重要環節。若此目標落空，安全力量建設或將成為內戰序曲。

伊拉克能否通過憲政途徑塑造真正的民族國家？

此問題的答案將決定伊拉克成為中東改革路標，抑或不斷擴散的衝突淵藪。鑑此，制定撤軍時間表應配合邀請國際社會構建伊拉克未來框架的政治倡議。某些盟友或欲作壁上觀，但現實安全關切不容其置身事外。我們亟需國際協作，非為軍事考量，實為應對政治挑戰——這最終將檢驗西方世界構建適應其戰略需求的全球體系的政治智慧。

二、英文

There have been conflicting reports about the timing of American troop withdrawals from Iraq. Gen. George Casey, commander of U.S. forces there, has announced that the United States intends to begin a “fairly substantial” withdrawal of U.S. forces after the projected December elections establish a constitutional government. Other sources have indicated that this will involve 30,000 troops, or some 22 percent of U.S. forces in Iraq. Some high- level statements from Baghdad have indicated that the beginning of withdrawals may be delayed until next summer. On either schedule, progress is dependent upon improvements in the security situation and in the training of Iraqi forces.

A review of withdrawal strategy therefore seems in order. For one thing, how are the terms “progress” and “improvement” to be defined? In a war without front lines, does a lull indicate success or a strategic decision by the adversary? Is a decline in enemy attacks due to attrition or to a deliberate enemy strategy of conserving forces to encourage American withdrawal? Or are we in a phase similar to the aftermath of the Tet Offensive in Vietnam in 1968, which at the time was widely perceived as an American setback but is now understood as a major defeat for Hanoi?

For someone like me, who observed firsthand the anguish of the original involvement in Vietnam during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, and who later participated in the decisions to withdraw during the Nixon administration, Casey’s announcement revived poignant memories. For a decision to withdraw substantial U.S. forces while the war continues is a potentially fateful event. It affects the calculations of insurgents and government forces alike, so that the definition of progress becomes nearly as much a psychological as a military judgment. Every soldier withdrawn represents a larger percentage of the remaining total. The capacity for offensive action of the remaining forces shrinks. Once the process is started, it runs the risk of operating by momentum rather than by strategic analysis, and that process is increasingly difficult to reverse.

Despite such handicaps, the decision to replace U.S. forces with local armies during the Vietnam War – labeled “Vietnamization” – was, from the security viewpoint, successful on the whole. Between 1969 and the end of 1972, more than 500,000 U.S. troops were withdrawn. American involvement in ground combat ended in early 1971. U.S. casualties were reduced from an average of 400 a week in 1968 and early 1969 to an average of 20 a week in 1972.

These measures were possible because, after the failure of Hanoi’s Tet Offensive, the guerrilla threat was substantially eliminated. Saigon and all other urban centers were far safer than major cities in Iraq are today. Saigon controlled perhaps 80 percent of the country with relatively well- established front lines. Vietnamese army units were increasingly able to repel offensives from the regular forces of Hanoi.

When the Vietnamese army, with substantial U.S. air support, broke the back of the North Vietnamese all-out offensive in 1972, Vietnamization could be judged a success. Shortly afterward the North Vietnamese accepted terms that they had rejected for four years. (That they did, however, does not settle the debate over whether a different withdrawal rate – slower, faster or none at all until after a settlement – could have speeded that day.) Three years later, these results were reversed, not because of internal violence but because of an external attack by Hanoi’s conventional military force, in violation of every provision of the Paris agreement.

America’s emotional exhaustion with the war and the domestic travail of Watergate had reduced economic and military aid to Vietnam by two- thirds, and Congress prohibited military support, even via airpower, to the besieged ally. None of the countries that had served as guarantors of the agreement was prepared to lift a diplomatic finger.

All this demonstrated two principles applicable to Iraq: Military success is difficult to sustain unless buttressed by domestic support. And an international framework within which the new Iraq can find its place needs to be fostered.

History, of course, never repeats itself precisely. Vietnam was a battle of the Cold War; Iraq is an episode in the struggle against radical Islam. The stake in the Cold War was perceived to be the political survival of independent nation-states allied with the United States around the Soviet periphery. The war in Iraq is less about geopolitics than about the clash of ideologies, cultures and religious beliefs. Because of the long reach of the Islamist challenge, the outcome in Iraq will have an even deeper significance than that in Vietnam. If a Taliban-type government or a fundamentalist radical state were to emerge in Baghdad or any part of Iraq, shock waves would ripple through the Islamic world. Radical forces in Islamic countries or Islamic minorities in non-Islamic states would be emboldened in their attacks on existing governments. The safety and internal stability of all societies within reach of militant Islam would be imperiled.

This is why many opponents of the decision to start the war agree with the proposition that a catastrophic outcome would have grave global consequences – a fundamental difference from the Vietnam debate. On the other hand, the military challenge in Iraq is more elusive. Local Iraqi forces are being trained for a form of combat entirely different from the traditional land battles of the last phase of the Vietnam War. There are no front lines; the battlefield is everywhere. We face a shadowy enemy pursuing four principal objectives: (1) to expel foreigners from Iraq; (2) to penalize Iraqis cooperating with the occupation; (3) to create a chaos out of which a government of their Islamist persuasion will emerge as a model for other Islamic states; and (4) to turn Iraq into a training base for the next round of fighting, probably in moderate Arab states such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan.

North Vietnamese forces possessed heavy weapons, had sanctuaries in adjoining countries and numbered at least a half-million trained troops. Iraqi insurgents number in the tens of thousands and are lightly armed. Their most effective weapon is a homemade explosive, their most effective delivery system the suicide bomber and their most frequent targets unarmed civilians.

The Iraqi population has shown extraordinary equanimity in the face of this deliberate and systematic slaughter. In the end, its perception will determine the outcome as much as the military situation does. It will know how secure it is; it will determine the sacrifices it is prepared to make.

In essence, the Iraq war is a contest over which side’s assessment turns out to be correct. The insurgents are betting that by exacting a toll among supporters of the government and collaborators with America, they can frighten an increasing number of civilians into, at a minimum, staying on the sidelines, thereby undermining the government and helping the insurgents by default. The Iraqi government and the United States are counting on a different kind of attrition: that possibly the insurgents’ concentration on civilian carnage is due to the relatively small number of insurgents, which obliges them to conserve manpower and to shrink from attacking hard targets; hence, the insurgency can gradually be worn down.

Because of the axiom that guerrillas win if they do not lose, stalemate is unacceptable. American strategy, including a withdrawal process, will stand or fall not on whether it maintains the existing security situation but on whether the capacity to improve it is enhanced. Victory over the insurgency is the only meaningful exit strategy.

The quality of intelligence will be crucial. Specifically, these issues require attention: How do we assess the fighting capacity of the insurgents and their strategy? To what level must attacks on civilians be reduced, and over what period, before a province can be described as pacified? What is the real combat effectiveness of Iraqi security forces, and against what kind of dangers? To what extent are the Iraqi forces penetrated by insurgents? How will Iraqi forces react to insurgent blackmail – for example, if a general’s son is kidnapped? What is the role of infiltration from neighboring countries? How can it be defeated?

Experience in Vietnam suggests that the effectiveness of local forces is profoundly affected by the political framework. South Vietnam had about 11 divisions, two in each of the four corps areas and three others constituting a reserve. In practice, only the reserve forces could be used throughout the country. The divisions defending the provinces in which they were stationed and from which they were recruited were often quite effective. They helped defeat the North Vietnamese offensive in 1972. When moved into a different and unfamiliar corps area, however, they proved far less steady. This was one of the reasons for the disasters of 1975.

The Iraqi equivalent may well be the ethnic and religious antagonisms between Sunnis, Shiites and Kurds. In Vietnam, the effectiveness of forces depended on geographic ties, but the provinces did not perceive themselves in conflict with each other. In Iraq, each of the various ethnic and religious groupings sees itself in an irreconcilable, perhaps mortal, confrontation with the others. Each group has what amounts to its own geographically concentrated militia. In the Kurdish area, for example, internal security is maintained by Kurdish forces, and the presence of the national army is kept to a minimum, if not totally prevented. The same holds true to a substantial extent in the Shiite region.

Is it then possible to speak of a national army at all? Today the Iraqi forces are in their majority composed of Shiites, and the insurrection is mostly in traditional Sunni areas. It thus foreshadows a return to the traditional Sunni-Shiite conflict, only with reversed capabilities. These forces may cooperate in quelling the Sunni insurrection. But will they, even when adequately trained, be willing to quell Shiite militias in the name of the nation? Do they obey the ayatollahs, especially Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, or the national government in Baghdad?

And if these two entities are functionally the same, can the national army make its writ run in non-Shiite areas except as an instrument of repression? And is it then still possible to maintain a democratic state?

The ultimate test of progress will therefore be the extent to which the Iraqi armed forces reflect – at least to some degree – the ethnic diversity of the country and are accepted by the population at large as an expression of the nation. Drawing Sunni leaders into the political process is an important part of an anti-insurgent strategy. Failing that, the process of building security forces may become the prelude to a civil war.

Can a genuine nation emerge in Iraq through constitutional means?

The answer to that question will determine whether Iraq becomes a signpost for a reformed Middle East or the pit of an ever-spreading conflict. For these reasons, a withdrawal schedule should be accompanied by some political initiative inviting an international framework for Iraq’s future. Some of our allies may prefer to act as bystanders, but reality will not permit this for their own safety. Their cooperation is needed, not so much for the military as for the political task, which will test, above all, the West’s statesmanship in shaping a global system relevant to its necessities.