基式外交：應對伊朗的下一步行動 @《基式外交研究》2025年第20期_風聞

**作者：**亨利・A・基辛格

**譯者：**大外交青年智庫基式外交研究中心

來源：《基式外交研究》2025年第20期“經典文獻重譯”專欄文章

**審定：**基式外交研究中心學術委員會

**文源：**Kissinger, Henry A. “The Next Steps With Iran.” The Washington Post, July 31, 2006.

**聲明：**基式外交研究中心轉載、編譯與翻譯的內容均為非商業性引用（學術研究），不作商用，版權歸原作者所有。如有問題請即刻聯繫，如需轉載請註明出處

**郵箱：**[email protected]

一、摘要

基辛格在文中指出，當前黎巴嫩與加沙衝突的根源指向伊朗核問題。儘管六國集團提出的談判方案仍未獲伊朗回應，但近東亂局可能成為歷史轉折點。伊朗面臨雙重挑戰：既試圖通過核武追求現代化，又受困於宗教極端主義傳統。作者強調，唯有伊朗採納符合國際秩序的現代主義與和平伊斯蘭觀，才能化解矛盾。基辛格警告，若六國集團對伊朗核計劃的隱忍與伊朗的挑釁形成僵局，將導致多邊秩序崩潰。歷史教訓表明，對侵略行為的妥協（如阿比西尼亞危機）會引發更大災難。伊朗必須在意識形態與國家利益間作出抉擇，而六國集團的外交目標應是迫使伊朗直面這一選擇。作者對比中美建交經驗，指出中國轉向合作源於戰略安全考量，而非外交技巧。伊朗與美國缺乏類似共識，其地區挑釁行為凸顯戰略意圖模糊。當前伊朗拖延核談判，試圖積累核能力以增強地區影響力。六國集團需在技術進程使制裁失效前果斷行動，建立國際核濃縮體系，並將核談判與伊朗整體對外關係審查相結合。基辛格認為，美國需準備好維護防擴散努力，但同時應探索所有可行外交選項。強硬立場需與明確目標結合，既解決核危機，又為伊朗迴歸國際社會創造條件。最終，國際社會必須避免伊朗在關鍵地區實現帝國野心，同時為其和平發展提供空間。

二、中文

全球目光聚焦於黎巴嫩與加沙地帶的戰火，但事件背景不可避免地指向伊朗。令人遺憾的是，圍繞伊朗核問題的外交進程始終滯後於事態發展。當黎巴嫩與以色列城鎮遭受炮火襲擊、以色列重新控制加沙部分區域時，所謂“六國集團”（美國、英國、法國、德國、俄羅斯、中國）於5月提出的核談判方案仍在等待德黑蘭的回應。或許伊朗將某些外交溝通中的懇求語氣視為軟弱不決的信號，抑或黎巴嫩的暴力衝突促使該國宗教領袖重新審視引發危機的風險。

無論從何種角度解讀，當前近東亂局都可能成為歷史轉折點。伊朗或將逐漸領悟“意外後果定律”。而六國集團再也無法迴避伊朗帶來的雙重挑戰：一方面，核武追求象徵着伊朗試圖通過現代國家權力符號實現現代化；另一方面，這種訴求卻由狂熱的宗教極端主義推動，而該思想已使穆斯林中東地區停滯數百年。唯有伊朗採納符合國際秩序的現代主義，並秉持與和平共處相容的伊斯蘭觀，這一矛盾才能在避免衝突的前提下得以解決。

迄至目前，六國集團對伊朗拒絕談判的應對方案仍模糊不清，僅提出通過聯合國安理會實施非特定製裁威脅。但若六國集團的隱忍剋制與伊朗總統的挑釁謾罵形成僵局，最終導致事實上默許伊朗核計劃，全球多邊秩序前景將全面黯淡。若安理會五常加德國無法共同實現其公開承諾的目標，每個國家（尤其是六國成員）都將面臨日益嚴峻的威脅——無論是激進伊斯蘭組織的國內壓力、恐怖主義行徑，還是大規模殺傷性武器擴散必然引發的局部衝突。

此類災難的歷史隱喻並非1938年民主國家將捷克斯洛伐克德語區拱手相讓的《慕尼黑協定》，而是1935年國際社會對墨索里尼入侵阿比西尼亞（埃塞俄比亞）的反應。慕尼黑會議上，民主國家認為希特勒的訴求在民族自決原則下具有某種合理性，只是對其手段感到反感。而在阿比西尼亞危機中，挑戰性質不容置疑，國聯以壓倒性多數認定意大利的軍事冒險為侵略行為並實施制裁，但面對制裁後果卻退縮妥協，拒絕實施意大利無法承受的石油禁運。國聯從此一蹶不振。若處理伊朗與朝鮮問題的六國機制遭遇類似失敗，世界將陷入既無治理原則又無有效機構約束的核擴散泥沼。

一個現代化、強大且和平的伊朗有望成為地區穩定與發展的支柱。但這一切的前提是伊朗領導人必須明確其代表的是某種意識形態還是民族國家——其根本動機究竟是宗教聖戰還是國際合作。六國集團外交的核心目標應是迫使伊朗直面這一抉擇。

外交從來不是空中樓閣，其效力不取決於辭令機鋒，而源自風險收益的精密權衡。克勞塞維茨“戰爭是外交通過其他手段的延續”這一著名論斷，既揭示了外交的挑戰也限定了其邊界。戰爭可以迫使對手屈服，外交則需要喚起共識。軍事勝利能讓戰勝國至少在短期內發號施令，而外交成功的標誌是主要當事方基本滿意——它應當（或努力）創造共同目標，至少在談判議題上達成一致；否則協議難以持久。戰爭的風險在於突破客觀界限，外交的大忌則是以程序替代目標。外交不應與油嘴滑舌混為一談，它不是修辭表演，而是理念博弈。若外交淪為國內政治的作秀工具，只會助長而非化解激進挑戰。

常有人主張，應對伊朗需要類似20世紀70年代促使中美關係正常化的外交智慧。但中國並非因高超外交技巧而改變立場，而是由於與蘇聯十年衝突升級，逐漸意識到其安全威脅更多來自北部邊境不斷集結的蘇軍，而非資本主義美國。中蘇珍寶島武裝衝突加速了北京脱離蘇聯陣營的進程。

美國外交的貢獻在於理解這些事件的戰略意義並果斷行動。尼克松政府並未説服中國改變其戰略優先級，而是讓中國確信：實施其戰略需求是安全的，並將提升長遠前景。美方通過聚焦地緣政治根本目標，同時擱置部分爭議問題實現了這一點。1972年《上海公報》——首份中美聯合公報——即象徵這一進程。與慣例不同的是，公報在列出一系列持續分歧後，提出防止“第三方”（顯然指蘇聯）謀求霸權的共同目標。

伊朗談判的複雜性遠超中美破冰。在中美接觸前兩年，雙方通過微妙、互惠的象徵性外交行動傳遞意圖，默契達成對國際形勢的並行認知，中國最終選擇融入合作型世界。

反觀伊朗與美國，連近似的世界觀都不存在。伊朗對美國談判提議報以嘲諷，並加劇地區緊張局勢。即便黎巴嫩真主黨越境襲擊以色列及綁架以軍士兵並非德黑蘭直接策劃，若實施者認為此舉違背伊朗戰略意圖，此類事件也斷不會發生。簡言之，伊朗尚未明確其追求的世界秩序——或者説從國際穩定視角看，它已做出錯誤選擇。若黎巴嫩危機能讓六國集團外交產生緊迫感，並促使德黑蘭態度轉向務實，這場危機或將成為歷史轉折點。

迄至目前，伊朗一直在拖延時間。宗教領袖顯然試圖儘可能積累核能力，以便在暫停鈾濃縮後仍能以重啓核武計劃為威脅，提升其地區影響力。

鑑於技術發展速度，一味隱忍極易淪為綏靖縱容。六國集團必須明確其信念的堅定程度，尤其要在技術進程使阻止鈾濃縮目標失效前果斷行動。在這一臨界點到來前，必須就制裁達成共識。有效制裁必須全面徹底，半心半意的象徵性措施只會集各種弊端之大成。盟國間磋商必須避免重蹈國聯在阿比西尼亞問題上的遲疑覆轍。我們應從朝核談判中汲取教訓：切勿在內部及談判集團內部久拖不決，致使對方趁機增強核能力。同時，美國的合作伙伴也需及時做出決策，以便協調行動。

暫停鈾濃縮不應是談判終點。下一步應按俄羅斯提議，建立由國際管控、在全球指定中心進行的核燃料濃縮體系。這將緩解對伊朗的歧視性爭議，併為核能開發樹立範式，避免每個新參與者引發核危機。

布什總統已宣佈美國願參與六國與伊朗的談判，以阻止伊朗核武計劃。但核談判無法與全面審視伊朗整體對外關係割裂開來。

人質危機的歷史積怨、數十年的孤立狀態以及伊朗政權的彌賽亞情結，構成此類外交的巨大障礙。若德黑蘭執意將波斯帝國傳統與當代伊斯蘭狂熱相結合，與美國——乃至六國談判夥伴——的衝突將不可避免。絕不能允許伊朗在這個對全球至關重要的地區實現其帝國統治夢想。

與此同時，一個專注於開發本國人才與資源的伊朗無需懼怕美國。儘管難以想象在現任總統領導下，伊朗會參與需要其放棄恐怖主義活動或停止支持真主黨等組織的談判進程，但這一認知應通過談判過程逐漸顯現，而非成為拒絕談判的理由。這種策略意味着重新定義政權更迭目標，為伊朗無論誰掌權都提供真正改變方向的機會。

至關重要的是，將此類政策轉化為可透明核查的明確目標。地緣政治對話無法替代核濃縮危機的早期解決方案。該問題必須單獨、迅速且堅定地予以解決。但能否將在此問題上的強硬立場理解為邀請伊朗迴歸國際社會的第一步，將在很大程度上決定全局。

最終，美國必須做好準備維護其阻止伊朗核武計劃的努力。為此，美國有責任探索所有體面的替代方案。

三、英文

The world’s attention is focused on the fighting in Lebanon and the Gaza Strip, but the context leads inevitably back to Iran. Unfortunately, the diplomacy dealing with that issue is constantly outstripped by events. While explosives are raining on Lebanese and Israeli towns and Israel reclaims portions of Gaza, the proposal to Iran in May by the so-called Six (the United States, Great Britain, France, Germany, Russia and China) for negotiations on its nuclear weapons program still awaits an answer. It’s possible that Tehran reads the almost pleading tone of some communications addressed to it as a sign of weakness and irresolution. Or perhaps the violence in Lebanon has produced second thoughts among the mullahs about the risks of courting and triggering crisis.

However the tea leaves are read, the current Near Eastern upheaval could become a turning point. Iran may come to appreciate the law of unintended consequences. For their part, the Six can no longer avoid dealing with the twin challenges that Iran poses. On the one hand, the quest for nuclear weapons represents Iran’s reach for modernity via the power symbol of the modern state; at the same time, this claim is put forward by a fervent kind of religious extremism that has kept the Muslim Middle East unmodernized for centuries. This conundrum can be solved without conflict only if Iran adopts a modernism consistent with international order and a view of Islam compatible with peaceful coexistence.

Heretofore the Six have been vague about their response to an Iranian refusal to negotiate, except for unspecific threats of sanctions through the United Nations Security Council. But if a deadlock between strained forbearance by the Six and taunting invective from the Iranian president leads to de facto acquiescence in the Iranian nuclear program, prospects for multilateral international order will dim everywhere. If the permanent members of the Security Council plus Germany are unable jointly to achieve goals to which they have publicly committed themselves, every country, especially those composing the Six, will face growing threats, be they increased domestic pressure from radical Islamic groups, terrorist acts or the nearly inevitable conflagrations sparked by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

The analogy of such a disaster is not Munich, when the democracies yielded the German-speaking part of Czechoslovakia to Hitler, but the response when Mussolini invaded Abyssinia. At Munich, the democracies thought that Hitler’s demands were essentially justified by the principle of self-determination; they were repelled mostly by his methods. In the Abyssinian crisis, the nature of the challenge was uncontested. By a vast majority, the League of Nations voted to treat the Italian adventure as aggression and to impose sanctions. But they recoiled before the consequences of their insight and rejected an oil embargo, which Italy would have been unable to overcome. The league never recovered from that debacle. If the six-nation forums dealing with Iran and North Korea suffer comparable failures, the consequence will be a world of unchecked proliferation, not controlled by either governing principles or functioning institutions.

A modern, strong, peaceful Iran could become a pillar of stability and progress in the region. This cannot happen unless Iran’s leaders decide whether they are representing a cause or a nation — whether their basic motivation is crusading or international cooperation. The goal of the diplomacy of the Six should be to oblige Iran to confront this choice.

Diplomacy never operates in a vacuum. It persuades not by the eloquence of its practitioners but by assembling a balance of incentives and risks. Clausewitz’s famous dictum that war is a continuation of diplomacy by other means defines both the challenge and the limits of diplomacy. War can impose submission; diplomacy needs to evoke consensus. Military success enables the victor in war to prescribe, at least for an interim period. Diplomatic success occurs when the principal parties are substantially satisfied; it creates — or should strive to create — common purposes, at least regarding the subject matter of the negotiation; otherwise no agreement lasts very long. The risk of war lies in exceeding objective limits; the bane of diplomacy is to substitute process for purpose. Diplomacy should not be confused with glibness. It is not an oratorical but a conceptual exercise. When it postures for domestic audiences, radical challenges are encouraged rather than overcome.

It is often asserted that what is needed in relation to Iran is a diplomacy comparable to that which, in the 1970s, moved China from hostility to cooperation with the United States. But China was not persuaded by skillful diplomacy to enter this process. Rather, China was brought, by a decade of escalating conflict with the Soviet Union, to a conviction that the threat to its security came less from capitalist America than from the growing concentration of Soviet forces on its northern borders. Clashes of Soviet and Chinese military forces along the Ussuri River accelerated Beijing’s retreat from the Soviet alliance.

The contribution of American diplomacy was to understand the significance of these events and to act on that knowledge. The Nixon administration did not convince China that it needed to change its priorities. Its role was to convince China that implementing its strategic necessities was safe and would enhance China’s long-term prospects. It did so by concentrating the diplomatic dialogue on fundamental geopolitical objectives, while keeping some contentious items in abeyance. The Shanghai Communique of 1972, the first Sino-U.S. communique, symbolized this process. Contrary to established usage, it listed a series of continuing disagreements as a prelude to the key common objective of preventing hegemonic aspirations of unnamed third parties — clearly implying the Soviet Union.

The challenge of the Iranian negotiation is far more complex. For two years before the opening to China, the two sides had engaged in subtle, reciprocal, symbolic and diplomatic actions to convey their intentions. In the process, they had tacitly achieved a parallel understanding of the international situation, and China opted for seeking to live in a cooperative world.

Nothing like that has occurred between Iran and the United States. There is not even an approximation of a comparable world view. Iran has reacted to the American offer to enter negotiations with taunts, and has inflamed tensions in the region. Even if the Hezbollah raids from Lebanon into Israel and the kidnapping of Israeli soldiers were not planned in Tehran, they would not have occurred had their perpetrators thought them inconsistent with Iranian strategy. In short, Iran has not yet made the choice of the world it seeks — or it has made the wrong choice from the point of view of international stability. The crisis in Lebanon could mark a watershed if it confers a sense of urgency to the diplomacy of the Six and a note of realism to the attitudes in Tehran.

Up to now Iran has been playing for time. The mullahs apparently seek to accumulate as much nuclear capability as possible so that, even were they to suspend enrichment, they would be in a position to use the threat of resuming their weapons effort as a means to enhance their clout in the region.

Given the pace of technology, patience can easily turn into evasion. The Six will have to decide how serious they will be in insisting on their convictions. Specifically, the Six will have to be prepared to act decisively before the process of technology makes the objective of stopping uranium enrichment irrelevant. Well before that point is reached, sanctions will have to be agreed on. To be effective, they must be comprehensive; halfhearted, symbolic measures combine the disadvantage of every course of action. Interallied consultations must avoid the hesitation that the League of Nations conveyed over Abyssinia. We must learn from the North Korean negotiations not to engage in a process involving long pauses to settle disagreements within the administration and within the negotiating group, while the other side adds to its nuclear potential. There is equal need, on the part of America’s partners, for decisions permitting them to pursue a parallel course.

A suspension of enrichment of uranium should not be the end of the process. A next step should be the elaboration of a global system of nuclear enrichment to take place in designated centers around the world under international control — as proposed for Iran by Russia. This would ease implications of discrimination against Iran and establish a pattern for the development of nuclear energy without a crisis with each entrant into the nuclear field.

President Bush has announced America’s willingness to participate in the discussions of the Six with Iran to prevent emergence of an Iranian nuclear weapons program. But it will not be possible to draw a line between nuclear negotiations and a comprehensive review of Iran’s overall relations to the rest of the world.

The legacy of the hostage crisis, the decades of isolation and the messianic aspect of the Iranian regime represent huge obstacles to such a diplomacy. If Tehran insists on combining the Persian imperial tradition with contemporary Islamic fervor, then a collision with America — and, indeed, with its negotiating partners of the Six — is unavoidable. Iran simply cannot be permitted to fulfill a dream of imperial rule in a region of such importance to the rest of the world.

At the same time, an Iran concentrating on the development of the talents of its people and the resources of its country should have nothing to fear from the United States. Hard as it is to imagine that Iran, under its present president, will participate in an effort that would require it to abandon its terrorist activities or its support for such instruments as Hezbollah, the recognition of this fact should emerge from the process of negotiation rather than being the basis for a refusal to negotiate. Such an approach would imply the redefinition of the objective of regime change, providing an opportunity for a genuine change in direction by Iran, whoever is in power.

It is important to express such a policy in precise objectives capable of transparent verification. A geopolitical dialogue is not a substitute for an early solution of the nuclear enrichment crisis. That must be addressed separately, rapidly and firmly. But a great deal depends on whether a strong stand on that issue is understood as the first step in the broader invitation to Iran to return to the wider world.

In the end, the United States must be prepared to vindicate its efforts to prevent an Iranian nuclear weapons program. For that reason, America has an obligation to explore every honorable alternative.

四、譯文拾貝

Six

中文解釋：六國集團，指美國、英國、法國、德國、俄羅斯和中國組成的國際談判團體，針對伊朗核問題。

英文語境：“the proposal to Iran in May by the so-called Six… for negotiations on its nuclear weapons program”

N****uclear weapons program

中文解釋：核武器計劃，伊朗發展核武器的系統性計劃。

英文語境：“negotiations on its nuclear weapons program still awaits an answer”

Sanctions

中文解釋：制裁，國際社會通過經濟或政治手段對某國施壓的行為。

英文語境：“unspecific threats of sanctions through the United Nations Security Council”

United Nations Security Council

中文解釋：聯合國安理會，聯合國負責維護國際和平與安全的核心機構。

英文語境：“sanctions through the United Nations Security Council”

Munich

中文解釋：慕尼黑協定，1938年英法對納粹德國綏靖政策的象徵事件。

英文語境：“The analogy of such a disaster is not Munich… but the response when Mussolini invaded Abyssinia”

League of Nations

中文解釋：國際聯盟，一戰後成立的國際組織，因未能阻止侵略而失敗。

英文語境：“The league never recovered from that debacle”

Proliferation

中文解釋：擴散，大規模殺傷性武器（如核武器）的擴散。

英文語境：“a world of unchecked proliferation… weapons of mass destruction”

Conflagrations

中文解釋：戰火/衝突，大規模暴力衝突或戰爭。

英文語境：“nearly inevitable conflagrations sparked by the proliferation”

Clausewitz’s dictum

中文解釋：克勞塞維茨名言，卡爾·馮·克勞塞維茨提出的“戰爭是政治的延續”。

英文語境：“Clausewitz’s famous dictum that war is a continuation of diplomacy”

Shanghai Communique

中文解釋：上海公報，1972年中美首份聯合公報，標誌關係正常化。

英文語境：“The Shanghai Communique of 1972... symbolized this process”

Hegemonic aspirations

中文解釋：霸權野心，某國追求區域或全球主導地位的企圖。

英文語境：“preventing hegemonic aspirations of unnamed third parties”

Hezbollah

中文解釋：真主黨，黎巴嫩什葉派武裝組織，受伊朗支持。

英文語境：“Even if the Hezbollah raids from Lebanon into Israel…”

Uranium enrichment

中文解釋：鈾濃縮，核技術關鍵步驟，可用於和平或武器目的。

英文語境：“the objective of stopping uranium enrichment irrelevant”

Regime change

中文解釋：政權更迭，通過外部干預改變某國政權。

英文語境：“the redefinition of the objective of regime change”

Terrorist activities

中文解釋：恐怖活動，非國家行為體發動的暴力襲擊。

英文語境：“require Iran to abandon its terrorist activities”

Geopolitical dialogue

中文解釋：地緣政治對話，基於地理位置與權力平衡的國際談判。

英文語境：“A geopolitical dialogue is not a substitute for an early solution”

International control

中文解釋：國際監管，多邊機構對敏感技術或資源的監督。

英文語境：“nuclear enrichment… under international control”

Comprehensive sanctions

中文解釋：全面制裁，覆蓋經濟、貿易等多領域的制裁。

英文語境：“To be effective, they must be comprehensive”

Oil embargo

中文解釋：石油禁運，禁止某國石油出口或進口的措施。

英文語境：“rejected an oil embargo, which Italy would have been unable to overcome”

Balance of incentives

中文解釋：激勵平衡，外交中權衡獎勵與懲罰的策略。

英文語境：“diplomacy… by assembling a balance of incentives and risks”

Strategic necessities

中文解釋：戰略必要性，國家為安全必須採取的核心行動。

英文語境：“implementing its strategic necessities was safe”

Multilateral international order

中文解釋：多邊國際秩序，基於多國合作與規則的國際體系。

英文語境：“prospects for multilateral international order will dim everywhere”

Radical Islamic groups

中文解釋：激進伊斯蘭組織，主張極端宗教意識形態的團體。

英文語境：“increased domestic pressure from radical Islamic groups”

Functioning institutions

中文解釋：有效機制，能實際運作的國際組織或制度。

英文語境：“not controlled by… functioning institutions”

Unintended consequences

中文解釋：意外後果，行動引發的非預期結果。

英文語境：“Iran may come to appreciate the law of unintended consequences”

Crusading vs. international cooperation

中文解釋：聖戰vs.國際合作，意識形態對抗與國際協作的二元選擇。

英文語境：“whether their basic motivation is crusading or international cooperation”

Symbolic measures

中文解釋：象徵性措施，形式意義大於實際效果的舉措。

英文語境：“halfhearted, symbolic measures combine the disadvantage”

Interallied consultations

中文解釋：盟國間磋商，同盟國家間的政策協調。

英文語境：“Interallied consultations must avoid the hesitation…”

Negotiating group

中文解釋：談判小組，代表國家或集團進行談判的團隊。

英文語境：“settle disagreements within the negotiating group”

Nuclear potential

中文解釋：核潛力，某國發展核武器的潛在能力。

英文語境：“the other side adds to its nuclear potential”

Transparent verification

中文解釋：透明核查，可公開監督的驗證機制。

英文語境：“express such a policy in precise objectives capable of transparent verification”

Geopolitical objectives

中文解釋：地緣政治目標，基於地理戰略的國家利益目標。

英文語境：“concentrating the diplomatic dialogue on fundamental geopolitical objectives”

Abeyance

中文解釋：暫停/擱置，暫時擱置爭議或行動。

英文語境：“keeping some contentious items in abeyance”

Common purposes

中文解釋：共同目標，多方認可的合作方向。

英文語境：“it creates — or should strive to create — common purposes”

Diplomatic success

中文解釋：外交成功，通過談判達成各方滿意的結果。

英文語境：“Diplomatic success occurs when the principal parties are satisfied”

Military success

中文解釋：軍事成功，通過武力實現戰略目標。

英文語境：“Military success enables the victor in war to prescribe”

Balance of risks

中文解釋：風險平衡，外交中權衡風險與收益的策略。

英文語境：“diplomacy… by assembling a balance of incentives and risks”

Domestic audiences

中文解釋：國內觀眾，國家內部公眾或政治支持者。

英文語境：“When it postures for domestic audiences, radical challenges are encouraged”

Radical challenges

中文解釋：激進挑戰，對現有秩序或規則的極端反對。

英文語境：“radical challenges are encouraged rather than overcome”

Security threats

中文解釋：安全威脅，對國家或國際安全的潛在危險。

英文語境：“the threat to its security came less from capitalist America”

International stability

中文解釋：國際穩定，全球或地區層面的和平與秩序。

英文語境：“the wrong choice from the point of view of international stability”

Regional stability

中文解釋：地區穩定，特定地理區域的和平與安全。

英文語境：“a pillar of stability and progress in the region”

Imperial rule

中文解釋：帝國統治，通過強權控制他國或地區。

英文語境：“Iran simply cannot be permitted to fulfill a dream of imperial rule”

Diplomatic actions

中文解釋：外交行動，國家通過外交手段採取的措施。

英文語境：“subtle, reciprocal, symbolic and diplomatic actions”

Symbolic actions

中文解釋：象徵性行動，具有政治象徵意義但實際影響有限的行為。

英文語境：“subtle, reciprocal, symbolic and diplomatic actions”

Comprehensive review

中文解釋：全面審查，對某議題的系統性評估。

英文語境：“a comprehensive review of Iran’s overall relations”

Genuine change

中文解釋：真正改變，實質性的政策或方向調整。

英文語境：“providing an opportunity for a genuine change in direction”

Policy redefinition

中文解釋：政策重新定義，調整或更新原有政策目標。

英文語境：“the redefinition of the objective of regime change”

Verified objectives

中文解釋：可驗證目標，需通過核查確認的協議條款。

英文語境：“express such a policy in precise objectives capable of transparent verification”

Honorable alternative

中文解釋：體面選擇，既能維護尊嚴又能解決問題的外交選項。

英文語境：“America has an obligation to explore every honorable alternative”