基式外交：德國聯合政府能否行穩致遠？ @《基式外交研究》2025年第14期_風聞

**作者：**亨利・A・基辛格

**來源：**大外交青年智庫基式外交研究中心《基式外交研究》2025年第14期

**文源：**Kissinger, Henry A. “Will Germany’s Coalition Work?” The Washington Post, November 22, 2005.

**聲明：**基式外交研究中心轉載、編譯與翻譯的內容均為非商業性引用（學術研究），不作商用，如有問題請即刻聯繫

一、中文

安格拉・默克爾就任德國總理之際，這個國家正處於多重危機的交織點：國內改革與經濟低迷的博弈，社會僵局與創新突破的角力，歐洲一體化停滯與重構的抉擇，以及大西洋聯盟傳統模式與新定位的碰撞。

當首輪選舉結果揭曉並組建大聯合政府時，我曾擔憂會陷入政治僵局。這位在選舉中未能贏得絕對優勢的女總理，將如何駕馭兩個歷史上長期處於尖鋭對立狀態的政黨聯盟？在剛剛結束的大選裏，兩黨幾乎在所有議題上都存在嚴重分歧。而外交政策領域——特別是與美國的爭端——已在德國民意中根深蒂固，任何重大調整都可能舉步維艱，更何況新任外長是卸任總理最親密的政治盟友之一。

然而，我正逐漸傾向於另一種可能性：聯合政府的兩大政黨都深知，若彼此掣肘，聯盟終將破裂，而雙方都將重新面對迫使他們組建聯合政府的根本性困境。前總理施羅德嘗試的邊際改革已導致社民黨面臨分裂風險；默克爾提出的激進市場化改革方案則使選民近乎分裂——若計入前共產黨勢力，甚至形成了微弱的左傾多數。這種政治僵局可能導致主流政黨在選舉中失勢，選民大規模轉向小黨或極端政治光譜的新興力量。

新任總理的個人特質為破局提供了額外希望。競選期間，輿論曾熱衷於批評默克爾缺乏個人魅力。但對於總理職位而言，其崛起本身就是非凡成就：從東德籍籍無名的科研人員，在沒有特殊政治根基的背景下，短時間內擊敗黨內資深政客，最終登頂權力巔峯。這種執着於核心目標的堅定意志，或將在日常治理中轉化為獨特的政治驅動力。

外交政策領域最能彰顯領導力。冷戰時期，歐洲安全依賴美國力量支撐，而戰爭創傷催生了德國以美國夥伴身份重返國際社會的道德訴求。這種共同命運感促成了大西洋聯盟的建立，推動了歐洲一體化進程，並有效彌合了戰術分歧。

蘇聯解體終結了歐洲對美國的戰略依賴，新生代崛起消解了德國對美國政策的情感依附。對於在60年代及之後成長起來的德國人而言，越南戰爭和在德部署中程導彈是最深刻的政治記憶。這種與美國的疏離感演變為大規模抗議運動，尤以1968年和1982年為甚。當蘇聯解體遭遇德國政府更迭，跨大西洋關係的基調與實質變革已呼之欲出。與此同時，美國的代際更迭也將政治重心轉向對歐情感紐帶較弱的地區。

任何德國總理都可能對加入伊拉克戰爭持謹慎態度，但唯有“68一代”的政治人物才會將政策建立在公開反對美國的基礎上，並在兩次大選中以質疑美國終極動機為核心訴求。若非如此，德法俄三國也不可能在聯合國採取聯合行動挫敗美國外交努力。

大西洋兩岸都存在決策失誤。布什當局提出的先發制人戰略新學説即為典型案例。從技術變革、大規模殺傷性武器擴散和恐怖主義威脅角度看，該理論有其合理性，但單方面宣佈如此激進的戰略轉變，顯然違背了傳統聯盟慣例。

本質而言，多邊主義與單邊主義之爭並非程序問題，而是實質分歧。當戰略目標一致時，多邊決策自然水到渠成；當目標相悖時，多邊機制則淪為空殼。大西洋聯盟面臨的根本挑戰，並非程序規則的廢弛，而是共同命運感的逐漸消解。

當前雙方都展現出修復合作關係的意願。美國國務卿賴斯在2月的演講中提出新型協商機制；德國默克爾政府標誌着戰後第三代領導人的登場——既不盲目追隨50、60年代的親美主義，也未被“68一代”的反美情緒所塑造。社民黨新任外長的背景正是這種代際轉變的縮影，而總理本人的經歷更具典型意義。

默克爾將以系統科學家的思維方式，避免在大西洋主義與歐洲主義之間做非此即彼的選擇，也不會將對俄情感親近誤判為大戰略。這位務實、嚴謹而深思熟慮的領導人，將致力於構建適應新國際秩序的夥伴關係框架——既不選邊站在法美之間，而是創建兼容幷蓄的合作體系。

布什當局已表現出合作意願，但需警惕將合作異化為對短期方案的盲目追捧。美國應剋制將協商機制變為推銷自身政策偏好的傾向，為德國參與塑造未來國際秩序留出空間。

在聖戰主義肆虐、亞洲崛起、貧困與疾病蔓延、能源危機等全球性挑戰日益凸顯的時代，大西洋國家的核心使命在於重塑共同命運感。這種戰略共識的重建，將決定跨大西洋夥伴關係能否在21世紀續寫新的歷史篇章。

二、英文

Angela Merkel takes office as chancellor of Germany at a moment of crisis for a country poised between domestic reform and economic doldrums and social deadlock, between stalemate and new creativity on European integration, and between tradition and the need for new patterns in the Atlantic Alliance.

When I first saw the close election results and the makeup of the Grand Coalition that is to govern, I feared deadlock. How would a chancellor with disappointing electoral results tame a coalition of parties historically in strident opposition to one another, and that had bitterly split on almost all issues in the recent election? And the foreign policy issues – especially the disputes with the United States – have become so embedded in German public opinion that significant modifications might prove unfeasible, especially as the new foreign minister is one of the closest associates of the outgoing chancellor.

But there is an alternative prospect to which I am increasingly leaning. Both coalition parties know that if they frustrate each other, the coalition will break up and each will face the dilemmas that obliged them to form it in the first place. When the departing chancellor, Gerhard Schroeder, attempted marginal reforms, it threatened to split the Social Democratic Party. When Merkel offered a far-reaching, market-oriented alternative, it divided the electorate almost evenly – indeed, with a slight majority for the left if one includes former communists. Thus a deadlock might make the dominant parties irrelevant by producing a major electoral shift to minor parties or to new ones at the extremes of the political spectrum.

The personality of the new chancellor provides additional hope. It was fashionable to deprecate Merkel’s apparent charisma deficit during the electoral campaign. But for the chancellor’s office, the extraordinary achievement of her rise may prove more relevant. Within a short time, she advanced from obscure scientific researcher in communist East Germany to chancellor, without representing a special constituency of her own, against opponents in her own party who had spent their lives scrambling up the political ladder. Her single-minded persistence in the pursuit of substantive goals may create its own impetus in the day-to-day business of governing.

Foreign policy is the field where the scope for leadership is greatest. During the Cold War, Europe needed American power for its security. And the trauma of its wartime history produced a moral impulse in Germany to return to the world community as a partner of the United States. A sense of a common destiny evolved which led to the foundation of the Atlantic Alliance, spurred European integration and helped submerge tactical differences.

The collapse of the Soviet Union ended Europe’s strategic dependence on the United States; the emergence of a new generation ended Germany’s emotional dependence on U.S. policy. For those who came to maturity in the 1960s and afterward, the great emotional political experience was opposition to the Vietnam War and deployment of medium-range missiles in Germany. This dissociation from the United States escalated into massive demonstrations, especially in 1968 and ’82. When the collapse of the Soviet Union coincided with a change of government in Germany, the stage was set for a modification in the tone as well as the substance of allied relationships. A similar shift of generations in the United States moved the center of gravity of U.S. politics to regions less emotionally tied to Europe.

It is likely that any German chancellor would have been reluctant to join the war in Iraq. But no chancellor or foreign minister not of the ’68 generation would have based his policy on overt opposition to the United States and conducted two election campaigns on a theme of profound distrust of America’s ultimate motives. Nor would demonstrative joint efforts with France and Russia to thwart American diplomatic efforts at the United Nations have been likely.

Mistakes were made on both sides of the Atlantic. The proclamation by the Bush administration of a new strategic doctrine of preemptive war was one of them. The doctrine was intellectually defensible in light of changed technology, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and terrorism. But announcing unilaterally what appeared as a radical change of doctrine ran counter to traditional alliance practice.

In the end, the issue of multilateralism vs. unilateralism does not concern procedure but substance. When purposes are parallel, multilateral decision follows nearly automatically. When they diverge, multilateral decision making turns into an empty shell. The challenge to the Atlantic Alliance has been less the abandonment of procedure than the gradual evaporation of a sense of common destiny.

Both sides seem committed to restoring a more positive collaboration. In America, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice outlined a new consultative approach in a February speech. In Germany, the Merkel government marks the advent of a third postwar generation: less in thrall to the emotional pro-Americanism of the 1950s and ’60s but not shaped by the passions of the so-called ’68 generation. This will be the case with the new foreign minister from the Social Democratic Party. The generational change is especially pronounced in the case of the chancellor.

With her systematic scientist’s approach, Merkel will avoid choosing between Atlanticism and Europe or confusing sentimental moves toward Russia with grand strategy. Matter-of-fact, serious and thoughtful, she will strive to be a partner for a set of relationships appropriate to the new international order – one that refuses to choose between France and the United States but rather establishes a framework embracing both.

The Bush administration has shown willingness to cooperate. Indeed, one concern is that cooperation may shade into an enthusiasm that overwhelms the dialogue with short-term schemes drawn from the period of strain. The administration needs to take care to restrain its proclivity to conduct consultation as a strenuous exercise in pressing American preferences. Scope needs to be left for the elaboration of a German view of the future.

The key challenge before the Atlantic nations is to develop a new sense of common destiny in the age of jihad, the rise of Asia, and the emerging universal problems of poverty, pandemics and energy, among many others.