基式外交：如何從伊拉克撤軍 @《基式外交研究》2025年第15期_風聞

**作者：**亨利・A・基辛格

**譯者：**大外交青年智庫基式外交研究中心

來源：《基式外交研究》2025 年第 15 期“經典文獻重譯”專欄文章

**審定：**基式外交研究中心學術委員會

**文源：**Kissinger, Henry A. “How to Exit Iraq.” The Washington Post, December 18, 2005.

**聲明：**基式外交研究中心轉載、編譯與翻譯的內容均為非商業性引用（學術研究），不作商用，版權歸原作者所有。如有問題請即刻聯繫，如需轉載請註明出處。

一、摘要

本文通過基式外交視角，剖析2005年美國從伊拉克撤軍的戰略困境。基辛格以現實主義立場強調，撤軍決策必須超越技術性爭議，聚焦全球戰略後果。作者提出軍事政治協同路徑，主張通過構建國際共識、整合地區力量，實現從軍事介入到政治存在的平穩過渡。研究揭示，基式外交的核心在於將地緣政治現實與意識形態博弈相結合，為當代大國戰略決策提供歷史鏡鑑。

二、中文

當前，美國政府與批評者似乎達成一個共識：美軍從伊拉克開始撤軍將成為歷史轉折點。雙方的分歧主要集中在撤軍速度、規模以及撤軍應遵循時間表還是塑造事件發展的戰略這一核心問題上。

儘管這個問題常常被用專業術語來闡述，但它的核心並非撤軍的具體操作方式。相反，這場辯論應該圍繞撤軍的後果展開：最終，撤軍是會被視為被迫的撤退，還是會被看作是一項旨在增強國際安全的審慎且精心規劃的戰略的一部分。無論人們對發動伊拉克戰爭的決定、介入戰爭的方式，還是進行戰爭的戰略持何種觀點——我本人支持最初發動戰爭的決定——都必須清楚失敗可能帶來的後果。如果我們離開時，留下的只是一個失敗的國家和一片混亂，那麼這對該地區以及美國在世界上的地位都將是災難性的。

激進伊斯蘭主義現象遠超從巴厘島到雅加達、新德里、突尼斯、利雅得、伊斯坦布爾、卡薩布蘭卡、馬德里直至倫敦的恐怖襲擊總和。這是伊斯蘭激進勢力試圖在穆斯林聚居區清除世俗主義、多元價值觀和西方制度的意識形態洪流。其動力源於一種確信：既定目標正走向衰落且缺乏抵抗意志。

任何看似印證這種確信的事件都將加劇革命動能。若在巴格達或摩蘇爾、巴士拉等主要城市建立原教旨主義政權，若恐怖分子獲得大片訓練與庇護領地，或美國干預以混亂與內戰告終，伊斯蘭激進勢力將在任何穆斯林人口密集區或非原教旨主義伊斯蘭政權國家獲得加速擴張。在聖戰勢力所及範圍內，沒有一個國家能夠倖免於由構成聖戰的眾多狂熱中心所引發的動盪後果。

軍事失利將嚴重損害美國的全球信譽。我們的領導力及在巴勒斯坦、伊朗等地區問題上的話語權將被削弱；中、俄、歐、日等主要國家對美國貢獻能力的信心將下降。軍事壓力暫緩後，更大危機將接踵而至。

災難性後果由全球影響而非國內政治話語界定。布什總統已提出可行戰略，承認政策需在實踐中完善。但是，要求設定撤軍時間表的呼聲日益高漲，這掩蓋了歷史告訴我們的、克服游擊戰所必需的耐心品質。即便戰略正確，操之過急也會導致功虧一簣。

批評者與政府發言人在“伊拉克部隊訓練成熟後應接替美軍”這一觀點上達成共識，這正是圍繞伊拉克部隊戰備狀態爭議的根源。但單純以伊軍替代美軍的戰略可能導致令人不滿的僵局長期化。即使假設訓練按計劃完成且伊軍戰鬥力與所替代美軍相當（這本身存疑），我仍質疑美軍削減應與伊軍訓練線性掛鈎的前提。僅僅為了維持當前安全局勢而制定的戰略，有可能證實這樣一句格言：只要游擊隊不失敗，他們就算是勝利了。

更優方案是將首批完全訓練的伊軍視為聯軍增援而非替代力量，從而得以部署兵力至邊境遏制滲透，並加速針對游擊隊基礎設施的進攻行動。這種策略有助於緩解地面部隊短缺問題，該問題已延緩整個佔領期間的反恐行動。雖看似耗時更長，卻能為穩定局勢創造更好條件，進而提供更可靠的撤軍路徑。

新部隊的戰鬥力不能僅以訓練標準衡量。用五角大樓術語來説，終極指標是其對既定政治目標的忠誠度。他們為何而戰將決定其戰鬥效能。

負責任的撤軍戰略必須實現政治與安全要素的系統整合——重中之重是鞏固國民政府。當伊拉克武裝力量自視為（並被民眾視為）國家利益而非宗派或地區利益的捍衞者時，才算取得實質進展。當他們能向遜尼派地區推進並願意解除多數兵員來源的什葉派地區民兵武裝時，才能真正成為國家軍隊。

因此，將撤軍時機的判斷完全交給軍事指揮官，會給他們帶來過於沉重的負擔。他們關於安全的觀點需要與對一項重大行動必然會產生的政治及附帶後果的判斷相結合。要實現這種平衡，前提是我們國內辯論的各方都能因認識到失敗的嚴重後果而保持克制。

心理影響——尤其是對伊拉克政治結構的即時影響——將至關重要。計劃於上週選舉後啓動的首批撤軍將被視為不可逆轉的快速全面撤軍的第一步，還是取決於明確政治安全進展的階段性安排？若屬前者，伊拉克各政治派系將着手保護眼前利益，準備應對預期的勢力較量。考慮美國對統一伊拉克世俗包容政府偏好的動力將減弱。政府在認為失去關鍵軍事支持的時刻，將難以擴大執政基礎。在此情況下，即使非公開設定時間表、旨在安撫美國民意的有限撤軍也可能演變為不可逆轉的進程。

若以越南經驗為鑑，在這種氛圍下，撤軍規模可能成為評判美國政策成敗的主要國內標準。繼續或加速撤軍的壓力可能放大，導致與政治進展標準脱節。由技術或國內因素驅動的進程可能引發伊拉克派系間的競賽，競相通過政治施壓或動用民兵加速美軍撤離以獲取民族主義聲譽。

美國介入伊拉克是為了保護該地區的安全以及自身的安全。但是，如果不將撤軍進程建立在某種國際共識的基礎之上，就無法完成這一進程。地緣政治現實不會從這個已經與之共存並深受其害數千年的地區消失，而且這個地區曾在20世紀50年代和80年代將美國軍隊捲入黎巴嫩的漩渦，在 2001 年將其捲入阿富汗，在1991年和2003年將其捲入波斯灣，還曾導致美國兩次處於軍事戒備狀態（分別是1970年敍利亞入侵約旦和1973年阿以戰爭期間）。伊拉克各派別之間的激情、信念和競爭仍將繼續存在。無論我們是與這些勢力互動，還是聽之任之，這個國家都會以這樣或那樣的形式出現一個地區體系。因此，美國必須接受無法完全政治撤離的現實，儘管軍事存在的規模與形式會變化。為避免激進勢力主導，必須始終將政治與安全目標相結合。

必須讓與伊拉克安全穩定相關或認為自身安全穩定受其影響的國家參與下一階段政策制定。伊拉克正在發展的政治機構需要融入國際與地區體系——這並非出於對理論上多邊主義的盲從，而是因為若不然，美國將不得不獨自扮演永久警察角色，而這一角色既可能被未來伊拉克政府長期拒絕，亦會因國內爭議而難以維繫，且本文所述辯論本身就會阻礙這一角色的履行。

現在不僅需要明確伊拉克戰略前景，還應擴大整個地區的政治協商基礎。應在伊拉克選舉後組建包括歐洲主要盟友、印度（因其穆斯林人口）、巴基斯坦、土耳其及伊拉克鄰國在內的政治聯絡小組。美國駐巴格達大使與伊朗當局關於伊拉克的政治對話已獲批准。

但不能僅與巴格達鄰國進行此類接觸。聯絡小組的職能應包括為伊拉克政治演變提供建議、擴大政府合法性基礎，並體現國際社會對該地區穩定與發展的廣泛關切。隨着時間推移，該小組可發展為處理影響中東穩定其他問題的論壇，包括伊斯蘭激進主義根源問題。政治框架不能替代軍事勝利，但沒有政治框架，軍事勝利也難以持久。

三、英文

The administration and its critics seem to agree that the beginning of an American withdrawal from Iraq will mark a turning point. What divides them is the speed and extent of the drawdown and whether it should be driven by a timetable or by a strategy that seeks to shape events.

Though often put into technical terms, the issue is not the mechanics of withdrawal. Rather, the debate should be over consequences: whether, in the end, withdrawal will be perceived as a forced retreat or as an aspect of a prudent and carefully planned strategy designed to enhance international security. Whatever one’s view of the decision to undertake the Iraq war, the method by which it was entered, or the strategy by which it was conducted – and I supported the original decision – one must be clear about the consequences of failure. If, when we go, we leave nothing behind but a failed state and chaos, the consequences will be disastrous for the region and for America’s position in the world.

For the phenomenon of radical Islam is more than the sum of individual terrorist acts extending from Bali through Jakarta to New Delhi, Tunisia, Riyadh, Istanbul, Casablanca, Madrid and London. It is an ideological outpouring by which Islam’s radical wing seeks to sweep away secularism, pluralistic values and Western institutions wherever Muslims live. Its dynamism is fueled by the conviction that the designated victims are on the decline and lack the will to resist.

Any event that seems to confirm these convictions compounds the revolutionary dynamism. If a fundamentalist regime is installed in Baghdad or in any of the other major cities, such as Mosul or Basra, if terrorists secure substantial territory for training and sanctuaries, or if chaos and civil war mark the end of the American intervention, Islamic militants will gain momentum wherever there are significant Islamic populations or nonfundamentalist Islamic governments. No country within reach of jihad would be spared the consequences of the resulting upheavals sparked by the many individual centers of fanaticism that make up the jihad.

Defeat would shrivel U.S. credibility around the world. Our leadership and the respect accorded to our views on other regional issues from Palestine to Iran would be weakened; the confidence of other major countries – China, Russia, Europe, Japan – in America’s potential contribution would be diminished. The respite from military efforts would be brief before even greater crises descended on us.

A disastrous outcome is defined by the global consequences, not domestic rhetoric. President Bush has put forward a plausible strategy. It acknowledges that policy has been leavened by experience. But the crescendo of demands for a timetable suppresses the quality of patience that history teaches is the prerequisite for overcoming guerrilla warfare. Even an appropriate strategy can be vitiated if it is executed in too precipitate a manner.

The views of critics and administration spokesmen converge on the proposition that as Iraqi units are trained, they should replace U.S. forces – hence the controversy over which Iraqi units are in what state of readiness. But strategy based on substituting Iraqi for U.S. troops may result in perpetuating an unsatisfactory stalemate. Even assuming that the training proceeds as scheduled and produces units the equivalent of the U.S. forces being replaced – a highly dubious proposition – I would question the premise that American reductions should be in a linear relationship to Iraqi training. A design for simply maintaining the present security situation runs the risk of confirming the adage that guerrillas win if they do not lose.

The better view is that the first fully trained Iraqi units should be seen as increments to coalition forces and not replacements, making possible the deployment of forces toward the frontiers to curtail infiltration, as well as accelerated offensive operations aimed at the guerrilla infrastructure. Such a strategy would help remedy the shortage of ground forces, which has slowed anti-guerrilla operations throughout the occupation. While seemingly more time-consuming, it would present better opportunities for stabilizing the country and would thus provide a more reliable exit route.

The combat performance of new units cannot be measured by training criteria alone. The ultimate metrics – to use Pentagon terminology – are to what extent they are motivated toward agreed political goals. What they fight for will determine how well they fight.

A responsible exit strategy must emerge from the systematic integration of political and security elements – above all, the consolidation of the national government. Real progress will have been made when the Iraqi armed forces view themselves – and are seen by the population – as defenders of the nation’s interest, not sectarian or regional interests. They will have become a national force when they are able to carry the fight into Sunni areas and grow willing to disarm militias in the Shiite regions from which the majority of them are recruited.

To delegate to military commanders the judgments as to the timing of withdrawals therefore places too great a burden on them. Their views regarding security need to be blended with judgments regarding the political and collateral consequences that a major initiative inevitably produces. Such a balance presupposes that all sides in our domestic debate adopt a restraint imposed on us by awareness of the grave consequences of failure.

The psychological impact, most immediately on the Iraqi political structure, will be crucial. Will the initial reductions – set to begin sometime after last week’s elections – be viewed as the first step of an inexorable process to rapid and complete withdrawal? Or will they be seen as a stage of an agreed process dependent on tangible and definable political and security progress? If the former, the political factions in Iraq will maneuver to protect their immediate assets in preparation for the expected test of strength between the various groups. The incentive to consider American preferences for a secular and inclusive government in a unified Iraq will shrink. It will be difficult to broaden the base of a government at the very moment it thinks it is losing its key military support. In these circumstances, even a limited withdrawal not formally geared to a fixed timetable and designed to placate American public opinion could acquire an irreversible character.

If the experience of Vietnam is any guide, the numbers of returning troops could, in such an atmosphere, turn into the principal domestic test of successful U.S. policy. Pressures to continue or accelerate the withdrawals could be magnified so that the relationship to the political criteria of progress would be lost. A process driven by technical or domestic criteria might evoke a competition between Iraqi factions to achieve nationalist credit for accelerating the U.S. withdrawal, perhaps by turning on us either politically or with some of their militia.

The United States intervened in Iraq to protect the region’s security and its own. But it cannot conclude that process without anchoring it in some international consensus. Geopolitical realities will not disappear from a region that has lived with them and suffered from them for millennia and that has drawn U.S. military forces into their vortex in Lebanon in the 1950s and 1980s, in Afghanistan in 2001 and in the Persian Gulf in 1991 and 2003 – and has caused two U.S. military alerts (over the Syrian invasion of Jordan in 1970 and the Arab-Israeli war in 1973). The passions, convictions and rivalries of the factions in Iraq will continue. A regional system will emerge in that country in one form or another through our interaction, either with these forces or through our default. In that sense, Americans must accept the reality that their country can never make a total political withdrawal, though the size and location of the military presence will vary. It will always have to meld political and security objectives if the predominance of radical states is to be avoided.

The countries that are relevant to Iraq’s security and stability or that consider their security and stability affected by the emerging arrangements must be given a sense of participation in the next stage of Iraq policy. The developing political institutions in Iraq need to be built into an international and regional system – not out of obeisance to a theoretical multilateralism but because otherwise America will have to function alone as the permanent policeman, a role that any projected Iraqi government is likely to reject in the long run and that the very debate discussed in this article inhibits.

The time has come not only to define the strategic future in Iraq but also to broaden the base of political consultation in the region at large. A political contact group including key European allies, India (because of its Muslim population), Pakistan, Turkey and some neighbors of Iraq should be convoked after the Iraqi election. Political discussions between the U.S. ambassador in Baghdad and Iranian authorities regarding Iraq have already been approved.

These cannot be the sole contacts with Baghdad’s neighbors. The functions of the contact group would be to advise on the political evolution of Iraq, to broaden the basis of legitimacy of the government and to reflect a broad international interest in the stability and progress of the region. As time goes on, the group could become a forum to deal with other issues affecting Middle East stability, including some of the causes of Islamic radicalism. A political framework is not a substitute for a successful military outcome, but military success cannot be long sustained without it.

四、譯文拾貝

American withdrawal from Iraq（美國從伊拉克撤軍）：指美國從伊拉克戰場逐步減少軍事存在的行動，涉及戰略調整與地區安全影響。

Turning point（轉折點）：對國際政治格局或戰略方向產生重大影響的關鍵事件節點。

Forced retreat（被迫撤退）：因軍事失利或戰略壓力而不得不採取的撤退行動，常伴隨政治聲譽損失。

Prudent and carefully planned strategy（審慎且周密計劃的戰略）：基於風險評估和長期目標設計的系統性行動方案，強調穩定性與可控性。

Radical Islam（激進伊斯蘭主義）：主張通過暴力或極端手段推行伊斯蘭教法的意識形態，與世俗化、多元化價值觀對立。

Jihad（聖戰）：伊斯蘭語境中“奮鬥”的宗教概念，被極端組織曲解為針對非穆斯林的暴力鬥爭。

Islamic militants（伊斯蘭激進分子）：以暴力手段追求政治或宗教目標的伊斯蘭極端組織成員。

U.S. credibility（美國的公信力）：國際社會對美國政策可靠性和履行承諾能力的信任程度。

Regional issues（地區問題）：特定地理區域內涉及多國利益的政治、安全或經濟爭端。

Guerrilla warfare（游擊戰）：非正規武裝力量通過機動、突襲等戰術對抗正規軍的戰爭形式。

Stalemate（僵局）：衝突雙方力量均衡，導致軍事或政治進展停滯的狀態。

Exit strategy（撤軍戰略）：軍事幹預後有序撤離的計劃，需兼顧後續政治穩定與安全保障。

Anti-guerrilla operations（反游擊戰行動）：針對遊擊武裝的軍事打擊和治安維護行動。

Military commanders（軍事指揮官）：負責軍事行動指揮的高級將領，需權衡戰場態勢與政治目標。

Political and security elements（政治與安全要素）：影響國家或地區穩定的政治結構與軍事安全因素的綜合體系。

Psychological impact（心理影響）：國際行動對目標羣體或國際社會心理認知產生的長期效應。

Secular and inclusive government（世俗包容性政府）：尊重多元文化、宗教，實行非宗教化治理的政權形式。

International consensus（國際共識）：多國對某一問題達成的普遍認可或合作意向。

Geopolitical realities（地緣政治現實）：由地理位置、資源分佈和戰略利益構成的客觀政治格局。

Contact group（聯絡小組）：為協調特定議題而臨時組建的多國協商機制。

Multilateralism（多邊主義）：通過國際組織或多國合作解決全球性問題的外交理念。

Islamic radicalism（伊斯蘭激進主義）：主張以極端手段實現伊斯蘭政治化的意識形態運動。

Militia disarmament（民兵解除武裝）：解散非正規武裝組織並收繳其武器的安全措施。

Sectarian interests（宗派利益）：基於宗教或族羣分歧的局部政治集團利益訴求。

Sunni areas（遜尼派地區）：以遜尼派穆斯林為主要人口的地理區域，常與什葉派形成對立。

Shiite regions（什葉派地區）：以什葉派穆斯林為主要人口的地理區域，與遜尼派存在歷史矛盾。

National force（國家武裝力量）：代表國家統一意志、超越宗派或地區利益的正規軍事力量。

Collateral consequences（附帶後果）：軍事行動或政策引發的非預期政治、社會連鎖反應。

Timetable-driven withdrawal（時間表驅動的撤軍）：按預設時間表而非實際局勢調整的撤軍策略，可能加劇風險。

Strategic stalemate（戰略僵局）：衝突雙方在長期對抗中無法取得決定性優勢的戰略狀態。